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*     NOV  2  1904 


BL  240  .133  1904 

Hand,  J.  E. 

Ideals  of  science  &  faith 


Ideals 

of 

Science  and  Faith 


Ideals 

of 

Science   &  Faith 

ESSAYS    BY   VARIOUS    AUTHORS 


Edited  by 

The    Rev.    J.    E.    HAND 

(Editor  of  "Good  Citizenship") 


All  rights  reserved 


New  York 
Longmans,  Green,  &  Co. 

London :  George  Allen 

1904 


Copyright,  IQ04,  by 
Longmans,  Green,  and  Co. 


UNIVERSITY  PRESS    •   JOHN  WILSON 
AND    SON      •      CAMBRIDGE,     U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

For  several  centuries  Religion  and  Science  have 
been  much  at  enmity  —  sometimes  in  open  warfare, 
sometimes  in  covert  hostilities.  Round  these  two 
great  interests  social  alliances,  temporal  and  spir- 
itual, have  grouped  themselves.  Religion  has  re- 
ceived a  wavering  and  intermittent  support  from 
Philosophy,  and  has  enjoyed  an  alliance  —  bickering 
yet  abiding  —  with  the  Governing  Classes,  Military, 
Political,  and  Juristic.  Science  has  been  in  alliance 
—  always  unorganised  and  generally  unconscious  — 
with  Industry ;  from  the  first  with  the  Mechanical 
Crafts,  and  of  late  increasingly  with  the  great  vital 
activities  of  Agriculture,  Health  Maintenance,  and 
Education. 

A  new  grouping  is  now  beginning  to  appear. 
That  the  feud  between  Religion  and  Science  will 
wholly  disappear  is  perhaps  more  than  can  be  hoped 
for  under  present  circumstances;  but  on  all  sides 
is  a  growing  recognition  that  the  ideals  common  to 
both  Religion  and  Science  are  not  only  numerous, 
but  are  indeed  the  very  ideals  for  which  the  nobler 

v 


Preface 

spirits  on  both  sides  care  most.  Hence  it  is  that 
men  of  science  and  theologians  alike  evince  an  in- 
creasing desire  for  mutual  toleration,  sometimes  even 
for  some  measure  of  co-operation,  if  not  positive 
alliance.  That  is  a  position  from  which  the  deepest 
and  most  practical  minds  on  both  sides  have  never 
been  far  removed. 

Thus  at  the  present  time  not  a  few  leaders  of 
thought  formerly  ranged  in  opposing  camps  are 
beginning  to  forecast  the  possibilities  of  such  new 
groupings,  even  to  suggest  co-operative  campaigns 
on  behalf  of  the  ideals  common  to  both  the  theo- 
logical and  scientific  thought  of  to-day. 

As  a  recent  notable  example  of  the  approach 
toward  religious  problems  from  the  side  of  physical 
science  the  Editor  has  to  express  his  indebtedness 
for  the  permission  to  reprint  SIR  OLIVER  LODGE'S 
papers  in  the  Hibbert  Journal.  The  HON.  Ber- 
trand  Russell's  paper  in  this  volume  is  reprinted 
by  kind  permission  of  the  Editor  of  the  Independent 
Review. 

The  further  definition  of  the  ideals  of  the  sciences, 
their  correspondence  with  those  of  faith,  their  appli- 
cation to  life,  are  the  questions  which  the  Editor  of 
this  volume  has  proposed  to  the  remaining  writers, 
whom  he  has  invited  as  representatives  of  different 
standpoints.     Each  writer,  of  course,  remains  exclu- 

vi 


Preface 

sively  responsible  for  his  own  contribution.     Their 
answers  complete  the  present  volume  of  papers. 

My  warmest  thanks  are  due  to  each  writer.  The 
compilation  of  this  collection  would  never  have  been 
attempted  without  the  concurrence  and  advice  of 
my  friends,  Professor  Patrick  Geddes,  Mr.  VICTOR 
V.  Branford,  and  Rev.  Ronald  Bayne. 

J.  E.   HAND. 

St.  Mary's,  Bryanston  Square, 

London,  W. 
March  7,  1904. 


Vll 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface     v 

Introduction xi 

APPROACHES    THROUGH    SCIENCE 
AND    EDUCATION 

A  Physicist's  Approach 3 

Sir  Oliver^Lodge,  D.Sc,  LL.D.,  F.R.S. 

Principal  of  the  University  of  Birmingham 

A  Biological  Approach 49 

Professor  J.  Arthur  Thomson,  M.A. 
Natural  History  Department,  University  of  Aberdeen 
Professor  Patrick  Geddes 

University  Hall,  Edinburgh 

A  Psychological  Approach 81 

Professor  John  H.  Muirhead,  M.A. 

Professor  of  Philosophy,  University  of  Birmingham 


A  Sociological  Approach  towards  Unity     .     .     .     103 
Victor  V.  Branford,  M.A. 

Honorary  Secretary,   The  Sociological  Society 

An  Ethical  Approach 157 

Hon.  Bertrand  Russell 

Author  of"  The  Principles  of  Mathematics,"  etc. 
ix 


Contents 


PAGE 


An    Educational    Approach  —  A    Technical    Ap- 
proach      .     . 170 

Professor  Patrick  Geddes 

University  Ha//,  Edinburgh 

APPROACHES    THROUGH    FAITH 

A  Presbyterian  Approach 219 

The  Rev.  John  Kelman,  M.A. 
Author  of"  The  Faith  of  Robert  Louis  Stevenson,"  etc. 

A  Church  of  England-  Approach 246 

The  Rev.  Ronald  Bayne,  M.A. 

Editor  "  Hooker's  Laws  of  Ecc/esiastica/  PoUty"  etc., 
Fifth  Book 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 269 

The  Rev.  Philip  Napier  Waggett,  M.A. 

Author  of  " Science  and  Retigion  " 

A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 304 

Wilfrid  Ward,  B.A. 

Author  of  "  Witnesses  to  the  Unseen"  etc. 

Index 325 


INTRODUCTION 

Of  essays  like  the  following,  written  from  such 
widely  different  standpoints,  and  expressing  the 
fullest  independence  of  thought  and  treatment,  the 
reader  will  not  expect  a  summing-up  of  the  essen- 
tial thoughts,  much  less  a  positive  conclusion.  Our 
task  is  mainly  to  introduce,  in  the  simple  and  social 
sense,  independent  writers,  who  have  never  before 
written  together,  and  who  will  not  in  most  cases, 
until  this  volume  appears,  see  how  they  may  have 
respectively  treated  their  subject. 

Under  these  circumstances  both  particular  and 
general  appreciation  must  be  left  to  the  reader.  Yet 
the  Editor  may  be  allowed  to  amplify  the  general 
purpose  of  the  volume,  which  distinguishes  it  from  a 
mere  group  of  magazine  articles,  beyond  the  scanty 
outline  of  the  preface;  he  may  make  a  somewhat 
fuller  statement  as  befits  one  whose  task  has  been 
to  suggest  a  discussion,  but  who  does  not  seek  to 
close  it. 

His  general  point  of  view  is  in  the  first  place 
retrospective;  it  is  analytical,  also,  of  the  present 
situation;  it  is  hopeful,  too,  as  regards  the  future  — 
though  not  professing  to  lift  the  veil. 

The  Mediaeval  Church  was  the  custodian  of  the 
knowledge  of  the  times,  as  well  as  of  its  faith :  that 

xi 


Introduction 

at  its  best  it  added  new  gold  to  the  treasury,  minted 
it,  even  circulated  it,  has  once  and  again  been  gen- 
erously recognised  by  the  man  of  science ;  that  at  its 
worst  it  not  only  hid  it  in  a  napkin,  but  buried  it,  or 
sometimes  even  cast  it  away,  is  frankly  avowed  by 
the  theologian.  And  since  tragic  incident  impresses 
us  even  more  than  every-day  well-being,  history  has 
preserved  many  instances  of  the  repression  of  knowl- 
edge, many  tales  of  the  struggle  for  the  emancipa- 
tion of  scientific  thought  from  the  limits  imposed 
by  the  theology,  or  rather  the  theologians,  of  the 
times. 

The  story  of  how  secular  knowledge  became  grad- 
ually segregated  off,  is  from  both  the  theologian's 
and  the  scientist's  point  of  view  tragic  enough;  nor 
is  it  needful  here  to  recall  the  increasing  seriousness 
of  opposition  and  of  conflict,  century  after  century. 
That  much  once  called  religion  was  prompted  by 
good  and  bad  motives,  sometimes  by  preoccupation 
with  the  things  of  the  spirit,  by  loyalty  to  historic 
predecessors,  sometimes  by  timidity,  bewilderment, 
jealousy,  is  confessed  by  the  theologian,  while  the 
historian  of  science  may  also  admit  limitations  to  his 
heroes,  as  well  as  incompleteness  in  their  thought. 

For  three  centuries  campaign  has  thus  been  suc- 
ceeding campaign.  The  Cosmos  is  not  geocentric ; 
the  earth  is  very  old ;  man  not  only  has  a  right  but 
is  bound  to  use  his  intelligence;  geology  does  not 
square  with  Genesis;  the  history  of  things  shows  not 
a  simultaneous  creation  of  things  as  they  stand,  but 

xii 


Introduction 

a  coming   and  becoming   of  them  —  evolution  thus 
appearing  contrasted  with  creation. 

Man  is  very  old,  the  historic  period  comparatively 
new;  man  seems  a  product  of  animal  evolution; 
anthropology  reveals  that  his  social  evolution  also 
has  been  from  hard  struggle  and  humble  conditions ; 
it  not  only  seeks  to  describe  the  rise  of  material 
civilisation,  but  even  the  evolution  of  religions. 
Criticism  anthropological  and  criticism  historical 
converge  upon  the  sacred  books,  and  treat  them 
as  natural  developments  too. 

The  observation  of  religious  developments,  from 
the  common  types  of  childhood,  adolescence,  matu- 
rity or  age,  to  the  rarest  personalities  of  genius  is 
beginning.  There  seems,  in  fact,  no  limit  to  the  ad- 
vance of  science ;  while  its  more  audacious  devotees 
show  now  and  then  some  tendency  to  ascend  the 
tripod,  and  have  even  claimed  in  the  name  of  science 
to  erect  new  altars. 

What  mainly  have  been  the  tactics  of  the  theolo- 
gian, apart  from  mere  recourse  to  Index  or  personal 
ban,  —  to  action  political  rather  than  theological? 
Most  commonly,  of  course,  he  has  resisted  this  ad- 
vance with  dialectic  might  and  main,  and  thus  may 
claim  to  have  been,  if  not  welcome  to  the  individual 
man  of  science,  at  least  useful  to  his  fellows  or  suc- 
cessors, as  testing  his  assumptions  and  detecting 
crudities  and  incompleteness.  This  defence  has  had 
its  distinguished  sorties,  though  such  sharp  fight- 
ing seems  to  have  ceased  for  a  time.     Often,  too,  the 

xiii 


Introduction 

theologian  has  retired  into  his  fastnesses,  where  the 
man  of  science  could  not  follow  him,  but  only  stand 
outside  and  cry,  "  Mysticism  —  Metaphysics,"  or  the 
like,  with  how  much  of  relevancy  we  need  not  here 
investigate.  What  concerns  us  is  that  a  few  have 
made  attempts  towards  mutual  understanding. 

Is  the  scientific  man  who  boasts  of  victory  in  any 
of  the  above-named  controversies  quite  generous  to 
the  theologian  whom  he  calls  defeated?  And  must 
he  not  recognise  that  even  what  may  be  defeat  to 
one  generation  may  be  loyally  accepted  by  the  next, 
which  may  even  incorporate  the  new  order  so  fully 
as  hardly  to  understand  the  difficulties  of  the  old? 

If  we  look  beyond  the  militant  scientists,  each  so 
commonly  a  specialist  fighting  for  his  own  hand,  and 
ignoring  all  else,  we  see  that  many  men  of  science 
have  felt  more  or  less  completely  that  the  theologian 
has  still  his  own  problems,  distinct  from  those  of 
physical  and  natural  science.  Some  prefer  to  ignore 
these  problems,  are  mere  Gallios ;  others  keep  abso- 
lute silence,  even  practically  conceal  the  fact  that 
questions  assail  them  which  their  science  cannot 
answer.  Others,  recognising  the  growing  tendency 
of  science  to  unity,  have  sought  to  formulate  a 
scientific  synthesis,  and  to  find  within  its  range  scope 
for  the  feelings  which  have  been  hitherto  met  by 
the  historic  religions.  Others  again  deny  both  the 
scientific  and  the  theological  synthesis.  Seldom 
indeed  do  men  of  science  and  theology  meet  to 
think  and  talk  these  matters   over.     It  is  this  atti- 

xiv 


Introduction 

tude  which  gives  its  character  to  the  present  volume. 
It  will  be  easy  for  the  critic  to  point  out  insufficient 
unity  of  treatment ;  but  that  physicist  and  biologist, 
psychologist  and  educationalist,  sociologist  and  mor- 
alist, who  thus  by  themselves  represent  the  main  ele- 
ments for  scientific  synthesis,  —  that  active  members, 
too,  of  great  religious  communions,  should  all  here 
meet,  is  in  itself  a  great  advance  towards  unity ;  so 
that  this  small  initial  volume,  without,  of  course,  in 
any  way  claiming  to  be  epoch-making  in  thought, 
may,  none  the  less,  be  an  epoch-marking  one.  The 
spirit  enclosed  in  the  covers  of  this  book  may  be- 
come more  consciously  present  in  life  and  action. 
For  when  so  many  are  not  only  faithfully  seeking  to 
see  the  thing  as  it  is,  but  to  make  it  what  it  should 
be,  some  progress  towards  the  Kingdom  of  the  Ideal 
is  surely  at  hand. 

Without  claiming  or  expecting  too  much  from  our 
symposium,  it  is  something  to  recognise  that  many 
of  the  older  causes  of  friction  have  here  disappeared, 
after  eras  of  conflict  and  of  compromise.  Not  only 
is  the  old  bitterness  absent  from  these  pages,  but 
better  feeling  has  replaced  it,  with  correspondingly 
modest  and  temperate  expression,  with  logical  care 
of  terminology  and  method,  and  consequent  absence 
of  the  old  bickerings  over  what  are,  after  all,  mere 
side-issues ;  better  still,  we  see  no  longer  on  either 
side  the  old  misunderstanding  of  the  distinctness  of 
the  respective  aims  of  scientist  and  theologian.  Now 
that  Genesis  is  no  longer  defended  as  a  geological 


Introduction 

primer,  it  is  also  no  longer  attacked  as  one.  Later 
forms  of  the  same  confusion  are  also  avoided,  as,  for 
instance,  those  which  too  long  lingered  in  the  dis- 
cussions of  organic  or  anthropological  evolution  and 
which  are  not  yet  extinct  upon  more  recent  planes. 
For  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  our  current  termi- 
nology was  mainly  evolved  during  this  older  state  of 
things. 

To  remove  these  causes  of  friction  is  itself,  then,  a 
great  step ;  but  we  need  more  even  to  approach  a 
true  Eirenikon.  No  doubt  each  statement  of  the 
larger  issues  of  each  science,  of  the  larger  standpoint 
of  each  of  the  Churches,  makes  notably  for  harmony, 
since  each  of  us  is  thus  helped  to  see  the  other  at 
his  best,  and  to  consider  his  main  position  without 
reference  to  the  accessories  or  details  which  may  too 
easily  disguise  this. 

This  stage,  therefore,  we  may  claim  the  essays  of 
our  volume  reach:  indeed,  rather,  that  this  is  their 
very  starting-point.  Narrow  have  been  the  limits 
of  space  necessarily  imposed  on  each  writer,  yet 
they  express  much  of  the  characteristic  attitude  and 
aims  of  the  cultivators  of  the  great  fields  of  science, 
of  the  thoughtful  adherents  and  exponents  of  great 
historic  divisions  of  the  religious  world ;  the  general 
impression  from  reading  them  will  help  us  to  realise 
what  is  the  aim  of  science,  and  what  is  the  aim  of 
theology,  indeed  of  religion. 

Science  is  not  merely  observing  the  actual  world 
of  phenomena,  but  is  organising  an  ever-increasing 

xvi 


Introduction 

yet  ever-unifying  body  of  interpretative  conceptual 
formulae ;  and  these  have  real  and  vital  relations 
to  life  as  a  whole,  knowledge  leading  to  foresight, 
and  foresight  to  more  organised  action,  educational, 
social,  moral,  no  less  than  physical,  industrial,  or 
hygienic.  This  the  theologian  not  only  generally 
admits  but  increasingly  realises.  He  in  turn  may 
ask  the  man  of  science:  may  not  theology  in  its 
turn  become  more  intelligible  to  you  as  a  system  of 
transcendental  formulae,  which  has  long  practically 
helped  to  unify  life,  which  does  still  thus  help  many, 
and  which  therefore,  no  doubt,  in  fuller  and  fuller 
correlation  with  the  formulations  of  science,  may 
thus  aid  again?  Our  thought  has  no  doubt  at  times 
been  fixed,  and  even  arrested ;  but  you  yourselves 
have  helped  us  to  recognise  that  its  past  is  one  of 
evolution;  well,  what  if  it  be  now  beginning  to 
evolve  again?  Are  you  evolutionists  if  you  deny  us 
a  future?  On  what  grounds  can  you  assume  our 
mere  disappearance?  May  not,  must  not  our  atti- 
tudes, scientific  and  theological,  be  in  some  way 
complementary  rather  than  opposed? 

In  these  pages  we  see  the  man  of  science  stating 
anew  the  world-old  problems  of  the  religions,  the 
religions,  too,  regarding  their  quondam  assailant  with 
sympathetic  appreciation,  not  hostility.  Has  not  the 
attitude  of  contemporary  science  been  largely  ex- 
pressed by  one  of  its  most  active  workers  in  the 
notable  saying  that  "  science  is  now  indeed  con- 
ceived, but  not  yet  born"?  And  is  not  the  theo- 
*  xvii 


Introduction 

logian,  even  he  who  attaches  most  significance  to  his 
historic  concept  of  the  Church,  also  admitting,  or 
rather  more  and  more  fully  realising,  that  the  Church 
in  its  ideal  and  triumphant  sense  is  but  unborn? 

A  recent  writer,1  has  insisted  freshly  on  the  need  of 
clearer  distinction,  yet  ever-renewing  unity  between 
the  elemental  sense  of  things  from  the  standpoint  of 
observational  science,  and  their  widest  significance ; 
that  is,  their  fullest  denotations  and  connotations, 
from  the  highest  standpoint  of  our  mental,  moral, 
social,  religious  evolution.  It  is  from  the  former  ele- 
mental and  inductive  standpoint  that  the  scientist 
finds  his  start-point  and  refuge,  but  from  the  latter 
the  theologian.  Yet  at  these  two  extremes  neither 
can  remain :  each  must  progress  to  meet  the  other ; 
each,  too,  must  act  in  life,  must  organise  action. 
Hence  their  "  meaning,"  their  intention  may  often 
clash,  may  often  be  divergent,  perhaps  still  more 
often  seem  so.  Yet  is  not  the  mutual  translation 
of  the  many  languages  of  the  sciences,  the  common 
translation,  too,  of  the  many  idioms  of  the  different 
schools  of  theology,  now  becoming  possible?  And 
this  even  to  plain  and  busy  men?  Must  not  all 
these  complete  one  another,  —  nor  any  longer  de- 
sire the  exclusion  of  any?  Let  the  religious  be- 
come scientific,  and  the  scientific  religious;  then 
there  may  be  peace.  But  the  only  true  peace  is 
active  peace,  constructive  peace.  The  elemental 
scientific  thought  and  action  are  evidently,  as  these 
1  V.  Welby,  What  is  Meaning?  Macmillan,  1902. 
xviii 


Introduction 

pages  show,  not  only  growing  inductively,  but 
grasping  deductively,  feeling,  idealising.  And  so 
conversely  for  the  theologian's  transcendental  view. 
Since  the  man  of  science  has  learned  and  taught 
much  of  unsuspected  unity  amid  the  variety  of 
Nature,  so  may  not  the  theologian  also  learn  more 
and  more  of  unity  amid  the  many  aspects  of  the 
Ideal?  and  so  even  come  to  teach  anew?  And 
since  this  increasing  knowledge  of  the  phenomenal 
order  has  already  yielded  such  new  arts,  transform- 
ing material  life,  and  thence  reacting  both  for  good 
and  evil  upon  the  intellectual  and  moral  life  also, 
upon  the  social  and  the  religious,  may  not,  must 
not  the  transcendental  idealist  again  not  only  rein- 
terpret, but  reorganise  and  reconstruct?  As  the 
science  of  each  historic  period  has  grown  towards 
a  synthesis,  a  philosophy,  so  the  arts  of  each  period 
have  correspondingly  gained  their  unification  from 
religion,  their  highest  expression  in  cult.  What 
theologian,  then,  observing  this  vast  modern  devel- 
opment of  arts  and  sciences,  need  fail  to  see  in  these 
the  preparation  of  new  resources,  not  only  for  the 
new  Academy,  the  new  Republic,  but  for  the  new 
Cathedral  also;  nor  fear  to  see,  upon  that  nobler 
Athens,  towards  which  arts  and  sciences  are  con- 
verging, the  descent  of  a  yet  nobler  City  of  the 
Ideal,  a  New  Jerusalem  indeed? 


xix 


APPROACHES  THROUGH  SCIENCE 
AND    EDUCATION 


A    PHYSICIST'S   APPROACH 

SIR  OLIVER  LODGE,   D.Sc.,  LL.D.,  F.R.S. 

Principal  of  the  University  of  Birmingham 

THE   OUTSTANDING   CONTROVERSY 

I 

IT  is  widely  recognised  at  the  present  day  that  the 
modern  spirit  of  scientific  inquiry  has  in  the  main 
exerted  a  wholesome  influence  upon  Theology,  clear- 
ing it  of  much  encumbrance  of  doubtful  doctrine, 
freeing  it  from  slavery  to  the  literal  accuracy  of  his- 
torical records,  and  reducing  the  region  of  the  mirac- 
ulous or  the  incredible,  with  which  it  used  to  be 
almost  conterminous,  to  a  comparatively  small  area. 

Benefit  is  likely  to  continue  as  true  science  ad- 
vances, but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  nature  of 
the  benefit  will  always  be  that  of  a  clearing  and  unload- 
ing process.  There  must  always  come  a  time  when 
such  a  process  has  gone  far  enough,  and  when  some 
positive  contribution  may  be  expected.  Whether 
such  a  time  has  now  arrived  or  not  is  clearly  open  to 
question,  but  I  think  it  will  be  admitted  that  orthodox 
science  at  present,  though  it  shows  some  sign  of  ab- 
staining from  virulent  criticism,  is  still  a  long  way  from 
itself  constituting  any  support  of  religious  creeds; 

3 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

nor  are  its  followers  ready  to  admit  that  they  have  as 
yet  gone  too  far,  perhaps  not  even  far  enough,  in  the 
negative  direction.  No  doubt  it  must  be  admitted 
by  both  sides  that  the  highest  Science  and  the  truest 
Theology  must  ultimately  be  mutually  consistent,  and 
may  be  actually  one ;  but  that  is  far  from  the  case  at 
present.  The  term  "  Theology,"  as  ordinarily  used, 
necessarily  signifies  nothing  ultimate  or  divine;  it 
signifies  only  the  present  state  of  human  knowledge 
on  theological  subjects;  and  similarly  the  term 
"  Science,"  if  similarly  employed,  represents  no  fetish 
to  be  blindly  worshipped  as  absolute  truth,  but  merely 
the  present  state  of  human  knowledge  on  subjects 
within  its  grasp,  together  with  the  practical  con- 
sequences deducible  from  such  knowledge  in  the 
opinion  of  the  average  scientific  man :  it  means  what 
may  be  called,  briefly,  orthodox  science,  the  orthodox 
science  of  the  present  day,  as  set  forth  by  its  pro- 
fessed exponents,  and  as  indicated  by  the  general 
atmosphere  or  setting  in  which  facts  in  every  branch 
of  knowledge  are  now  regarded  by  cultivated  men. 

It  may  be  objected  that  there  is  no  definite  body 
of  doctrine  which  can  be  called  orthodox  science; 
and  it  is  true  that  there  is  no  formulated  creed ;  but 
I  suggest  that  there  is  more  nearly  an  orthodox 
science  than  there  is  an  orthodox  theology.  Pro- 
fessors of  theology  differ  among  themselves  in  a 
somewhat  conspicuous  manner;  and  even  in  the 
branch  of  it  with  which  alone  most  Englishmen  are 
familiar,  viz.,  Christian  Theology,  there  are  differences 
of  opinion  on  apparently  important  issues,  as  is  evi- 
denced by  the  existence  of  Sects,  ranging  from  Uni- 

4 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

tarians  on  the  one  side,  to  Greek  and  Roman  Catholics 
on  the  other.  In  science,  sectarianism  is  less  marked, 
controversies  rage  chiefly  round  matters  of  detail,  and 
on  all  important  issues  its  professors  are  agreed.  This 
general  consensus  of  opinion  on  the  part  of  experts, 
a  general  consensus  which  the  public  are  willing 
enough  to  acquiesce  in,  and  adopt  as  far  as  they  can 
understand,  is  what  I  mean  by  the  term  "  science  as 
now  understood,"  or,  for  brevity,  "  modern  science." 

Similarly,  by  religious  doctrine  we  shall  mean  the 
general  consensus  of  theologians  so  far  as  they  are 
in  agreement,  especially  perhaps  the  general  con- 
sensus of  Christian  theologians ;  eliminating  as  far 
as  possible  the  presumably  minor  points  on  which 
they  differ,  and  eliminating  also  everything  manifestly 
below  the  level  of  dogma  generally  accepted  at  the 
present  day. 

Now  it  must,  I  think,  be  admitted  that  the  modern 
scientific  atmosphere,  in  spite  of  much  that  is  whole- 
some and  nutritious,  exercises  some  sort  of  blighting 
influence  upon  religious  ardour,  and  that  the  great 
saints  or  seers  have  as  a  rule  not  been  eminent  for 
their  acquaintance  with  exact  scientific  knowledge, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  have  felt  a  distrust  and  a  dislike 
of  that  uncompromising  quest  for  cold  hard  truth  in 
which  the  leaders  of  science  are  engaged ;  and  on  the 
other  hand,  that  the  leaders  of  science  have  shown  an 
aloofness  from,  if  not  a  hostility  for,  the  theoretical 
aspects  of  religion.  In  fact,  it  may  be  held  that  the 
general  drift  or  atmosphere  of  modern  science  is 
adverse  to  the  highest  religious  emotion,  because 
hostile  to  many  of  the  doctrines  and  beliefs  upon 

5 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

which  such  an  exalted  state  of  feeling  must  be  based, 
if  it  is  to  be  anything  more  than  a  wave  of  transient 
enthusiasm. 

Nevertheless,  we  must  admit  that  there  have  been 
men  of  science,  there  must  be  many  now  living,  who 
accept  fully  the  facts  and  implications  of  science,  who 
accept  also  the  creeds  of  the  Church,  and  who  do  not 
keep  the  two  sets  of  ideas  in  water-tight  compartments 
of  their  minds,  but  do  distinctly  perceive  a  reconciling 
and  fusing  element. 

If  we  proceed  to  ask  what  is  this  reconciling 
element,  we  find  that  it  is  neither  science  nor  theol- 
ogy, but  that  it  is  philosophy,  or  else  it  is  poetry. 
By  aid  of  philosophy,  or  by  aid  of  poetry,  a  great 
deal  can  be  accomplished.  Mind  and  matter  may 
be  then  no  longer  two,  but  one;  this  material  uni- 
verse may  then  become  the  living  garment  of  God ; 
gross  matter  may  be  regarded  as  a  mere  inference, 
a  mode  of  apprehending  an  idealistic  cosmic  reality, 
in  which  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being ;  the 
whole  of  existence  can  become  infused  and  suffused 
with  immanent  Deity. 

No  reconciliation  would  then  be  necessary  between 
the  spiritual  and  the  material,  between  the  laws  of 
Nature  and  the  will  of  God,  because  the  two  would 
be  but  aspects  of  one  all-comprehensive  pantheistic 
entity. 

All  this  may  possibly  be  in  some  sort  true,  but  it 
is  not  science  as  now  understood.  It  is  no  more 
science  than  are  the  creeds  of  the  Churches.  It  is 
a  guess,  an  intuition,  —  an  inspiration  perhaps,  —  but 
it  is  not  a  link  in  a  chain  of  assured  and  reasoned 

6 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

knowledge ;  it  can  no  more  be  clearly  formulated  in 
words,  or  clearly  apprehended  in  thought,  than  can 
any  of  the  high  and  lofty  conceptions  of  religion.  It 
is,  in  fact,  far  more  akin  to  religion  than  to  science. 
It  is  no  solution  of  the  knotty  entanglement,  but  a 
soaring  above  it;   it  is  a  reconciliation  in  excelsis. 

Minds  which  can  habitually  rise  to  it  are,  ipso  facto, 
essentially  religious,  and  are  exercising  their  religious 
functions ;  they  have  flown  off  the  dull  earth  of  exact 
knowledge  into  an  atmosphere  of  faith. 

But  if  this  flight  be  possible,  especially  if  it  be  ever 
possible  to  minds  engaged  in  a  daily  round  of  scien- 
tific teaching  and  investigation,  how  can  it  be  said 
that  the  atmosphere  of  modern  science  and  the  atmos- 
phere of  religious  faith  are  incompatible?  Wherein 
lies  the  incompatibility? 

My  reply  briefly  is  —  and  this  is  the  kernel  of  what 
I  have  to  say  —  that  orthodox  modern  science  shows 
us  a  self-contained  and  self-sufficient  universe,  not  in 
touch  with  anything  beyond  or  above  itself,  —  the 
general  trend  and  outline  of  it  known ;  —  nothing 
supernatural  or  miraculous,  no  intervention  of  beings 
other  than  ourselves,  being  conceived  possible. 

While  religion,  on  the  other  hand,  requires  us  con- 
stantly and  consciously  to  be  in  touch,  even  affection- 
ately in  touch,  with  a  power,  a  mind,  a  being  or  beings, 
entirely  out  of  our  sphere,  entirely  beyond  our  scien- 
tific ken ;  the  universe  contemplated  by  religion  is  by 
no  means  self-contained  or  self-sufficient,  it  is  depend- 
ent for  its  origin  and  maintenance,  as  we  for  our  daily 
bread  and  future  hopes,  upon  the  power  and  the  good- 
will of  a  being  or  beings  of  which  science  has  no 

7 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

knowledge.  Science  does  not  indeed  always  or  con- 
sistently deny  the  existence  of  such  transcendent 
beings,  nor  does  it  make  any  effectual  attempt  to 
limit  their  potential  powers,  but  it  definitely  disbe- 
lieves in  their  exerting  any  actual  influence  on  the 
progress  of  events,  or  in  their  producing  or  modify- 
ing the  simplest  physical  phenomenon. 

For  instance,  it  is  now  considered  unscientific  to 
pray  for  rain,  and  Professor  Tyndall  went  so  far  as 
to  say :  — 

"The  principle  [of  the  conservation  of  energy] 
teaches  us  that  the  Italian  wind,  gliding  over  the 
crest  of  the  Matterhorn,  is  as  firmly  ruled  as  the  earth 
in  its  orbital  revolution  round  the  sun ;  and  that  the 
fall  of  its  vapour  into  clouds  is  exactly  as  much  a 
matter  of  necessity  as  the  return  of  the  seasons.  The 
dispersion,  therefore,  of  the  slightest  mist  by  the 
special  volition  of  the  Eternal,  would  be  as  much  a 
miracle  as  the  rolling  of  the  Rhone  over  the  Grimsel 
precipices,  down  the  valley  of  Hasli  to  Meyringen 
and  Brientz.  .  .  . 

"  Without  the  disturbance  of  a  natural  law,  quite  as 
serious  as  the  stoppage  of  an  eclipse,  or  the  rolling 
of  the  river  Niagara  up  the  Falls,  no  act  of  humilia- 
tion, individual  or  national,  could  call  one  shower 
from  heaven,  or  deflect  towards  us  a  single  beam  of 
the  sun." 1 

Certain  objections  may  be  made  to  this  statement 
of  Professor  Tyndall's,  even  from  the  strictly  scientific 
point  of  view :  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy 

1  From  "Fragments  of  Science,"  Prayer  and  Natural  Law. 

8 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

is  needlessly  dragged  in  when  it  has  nothing  really 
to  do  with  it.  We  ourselves,  for  instance,  though  we 
have  no  power,  nor  hint  of  any  power,  to  override 
the  conservation  of  energy,  are  yet  readily  able,  by 
a  simple  physical  experiment,  or  by  an  engineering 
operation,  to  deflect  a  ray  of  light,  or  to  dissipate  a 
mist,  or  divert  a  wind,  or  pump  water  uphill;  and 
further  objections  may  be  made  to  the  form  of  the 
statement,  notably  to  the  word  "  therefore  "  as  used  to 
connect  propositions  entirely  different  in  their  terms. 
But  the  meaning  is  quite  plain  nevertheless,  and  the 
assertion  is  that  any  act,  however  simple,  if  achieved 
by  special  volition  of  the  Eternal,  would  be  a  miracle  ; 
and  the  implied  dogma  is  that  the  special  volition  of 
the  Eternal  can,  or  at  any  rate  does,  accomplish 
nothing  whatever  in  the  physical  world.  And  this 
dogma,  although  not  really  a  deduction  from  any  of 
the  known  principles  of  physical  science,  and  possi- 
bly open  to  objection  as  a  petitio  principii,  may  never- 
theless be  taken  as  a  somewhat  exuberant  statement 
of  the  generally  accepted  inductive  teaching  of  ortho- 
dox science  on  the  subject. 

It  ought,  however,  to  be  admitted  at  once  by 
Natural  Philosophers  that  the  unscientific  character 
of  prayer  for  rain  depends  really  not  upon  its  con- 
flict with  any  known  physical  law,  since  it  need  in- 
volve no  greater  interference  with  the  order  of  nature 
than  is  implied  in  a  request  to  a  gardener  to  water 
the  garden  —  it  does  not  really  depend  upon  the  im- 
possibility of  causing  rain  to  fall  when  otherwise  it 
might  not  —  but  upon  the  disbelief  of  science  in  any 
power  who  can  and  will  attend  and  act.     To  prove 

9 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

this,  let  us  bethink  ourselves  that  it  is  not  an  incon- 
ceivable possibility  that  at  some  future  date  mankind 
may  acquire  some  control  over  the  weather,  and  be 
able  to  influence  it;  not  merely  in  an  indirect  man- 
ner, as  at  present  they  can  affect  climate,  by  felling 
forests  or  flooding  deserts,  but  in  some  more  direct 
fashion ;  in  that  case  prayers  for  rain  would  begin 
again,  only  the  petitions  would  be  addressed,  not  to 
heaven,  but  to  the  Meteorological  Office.  We  do 
not  at  present  ask  the  secretary  of  that  government 
department  to  improve  our  seasons,  simply  because 
we  do  not  think  that  he  knows  how ;  if  we  thought 
he  did,  we  should  have  no  hesitation,  on  the  score 
of  his  possible  non-existence,  or  a  doubt  lest  our 
letter  should  never  reach  him.  Professor  Tyndall's 
dogma,  will,  if  pressed,  be  found  to  embody  one  of 
these  last  alternatives,  although  superficially  it  pre- 
tends to  make  the  somewhat  grotesque  suggestion 
that  the  alteration  requested  is  so  complicated  and 
involved,  that  really,  with  the  best  intentions  in  the 
world,  the  Deity  does  not  know  how  to  do  it. 

No  doubt  the  line  of  piety  might  be  taken,  that 
the  central  Office  knew  best  what  it  was  about,  and 
that  petitions  were  only  worrying;  but  that  would  be 
rather  a  supine  and  fatalistic  attitude  if  we  were  in 
real  distress,  and  certainly,  on  a  higher  level,  it  would 
be  a  very  unfilial  one.  Religious  people  have  been 
told,  on  what  they  generally  take  to  be  good  au- 
thority, that  prayer  might  be  a  miraculously  power- 
ful engine  for  achievement,  even  in  the  physical 
world,  if  they  would  only  believe  with  sufficient 
vigour ;  but  (I  am  not  here  questioning  the  sound- 

10 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

ness  of  their  position)  they  have  dramatised  or  spirit- 
ualised away  the  statement,  and  act  upon  it  no  more. 
Influenced  it  is  to  be  presumed  by  science,  they  have 
come  definitely  to  disbelieve  in  physical  interference 
of  any  kind  whatever  on  the  part  of  another  order 
of  beings,  whether  more  exalted  or  more  depraved 
than  ourselves,  although  such  beings  are  frequently 
mentioned  in  their  sacred  books. 

Whatever  they  might  be  able  to  do  if  they  chose, 
for  all  practical  purposes  such  beings  are  to  the  aver- 
age scientific  man  purely  imaginary,  and  he  feels 
sure  that  we  can  never  have  experiential  knowledge 
of  them  or  their  powers.  In  his  view  the  universe 
lies  before  us  for  investigation,  and  we  perceive  that 
it  is  complete  without  them  ;  it  is  subject  to  our  own 
partial  control  if  we  are  willing  patiently  to  learn  how 
to  exercise  it,  but  to  no  other  control  does  it  make 
any  pretence  of  obedience.  Even  in  the  most  vital 
concerns  of  life,  it  is  the  doctor,  not  the  priest,  who 
is  summoned:  a  pestilence  is  no  longer  attributed 
to  divine  jealousy,  nor  would  the  threshing-floor  of 
Araunah  be  used  to  stay  it. 

Nor  is  the  terminology  of  the  two  subjects  com- 
mensurate. The  death  of  an  archbishop  can  be 
stated  scientifically  in  terms  not  very  different  from 
those  appropriate  to  the  stoppage  of  a  clock,  or  the 
extinction  of  a  fire;  but  the  religious  formula  for 
the  same  event  is  that  it  has  pleased  God  in  His  infi- 
nite wisdom  to  take  to  Himself  the  soul  of  our  dear 
brother,  etc.  The  very  words  of  such  a  statement 
are  to  modern  science  unmeaning.  (In  saying  this, 
I  trust  to  be  understood  as  not  now  in  the  slightest 

ii 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

degree  attempting  to  judge  the  question  which  form 
is  the  more  appropriate.) 

Religion  may,  in  fact,  be  called  supernatural  or 
superscientific,  if  the  term  "natural"  be  limited  to 
that  region  of  which  we  now  believe  that  we  have 
any  direct  scientific  knowledge. 

In  disposition  also  they  are  opposite.  Science 
aims  at  a  vigorous  adult,  intelligent,  serpent-like 
wisdom,  and  active  interference  with  the  course  of 
nature ;  religion  aims  at  a  meek,  receptive,  child- 
hearted  attitude  of  dovelike  resignation  to  the  Divine 
will. 

Take  a  scientific  man  who  is  not  something  more 
than  a  scientific  man,  one  who  is  not  a  poet,  or  a 
philosopher,  or  a  saint,  and  place  him  in  the  atmos- 
phere habitual  to  the  churches, — and  he  must  starve. 
He  requires  solid  food,  and  he  finds  himself  in  air. 
He  requires  something  to  touch  and  define  and 
know  ;  but  there  everything  is  ethereal,  indefinable, 
illimitable,  incomprehensible,  beautiful,  and  vague. 
He  dies  of  inanition. 

Take  a  religious  man,  who  has  not  a  multitude  of 
other  aptitudes  overlaid  upon  his  religion,  into  the 
cold  dry  workings,  the  gropings  and  tunnellings  of 
science,  where  everything  must  be  scrutinised  and 
proved,  distinctly  conceived  and  precisely  formulated, 
—  and  he  cannot  breathe.  He  requires  air  and  free 
space,  whereas  he  finds  himself  underground,  among 
foundations  and  masonry,  very  solid  and  substantial, 
but  very  cabined  and  confined.     He  dies  of  asphyxia. 

If  a  man  be  able  to  live  in  both  regions,  to  be 
amphibious   as   it   were,   able   to  take    short    flights 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

occasionally,  and  able  to  burrow  underground  occa- 
sionally, accepting  the  solid  work  of  science  and  be- 
lieving its  truth,  realising  the  aerial  structures  of 
religion,  and  perceiving  their  beauty,  will  such  a  man 
be  as  happily  and  powerfully  and  freely  at  home  in 
the  air  as  if  he  had  no  earth  adhering  to  his  wings? 
Is  the  modern  man  as  happily  and  powerfully  and 
freely  religious  as  he  might  have  been  with  less  in- 
formation? Or,  I  would  add  parenthetically,  as  he 
may  yet  perhaps  again  be  with  more? 


II 

Leaving  the  general,  and  coming  to  details,  let  us 
look  at  a  few  of  the  simpler  religious  doctrines,  such 
as  are  still,  I  suppose,  popularly  held  in  this  country. 
The  creed  of  the  ancient  Israelites  was  well,  or  at 
least  strikingly,  summarised  by  Mr.  Huxley  in  one 
of  his  NineteentJi  Century  articles  (March  1886).  He 
there  says :  "  The  chief  articles  of  the  theological 
creed  of  the  old  Israelites,  which  are  made  known  to 
us  by  the  direct  evidence  of  the  ancient  records,  .  .  . 
are  as  remarkable  for  that  which  they  contain  as  for 
that  which  is  absent  from  them.  They  reveal  a  firm 
conviction  that,  when  death  takes  place,  a  something 
termed  a  soul,  or  spirit,  leaves  the  body  and  continues 
to  exist  in  Sheol  for  a  period  of  indefinite  duration, 
even  though  there  is  no  proof  of  any  belief  in  abso- 
lute immortality ;  that  such  spirits  can  return  to  earth 
to  possess  and  inspire  the  living;  that  they  are  in 
appearance  and  in  disposition  likenesses  of  the  men 

13 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

to  whom  they  belonged,  but  that,  as  spirits,  they 
have  larger  powers  and  are  freer  from  physical  limita- 
tions ;  that  they  thus  form  one  of  a  number  of  kinds 
of  spiritual  existence  known  as  Elohim,  of  whom 
Jahveh,  the  national  God  of  Israel,  is  one ;  that,  con- 
sistently with  this  view,  Jahveh  was  conceived  as  a 
sort  of  spirit,  human  in  aspect  and  in  sense,  and  with 
many  human  passions,  but  with  immensely  greater  in- 
telligence and  power  than  any  other  Elohim,  whether 
human  or  divine." 

The  mere  calm  statement  of  so  preposterous  a 
creed  is  plainly  held  by  Mr.  Huxley  to  be  a  suffi- 
cient refutation. 

But  we  need  not  limit  ourselves  to  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, where  doubtless  some  supposed  facts  may  be 
abandoned  without  detriment,  as  belonging  to  the 
legendary  or  the  obscure  ;  we  may  be  constrained  by 
science  to  go  further,  and  to  admit  that  even  funda- 
mental Christian  doctrines,  such  as  the  Incarnation 
or  non-natural  birth,  and  the  Resurrection  or  non- 
natural  disappearance  of  the  body  from  the  tomb, 
have,  from  the  scientific  point  of  view,  no  reasonable 
likelihood  or  possibility  whatever.  It  may  be,  and 
often  has  been,  asserted  that  they  appear  as  childish 
fancies,  appropriate  to  the  infancy  of  civilisation  and 
a  pre-scientific  credulous  age  ;  readily  intelligible  to 
the  historian  and  student  of  folk-lore,  but  not  other- 
wise interesting.  The  same  has  been  said  of  every 
variety  of  miracle,  and  not  merely  of  such  dogmas 
as  the  fall  of  man  from  an  original  state  of  perfection, 
of  the  comparatively  recent  extirpation  of  the  human 
race  down  to  a  single  family,  and  so  on. 

14 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

The  whole  historical  record,  wherever  it  exceeds 
the  commonplace,  every  act  attributed  directly  to  the 
Deity,  whether  it  be  sending  fire  from  heaven,  or 
writing  upon  stone,  or  leadings  by  cloud  and  fire,  or 
conversations,  whether  during  trance  or  otherwise,  is 
utterly  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  modern  science  (let  it 
be  clearly  remembered  how  I  have  defined  the  phrase 
"  modern  science  "  above) ;  and  when  considered  pro- 
saically, much  of  the  record  is  summarily  discredited, 
even  I  think  by  many  theologians  now.  Nor  is  this 
acquiescence  in  negation  confined  to  the  leaders. 
The  general  religious  world  has  agreed  apparently  to 
throw  overboard  Jonah  and  the  whale,  Joshua  and  the 
sun,  the  three  Children  and  the  fiery  furnace ;  it  does 
not  seem  to  take  anything  in  the  book  of  Judges  or 
the  book  of  Daniel  very  seriously;  and  though  it  still 
clings  pathetically  to  the  book  of  Genesis,  it  is  willing 
to  relegate  to  poetry,  i.e.  to  imagination  or  fiction, 
such  legends  as  the  creation  of  the  world,  Adam  and 
his  rib,  Eve  and  the  apple,  Noah  and  his  ark,  language 
and  the  tower  of  Babel,  Elijah  and  the  chariot  of  fire, 
and  many  others.  The  stock  reconciling  phrase,  with 
regard  to  the  legend  of  a  six-days'  creation,  or  the 
Levitican  mistakes  in  Natural  History,  after  the 
strained  "  day-period "  mode  of  interpretation  had 
been  exploded  in  "  Essays  and  Reviews,"  used  to  be, 
that  the  Bible  was  never  meant  to  teach  science ;  and 
so,  whenever  it  touches  upon  any  branch  of  natural 
knowledge,  it  is  to  be  interpreted  in  a  friendly  spirit, 
i.e.  it  is  to  be  glossed  over,  and  in  point  of  fact  dis- 
believed. But  a  book  which  deals  with  so  prodigious 
a  subject  as  the  origin  of  all  things,  and  the  history 

i5 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

of  the  human  race,  cannot  avoid  a  treatment  of  natu- 
ral facts  which  is  really  a  teaching  of  science,  whether 
such  teaching  is  meant  or  not ;  and  indeed  the  whole 
idea  involved  in  the  word  "  meant "  is  repugnant  to 
the  conceptions  of  modern  science,  which  has  ousted 
teleology  from  its  arena. 

Moreover,  if  religious  people  go  as  far  as  this,  where 
are  they  to  stop?  What,  then,  do  they  propose  to 
do  with  the  turning  of  water  into  wine,  the  ejection  of 
devils,  the  cursing  of  the  fig-tree,  the  feeding  of  five 
thousand,  the  raising  of  Lazarus?  Or,  to  go  deeper 
still,  what  do  they  make  of  the  scene  at  the  Baptism, 
of  the  Transfiguration,  of  the  signs  at  the  Crucifixion, 
the  appearances  after  Death,  the  Ascension  into 
heaven?  May  it  not  be  supposed  that  neither  ortho- 
dox religion  nor  orthodox  science  has  said  its  last 
word  on  these  questions? 

But  it  may  be  urged  that  even  these  are  but  details 
compared  with  the  one  transcendent  doctrine  of  the 
existence  of  an  omnipotent  and  omniscient  benevo- 
lent personal  God ;  the  fundamental  tenet  of  nearly 
all  religions.  But  so  far  as  science  has  anything  to 
say  on  this  subject,  and  it  has  not  very  much,  its 
tendency  is  to  throw  mistrust,  not  upon  the  existence 
of  Deity  itself,  but  upon  any  adjectives  applied  to  the 
Deity.  "  Infinite "  and  "  eternal "  may  pass,  and 
"  omnipotent "  and  "  omniscient "  may  reluctantly  be 
permitted  to  go  with  them,  —  these  infinite  adjectives 
relieve  the  mind,  without  expressing  more  than  is 
implicitly  contained  in  the  substantive  God.  But 
concerning  "  personal"  and  "  benevolent"  and  other 
anthropomorphic  adjectives,  science  is   exceedingly 

16 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

dubious ;  nor  is  omnipotence  itself  very  easily  recon- 
cilable with  the  actual  condition  of  things  as  we  now 
experience  them.  The  present  state  of  the  world  is 
very  far  short  of  perfection.  Why  are  things  still  im- 
perfect if  controlled  by  a  benevolent  omnipotence? 
Why,  indeed,  does  evil  or  pain  at  all  exist?  All  very 
ancient  puzzles  these,  but  still  alive ;  and  the  solution 
to  them  so  far  attempted  by  science  lies  in  the  word 
Evolution,  a  word  in  itself  not  readily  applicable  to 
the  work  of  a  God. 

Taught  by  science,  we  learn  that  there  has  been  no 
fall  of  man,  there  has  been  a  rise.  Through  an  ape- 
like ancestry,  back  through  a  tadpole  and  fishlike 
ancestry,  away  to  the  early  beginnings  of  life,  the 
origin  of  man  is  being  traced  by  science.  There  was 
no  specific  creation  of  the  world  such  as  was  con- 
ceived appropriate  to  a  geocentric  conception  of  the 
universe;  the  world  is  a  condensation  of  primeval  gas, 
a  congeries  of  stones  and  meteors  fallen  together; 
still  falling  together,  indeed,  in  a  larger  neighbouring 
mass  (the  Sun).  By  the  energy  of  the  still  persistent 
falling  together,  the  ether  near  us  is  kept  constantly 
agitated,  and  to  the  energy  of  this  ethereal  agitation 
all  the  manifold  activity  of  our  planet  is  due.  The 
whole  system  has  evolved  itself  from  mere  moving 
matter  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  gravitation,  and 
there  is  no  certain  sign  of  either  beginning  or  end. 
Solar  systems  can  by  collision  or  otherwise  resolve 
themselves  into  nebulae,  and  nebulae  left  to  themselves 
can  condense  into  solar  systems,  —  everywhere  in  the 
spaces  around  us  we  see  a  part  of  the  process  going 
on;  the  formation  of  solar  systems  from  whirling 
*  17 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

nebulae  lies  before  our  eyes,  if  not  in  the  visible  sky 
itself,  yet  in  the  magnified  photographs  taken  of  that 
sky.  Even  though  the  whole  process  of  evolution  is 
not  completely  understood  as  yet,  does  anyone  doubt 
that  it  will  become  more  thoroughly  understood  in 
time?  and  if  they  do  doubt  it,  would  they  hope 
effectively  to  bolster  up  religion  by  such  a  doubt? 
It  is  difficult  to  resist  yielding  to  the  bent  and  trend 
of  "  modern  science,"  as  well  as  to  its  proved  con- 
clusions. Its  bent  and  trend  may  have  been  wrongly 
estimated  by  its  present  disciples:  a  large  tract  of 
knowledge  may  have  been  omitted  from  its  ken, 
which  when  included  will  revolutionise  some  of  their 
speculative  opinions  ;  but,  however  this  may  be,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  about  the  tendency  of  orthodox 
science  at  the  present  time.  It  suggests  to  us  that 
the  Cosmos  is  self-explanatory,  self-contained,  and 
self-maintaining.  From  everlasting  to  everlasting  the 
material  universe  rolls  on,  evolving  worlds  and  disin- 
tegrating them,  evolving  vegetable  beauty  and  de- 
stroying it,  evolving  intelligent  animal  life,  developing 
that  into  a  self-conscious  human  race,  and  then  plung- 
ing it  once  more  into  annihilation. 

"  Thou  makest  thine  appeal  to  me  ! 
I  bring  to  life,  I  bring  to  death, 
The  spirit  does  but  mean  the  breath, 
I  know  no  more.  ..." 

But  at  this  point  the  theologian  happily  and  eagerly 
interposes,  with  a  crucial  inquiry  of  science  about 
this  same  bringing  to  life.  Granted  that  the  blaze  of 
the  sun  accounts  for  winds  and  waves,  and  hail,  and 

18 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

rain,  and  rivers,  and  all  the  myriad  activities  of  the 
earth,  does  it  account  for  life?  Has  it  accounted  for 
the  life  of  the  lowest  animal,  the  tiniest  plant,  the 
simplest  cell,  hardly  visible  but  self-moving,  in  the 
field  of  a  microscope? 

And  science,  in  chagrin,  has  to  confess  that  hitherto 
in  this  direction  it  has  failed.  It  has  not  yet  witnessed 
the  origin  of  the  smallest  trace  of  life  from  dead 
matter :  all  life,  so  far  as  has  been  watched,  proceeds 
from  antecedent  life.  Given  the  life  of  a  single  cell, 
science  would  esteem  itself  competent  ultimately  to 
trace  its  evolution  into  all  the  myriad  existences  of 
plant  and  animal  and  man ;  but  the  origin  of  proto- 
plasmic activity  itself  as  yet  eludes  it.  But  will  the 
Theologian  triumph  in  the  admission?  will  he  therein 
detect  at  last  the  dam  which  shall  stem  the  torrent  of 
scepticism?  will  he  base  an  argument  for  the  direct 
action  of  the  Deity  in  mundane  affairs  on  that  failure, 
and  entrench  himself  behind  that  present  incompe- 
tence of  labouring  men?  If  so,  he  takes  his  stand  on 
what  may  prove  a  yielding  foundation.  The  present 
powerlessness  of  science  to  explain  or  originate  life  is 
a  convenient  weapon  wherewith  to  fell  a  pseudo-scien- 
tific antagonist  who  is  dogmatising  too  loudly  out  of 
bounds ;  but  it  is  not  perfectly  secure  as  a  permanent 
support.  In  an  early  stage  of  civilisation  it  may  have 
been  supposed  that  flame  only  proceeded  from  ante- 
cedent flame,  but  the  tinder-box  and  the  lucifer-match 
were  invented  nevertheless.  Theologians  have  prob- 
ably learnt  by  this  time  that  their  central  tenets  should 
not  depend,  even  partially,  upon  nescience,  or  upon  ne- 
gations of  any  kind,  lest  the  placid  progress  of  posi- 

19 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

tive  knowledge  should  once  more  undermine  their 
position,  and  another  discovery  have  to  be  scouted 
with  alarmed  and  violent  anathemas. 

Any  year,  or  any  century,  the  physical  aspect 
of  the  nature  of  life  may  become  more  intelli- 
gible, and  may  perhaps  resolve  itself  into  an  action 
of  already  known  forces  acting  on  the  very  com- 
plex molecule  of  protoplasm.  Already  in  Germany 
have  inorganic  and  artificial  substances  been  found 
to  crawl  about  on  glass  slides  under  the  action 
of  surface-tension  or  capillarity,  with  an  appearance 
which  is  said  to  have  deceived  even  a  biologist  into 
hastily  pronouncing  them  living  amoebae.  Life  in 
its  ultimate  element  and  on  its  material  side  is  such 
a  simple  thing,  it  is  but  a  slight  extension  of 
known  chemical  and  physical  forces ;  the  cell  must  be 
able  to  respond  to  stimuli,  to  assimilate  outside  ma- 
terials, and  to  subdivide.  I  apprehend  that  there  is 
not  a  biologist  but  believes  (perhaps  quite  errone- 
ously) that  sooner  or  later  the  discovery  will  be  made, 
and  that  a  cell  having  all  the  essential  functions  of 
life  will  be  constructed  out  of  inorganic  material. 
Seventy  years  ago  organic  chemistry  was  the  chemis- 
try of  vital  products,  of  compounds  that  could  not  be 
made  artificially  by  man.  Now  there  is  no  such 
chemistry;  the  name  persists,  but  its  meaning  has 
changed. 

It  may  be  conceivably  argued  that  after  all  we  are 
alive,  and  that  if  we  ever  learn  how  to  make  animals 
or  plants,  they  will  take  their  origin  from  life,  just  as 
when  we  make  new  species  by  artificial  selection  we 
exercise  a  control  over  the  forces  of  nature  which  in 

20 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

some  small  way  may  be  akin  to  the  methods  of  the 
divine  control.  And  this  may  possibly  be  a  theme 
capable  of  enlargement. 

But  meanwhile  what  do  we  mean  by  such  a  phrase 
as  divine  control?  for,  after  all,  the  controversy  be- 
tween religion  and  science  is  not  so  much  a  contro- 
versy as  to  the  being  or  not  being  of  a  God.  Science 
might  be  willing  to  concede  this  as  a  vague  and  in- 
effective hypothesis,  but  there  would  still  remain  a 
question  as  to  His  mode  of  action,  a  controversy  as 
to  the  method  of  the  divine  government  of  the  world. 

And  this  is  the  standing  controversy,  by  no  means 
really  dead  at  the  present  day.  Is  the  world  controlled 
by  a  living  Person,  accessible  to  prayer,  influenced  by 
love,  able  and  willing  to  foresee,  to  intervene,  to  guide, 
and  wistfully  to  lead  without  compulsion  spirits  in 
some  sort  akin  to  Himself? 

Or  is  the  world  a  self-generated,  self-controlling 
machine,  complete  and  fully  organised  for  movement, 
either  up  or  down,  for  progress  or  degeneration,  ac- 
cording to  the  chances  of  heredity  and  the  influence 
of  environment?  Has  the  world,  as  it  were,  secreted 
or  arrived  at  life  and  mind  and  consciousness  by  the 
play  of  natural  forces  acting  on  the  complexities  of 
highly  developed  molecular  aggregates ;  at  first  life- 
cells,  ultimately  brain-cells ;  and  these  not  the  organ 
or  instrument,  but  the  very  reality  and  essence  of  life 
and  of  mind? 

If  there  be  any  other  orders  of  conscious  existence 
in  the  universe,  as  probably  there  are,  are  they  also 
locked  up  on  their  several  planets,  without  the  power 
of  communicating  or  helping  or  informing,  and  all 

21 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

working  out  their  own  destiny  in  permanent  iso- 
lation? Everything  in  such  a  world  would  be  not 
only  apparently  but  really  a  definite  sequence  of 
cause  and  effect,  just  as  it  seems  to  us  here;  and 
prayer,  to  be  effectual  in  such  a  world,  must  be  not 
what  theologians  mean  by  prayer,  but  must  be  either 
simple  meditation  for  acquiescence  in  the  inevitable, 
or  else  a  petition  addressed  to  some  other  of  the 
dwellers  in  our  time  and  place,  that  they  may  be 
induced  by  benevolent  acts  to  ease  some  of  the  bur- 
dens to  which  their  petitioners  are  liable. 

We  thus  return  to  our  original  thesis,  that  the  root 
question  or  outstanding  controversy  between  science 
and  faith  rests  upon  two  distinct  conceptions  of  the 
universe :  —  the  one,  that  of  a  self-contained  and  self- 
sufficient  universe,  with  no  outlook  into  or  links  with 
anything  beyond,  uninfluenced  by  any  life  or  mind 
except  such  as  is  connected  with  a  visible  and  tan- 
gible material  body ;  and  the  other  conception,  that 
of  a  universe  lying  open  to  all  manner  of  spiritual 
influences,  permeated  through  and  through  with  a 
Divine  spirit,  guided  and  watched  by  living  minds, 
acting  through  the  medium  of  law  indeed,  but  with 
intelligence  and  love  behind  the  law :  a  universe  by 
no  means  self-sufficient  or  self-contained,  but  with 
feelers  at  every  pore  groping  into  another  super- 
sensuous  order  of  existence,  where  reign  laws  hith- 
erto unimagined  by  science,  but  laws  as  real  and  as 
mighty  as  those  by  which  the  material  universe  is 
governed. 

According  to  the  one  conception,  faith  is  childish 
and  prayer  absurd;   the  only  individual  immortality 

22 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

lies  in  the  memory  of  descendants ;  kind  actions  and 
cheerful  acquiescence  in  fate  are  the  highest  religious 
attributes  possible ;  and  the  future  of  the  human  race 
is  determined  by  the  law  of  gravitation  and  the  cir- 
cumstances of  space. 

According  to  the  other  conception,  prayer  may  be 
mighty  to  the  removal  of  mountains,  and  by  faith  we 
may  feel  ourselves  citizens  of  an  eternal  and  glorious 
cosmogony  of  mutual  help  and  co-operation,  advanc- 
ing from  lowly  stages  to  even  higher  states  of  happy 
activity,  world  without  end,  and  may  catch  in  antici- 
pation some  glimpses  of  that  "  one  far-off  divine  event 
to  which  the  whole  creation  moves." 

The  whole  controversy  hinges,  in  one  sense,  on  a 
practical  pivot  —  the  efficacy  of  prayer.  Is  prayer  to 
hypothetical  and  supersensuous  beings  as  senseless 
and  useless  as  it  is  unscientific?  or  does  prayer 
pierce  through  the  husk  and  apparent  covering  of 
the  sensuous  universe,  and  reach  something  living, 
loving,  and  helpful  beyond? 

And  in  another  sense  the  controversy  turns  upon 
a  question  of  fact.  Do  we  live  in  a  universe  per- 
meated with  life  and  mind :  life  and  mind  independ- 
ent of  matter  and  unlimited  in  individual  duration? 
Or  is  life  limited,  in  space  to  the  surface  of  masses  of 
matter,  and  in  time  to  the  duration  of  the  material 
envelope  essential  to  its  manifestation? 

The  answer  is  given  in  one  way  by  orthodox 
modern  science,  and  in  another  way  by  Religion  of 
all  times ;  and  until  these  opposite  answers  are  made 
consistent,  the  reconciliation  between  Science  and 
Faith  is  incomplete. 

23 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

THE   RECONCILIATION 
III 

It  may  or  may  not  have  been  observed,  by  anyone 
who  has  read  the  earlier  portions  of  this  paper,  — but 
in  so  far  as  it  has  been  missed,  the  whole  meaning  of 
the  paper  has  been  misconceived,  —  that  when  speak- 
ing of  the  atmosphere  or  the  conclusions,  the  doctrines 
or  the  tendency  of  "  science,"  I  was  careful  always  to 
explain  that  I  meant  orthodox  or  present-day  science : 
meaning  not  the  comprehensive  grasp  of  a  Newton, 
but  science  as  now  interpreted  by  its  recognised  offi- 
cial exponents,  by  the  average  Fellow  of  the  Royal 
Society  for  instance;  just  as  by  "faith"  I  intended 
not  the  ecstatic  insight  aroused  in  a  seer  by  some 
momentary  revelation,  but  the  ordinary  workaday 
belief  of  the  average  enlightened  theologian.  And 
my  thesis  was  that  the  attitudes  of  mind  appropriate 
to  these  two  classes  were  at  present  fundamentally 
diverse;  that  there  was  still  an  outstanding  contro- 
versy, or  ground  for  controversy,  between  science 
and  faith,  although  active  fighting  has  been  sus- 
pended, and  although  all  bitterness  has  passed  from 
the  conflict,  let  us  hope  never  to  return.  But  the 
diversity  remains,  and  for  the  present  it  is  better  so, 
if  it  has  not  achieved  its  work.  Eliminating  the 
bitterness,  the  conflict  has  been  useful,  and  it  would 
be  far  from  well  even  to  attempt  to  bring  it  to  a 
close  prematurely.  But  yet  there  must  be  an  end  to 
it  some  time ;  reconciliation  is  bound  to  lie  some- 
where in  the  future ;  no  two  parts  or  aspects  of  the 

24 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

Universe  can  permanently  and  really  be  discordant. 
The  only  question  is  where  the  meeting-place  may 
be;  whether  it  is  nearest  to  the  orthodox  faith  or 
to  the  orthodox  science  of  the  present  day.  This 
question  is  the  subject  of  the  present  or  concluding 
portion  of  my  article.  Let  me,  greatly  daring,  pre- 
sume to  enter  upon  the  inquiry  into  what  is  really 
true  and  essential  in  the  opposing  creeds,  how  much 
of  each  has  its  origin  in  over-hasty  assumption  or 
fancy,  and  how  far  the  opposing  views  are  merely  a 
natural  consequence  of  imperfect  vision  of  opposite 
sides  of  the  same  veil. 

First  among  the  truths  that  will  have  to  be  ac- 
cepted by  both  sides,  we  may  take  the  reign  of  Law, 
sometimes  called  the  Uniformity  of  Nature.  The 
discovery  of  uniformity  must  be  regarded  as  mainly 
the  work  of  Science :  it  did  not  come  by  revelation. 
In  moments  of  inspiration  it  was  glimpsed,  —  "  the 
same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  for  ever,"  —  but  the 
glimpse  was  only  momentary,  the  Hebrew  "  atmos- 
phere "  was  saturated  with  the  mists  of  cataclysm, 
visible  judgments,  and  conspicuous  interferences. 
We  used  to  be  told  that  the  Creator's  methods 
were  adapted  to  the  stage  of  His  creatures,  and 
varied  from  age  to  age :  that  it  was  really  His 
actions,  and  not  their  mode  of  regarding  them,  that 
varied.  The  doctrine  of  uniformity  first  took  root 
and  grew  in  scientific  soil. 

At  first  sight  this  doctrine  of  uniformity  excludes 
Divine  control,  excludes  anything  in  the  nature  of 
personal  will,  of  intention,  of  guidance,  of  adaptation, 
of  management.     The  law  of  evolution  proceeds  still 

25 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

further  in  the  same  direction;  it  shows  that  things 
change  and  how  they  change,  and  it  attempts  to 
show  why  they  change.  The  Darwinian  form  of  it 
attempts  to  account  for  the  origin  of  species  by 
inevitable  necessity,  free  from  artificial  selection  or 
operations  analogous  to  those  of  the  breeder.  Tele- 
ology has  gone,  and  guidance  and  purpose  appear 
to  have  gone  with  it. 

At  first  sight,  but  at  first  sight  only.  So  might  a 
spectator,  witnessing  some  great  and  perfect  factory, 
with  machines  constantly  weaving  patterns,  some 
beautiful,  some  ugly,  conclude,  or  permit  himself  to 
dream  at  least,  after  some  hours'  watching,  during 
which  everything  proceeded  without  a  hitch,  driven 
as  it  were  by  inexorable  fate,  that  everything  went  of 
itself,  controlled  by  cold  dreary  necessity.  And  if 
his  inspection  could  be  continued  for  weeks  or  years, 
and  it  still  presented  the  same  aspect,  the  dream 
would  begin  to  seem  to  be  true :  the  perfection  of 
mechanism  would  weary  the  observer:  his  human 
weakness  would  long  for  something  to  go  wrong,  so 
that  someone  from  an  upper  office  might  step  down 
and  set  it  right  again.  Humanity  is  accustomed  to 
such  interventions  and  breaks  in  a  ceaseless  sequence, 
and,  when  no  such  breaks  and  interventions  occur, 
may  conclude  hastily  that  the  scheme  is  self-originat- 
ing, self-sustained,  that  it  works  to  no  ultimate  and 
foreseen  destiny. 

So  sometimes,  looking  at  the  east  end  of  London, 
or  many  another  only  smaller  city,  has  the  feeling  of 
despair  seized  men :  they  wonder  what  it  can  all 
mean.     So,  on  the  other  hand,  looking  at  the  loom 

26 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

of  nature,  has  the  feeling,  not  of  despair,  but  of  what 
has  been  called  atheism,  one  ingredient  of  atheism, 
arisen :  atheism  never  fully  realised,  and  wrongly  so 
called ;  recently  it  has  been  called  severe  Theism 
indeed ;  for  it  is  joyful  sometimes,  interested  and 
placid  always,  exultant  at  the  strange  splendour  of 
the  spectacle  which  its  intellect  has  laid  bare  to 
contemplation,  satisfied  with  the  perfection  of  the 
mechanism,  content  to  be  a  part  of  the  self-generated 
organism,  and  endeavouring  to  think  that  the  feelings 
of  duty,  of  earnest  effort,  and  of  faithful  service,  which 
conspicuously  persist  in  spite  of  all  discouragement, 
are  on  this  view  intelligible  as  well  as  instinctive,  and 
sure  that  nothing  less  than  unrepining,  unfaltering, 
unswerving  acquiescence  is  worthy  of  our  dignity  as 
man. 

The  law  of  evolution  not  only  studies  change  and 
progress,  it  seeks  to  trace  sequences  back  to  antece- 
dents :  it  strains  after  the  origin  of  all  things.  But 
ultimate  origins  are  inscrutable.  Let  us  admit,  as 
scientific  men,  that  of  real  origin,  even  of  the  simplest 
thing,  we  know  nothing;  not  even  of  a  pebble.  Sand 
is  the  debris  of  rocks,  and  fresh  rocks  can  be  formed 
of  compacted  sand ;  but  this  suggests  infinity,  not 
origin.  Infinity  is  non-human  and  we  shrink  from  it, 
yet  what  else  can  there  be  in  space?  And  if  in  space, 
why  not  in  time  also?  Much  to  be  said  here,  per- 
haps, but  let  it  pass.  We  must  admit  that  science 
knows  nothing  of  ultimate  origins.  Which  first,  the 
hen  or  the  egg?  is  a  trivial  form  of  a  very  real  puzzle. 
That  the  world,  in  the  sense  of  this  planet,  this  homely 
lump  of  matter  we  call  the  earth  —  that  this  had  an 

27 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

origin,  a  history,  a  past,  intelligible  more  or  less, 
growingly  intelligible  to  the  eye  of  science,  is  true 
enough.  The  date  when  it  was  molten  can  be  roughly 
estimated ;  the  manner  and  mechanism  of  the  birth 
of  the  moon  has  been  guessed :  the  earth  and  moon 
then  originated  in  one  sense ;  before  that  they  were 
part  of  a  nebula,  like  the  rest  of  the  solar  system ; 
and  some  day  the  solar  system  may  again  be  part  of 
a  nebula,  by  reason  of  collision  with  some  at  present 
tremendously  distant  mass.  But  all  that  is  nothing 
to  the  Universe ;  nothing  even  to  the  visible  universe. 
The  collisions  there  take  place  every  now  and  again 
before  our  eyes.  The  Universe  is  full  of  lumps  of 
matter  of  every  imaginable  size :  the  history  of  a 
solar  system  may  be  written  —  its  birth  and  also  its 
death,  separated  may  be  by  millions  of  millions  of 
years;  but  what  of  that?  It  is  but  an  episode,  a 
moment  in  the  eternal  cosmogony,  and  the  eye  of 
history  looks  to  what  happened  before  the  birth  and 
after  the  death  of  any  particular  aggregate ;  just  as  a 
child  may  trace  the  origin  and  destruction  of  a  soap 
bubble,  the  form  of  which  is  evanescent,  the  material 
of  which  is  permanent. 

While  the  soap  bubble  lived  it  was  the  scene  of 
much  beauty  and  of  a  kind  of  law  and  order  impos- 
sible to  the  mere  water  and  soap  out  of  which  it  was 
made,  and  into  which  again  it  has  collapsed.  The 
history  of  the  soap  bubble  can  be  written,  but  there 
is  a  before  and  an  after.  So  it  is  with  the  solar 
system  ;  so  with  any  assigned  collocation  of  matter  in 
the  universe.  No  point  in  space  can  be  thought  of 
"  at  which  if  a  man  stand  it  shall  be  impossible  for 

28 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

him  to  cast  a  javelin  into  the  beyond  " ;  nor  can  any 
epoch  be  conceived  in  time  at  which  the  mind  will 
not  instantly  and  automatically  inquire,  "  and  what 
before,"  or  "  what  after"? 

Yet  does  the  human  mind  pine  for  something  finite : 
it  longs  for  a  beginning,  even  if  it  could  dispense 
with  an  end.  It  has  tried  of  late  to  imagine  that  the 
law  of  dissipation  of  energy  was  a  heaven-sent  mes- 
sage of  the  finite  duration  of  the  Universe,  so  that 
before  everything  was,  it  could  seek  a  Great  First 
Cause ;  and  after  everything  had  been,  could  take 
refuge  once  more  in  Him. 

Seen  more  closely,  these  are  childish  notions. 
They  would  be  no  real  help  if  they  were  true ;  they 
cannot  be  true,  no  more  than  any  other  fairy  tale 
suitable  for  children. 

In  the  dawn  of  civilisation,  God  walked  in  the 
garden  in  the  cool  of  the  day.  Down  to  say  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  He  brought  things 
into  existence  by  a  creative  Fiat,  and  looked  on  His 
work  for  a  time  with  approbation ;  only  to  step  down 
and  destroy  a  good  deal  of  it  before  many  years  had 
elapsed,  and  to  patch  it  up  and  try  to  mend  it  from 
time  to  time. 

All  very  human :  the  endless  rumble  of  the  ma- 
chinery is  distressing,  perfection  is  intolerable.  Still 
more  intolerable  is  imperfection  not  attended  to ;  the 
machinery  groans,  lacks  oil,  shows  signs  of  wear, 
some  of  the  fabrics  it  is  weaving  are  hideous ;  why, 
why,  does  no  one  care?  Surely  the  manager  will 
step  down  and  put  one  of  the  looms  to  rights,  or 
scold  a  workman,  or  tell  us  what  it  is  all  for,  and  why 

29 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

he  needs  the  woven  fabric,  dcr  Gottheit  lebendigcs 
Kleid,  before  long. 

We  see  that  he  does  not  now  interfere,  not  even 
when  things  go  very  wrong;  the  "  hands  "  are  left  to 
put  things  right  as  best  they  can,  nothing  mysterious 
ever  happens  now,  it  is  all  commonplace  and  semi-in- 
telligible; we  ourselves  could  easily  throw  a  machine 
out  of  gear;  we  do,  sometimes;  we  ourselves,  if  we 
are  clever  enough  and  patient  enough,  could  even  per- 
form the  far  harder  task  of  putting  one  right  again ; 
we  could  even  suggest  fresh  patterns ;  we  seem  to  be 
more  than  onlookers  —  as  musicians  and  artists  we 
can  create  —  perhaps  we  are  foremen;  and  if  ideas 
occur  to  us,  why  should  we  not  throw  them  into  the 
common  stock?  There  is  no  head  manager  at  all, 
this  thing  has  been  always  running;  as  the  hands  die 
off,  others  take  their  places ;  they  have  not  been 
selected  or  appointed  to  the  job;  they  are  only  here 
as  the  fittest  of  a  large  number  which  have  not  sur- 
vived ;  even  the  looms  seem  to  have  a  self-mending, 
self-regenerative  power;  and  we  ourselves,  we  are 
not  looking  at  it  or  assisting  in  it  for  long.  When 
we  go,  other  brilliantly-endowed  and  inventive  spec- 
tators or  helpers  will  take  our  places.  We  under- 
stand the  whole  arrangement  now;  it  is  simpler  than 
at  first  we  thought. 

Is  it,  then,  so  simple?  Does  the  uniformity  and 
the  eternity  and  the  self-sustainedness  of  it  make  it 
the  easier  to  understand?  Are  we  so  sure  that  the 
guidance  and  control  are  not  really  continuous,  in- 
stead of  being,  as  we  expected,  intermittent?  May 
we  be  not  looking  at  the  working  of  the  Manager  all 

3° 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

the  time,  and  at  nothing  else?  Why  should  He  step 
down  and  interfere  with  Himself? 

That  is  the  lesson  science  has  to  teach  theology  — 
to  look  for  the  action  of  the  Deity,  if  at  all,  then 
always;  not  in  the  past  alone,  nor  only  in  the  future, 
but  equally  in  the  present.  If  His  action  is  not  visible 
now,  it  never  will  be,  and  never  has  been  visible. 

Shall  we  look  for  it  in  toy  eruptions  in  the  West 
Indies?  As  well  look  for  it  in  the  fall  of  a  child's 
box  of  bricks  !  Shall  we  hope  to  see  the  Deity  some 
day  step  out  of  Himself  and  display  His  might  or  His 
love  or  some  other  attribute?  We  can  see  Him  now 
if  we  look ;  if  we  cannot  see,  it  is  only  that  our  eyes 
are  shut. 

"  Closer  is  He  than  breathing,  nearer  than  hands  or  feet:  "  — 

poetry,  yes — but  also  science;  the  real  trend  and 
meaning  of  Science,  whether  of  orthodox  "  science" 
or  not. 

IV 

There  is  nothing  new  in  Pantheism  :  —  indeed  no  ! 
But  there  are  different  kinds  of  pantheism.  That  the 
All  is  a  manifestation,  a  revelation  of  God,  —  that  it 
is  in  a  manner,  a  dim  and  ungraspable  manner,  in 
some  sort  God  Himself,  —  may  be  readily  granted ; 
but  what  does  the  All  include?  It  were  a  strange 
kind  of  All  that  included  mountains  and  trees,  the 
forces  of  nature,  and  the  visible  material  universe 
only,  and  excluded  the  intelligence,  the  will,  the 
emotions,  the  individuality  or  personality,  of  which 

3i 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

we  ourselves  are  immediately  conscious.  Shall  we 
possess  these  things  and  God  not  possess  them? 
That  would  be  no  pantheism  at  all.  Any  power, 
any  love,  of  which  we  ourselves  are  conscious  does 
thereby  certainly  exist ;  and  so  it  must  exist  in  highly 
intensified  and  nobler  form  in  the  totality  of  things, 

—  unless  we  make  the  grotesque  assumption  that  in 
all  the  infinite  universe  we  denizens  of  planet  Earth 
are  the  highest.  Let  no  worthy  human  attribute  be 
denied  to  the  Deity.  There  are  many  errors,  but 
there  is  one  truth,  in  Anthropomorphism.  Whatever 
worthy  attribute  belongs  to  man,  be  it  personality  or 
any  other,  its  existence  in  the  Universe  is  thereby 
admitted ;  we  can  deny  it  no  more. 

The  only  conceivable  way  of  denying  personality, 
and  effort,  and  failure,  and  renewed  effort,  and  con- 
sciousness, and  love,  and  hate  too,  for  that  matter,  in 
the  real  whole  of  things,  is  to  regard  them  as  illusory, 

—  physiological  and  purely  material  illusions  in  our- 
selves. Even  so,  they  are  in  some  sense  there  ;  they 
are  not  unreal,  however  they  are  to  be  accounted 
for.  We  must  blink  nothing ;  evolution  is  a  truth,  a 
strange  and  puzzling  truth ;  "  the  whole  creation 
groaneth  and  travaileth  together " ;  and  the  most 
perfect  of  all  the  sons  of  men,  the  likest  God  this 
planet  ever  saw,  He  to  whom  many  look  for  their  idea 
of  what  God  is,  surely  He  taught  us  that  suffering, 
and  sacrifice,  and  wistful  yearning  for  something  not 
yet  attainable  were  not  to  be  regarded  as  human 
attributes  alone. 

Must  we  not  admit  the  evil  attributes  also?  In 
the  Whole,  yes;  but  one  of  our  experiences  is  that 

32 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

there  are  grades  of  existence.  We  recognise  that  in 
ourselves  the  ape  and  tiger  are  dying  out,  that  the 
germs  of  higher  faculties  have  made  their  appear- 
ance; it  is  an  intensification  of  the  higher  that  we 
may  infer  in  the  more  advanced  grades  of  exist- 
ence; intensification  of  the  lower  lies  behind  and 
beneath  us. 

The  inference  or  deduction  of  some  of  the  attributes 
of  Deity,  from  that  which  we  can  recognise  as  "  the 
likest  God  within  the  soul,"  is  a  legitimate  deduction, 
if  properly  carried  out;  and  it  is  in  close  corres- 
pondence with  the  methods  of  physical  science.  It 
has  been  said  that  from  the  properties  of  a  drop  of 
water  the  possibility  of  a  Niagara  or  an  Atlantic 
might  be  inferred  by  a  man  who  had  seen  or  heard 
of  neither.1  And  it  is  true  that  by  experiment  on  a 
small  quantity  of  water  a  man  with  the  brain  of  New- 
ton and  the  mathematical  power  and  knowledge  of  Sir 
G.  G.  Stokes  could  deduce  by  pure  reasoning  most 
if  not  all  of  the  inorganic  phenomena  of  an  ocean; 
and  that  not  vaguely  but  definitely ;  the  existence  of 
waves  on  its  surface,  the  rate  at  which  they  would 
travel  as  dependent  upon  distance  from  crest  to 
crest,  their  maximum  height,  their  length  as  depend- 
ing on  depth  of  sea ;  the  existence  of  ripples  also, 
going  at  a  different  pace  and  following  a  different 
law  ;  the  breaking  of  waves  upon  a  shore ;  the  tides 
also ;  the  ocean  currents  caused  by  inequalities  of 
temperature,  and  many  other  properties  which  are 
realised  in  an  actual  ocean :  —  not  as  topographical 
realities  indeed,  but  as  necessary  theoretical  conse- 
1  Sir  Conan  Doyle,  A  Study  in  Scarlet. 
3  33 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

quences  of  the  hypothetical  existence  of  so  great  a 
mass  of  water.  Reasoning  from  the  small  to  the 
great  is  legitimate  reasoning,  notwithstanding  that  by 
increase  of  size  phenomena  wholly  different  and  at 
first  sight  unexpected  come  into  being.  No  one  not 
a  mathematician  looking  at  a  drop  of  water  could 
infer  the  Atlantic  billows  or  the  tides:  but  they  are 
all  there  in  embryo,  given  gravitation;  and  yet  not 
there  in  actuality  in  even  the  smallest  degree.  People 
sometimes  think  that  increase  of  size  is  mere  mag- 
nification, and  introduces  no  new  property.  They 
are  mistaken.  Waves  could  not  be  on  a  drop,  nor 
tides  either,  nor  waterspouts,  nor  storms.  The  simple 
fact  that  the  earth  is  large  makes  it  retain  an  atmos- 
phere; and  the  existence  of  an  atmosphere  enhances 
the  importance  of  a  globe  beyond  all  comparison,  and 
renders  possible  plant  and  animal  life.  The  simple 
fact  that  the  sun  is  very  large  makes  it  hot,  i.  e.  en- 
ables it  to  generate  heat,  and  so  fits  it  to  be  the  centre 
and  source  of  energy  to  worlds  of  habitable  activity. 

To  suppose  that  the  deduction  of  divine  attributes 
by  intensification  of  our  own  attributes  must  neces- 
sarily result  in  a  "  magnified  non-natural  man  "  is  to 
forget  these  facts  of  physical  science.  If  the  rea- 
soning is  bad,  or  the  data  insufficient,  the  result  is 
worthless,  but  the  method  is  legitimate,  though 
far  from  easy  ;  and  it  is  hardly  to  be  expected  that 
the  science  of  theology  has  yet  had  its  Newton,  or 
even  its  Copernicus.1     At  present  it  is  safest  to  walk 

1  Theologians  may  differ  from  this  estimate  ;  and  if  so,  I  de- 
fer to  their  opinion.  It  is  well  known  that  the  topics  slightly 
glanced  at  in  the  first  half  of  this  section  have  been  profoundly 

34 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

by  faith  and  inspiration  ;  and  it  is  the  saint  and 
prophet  rather  than  the  theologian  whom  humanity 
would  prefer  to  trust. 


Now  let  us  go  back  to  our  groping  inquiry  —  to  the 
series  of  questions  left  unanswered  in  the  latter  por- 
tion of  Part  II.  of  this  paper,  and  ask,  what  then  of 
prayer,  regarded  scientifically;  of  miracle,  if  we  like 
to  call  it  miracle ;  of  the  region  not  only  of  emotion 
and  intelligence,  but  of  active  work,  guidance,  and 
interference?  Are  these,  after  all,  so  rigorously  ex- 
cluded by  the  reign  of  law?  Are  not  these  also  parts 
of  its  kingdom?  Shall  law  apply  only  to  the  inor- 
ganic and  the  non-living?  Shall  it  not  rule  the 
domain  of  life  and  of  mind  too?  Speaking  or  think- 
ing of  the  Universe,  we  must  exclude  no  part; 

"  All  are  but  parts  of  one  stupendous  whole, 
Whose  body  nature  is,  and  God  the  soul ;  " 

u  For  as  the  reasonable  soul  and  human  flesh  is  one  man  "  — 

glimpses  of  truth,  poor  distorted  glimpses,  even  as 
this  paper:  what  more  can  be  expected  of  us? 

studied  by  them  ;  but  the  subject  is  so  difficult  that  an  outsider 
can  hardly  assume  that  as  much  progress  has  been  made  in 
Theology  as  in  the  physical  sciences.  Not  so  much  progress 
has  been  made  even  in  the  biological  sciences  as  in  the  more 
specifically  physical.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  biology  has  had 
its  Newton,  but  it  is  not  so  :  Darwin  was  its  Copernicus,  and 
revolutionised  ideas  as  the  era  of  Copernicus  did.  Newton  did 
not  revolutionise  ideas :  his  was  a  synthetic  and  deductive  era. 

35 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

Let  us  take  this  question  of  guidance.  We  must 
see  it  in  action  now  or  never.  Do  we  see  it  now? 
Orthodox  theology  vaguely  assumes  it  ;  orthodox 
science  sees  it  not  at  all.  What  is  the  truth?  Is  the 
blindness  of  science  subjective  or  objective?  Is 
the  vision  absent  because  there  is  nothing  to  see,  or 
because  we  have  shut  our  eyes,  and  have  declined 
to  contemplate  a  region  of  dim  and  misty  fact? 

Take  the  origin  of  species  by  the  persistence  of 
favourable  variations,  how  is  the  appearance  of  those 
same  favourable  variations  accounted  for?  Except 
by  artificial  selection,  not  at  all.  Given  their  appear- 
ance, their  development  by  struggle  and  inheritance 
and  survival  can  be  explained ;  but  that  they  arose 
spontaneously,  by  random  change  without  purpose,  is 
an  assertion  which  cannot  be  made.  Does  anyone 
think  that  the  skill  of  the  beaver,  the  instinct  of  the 
bee,  the  genius  of  a  man,  arose  by  chance,  and  that 
its  presence  is  accounted  for  by  handing  down  and 
by  survival?  What  struggle  for  existence  will  ex- 
plain the  advent  of  Beethoven?  What  pitiful  neces- 
sity for  earning  a  living  as  a  dramatist  will  educe  for 
us  Shakespeare  ?  These  things  are  beyond  science 
of  the  orthodox  type;  then  let  it  be  silent  and  deny 
nothing  in  the  Universe  till  it  has  at  least  made  an 
honest  effort  to  grasp  the  whole. 

Genius,  however,  science  has  made  an  effort  not 
wholly  to  ignore;  but  take  other  human  faculties  — 
Premonition,  Inspiration,  Prevision,  Telepathy  — 
what  is  the  meaning  of  these  things?  Orthodox 
science  refuses  to  contemplate  them,  orthodox  the- 
ology also  looks  at  some  of  them  askance.     Many 

36 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

philosophers  have  relegated  them  to  the  region  of 
the  unconscious,  or  the  subconscious,  where  dwell 
things  of  nothing  worth.  A  few  Psychologists  are 
beginning  to  attend. 

Men  of  religion  can  hold  aloof  or  not  as  they 
please :  probably  they  had  better  hold  aloof  until  the 
scientific  basis  of  these  things  has  been  rendered 
more  secure.  At  present  they  are  beyond  the  pale 
of  science,  but  they  are  some  of  them  inside  the 
Universe  of  fact,  —  all  of  them,  as  I  now  begin  to 
believe,  —  and  their  meaning  must  be  extracted.  So 
long  as  this  region  is  ignored,  dogmatic  science 
should  be  silent.  It  has  a  right  to  its  own  adopted 
region,  it  has  no  right  to  be  heard  outside.  It 
cannot  see  guidance,  it  cannot  recognise  the  mean- 
ing of  the  whole  trend  of  things,  the  constant  lead- 
ings, the  control,  the  help,  the  revelations,  the 
bcckonings,  beyond  our  normal  bodily  and  mental 
powers.  No,  for  it  will  not  look.  What  becomes  of 
an  intelligence  which  has  left  this  earth?  Whence 
comes  the  nascent  intelligence  which  arrives?  What 
is  the  meaning  of  our  human  personality  and  individ- 
uality? Did  we  spring  into  existence  a  few  years 
ago?  Do  we  cease  to  exist  a  few  years  hence? 
It  does  not  know.     It  does  not  want  to  know. 

Does  theology  seek  enlightenment  any  more  ener- 
getically? No;  it  is  satisfied  with  its  present  in- 
formation, which  some  people  mistake  for  divine 
knowledge  on  these  subjects.  Divine  knowledge  is 
perhaps  not  obtained  so  easily. 

At  present,  in  the  cosmic  scheme  we  strangely 
draw  the  line  at  man.     We  know  of  every  grade  of 

37 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

life  from  the  amoeba  upwards,  with  some  slight  miss- 
ing link  here  and  there,  —  and  these  led  up  to  by 
plants,  and  perhaps,  though  doubtfully,  by  crystals, 
—  but  the  series  terminates  with  man.  From  man 
the  scale  of  existence  is  supposed  to  step  to  God. 
Is  it  not  somewhat  sudden?  The  step  in  the  other 
direction,  from  man  to  the  amoeba,  is  as  nothing  to 
it.  Yet  that  is  a  wide  gap;  wide,  but  not  infinite. 
Why  this  sudden  jump  from  the  altitude  of  man 
into  infinity?  Are  there  no  intermediate  states  of 
existence? 

Perhaps  on  other  planets,  —  yes,  bodily  existence 
on  other  planets  is  probable,  not  necessarily  on  any 
planet  of  our  solar  system,  but  that  is  a  trifle  in  the 
visible  universe ;  it  is  as  our  little  five-roomed  house 
among  all  the  dwellings  of  mankind.  But  why  on 
other  planets  only?  Why  bodily  existence  only? 
Why  think  solely  of  those  incarnate  personalities 
from  whom,  by  reason  of  bodily  location,  we  are 
most  isolated?  Because  we  feel  more  akin  to  such, 
and  we  know  of  no  others.  A  good  answer  so  far, 
and  a  true.  But  do  we  wish  to  learn?  Have  we  our 
minds  open?  A  few  men  of  science  have  adduced 
evidence  of  intelligence  not  wholly  inaccessible  and 
yet  not  familiarly  accessible,  intelligence  perhaps  a 
part  of  ourselves,  perhaps  a  part  of  others,  intelli- 
gence which  seems  closely  connected  with  the  region 
of  genius,  of  telepathy,  of  clairvoyance,  to  which  I 
have  briefly  referred. 

Suppose  for  a  moment  that  there  were  a  God. 
Science  has  never  really  attempted  to  deny  His  exist- 
ence.    Conceive  a   scientific  God.     How  would  He 

33 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

work?  Surely  not  by  speech  or  by  intermittent  per- 
sonal interference.  He  would  be  in,  and  among,  and 
of,  the  whole  scheme  of  things.  The  universe  is 
governed  by  law ;  effect  is  connected  with  cause ; *  if 
a  thing  moves  it  is  because  something  moves  it;2 
effects  are  due  and  only  due  to  agents.  If  there  be 
guidance  or  control,  it  must  be  by  agents  that  it  is 
exerted.  Then  what  in  the  scheme  of  things  would 
be  His  agents? 

Surely  among  such  agents  we  must  recognise  our- 
selves: we  can  at  least  consider  how  we  and  other 
animals  work.  Watch  the  bird  teaching  its  young  to 
fly,  the  mother  teaching  a  child  to  read,  the  statesman 
nursing  the  destiny  of  a  new-born  nation.  Is  there 
no  guidance  there? 

What  is  the  meaning  of  legislation  and  municipal 
government,  and  acts  of  reform,  and  all  the  struggle 
after  better  lives  for  ourselves  and  others  ? 

Pure  automatism,  say  some  ;  an  illusion  of  free  will. 
Possibly ;  but  even  a  dream  is  not  an  absolute  nonen- 
tity;  the  effort,  however  it  be  expressed  or  accounted 
for,  exists. 

What  is  all  the  effort  —  regarded  scientifically  — 
but  the  action  of  the  totality  of  things  trying  to  im- 
prove itself,  striving  still  to  evolve  something  higher, 
holier,  and  happier  out  of  an  inchoate  mass?  There 
may  be  many  other  ways  of  regarding  it,  but  this  is 
one.  Failures,  mistakes,  sins,  —  yes,  they  exist ;  evo- 
lution would  be  meaningless  if  perfection  were  already 
attained ;  but  surely  even  now  we  see  some  progress, 

1  If  this  involves  controversy,  then  sequent  with  antecedent. 

2  This  I  wish  to  maintain  in  spite  of  controversy. 

39 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

surely  the  effort  of  our  saints  is  bearing  fruit.  This 
planet  has  laboured  long  and  patiently  for  the  advent 
of  a  human  race,  for  millions  of  years  it  was  the  abode 
of  strange  beasts,  and  now  recently  it  has  become  the 
abode  of  man.  What  but  imperfection  would  you  ex- 
pect? May  it  not  be  suggested  that  conscious  evil  or 
vice  looms  rather  large  in  our  eyes,  oppresses  us  with 
a  somewhat  exaggerated  sense  of  its  cosmic  import- 
ance, because  it  is  peculiarly  characteristic  of  the 
human  stage  of  development:  the  lower  animals 
know  little  or  nothing  of  it;  they  may  indeed  do 
things  which  in  men  would  be  vicious,  but  that  is 
just  what  vice  is  —  reversion  to  a  lower  type  after 
perception  of  a  higher.  The  consciousness  of  crime, 
the  active  pursuit  of  degradation,  does  not  arise  till 
something  like  human  intelligence  is  reached ;  and 
only  a  little  higher  up  it  ceases  again.  It  appears 
to  be  a  stage  rather  rapidly  passed  through  in  the 
cosmic  scheme.  Greed,  for  instance,  greed  in  the 
widest  sense,  accumulation  for  accumulation's  sake : 
it  is  a  human  defect,  and  one  responsible  for  much 
misery  to-day;  but  it  arose  recently,  and  already  it 
is  felt  to  be  below  the  standard  of  the  race.  A  stage 
very  little  above  present  humanity,  not  at  all  above 
the  higher  grades  of  present  humanity,  and  we  shall 
be  free  from  it  again. 

Let  us  be  thankful  we  have  got  thus  far,  and 
struggle  on  a  little  further.  It  is  our  destiny,  and 
whether  here  or  elsewhere  it  will  be  accomplished. 

We  are  God's  agents,  visible  and  tangible  agents, 
and  we  can  help ;  we  ourselves  can  answer  some 
kinds  of  prayer,  so  it  be  articulate ;  we  ourselves  can 

40 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

interfere  with  the  course  of  inanimate  nature,  can 
make  waste  places  habitable,  and  habitable  places 
waste.  Not  by  breaking  laws  do  we  ever  influence 
nature — we  cannot  break  a  law  of  nature,  it  is  not 
brittle,  we  only  break  ourselves  if  we  try  —  but  by 
obeying  them.  In  accordance  with  law  we  have  to 
act,  but  act  we  can  and  do,  and  through  us  acts  the 
Deity. 

And  perhaps  not  alone  through  us.  We  are  the 
highest  bodily  organisms  on  this  material  planet,  and 
the  material  control  of  it  belongs  to  us.  It  is  subject 
to  the  laws  of  Physics  and  to  the  laws  of  our  minds 
operating  through  our  bodies.  If  there  are  other 
beings  near  us  they  do  not  trespass.  It  is  our 
sphere,  so  far  as  Physics  are  concerned.  If  there  are 
exceptions  to  this  statement,  stringent  proof  must  be 
forthcoming. 

Assertions  are  made  that  under  certain  strange  con- 
ditions physical  interference  does  occur;  but  there  is 
always  a  person  present  in  an  unusual  state  when 
these  things  happen,  and  until  we  know  more  of  the 
power  of  the  unconscious  human  personality,  it  is 
simplest  to  assume  that  these  physical  acts  are 
due,  whether  consciously  or  unconsciously,  to  that 
person. 

But  what  about  our  mental  acts?  We  can  operate 
on  each  other's  minds  through  our  physical  envelope, 
by  speech  and  writing  and  in  other  ways,  but  we  can 
do  more :  it  appears  that  we  can  operate  at  a  dis- 
tance, by  no  apparent  physical  organ  or  medium; 
if  by  mechanism  at  all,  then  by  mechanism  at  any 
rate  unknown  to  us. 

41 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

If  we  are  open  to  influence  from  each  other  by 
non-corporeal  methods,  may  we  not  be  open  to  in- 
fluence from  beings  in  another  region  or  of  another 
order?  And  if  so,  may  we  not  be  aided,  inspired, 
guided,  by  a  cloud  of  witnesses,  —  not  witnesses 
only,  but  helpers,  agents  like  ourselves  of  the  im- 
manent God? 

How  do  we  know  that  in  the  mental  sphere  these 
cannot  answer  prayer,  as  we  in  the  physical?  It  is 
not  a  speculation  only,  it  is  a  question  for  experience 
to  decide.  Are  we  conscious  of  guidance?  do  we 
feel  that  prayers  are  answered  ?  that  power  to  do,  and 
to  will,  and  to  think  is  given  us?  Many  there  are 
who  with  devout  thankfulness  will  say  yes. 

They  attribute  it  to  the  Deity ;  so  can  we  attribute 
everything  to  the  Deity,  from  thunder  and  lightning 
down  to  daily  bread;  but  is  it  direct  action?  Does 
He  work  without  agents?  That  is  what  our  feel- 
ings tell  us,  but  it  is  difficult  to  discriminate ;  and 
fortunately  it  is  not  necessary;  the  whole  is  linked 
together, 

u  Bound  by  gold  chains  about  the  feet  of  God," 

and  through  it  all  His  energising  Spirit  runs.  On 
any  hypothesis  it  must  be  to  the  Lord  that  we  pray 
—  to  the  highest  we  know  or  can  conceive  ;  but  the 
answer  shall  come  in  ways  we  do  not  know,  and 
there  must  always  be  a  far  Higher  than  ever  we  can 
conceive. 

Religious  people  seem  to  be  losing  some  of  their 
faith  in  prayer :  they  think  it  scientific  not  to  pray  in 
the  sense  of  simple  petition.     They  may  be  right:  it 

42 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

may  be  the  highest  attitude  never  to  ask  for  anything 
specific,  only  for  acquiescence.  If  saints  feel  it  so, 
they  are  doubtless  right,  but,  so  far  as  ordinary 
science  has  anything  to  say  to  the  contrary,  a  more 
childlike  attitude  might  turn  out  truer,  more  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  total  scheme.  Prayer  for  a  fancied 
good  that  might  really  be  an  injury,  would  be  foolish ; 
prayer  for  breach  of  law  would  be  not  foolish  only 
but  profane ;  but  who  are  we  to  dogmatise  too  posi- 
tively concerning  law?  A  martyr  may  have  prayed 
that  he  should  not  feel  the  fire.  Can  it  be  doubted 
that,  whether  through  what  we  call  hypnotic  sug- 
gestion or  by  some  other  name,  the  granting  of  it 
was  at  least  possible?  Prayer,  we  have  been  told,  is 
a  mighty  engine  of  achievement,  but  we  have  ceased 
to  believe  it.  Why  should  we  be  so  incredulous? 
Even  in  medicine,  for  instance,  it  is  not  really  absurd 
to  suggest  that  drugs  and  no  prayer  may  be  almost 
as   foolish    as   prayer   and    no   drugs.1     Mental   and 

1  Diseases  are  like  weeds;  gardening  is  a  bacteriological 
problem.  Some  bacteria  are  good  and  useful  and  necessary; 
they  act  in  digestion,  in  manures,  etc. ;  others  are  baleful  and 
mean  disease.  The  gardener,  like  the  physician,  has  to  culti- 
vate the  plants  and  eradicate  the  weeds.  If  he  ignores  the 
existence  of  weeds  and  says  they  are  all  plants,  he  speaks  truth 
as  a  botanist,  but  is  not  a  practical  gardener.  If  he  says 
"  gardening  is  all  effort  on  my  part,  and  nothing  comes  from  the 
sky,  I  will  dig  and  I  will  water,  I  care  not  for  casual  rain  or  for 
sun,"  he  errs  foolishly  on  one  side.  If  he  says  "  the  sun  and 
the  rain  do  everything,  there  is  no  need  for  my  exertion,"  he 
errs  on  the  other  side,  and  errs  more  dangerously ;  because  he 
can  abstain  from  action,  whereas  he  cannot  exclude  rain  and 
sun,  however  much  he  presumes  to  ignore  them :  he  ought  to 

43 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

physical  are  interlocked.  The  crudities  of  "  faith- 
healing"  have  a  germ  of  truth,  perhaps  as  much 
truth  as  can  be  claimed  by  those  who  contemn  them. 
How  do  we  know  that  each  is  not  ignoring  one  side, 
that  each  is  but  half  educated,  each  only  adopting 
half  measures?  The  whole  truth  may  be  completer 
and  saner  than   the   sectaries   dream:    more   things 

may  be 

"  wrought  by  prayer 
Than  this  world  dreams  of." 

We  are  not  bodies  alone,  nor  spirits  alone,  but 
both;  our  bodies  isolate  us,  our  spirits  unite  us:  if 
I  may  venture  on  two  lines,  we  are  like 

Floating  lonely  icebergs,  our  crests  above  the  ocean, 
With  deeply  submerged  portions  united  by  the  sea. 

The  conscious  part  is  knowing,  the  subconscious 
part  is  ignorant:  yet  the  subconscious  can  achieve 
results  the  conscious  can  by  no  means  either  under- 
stand or  perform.  Witness  the  physical  operations 
of  "  suggestion  "  and  the  occasional  lucidity  of  trance. 

Each  one  of  us  has  a  great  region  of  the  subcon- 
scious, to  which  we  do  not  and  need  not  attend ; 
only  let  us  not  deny  it,  let  us  not  cut  ourselves  off 
from  its  sustaining  power:  if  we  have  instinct  for 
worship,  for  prayer,  for  communion  with  saints  or 
with  Deity,  let  us  trust  that  instinct,  for  there  lies 
the  true  realm  of  religion.     We  may  try  to  raise  the 

be  a  part  of  the  agency  at  work.  Sobriety  and  sanity  consist  in 
recognising  all  the  operative  causes — spiritual,  mental,  and 
material. 

44 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

subconscious  region  into  the  light  of  day,  and  study 
it  with  our  intellect  also ;  but  let  us  not  assume  that 
our  present  conscious  intelligence  is  already  so  well 
informed  that  its  knowledge  exhausts  or  determines 
or  bounds^  the  region  of  the  true  and  the  possible. 


VI 

As  to  what  is  scientifically  possible  or  impossible, 
anything  not  self-contradictory  or  inconsistent  with 
other  truth  is  possible.  Speaking  from  our  present 
scientific  ignorance,  and  in  spite  of  the  extract  from 
Professor  Tyndall  quoted  in  Part  I.  of  this  paper, 
this  statement  must  be  accepted  as  literally  true,  for 
all  we  know  to  the  contrary.  There  may  be  reasons 
why  certain  things  do  not  occur:  our  experience 
tells  us  that  they  do  not,  and  we  may  judge  that 
there  is  some  reason  why  they  do  not ;  there  may  be 
an  adaptation,  an  arrangement  among  the  forces  of 
nature  —  the  forces  of  nature  in  their  widest  sense  — 
which  enchains  them  and  screens  us  from  their  de- 
structive action,  after  the  same  sort  of  fashion  as 
the  atmosphere  screens  the  earth  from  the  furious 
meteoric  buffeting  it  would  otherwise  encounter  on 
its  portentous  journey  through  ever  new  and  untried 
depths  of  space.1 

We  may  indeed  be  well  protected ;  we  must,  else 
we  should  not  be  here ;  but  as  to  what  is  possible  — 

1  The  earth  does  not  describe  anything  like  a  closed  curve 
per  annum ;  the  sun  advances  rather  more  than  ten  miles  per 
second,  in  what  is  practically  a  straight  line. 

45 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

think  of  any  lower  creature,  low  enough  in  the  scale 
of  existence  to  ignore  us,  and  to  treat  us,  too,  as 
among  the  forces  of  nature,  and  then  let  us  bethink 
ourselves  of  how  we  may  appear,  not  to  God  or  to 
any  infinite  being,  but  to  some  personified  influence 
high  above  us  in  the  scale  of  existence.  Consider  a 
colony  of  ants,  and  conceive  them  conscious  at  their 
level;  what  know  they  of  fate  and  of  the  future? 
Much  what  we  know.  They  may  think  themselves 
governed  by  uniform  law  —  uniform,  that  is,  even  to 
their  understanding  —  the  march  of  the  seasons,  the 
struggle  for  existence,  the  weight  of  the  soil,  the 
properties  of  matter  as  they  encounter  it  —  no  more. 
For  centuries  they  may  have  continued  thus ;  when 
one  day,  quite  unexpectedly,  a  shipwrecked  sailor 
strolling  round  kicks  their  ant-hill  over.  To  and  fro 
they  run,  overwhelmed  with  the  catastrophe.  What 
shall  hinder  his  crushing  them  with  his  heel?  Labo- 
rare  est  or  are  in  their  case.  Let  him  watch  them  and 
see,  or  fancy  that  he  sees,  in  their  movements  the 
signs  of  industry,  of  system,  of  struggle  against  un- 
toward circumstance;  let  him  note  the  moving  of 
eggs,  the  trying  to  save  and  to  repair :  —  the  act  of 
destruction  may  by  that  means  be  averted. 

Just  as  our  earth  is  midway  among  the  lumps  of 
matter,  neither  small  like  a  meteoric  stone,  nor 
gigantic  like  a  sun,  so  may  be  the  place  we,  the 
human  race,  occupy  in  the  scale  of  existence.  All 
our  ordinary  views  are  based  on  the  notion  that 
we  are  highest  in  the  scale;  upset  that  notion  and 
anything  is  possible.  Possible,  but  we  have  to  ascer- 
tain the  facts,  not  what  might,  but  what  does  occur. 

46 


A  Physicist's  Approach 

Into  the  lives  of  the  lower  creatures  caprice  assuredly 
seems  to  enter;  the  treatment  of  a  fly  by  a  child  is 
capricious,  and  may  be  regarded  as  puzzling  to  the  fly. 
As  we  rise  in  the  scale  of  existence  we  hope  that 
things  get  better;  we  have  experience  that  they  do. 
It  may  be  said  that  up  to  a  point  in  the  scale  of  life 
vice  and  caprice  increase ;  that  the  lower  organisms 
and  the  plant  world  know  nothing  of  them,  and  that 
man  has  been  most  wicked  of  all ;  but  they  reach  a 
maximum  at  a  certain  stage  —  a  stage  the  best  of  the 
human  race  have  already  passed  —  and  we  need  not 
postulate  either  vice  or  caprice  in  our  far  superiors. 
Men  have  thought  themselves  the  sport  of  the  gods 
before  now,  but  let  us  hope  they  were  mistaken. 
Such  thoughts  would  lead  to  madness  and  despair. 
We  do  not  know  the  laws  which  govern  the  interac- 
tion of  different  orders  of  intelligence,  nor  do  we 
know  how  much  may  depend  on  our  own  attitude 
and  conduct.  It  may  be  that  prayer  is  an  instru- 
ment which  can  control  or  influence  higher  agencies, 
and  by  its  neglect  we  may  be  losing  the  use  of  a 
mighty  engine  to  help  on  our  lives  and  those  of 
others. 

The  Universe  is  huge  and  awful  every  way,  we 
might  so  easily  be  crushed  by  it;  we  need  the  help 
of  every  agency  available,  and  if  we  had  no  helpers 
we  should  stand  a  poor  chance.  The  loneliness  of 
it  when  we  leave  the  planet  would  be  appalling; 
sometimes  even  here  the  loneliness  is  great. 

What  the  "  protecting  atmosphere "  for  our  dis- 
embodied souls  may  be,  I  know  not.  Some  may 
liken  the  protection  to  the  care  of  a  man  for  a  dog, 

47 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

of  a  woman  for  a  child,  of  a  far-seeing  minister  for 
a  race  of  bewildered  slaves;  while  others  may  dash 
aside  the  contemplation  of  all  intermediaries  and 
agencies,  and  feel  themselves  safe  and  enfolded  in 
the  protecting  love  of  God  Himself. 

The  region  of  Religion  and  the  region  of  a  com- 
pleter Science  are  one. 

OLIVER  LODGE. 


48 


A    BIOLOGICAL    APPROACH 

PROFESSOR   J.   ARTHUR   THOMSON,   M.A. 

Natural  History  Department,  University  of  Aberdeen 

PROFESSOR   PATRICK   GEDDES 

University  Hall,  Edinburgh 

Introductory 

FOR  half  a  century  there  has  been  more  friction 
between  Biology  and  Theology  than  between 
any  other  two  expressions  of  Science  and  of  Faith, 
and  the  reasons  for  this  are  fairly  obvious.  Biology 
deals  with  life,  —  its  nature,  continuance,  and  evolu- 
tion,—  including  Human  Life,  and  has  come  to  con- 
clusions some  of  which  do  not  fit  in  well  with  the 
theological  doctrines  of  the  world  and  of  man ;  bio- 
logical discipline  fosters  certain  habits  of  mind  and  a 
conception  of  the  world  which  prompt  recoil  from 
various  theological  doctrines  that  touch  the  facts  of 
life,  or  foreclose  questions  which  these  doctrines 
raise ;  biology,  as  a  relatively  young  science,  has 
often  exhibited  the  self-confidence  and  intolerance 
associated  with  youth ;  and  finally,  not  a  few  on  both 
sides  have  rushed  into  the  controversial  lists  without 
due  acquaintance  with  the  rules  of  intellectual  tourna- 
ment, as  is  illustrated  when  the  biologist  makes  merry 
over  Jonah's  whale,  or  when  the  defender  of  the  faith 
entitles  his  book,  "  God  or  Natural  Selection." 
4  49 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

Although  there  has  never  been  much  love  lost 
between  Biology  and  Theology,  we  cannot  say  that 
there  is  any  unanimity  in  the  attitude  which  biolo- 
gists have  assumed,  or  assume,  in  regard  to  theologi- 
cal doctrines.  Some  are  or  have  been  aggressively 
hostile,  such  as  Haeckel  and  Huxley;  others  assume 
or  really  feel  a  nonchalant  indifference,  having  no 
use  for  theology ;  others  affect  a  superficial  acquies- 
cence, either  by  keeping  idea-tight  compartments  in 
their  cerebral  machinery,  or  by  condescending  to 
verbal  devices.  And  there  are  others,  who  feel  the 
opposition  to  be  real  and  deep,  but  who  try  to  effect 
friendly  contact  and  mutual  appreciation,  of  an  emo- 
tional sort  at  least. 

Similarly,  theologians  are  far  from  unanimity  in 
their  attitude  towards  biology.  There  are  those  who 
invade  the  biological  camp,  discovering  mistakes 
in  Darwinism,  incompleteness  everywhere,  and  the 
amateurishness  of  the  biologist  when  he  tries  to  be 
a  philosopher.  Others  affect  or  feel  indifference, 
and  are  in  their  fastnesses  quite  unmoved  by  any- 
thing the  biologist  may  have  to  say  regarding  hered- 
ity or  man's  place  in  nature.  Others,  more  facile, 
express  a  superficial  acquiescence  and  an  indulgent 
tolerance :  they  have  an  elastic  eclectic  system, 
capable  of  ingesting  all  data  vouched  for  by  respect- 
able authorities,  or  a  legerdemain  practice  with  verbal 
devices,  or,  like  some  of  their  scientific  brethren,  the 
art  of  keeping  idea-tight  compartments  in  their  brains. 
And  there  are  a  few  who  try  to  understand  what 
biologists  are  after,  who  endeavour  to  utilise  biologi- 
cal data  by  subliming  them  sub  specie  cetcmitatis ,  who 

5° 


A  Biological  Approach 

even  seek  to  re-adjust  the  theological  interpretations 
of  man  and  the  world  to  new  facts. 

Controversy  and  friction  must  be  regarded  as  often 
useful,  but  no  one  with  a  knowledge  of  the  thrusts 
and  parries  between  Biology  and  Theology  since  the 
publication  of  the  "Origin  of  Species"  (1859)  will 
deny  that  much  of  the  controversy  has  been  needless 
waste  of  time  and  energy.  Much  of  it  is  merely 
beating  or  heating  the  air;  and  there  have  been 
faults  on  both  sides. 

The  biologist  has  been  at  fault  —  in  combating 
doctrines  and  modes  of  interpretation  which  no  in- 
tellectual combatant  on  the  other  side  is  concerned 
to  defend ;  in  exciting  himself  over  minutiae  which 
are  but  outworks  of  the  citadel  of  faith,  or  historical 
vestiges  of  a  plan  of  campaign  now  almost  forgotten ; 
in  misunderstanding  the  aim  of  theology;  and  in 
failing  to  realise  the  need  of  religion  to  men  as  they 
are,  or  its  value  which  is  both  historically  and  experi- 
mentally demonstrable. 

The  theologian  also  has  been  at  fault,  sometimes 
in  keeping  aloof  from  the  order  of  facts  which  Bio- 
logy represents,  and  affecting  a  detachment  which  is 
contrary  to  the  genius  of  Christianity ;  sometimes  in 
misunderstanding  what  the  aim  of  science  is ;  some- 
times in  carping  at  minutiae;  and  oftenest  perhaps, 
in  imagining  that  his  transcendental  formulae  can 
continue  to  be  valid  if  they  remain  static. 

What  is  most  needed  is  self-criticism  on  both  sides, 
and  that  the  biologists  and  the  theologians  should 
meet  as  men  of  good-will  to  discuss  their  respective 
ideals  and  difficulties.     This  Eirenikon  is  intended  as 

5* 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

a  contribution  towards  that  mutual  understanding 
and  respect  that  makes  for  peace,  and  we  have 
devoted  the  bulk  of  our  essay  to  four  or  five  biologi- 
cal problems,  the  provisional  solutions  of  which  tend 
to  be  at  variance  with  theological  doctrines. 


I.  Illustration  of  Some  Biological  Problems, 

the  Provisional  Solutions   of  which 

tend  to  be  at  variance  with 

Theological  Doctrines 

A.  Biological  Analysis.  Science  is  not  any  par- 
ticular body  of  facts :  it  is  essentially  the  expression 
of  an  intellectual  attitude  or  mood  in  relation  to  any 
order  of  phenomena.  The  distinctive  feature  is  in 
the  method,  —  making  sure  of  facts,  classifying  them, 
analysing  them  into  their  simplest  adequate  expres- 
sion, observing  their  inter-relations,  grouping  them 
according  to  their  likenesses  of  co-existence  and 
sequence,  and  inventing  descriptive  formulae  which 
sum  them  up  in  terms  of  our  perceptual  experience. 

Thus  the  biologist,  who  may  be,  in  other  moods,  a 
poet,  or  a  philosopher,  or  religious,  seeks,  as  a  biolo- 
gist, to  interpret  scientifically  the  nature,  continuance, 
and  evolution  of  life.  He  becomes  aware  of  certain 
facts  (fractions  of  reality,  no  doubt)  which  interest 
him;  he  proceeds  to  make  himself  more  intimately 
acquainted  with  these,  that  is,  to  make  his  sensory 
experience  of  them  as  full  as  possible ;  he  seeks  to 
arrange  them  in  ordered  series,  to  detect  their  inter- 
relations and  likenesses  of  sequence,  to  reduce  them  to 

52 


A  Biological  Approach 

simpler  terms,  to  find  their  common  denominator ;  and 
he  finally  tries  to  sum  them  up  in  a  general  formula, 
which  he  often,  unfortunately,  calls  a  "  law."  But  he 
does  not  delude  himself  by  imagining  that  his  "  law  " 
is  an  explanation  of  the  facts  which  it  formulates. 

It  follows  then,  that  biological  analysis  is  working, 
and  must  work  in  a  direction  the  very  opposite  of 
that  of  theological  interpretation.  We  work  with 
William  of  Occam's  razor  (entia  11011  sunt  multipli- 
canda  prczter  necessitateni)  ;  "  entities  "  are  more  and 
more  closely  shorn  off;  "principles"  of  life  and 
growth,  of  development  and  heredity,  vanish;  "vital 
force  "  reluctantly  disappears ;  the  "  vegetable  soul " 
has  gone,  and,  for  many  cases,  the  "  animal  soul  "  has 
followed.  We  work  towards  a  common  denominator 
—  "protoplasm,"  which  if  it  appears  simple  to  the 
easy-going,  is  certainly  not  simple  to  the  expert. 

The  mediaeval  biologist  was  almost  forced  to  be 
"  spiritualistic,"  he  had  to  assume  "animal  spirits" 
and  "  vital  spirits,"  "  principles  of  life,"  "  vital  forces," 
and  "  vires  formative?"  Then  came  Harvey's  demon- 
stration of  some  main  factors  in  the  circulation  of 
the  blood,  the  first  of  a  long  series  of  attempts  to  ex- 
press vital  phenomena  in  terms  of  mechanism, — 
attempts  which  put  an  end  to  the  reign  of  "  spirits," 
though  not  to  the  intrusion  of  metaphysical  princi- 
ples. Each  great  step  in  physiological  analysis, 
especially  after  the  establishment  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  conservation  of  energy,  has  been  followed  by 
enthusiastic  adherence  to  the  mechanical  theory,  and 
then,  as  surely,  has  followed  a  re-action  to  vitalistic 
views.     Again  and  again  the  enthusiasm  of  discovery 

53 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

has  led  to  a  short-lived  belief  that  the  secret  of  the 
organism  was  about  to  be  solved ;  but  biologists  have 
always  come  sooner  or  later  to  see  that  their  pre- 
sumed interpretations  were  in  terms  of  things  that 
themselves  required  to  be  interpreted,  that  the  phys- 
ico-chemical interpretation  which  dominated  the 
mind  for  a  time  left  residual  phenomena  unaccounted 
for,  and  that  these  residual  phenomena  were  often 
quite  essential. 

We  are  confronted  to-day,  as  in  the  days  of 
Johannes  Miiller  and  Von  Baer,  with  the  opposed 
opinions  of  the  mechanical  and  the  vitalistic  schools. 
On  the  one  hand,  there  are  those  who  say  "  that  the 
further  physiology  advances,  the  more  does  it  become 
possible  to  explain,  on  physical  and  chemical  grounds, 
phenomena  which  have  hitherto  been  regarded  as 
associated  with  a  special  vital  force ;  that  it  is  only  a 
question  of  time ;  that  it  will  finally  be  shown  that 
the  whole  process  of  life  is  only  a  more  complicated 
form  of  motion  regulated  solely  by  the  laws  which 
govern  inorganic  nature."  And  it  must  be  admitted 
that  many  chemical  and  physical  processes  have  been 
detected  and  described  in  the  internal  economy  of  a 
living  creature,  and  that  results  of  great  value  have 
been  obtained  by  theoretically  abstracting  some  part 
of  the  body,  such  as  heart  or  lungs,  and  treating  it  as 
a  piece  of  mechanism,  disregarding  for  the  time  being 
what  is,  however,  essential,  —  its  maintenance  and 
growth,  its  control  and  determination  as  a  member  of 
the  unity  which  we  call  organism. 

It  may  seem  strange  to  ask  whether  the  progress 
of  nineteenth  century  physiology  has  been  signalised 

54 


A  Biological  Approach 

by  the  achievement  of  re-expressing  any  vital  phe- 
nomenon in  terms  of  physics  and  chemistry.  But  it 
is,  to  say  the  least,  very  doubtful  that  there  has  been 
any  such  success. 

"To  me,"  says  Bunge,  a  physiologist  of  undeniable 
standing,  "  the  history  of  physiology  teaches  the  exact 
opposite.  I  think  the  more  thoroughly  and  conscien- 
tiously we  endeavour  to  study  biological  problems, 
the  more  are  we  convinced  that  even  those  processes 
which  we  have  already  regarded  as  explicable  by 
chemical  and  physical  laws,  are  in  reality  infinitely 
more  complex,  and  at  present  defy  any  attempt  at  a 
mechanical  explanation." 

Dr.  J.  S.  Haldane  goes  even  further:  "  If  we  look 
back  at  the  phenomena  which  are  capable  of  being 
stated,  or  explained  in  physico-chemical  terms,  we 
see  at  once  that  there  is  nothing  in  them  characteris- 
tic of  life.  .  .  .  We  are  now  far  more  definitely  aware 
of  the  obstacles  to  any  advance  in  this  (physico- 
chemical)  direction,  and  there  is  not  the  slightest  in- 
dication that  they  will  be  removed,  but  rather  that 
with  further  increase  of  knowledge,  and  more  refined 
methods  of  physical  and  chemical  investigation,  they 
will  only  appear  more  and  more  difficult  to  sur- 
mount."    This  is  the  modern  vitalist  position. 

We  see,  then,  that  while  modern  biology  no  longer 
postulates  a  "vital  force,"  that  is,  a  "hyper-mechan- 
ical "  factor,  a  mystical  power,  a  non-material  agent, 
presiding  over  the  activities  of  the  body,  it  admits, 
through  probably  the  majority  of  its  experts,  that  the 
phenomena  distinctive  of  life  cannot  at  present  be  re- 
stated in  the  language  of  chemistry  and  physics.     It 

55 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

may  be  asked,  however,  whether  this  is  more  than  an 
argumentum  ad  ignorantiatn.  It  is  still  morning  on  the 
dial  of  science,  biological  analysis  is  still  in  its  youth, 
partial  re-statements  have  been  given  of  numerous 
functions,  we  know  much  in  regard  to  the  chemical 
aspects  of  metabolism,  synthetic  chemistry  is  still 
re-creating  organic  compounds  from  inorganic  ele- 
ments, and  so  on.  May  we  not  reasonably  expect 
some  day  to  attain  to  an  understanding  of  the  chem- 
ical secret  of  protoplasm,  in  regard  to  which  theories 
already  abound? 

To  this  we  can  only  answer,  that  at  any  given  time 
we  must  take  things  as  they  are.  Sufficient  unto  the 
day  is  the  progress  thereof.  Moreover,  if  we  could 
show  that  inorganic  processes  contain  implicitly  the 
potentiality  of  life,  then  our  conception  of  what  is 
often  brutally  called  "dead  matter"  will  have  to  be 
altered,  that  is  all.  Furthermore,  as  Karl  Pearson 
says,  "The  problem  of  whether  life  is  or  is  not  a 
mechanism,  is  not  a  question  of  whether  the  same 
things,  '  matter '  and  '  force '  are  or  are  not  at  the 
back  of  organic  and  inorganic  phenomena,  —  of  what 
is  at  the  back  of  either  class  of  sense-impressions  we 
know  absolutely  nothing,  —  but  of  whether  the  con- 
ceptual shorthand  of  the  physicist,  this  ideal  world  of 
ether,  atom,  and  molecule,  will  or  will  not  also  suffice 
to  describe  the  biologist's  perceptions."  Even  if 
the  physicist's  formulae  should  fit  vital  phenomena  — 
which  they  do  not  seem  to  do  —  there  would  be  no 
"  explanation"  forthcoming,  for  "mechanism  does  not 
explain  anything !  " 

It  may  be  said,  however,  from  the  theological  side : 
56 


A  Biological  Approach 

All  this  is  mock  modesty  on  your  part;  as  men  of 
science,  you  admit  that  it  is  not  at  present  possible 
to  re-describe  the  ways  of  life  by  physico-chemical 
formulae,  yet  at  the  bottom  of  your  hearts  you  be- 
lieve that  the  organism  is  nothing  more  than  a 
wonderful,  self-storing,  self-repairing  engine  with  the 
power  of  growing  and  multiplying,  as  even  crystals 
and  complex  molecules  may  do;  you  say  that  you 
cannot  at  present  get  below  your  common  denomi- 
nator, to  wit,  the  properties  of  protoplasm,  if  even 
you  can  always  get  so  far  in  reducing  the  fractions 
of  reality  that  you  know,  yet  you  are  looking  forward 
to  some  day  reading  the  riddle  of  protoplasm,  to 
seeing  life,  with  Ostwald,  for  instance,  as  an  intricate 
series  of  fermentations,  or  in  some  similar,  to  us 
equally  fantastic  way.  After  all,  you  are  looking 
forward,  more  cautiously,  perhaps,  than  before,  but 
even  more  deliberately  to  shutting  God  out  of  His 
universe.  To  this  we  must  simply  answer,  as  before, 
that  science  is  not  concerned  with  theoretical  may- 
be's  of  the  future;  that,  not  being  philosophy,  it 
does  not  seek  to  explain  anything,  merely  to  re- 
describe  in  conceptual  formulae;  and  that,  if  the 
worst  came  to  the  worst,  so  to  speak,  or  the  best 
to  the  best,  and  we  did  understand  the  secret  of 
protoplasm,  that  would  not,  to  use  Ruskin's  cruel 
summary,  prove  that  there  is  no  use  for  a  God,  —  a 
summary  which  was  an  irrelevancy  quite  unworthy 
of  his  sagaciously  analytic  mind  —  but  would  only 
show  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  dead  matter. 
The  same  line  of  argument  may  be  adopted  in  regard 
to  the  attempted  analysis  of  psychical  phenomena  in 

57 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

terms  of  physical  categories,  or  of  personal  experi- 
ence in  terms  of  sub-personal  categories,  but  we 
leave  this  to  the  psychologist. 

B.  The  Doctrine  of  Heredity.  Difficulties  of  an- 
other sort,  more  practical  than  those  in  Section  A, 
arise  when  we  consider  the  modern  biological  doc- 
trine of  heredity.  We  can  no  longer  think  of  Hered- 
ity as  a  Fate  outside  the  organism,  granting  certain 
gifts  and  withholding  others;  we  cannot  biologically 
draw  a  distinction  at  the  outset  of  a  life  between  the 
heir  and  his  inheritance,  for  they  are  identical.  In- 
heritance is  all  that  a  living  creature  is  or  has  to  start 
with  in  virtue  of  the  hereditary  relation,  —  the  relation 
of  genetic  continuity  which  binds  an  organism  to  its 
ancestry.  Nurture,  in  the  widest  sense,  may  do  much 
to  modify  a  man's  natural  inheritance,  or  the  expres- 
sion of  it  as  the  man  develops;  but  we  have  little 
warrant  for  believing  that  nurture  can  transmissibly 
change  nature  in  such  a  way  that  the  acquired  gains 
or  losses  of  parents  are  entailed  on  their  offspring. 
Mental  characteristics  (including  moral)  are  inherited, 
like  physical  characteristics.  Like  a  complex  mosaic, 
the  whole  of  a  man's  nature  is  built  up  of  contributions 
from  parents  and  grandparents  and  other  ancestors. 
The  child  is  a  chip  of  the  old  block,  —  the  average  of 
the  stock  from  which  he  springs.  A  good  nature  may 
be  half-hidden  under  acquired  ugliness ;  a  bad  nature 
may  be  nurtured  into  self-control  and  repression ;  on 
either  side  there  is  great  plasticity ;  but  the  real  stuff 
is  only  changeable  slowly  by  organic  variation. 

In  a  sense,  of  course,  all  this  is  an  old  story,  but 
the  modern  note  is  that  we  cannot  regard  the  inheri- 

5S 


A  Biological  Approach 

tance  as  a  legacy  to  a  metaphysically  abstracted  heir ; 
the  inheritance  is  or  constitutes  the  heir.  Rightly 
or  wrongly,  it  is  not  congruent  with  the  biological 
position  to  suppose  that  at  a  certain  point  in  develop- 
ment, the  soul  steps  in  to  put  its  shoulders  under  the 
yoke  of  the  inheritance.  To  make  an  antithesis  be- 
tween the  inheritance  and  what  a  preacher  quaintly 
called,  "  the  ego  behind  the  personality,"  seems  im- 
possible. Whatever  we  think  the  word  "  soul "  to 
mean,  it  cannot  be  intruded  into  the  unity  of  the 
heritage.  It  is  implicit  within  it  from  the  first,  a 
slumbering  potentiality,  part  and  parcel  of  the  in- 
herited organisation.  But  if  the  individual  is  the 
product  of  his  ancestry,  a  transient  whirlpool  in  the 
stream  of  life,  a  mosaic  of  hereditary  contributions 
from  many  forbears,  a  chip  of  the  old  block,  a  detach- 
able pendant  on  the  eternal  bead-string  of  germ-cells, 
and  altogether  predetermined,  who  can  praise  him, 
who  can  blame  him,  this  child  of  the  ages?  In  what 
sense  is  he  master  of  his  fate  or  arbiter  of  his  destiny? 
In  what  sense  is  he  responsible,  a  free  agent,  this 
product  whose  yea  and  nay  have  been  as  rigorously 
predetermined  as  his  stature? 

What  has  the  biologist  to  say?  Little  more  than 
this,  that,  well-fated,  or  ill-fated,  each  living  creature 
is  born  a  new  creature  —  an  individuality.  There  is 
variation  as  well  as  continuity,  and  the  mould  is,  so 
to  speak,  broken  each  time.  The  result  may  be  a 
monster,  a  mediocrity,  or  a  masterpiece,  with  the 
chances  always  in  favour  of  mediocrity,  but  in  any 
case,  each  new  creature  is  a  new  creature.  And  in 
the  case  of  man,  this  seems  to  imply  a  personality 

59 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

with  a  will  of  its  own  to  this  extent,  that  it  may  or 
may  not  use  possibilities  of  nurture  in  a  manner  quite 
unpredictable.  The  radius  of  freedom  of  choice  may 
be  long  or  short,  but  there  is  some  freedom,  some- 
thing unpredictable  in  the  activity  of  each  new  child. 
It  may  deceive  itself,  happily  or  unhappily,  as  to  the 
length  of  its  tether,  but  some  freedom  is  born  with  it 
just  because  it  is  something  new.  What  this  small 
or  large  measure  of  freedom  may  involve,  depends 
mainly  on  the  variety  of  stimuli  which  reach  the 
organism  during  its  development.  In  short,  the  fact 
of  variability  has  to  be  set  against  that  of  continuity, 
and  the  plastic  power  of  environment  against  the  per- 
sisting power  of  natural  inheritance. 

What  the  theologian  has  to  say  may  be  best  il- 
lustrated by  a  quotation  from  Prof.  James  Denny's 
recent  work  on  "  The  Atonement  and  the  Modern 
Mind."  "  All  life  is  one,  biologists  argue.  It  rises 
from  the  same  spring,  it  runs  the  same  course,  it 
comes  to  the  same  end.  The  life  of  man  is  rooted  in 
nature,  and  that  which  beats  in  my  veins  is  an  inheri- 
tance from  an  immeasurable  past.  It  is  absurd  to 
speak  of  my  responsibility  for  it,  or  of  my  guilt 
because  it  manifests  itself  in  me,  as  it  inevitably  does, 
in  such  and  such  forms.  .  .  .  How  are  we  to  appre- 
ciate this  mode  of  thought?  We  must  point  out,  I 
think,  the  consequence  to  which  it  leads.  If  a  man 
denies  that  he  is  responsible  for  the  nature  which  he 
has  inherited,  —  denies  responsibility  for  it,  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  inherited,  —  it  is  a  fair  question  to 
ask  him  for  what  he  does  accept  responsibility.  When 
he  has  divested  himself  of  the  inherited  nature,  what 

60 


A  Biological  Approach 

is  left?  The  real  meaning  of  such  disowning  of 
responsibility  is,  that  a  man  asserts  that  his  life  is  a 
part  of  the  physical  phenomena  of  the  universe,  and 
nothing  else ;  and  he  forgets,  in  the  very  act  of  mak- 
ing the  assertion,  that  if  it  were  true,  it  could  not 
be  so  much  as  made.  The  merely  physical  is  tran- 
scended in  every  such  assertion  ;  and  the  man  who  has 
transcended  it,  rooted  though  his  life  be  in  nature, 
and  one  with  the  life  of  the  whole  and  of  all  the  past, 
must  take  the  responsibility  of  living  that  life  out, 
on  the  high  level  of  self-consciousness  and  morality 
which  his  very  disclaimer  involves." 

C.  The  Evolution  Tlieory.  The  general  idea  of  evo- 
lution, which  is  fast  becoming  an  organic  element  in 
all  our  thinking,  is  not  in  any  way  peculiar  to  biology, 
though  it  has  been  most  worked  with  and  best  justi- 
fied in  this  sphere.  The  general  doctrine  of  organic 
evolution  states  that  the  plants  and  animals  now 
around  us  are  the  results  of  natural  (scientifically 
analysable)  processes  of  growth  and  change,  of  sift- 
ing and  singling,  working  throughout  the  ages,  that 
the  forms  we  see  are  the  descendants  of  ancestors  on 
the  whole  somewhat  simpler,  that  these  are  descended 
from  yet  simpler  forms,  and  so  on  backwards,  till  we 
lose  our  clue  in  the  unknown  —  but  doubtless  momen- 
tous—  vital  events  of  pre-Cambrian  ages,  or,  in  other 
words,  in  the  thick  mist  of  life's  beginnings.  This 
theory  has  been  slowly  evolved,  gaining  content  as  re- 
search furnished  fuller  illustration,  and  gaining  clear- 
ness as  criticism  forced  it  to  keep  in  touch  with  facts. 
It  has  been  slowly  developed  from  the  stage  of  sug- 
gestion to  the  stage  of  verification ;    from  being  an 

61 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

a  priori  anticipation,  it  has  become  an  interpretation 
of  nature ;  and  from  being  a  modal  interpretation,  it 
is  advancing  to  the  rank  of  a  causal  theory. 

What  does  the  theory  of  organic  evolution  imply? 
(i)  It  presupposes  in  some  form  or  other  an  order  of 
nature  to  start  with,  —  for  the  more  ambitious,  a 
nebula  or  an  earth  without  form  and  void,  or  for 
most  of  us  some  primitive  protoplasts  gliding  in  a 
quiet  pool.  It  cannot  evolve  a  cosmos  out  of  hope- 
less chaos,  or  out  of  nothing.  It  must  be  granted  a 
primeval  germ,  originating  it  does  not  know  how. 
Thus  to  some  extent  it  postulates  a  pre-established 
order  of  nature.  (2)  It  reveals  more  and  more  fully 
a  natural  and  necessary  history,  scientifically  con- 
ceivable, without  "  supernatural  "  intrusions,  one  world 
evolving  of  itself  m  the  same  sense  that  a  seed  or  an 
egg  develops  of  itself.  (3)  It  discloses  what  must 
on  the  whole  be  called  an  undeniable  progress,  from 
the  apparently  simple  to  the  obviously  complex,  with 
increasing  differentiation  and  integration,  towards 
more  and  more  perfect. adaptiveness  or  fitness,  more 
and  more  fulness  of  expression,  greater  and  greater 
freedom  from  the  grip  of  the  environment,  and  ever 
completer  unfolding  or  liberation  of  the  psychical  life. 

There  are  many  questions  which  the  theologian 
may  pertinently  ask  in  regard  to  the  evolution  theory. 
(1)  What  of  "the  mist  of  life's  beginnings"?  what 
of  the  vital  order  of  nature?  is  it  not  simpler  and 
franker  to  recognise  the  doctrine  of  creation  to  the 
extent  of  saying  that  God  created  the  primitive  proto- 
plasts? To  ask  this  of  a  man  is  reasonable,  but  not 
of  a  biologist  as  such,  who  has  no    scientific    data 

62 


A  Biological  Approach 

bearing  on  the  subject.1  (2)  Again,  the  theologian 
may  ask  the  biologist  if  he  thinks  that  his  theory  of 
evolution  really  gets  rid  of  the  teleological  idea  by 
showing,  for  instance,  how  the  wonderful  adaptations 
in  which  animal  nature  is  so  rich  have  historically 
come  about.  It  was  Romanes  who  said  :  "  Wherever 
we  tap  organic  nature,  it  seems  to  flow  with  purpose," 
and  every  naturalist  will  agree  —  if  the  word  seems 
be  underlined  and  if  the  word  "  purpose  "  be  put  in 
inverted  commas.  What  we  actually  observe  is  fit- 
ness, and  that  fitness  remains  as  real  as  before,  when 
we  have  succeeded  in  showing  how  it  came  to  be. 
In  the  end  we  are  forced  back  to  regarding  effective 
adapting  response  to  the  order  of  nature  as  a  primary 
quality  of  the  primeval  protoplasm  ;  and  even  if  that 
was  selected  out  from  stuffs  which  were  non-adaptive, 
the  primitive  adaptability  must  simply  come  in  a  little 
further  back.  To  show  that  the  history  of  a  thing 
affords  an  interpretation  of  its  present  fitness,  which 
is  what  biology  is  continually  doing,  and  to  interpret 
phases  of  the  history  in  the  light  of  the  finished  pro- 
duct, is  scientific  teleology.  "  There  is  a  wider  tele- 
ology," Huxley  wrote,  "  which  is  not  touched  by  the 
doctrine  of  evolution,  but  is  actually  based  upon  the 
fundamental    proposition   of  evolution."      But  what 

1  "  It  is  very  desirable,"  Huxley  repeatedly  said,  "  to  re- 
member that  evolution  is  not  an  explanation  of  the  cosmos,  but 
merely  a  generalised  statement  of  the  method  and  results  of  that 
process.  And,  further,  that,  if  there  is  any  proof  that  the 
cosmic  process  was  set  agoing  by  any  agent,  then  that  agent 
will  be  the  creator  of  it  and  of  all  its  products,  although  super- 
natural intervention  may  remain  strictly  excluded  from  its 
further  course. " 

63 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

transcendental  inference  is  to  be  drawn  from  the  fact 
of  fitness,  what  "  the  argument  from  design  "  really 
proves,  is  not  for  the  biologist  to  say.  (3)  Another 
question,  cognate  to  the  last,  is :  Does  the  evolu- 
tion-process as  it  now  proceeds,  and  as  it  has  pro- 
ceeded through  the  unthinkable  millions  of  years, 
whose  graveyards  are  all  we  can  know,  reveal  to  the 
biologist  any  plot,  any  strategy?  Is  it  true  that 
through  the  ages  an  increasing  purpose  runs?  or 
does  the  biologist  imagine  organic  evolution  as  a  con- 
catenation of  chance  episodes,  chapter  after  chapter 
of  happy  accidents?  Our  answer  is  that  the  evolu- 
tion-process seems  like  a  development-process,  orderly 
and  progressive;  that  there  have  been  catastrophes, 
crises,  "  chance-hits  "  in  the  former,  just  as  there  are  in 
the  latter,  but  that  on  the  whole  the  process  reads 
like  a  story  of  growth,  like  the  working  out  of  a  big 
idea.  The  evolution-theory  has  been  libelled  as  an 
attempt  to  re-instate  "  the  old  Pagan  goddess, 
Chance,"  but  Huxley  and  Darwin  cannot  have  failed 
to  convince  serious  students  that  by  "  chance " 
and  "  fortuitous  "  events,  they  meant  no  more  than 
events  of  whose  causes  they  were  ignorant.  Nowa- 
days, moreover,  "  chance "  has  been  subjected  to 
very  careful  study,  and  turns  out  to  be  one  of  the 
most  orderly  phenomena  in  the  universe !  (4)  The 
theologian  has  also  every  right  to  say  to  the  evolu- 
tionist :  Your  modal  formula  commends  itself  to  you, 
and  to  us ;  evolution  really  seems  to  have  been  the 
method  of  the  world's  becoming ;  but  tell  us  frankly 
how  far  you  have  got  on  in  raising  the  modal  formula 
to  the  rank  of  a  causal  theory?     Supposing  evolution 

64 


A  Biological  Approach 

be  a  fact,  what  of  the  factors  in  the  process?  There 
is  variability  supplying  the  raw  materials  of  progress ; 
there  is  modifiability  directly  affected  by  environ- 
mental influence ;  there  is  heredity  conditioning 
transmission  or  non-transmission ;  there  is  the  struggle 
for  existence,  the  outcome  of  which  is  natural  selec- 
tion or  discriminate  elimination,  and  a  survival  of  the 
relatively  more  fit;  and,  finally,  there  are  all  the 
forms  of  isolation  which  limit  the  range  of  mutual 
fertility.  But  are  these  factors  proving  themselves 
sufficient?  Has  not  one  of  the  leaders  written  an 
essay  "  On  the  unknown  factor  in  evolution  "? 

The  biologist's  answer  should  indicate  the  bigness 
of  the  concepts,  —  variation,  modification,  selection, 
isolation,  —  and  that  we  are  far  from  having  ex- 
hausted their  scope ;  that  the  discovery  of  any  new 
factor  scientifically  expressible  will  be  welcomed ; 
and  that  serious  aetiology  is  not  yet  fifty  years  old. 
The  formulae  work  well,  but  there  may  be  other 
formulae ;  the  evolution-theory  is  itself  in  process  of 
evolution.  But  while  there  is  much  dispute  and  un- 
certainty as  to  the  relative  values  of  the  various 
factors,  the  general  fact  of  evolution  becomes  ever 
clearer.  It  may  not  be  capable  of  rigid  demonstra- 
tion, like  the  conservation  of  energy,  but  we  know  of 
no  fact  contradictory  to  it,  of  no  lock  in  which  its 
master-key  does  not  turn. 

D.  Biological  Doctrine  of  Man.  Biology  reveals 
man  as  corporeally  affiliated  to  a  simian  stock,  as  of 
great  antiquity,  as  once  much  less  perfect,  and  yet 
as  the  climax  (as  regards  brains)  of  a  long  evolu- 
tionary process.  We  do  not  know  when  he  emerged 
5  65 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

as  such,  but  it  is  a  moderate  estimate  to  suggest  half 
a  million  years  ago.  We  do  not  know  whence  he 
emerged,  but  it  seems  just  to  reject  any  interpretation 
which  denies  his  structural  affiliation  to  some  ape-like 
type.  No  one  dreams  of  arguing  that  man  is  descended 
from  any  living  form  of  ape ;  but  at  what  point  the 
human  stock  diverged  from  the  simian  remains  quite 
obscure.  Man  has  his  structural  peculiarities,  of 
course,  from  his  chin  to  his  heel ;  but  the  great  gap 
between  man  and  other  living  creatures  is  in  brain- 
development,  in  mental  life,  —  in  his  language,  reason, 
and  morality,  expressed  at  so  many  different  levels 
along  an  inclined  plane.  Nor  do  we  know  how  man 
arose ;  for  in  spite  of  acute  suggestions  as  to  the  im- 
portance of  the  enlarged  brain,  the  erect  attitude,  the 
use  of  the  hands,  the  family  life,  the  prolonged  in- 
fancy, the  formation  of  an  external  heritage,  and  so 
on,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  factors  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  man  partake  largely  of  the  nature  of  may-be's 
which  have  no  permanent  position  in  science.  Thus  it 
happens  that  while  we  do  not  know  when,  or  whence, 
or  how  Man  emerged,  we  yet  regard  him  as  a  natural 
product  of  the  evolutionary  process,  because  the 
cumulative  evidence  is  so  strong  against  making  him 
"  the  great  exception."  It  is  unthinkable  that  the 
evolution-process  should  break  down  at  the  finish. 

It  must  be  noted  here  that  Darwin's  magnanimous 
collaborates,  the  Nestor  among  biologists,  the  doyen 
of  Evolution-theory  now  that  Spencer  has  gone,  does 
not  agree  with  his  brethren  in  regarding  Man  as  a 
natural  product  of  evolution.  Alfred  Russel  Wal- 
lace does  not   believe   that   the   known  factors   are 

66 


A  Biological  Approach 

adequate  to  account  for  Man's  higher  qualities,  for 
example,  the  artistic  and  moral  faculties,  and  he 
concludes  that  these  must  have  had  another  mode  of 
origin,  apart  from  the  normal  evolutionary  process. 
They  are  things  apart,  for  which  "  we  can  only  find 
an  adequate  cause  in  the  unseen  universe  of  spirit." 
He  says  the  same  in  regard  to  the  origin  of  life  and 
the  emergence  of  consciousness ;  and  of  course  no 
biologist  knows  how  to  solve  these  riddles,  or  can 
object  to  the  veteran  holding  any  view  he  pleases  in  re- 
gard to  them.  But  when  it  comes  to  separating  off  cer- 
tain qualities  of  man,  —  mathematical,  musical,  artistic, 
and  moral,  —  and  saying  that  these  cannot  be  products 
of  natural  evolution,  we  must  enter  a  respectful  pro- 
test. It  is  giving  up  the  problem  prematurely,  and 
without  exhausting  the  scope  of  the  known  factors. 
It  is  an  abandonment  of  the  scientific  position,  and 
suggestive  of  a  somewhat  quaint  dualism,  to  suppose 
that  "  spiritual  influences  "  are  ready  at  hand  to  help 
natural  evolution  over  stiles  of  difficulty.  It  has  to 
be  remembered,  however,  that  Wallace  has  had 
spiritualistic  experiences  which  have  convinced  him 
that  scientific  analysis  is  leaving  out  an  important 
set  of  factors. 

The  biological  doctrine  of  man  is  still  young  and 
incipient,  very  indefinite  still  as  to  the  when,  whence, 
and  how  of  his  emergence ;  but  the  whole  tendency 
of  research  is  in  favour  of  regarding  him  as  part  and 
parcel  with  the  rest  of  creation.  The  value  of  a 
Shakespeare,  a  Newton,  a  Goethe  is  not  lessened  by 
the  fact  that  each  was  once  a  simple  child,  and  be- 
fore that  a  minute  corpuscle  of  living  matter,  and 

67 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

the  same  holds  true  in  regard  to  man's  evolution. 
He  has  no  reason  to  be  ashamed  of  his  ancestry, 
and,  in  any  case,  it  does  not  affect  his  value.  But 
the  difficulty  is  to  reconcile  the  biological  interpreta- 
tion with  the  theological  doctrine  of  man  "  made  in 
the  image  of  God,"  yet  with  that  of  "  The  Fall " ; 
and  here,  then,  we  give  place  to  the  theologian.  Let 
him  restate  these  conceptions  in  our  idiom  by  all 
means,  if  he  can ;  let  him  at  any  rate  explain  them 
to  us  anew  in  that  of  his  own  times,  and  not  simply 
repeat  them  in  the  phraseology  of  the  past.  We 
realise  of  course  that  this  is  what  he  aims  at;  but  we 
do  not  yet  know  with  any  sufficient  clearness  what 
his  modern  re-statement  may  be. 

E.  Ethical  Aspect  of  Organic  Evolution.  Very 
vital  to  our  discussion  is  the  question  whether  any 
judgment  can  be  formed  as  to  the  ethical  aspect  of 
the  general  process  of  organic  evolution,  which  lies 
before  us  as  a  sort  of  object-lesson  in  progress.  If 
elimination  in  the  struggle  for  existence  be  nature's 
sole  formula  of  progress,  how  are  we  to  think  of  this 
in  relation  to  our  own  human  development? 

In  regard  to  this  question  four  positions  are  held. 
First,  there  are  those  who  simply  accept  the  conven- 
tional Darwinian  view,  and  use  it  to  justify  a  laissez- 
faire  policy.  Secondly,  there  is  the  position  of  those 
who,  so  to  speak,  give  Nature  up,  who  hear  in  her 
many  voices  no  helpful  word  to  man  in  his  endeavour 
after  better-being.  Thus  Professor  James  in  his  lec- 
ture "Is  life  worth  living?"  proclaims  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  Natural  Theology,  and  finds  in  Nature 
"no  universe,"  but  a  "  multiverse,"  all  plasticity  and 

68 


A  Biological  Approach 

indifference,  a  "harlot"  and  "mere  weather."  It  is 
said  that  science  is  never  more  than  a  broken  mirror 
which  philosophy  reunites;  if  so,  we  cannot  but  hope 
that  the  above  conclusion,  which  is  contrary  to  our 
whole  view  of  the  evolution-process,  is  not  a  good 
sample  of  philosophical  mending.  Thirdly,  there  is 
the  view  which  Huxley  stated  in  his  well-known 
Romanes  lecture,  that  ethical  progress  for  man  de- 
pends upon  his  combating  the  cosmic  process,  and 
rising  above  the  struggle  for  existence.  We  must 
look  for  no  moral  support  from  the  vast  "  gladiatorial 
show  "  of  nature ;  we  must  rather  set  our  face  against 
hers,  and  try  to  reverse  her  methods. 

Huxley  said  that  well-doing  has  only  as  much 
natural  sanction  as  ill-doing,  for  both  are  products 
of  natural  evolution.  Just  in  the  same  way  it  may 
be  said  that  disease  has  been  evolved  pari  passu  with 
vigorous  health,  and  therefore  has  as  much  natural 
sanction.  The  facts,  however,  contradict  this  view; 
for  Nature  pronounces  verdict  on  the  diseased  by 
eliminating  them,  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts  (some- 
times perhaps  anti-evolutionary)  to  save. 

Huxley  indicated  that  the  thief  and  the  murderer 
follow  nature  as  much  as  the  philanthropist.  But  we 
doubt  this,  since  they  pursue  a  course  which  often 
ends  in  their  elimination.  The  bay-tree  of  the  wicked 
may  seem  to  be  an  evergreen,  yet  it  does  die  down. 
There  is  little  crime  or  anti-social  conduct  in  the 
animal  world;  it  is  a  contradiction  in  terms. 

If  we  make  a  curve  of  the  ascent  of  vertebrates, 
marking  their  positions  according  to  the  degree  of 
brain-development  (which  is  generally  a  reliable  in- 

69 


) 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

dex  of  individuation),  we  find  that  as  the  curve 
ascends  the  ordinates  of  marital  affection,  parental 
care,  mutual  aid,  and  gentler  emotions  generally, 
are  on  the  whole  heightened  step  by  step.  That 
organisms  so  endowed  should  survive  in  spite  of  the 
admitted  egoistic  competition  that  is  rife,  is  nature's 
sanction.  The  earth  is  the  abode  of  the  strong,  but 
it  is  also  the  home  of  the  loving. 

It  appears,  then,  that  an  outlook  on  Nature's  regime 
or  strategy  suggests  to  some  merely  a  laissez-faire 
acquiescence  —  a  trustful  reliance  on  the  effective- 
ness of  the  selection-process ;  to  others  that  there  is 
no  guidance  at  all  to  be  had  from  this  "  harlot " 
Nature,  who  happens  to  be  our  mother;  to  others 
that  the  secret  of  man's  progress  is  to  try  to  reverse 
Nature's  strategy.  But  is  there  not  room  for  an  en- 
deavour to  diminish  the  self-confidence  of  the  acqui- 
escence, the  pessimism  of  aloofness,  the  antinomy  of 
suggested  reversal,  by  a  fresh  appeal  to  Nature?  We 
think  there  is.  We  cannot,  however,  enter  here  upon 
the  long  argument  which  is  needed  to  do  justice  to 
this  position;    only  an  outline  can  be  attempted. 

From  the  time  of  Empedocles,  who  recognised  two 
ultimate  forces  in  nature,  Love  and  Hate,  down  to 
Herbert  Spencer,  who  has  insisted  on  altruism  as 
well  as  egoism  in  Nature,  there  have  been  attempts 
to  see  nature  as  a  materialised  ethical  process;  and 
our  sympathies  are  with  this  endeavour.  "  From  the 
dawn  of  life,"  Spencer  said,  "  altruism  has  been  no 
less  essential  than  egoism."  "  Self-sacrifice  is  no  less 
primordial  than  self-preservation."  Similarly,  the  es- 
says of  Fiske,  our  own  "  Evolution  of  Sex,"  Drum- 

70 


A  Biological  Approach 

mond's  "  Ascent  of  Man,"  Coe's  book  on  "  Natural 
Selection,"  Kropotkin's  essays  on  "  Mutual  Aid," 
have  sought  to  emphasise  what  may  be  called  in 
general  terms  the  altruistic  aspects  of  life. 

The  point  is  whether  the  conventional  Darwinian 
appeal  to  Nature  can  claim  completeness.  Have  we 
not  been  too  readily  content  with  projecting  upon 
Nature  the  social  theory  of  a  competitive  mechanical 
and  military  age  ?  To  many  of  us  it  seems  that  there 
was  too  much  red  in  the  picture  which  Darwin 
painted ;  yet  it  should  be  remembered  that,  at  his 
best  at  least,  he  denned  the  struggle  for  existence, 
which  he  used  "  in  a  wide  or  metaphorical  sense,"  in 
such  wise  as  to  include  mutual  dependence  of  organ- 
ism upon  organism,  and  the  efforts  made  for  the  sake 
of  the  young.  The  trouble  is  that  Darwin's  caution 
has  not  always  been  maintained,  and  certainly  not 
always  imitated,  and  that  his  picture  has  been  re- 
produced by  cheap  or  coarser  processes  until  it  has, 
in  the  hands  of  some,  lost  both  subtlety  and  truth, 
and  become  a  harsh  and  ugly  print  of  Nature  as  "  a 
continuous  Waterloo,"  "  a  dismal  cockpit,"  a  "  vast 
gladiatorial  show."  This  is  not  merely  bad  as  a  piece 
of  unbalanced  cosmogony ;  the  worst  of  it  is  that,  by 
a  vicious  circle,  the  libel  projected  upon  Nature  is 
brought  back  again  to  justify  one  set  of  human 
methods,  the  egoistic;  to  discredit  others,  the  altru- 
istic ones. 

In  correction  of  this  it  has  been  urged  by  the 
authors  above-mentioned  that  organic  progress  de- 
pends on  much  more  than  a  squabble  round  the 
platter,  that  the  struggle  for  existence  is  far  more 

7i 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

than  an  internecine  struggle  at  the  margin  of  subsis- 
tence, that  it  includes  all  the  multitudinous  efforts  of 
self  and  for  others  between  the  poles  of  hunger  and 
love,  all  the  endeavours  of  mate  for  mate,  of  parent 
for  offspring,  of  kin  for  kin.  Love  and  life  are  factors 
in  progress  as  well  as  pain  and  death ;  the  struggle 
for  existence  is  often  in  part  an  endeavour  after  well- 
being  made  by  socially-bound  or  kin-bound  organisms 
in  a  social  environment;  the  premium  on  teeth  and 
claws,  on  beaks  and  talons,  is  not  greater  than  that 
on  the  warm  solicitude  of  the  maternal  heart  or  the 
patience  of  the  brooding  bird.  That  the  altruism  may 
be  quite  instinctive  does  not  seem  to  us  to  affect  the 
present  issue.  Species-regarding  is  species-regarding 
still,  so  far  as  the  biologist  is  concerned.  He  cannot 
enter  upon  the  casuistry  of  conscious  motive. 

It  does  not  seem  desirable  to  try  to  make  out  an 
undue  dualism  in  Nature's  process,  —  any  opposition 
between  the  struggle  for  existence  and  the  altruistic 
struggle.  At  its  best,  the  formula,  the  "  struggle  for 
existence,"  includes  all.  Thus  conceived  with  Darwin 
at  his  best,  it  is  both  competitive  and  non-competitive, 
conscious  and  unconscious,  self-regarding  and  species- 
regarding,  egoistic  and  altruistic.  It  occurs  between 
the  living  and  the  not-living,  between  fellows,  between 
foes,  between  the  sexes,  between  the  parts  of  an 
organism,  between  the  germ-cells  themselves,  and 
even  between  the  living  particles  that  compose  these 
cells.  In  other  words,  the  struggle  for  existence  is 
a  convenient  formula  for  a  certain  aspect  of  life, 
applicable  whenever  or  wherever  effectiveness  of 
vital  response  is  of  critical  moment. 

72 


A  Biological  Approach 

Thus,  as  we  have  elsewhere  indicated  in  detail,  we 
escape  from  the  conception  that  progress  depends 
primarily  upon  internecine  struggle  for  existence,  — 
that  is,  the  subordination  of  the  species  to  the  indi- 
vidual; and  we  insist  even  more  strongly  upon  that  of 
the  individual  to  the  maintenance  of  the  species,  in 
sex,  offspring,  and  society.  Thus  our  ethical  difficulty 
at  length  disappears,  since  the  greater  steps  of  ad- 
vance in  the  organic  world  compel  us  to  interpret  the 
general  scheme  of  evolution  as  primarily  a  materialised 
ethical  process,  underlying  all  appearance  of  a  glad- 
iatorial show.  We  have  not  to  pit  our  little  selves 
against  the  cosmic  process,  but  to  follow  along  those 
lines  of  the  cosmic  process  which  have  made  for  the 
highest  evolution.  We  see  that  it  is  possible  to  inter- 
pret the  ideals  of  ethical  progress  —  through  love 
and  sociality,  co-operation  and  sacrifice,  not  as  mere 
Utopias  contradicted  by  experience,  but  as  the  highest 
expressions  of  the  central  evolutionary  process  of 
the  natural  world.  As  evolutionary  biologists  we  are 
thus  practically  with  moralist  and  theologian,  even  with 
poet  or  sentimentalist  if  you  will,  against  "  the  vulgar 
economist "  of  Ruskin,  or  the  self-styled  "  practical 
politician  "  of  to-day. 

II.  Ideals  of  Biology 

We  have  said  enough  to  show  that  while  no  stretch 
of  the  imagination  will  enable  us  to  say  that  the  biol- 
ogist and  the  theologian  are  at  present  seeing  eye  to 
eye,  the  divergence  is  needlessly  exaggerated  by  for- 
getting the  essential   differences  in  their   aims  and 

73 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

methods,  "faith"  and  " science"  being  expressions  of 
quite  distinct  moods.  There  is  no  utility  in  opposing 
biological  and  theological  formulae,  for  they  are  in- 
commensurables.  The  point  is  whether  they  can  be 
unified  in  personal  and  social  experience,  held  together 
in  a  synthesis  which  is  more  than  biology  and  more 
than  theology.  This  seems  more  possible  than  it 
once  was,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  some  serious 
difficulties  remain  which  cannot  be  overcome  without 
more  mutual  re-adjustment  of  opinions  than  seems  at 
present  feasible.  It  is  idle  to  pretend  that  the  bio- 
logical doctrine  of  man  squares  well  with  its  theolog- 
ical analogue,  and  the  incongruities  are  not  wholly 
due  to  the  fact  that  science  works  with  empirical,  and 
faith  with  transcendental  formulae,  but  partly  to  a 
disagreement  in  regard  to  the  facts  of  the  case.  As 
the  facts  are,  of  course,  the  same  for  both  sides,  if 
they  could  only  be  seen  aright  by  both,  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  that  the  harmonising  process  already 
begun  will  continue  to  progress.  At  present,  how- 
ever, there  are,  we  maintain,  a  number  of  conclusions 
on  both  sides  which  cannot  be  hurriedly  abandoned, 
which  cannot,  however,  be  mutually  accepted.  There 
is  no  use  crying  "  Peace,  peace,"  when  there  is  no 
peace;  the  solution  must  come  about  by  growth, 
which  will  be  promoted  by  an  increased  recognition 
of  what  is  common  in  the  ideals  at  least  of  the  two 
outlooks.  We  propose,  therefore,  to  devote  the  last 
section  of  this  essay  to  a  brief  consideration  of  the 
ideals  of  biology. 

(a)  Intellectual.    Like   any  other  science,  Biology 
has  for  one  of  its  ideals  to  gain  a  clear,  orderly,  cor- 

74 


A  Biological  Approach 

related,  and  interpretable  view  of  nature.  It  analyses 
and  pulls  things  and  systems  of  things  to  pieces,  but 
only  as  a  means  to  an  end,  in  order  sooner  or  later 
to  put  them  together  again  unified  in  intelligence. 
Many  a  chaotic  corner  is  acquiring  a  semblance  of 
rational  order,  many  a  puzzling  obscurity  has  been 
illumined,  many  unsuspected  linkages,  correlations, 
and  affiliations  have  been  discovered.  The  vision  of 
the  web  of  life  becomes  clearer  year  by  year,  and 
though  the  progress  towards  a  coherent  system  of 
conceptual  formulae  in  which  to  express  what  we  are 
discovering  of  its  pattern  seems  asymptotic,  it  is  real. 
The  world  of  life,  so  bafflingly  heterogeneous,  is 
being  revealed  as  a  universe,  not  a  mere  multiverse ; 
we  are  finding  out  the  laws  of  the  great  kaleidoscope 
which  we  call  animate  nature ;  we  are  slowly  discover- 
ing the  strategy  as  well  as  the  tactics  of  evolution ; 
we  are  getting  at  the  plot  of  the  great  drama.  Every- 
where, unities  are  being  perceived,  —  the  unity  of 
vital  organisation  through  all  the  varied  styles  of 
architecture  in  plant  and  animal,  the  unity  of  vital 
processes  amid  all  the  multifarious  expressions  of 
life,  the  unity  of  development,  the  unity  of  evolution. 
What  the  poet  and  the  artist  see  instinctively,  what 
the  metaphysician  and  the  theologian  reach  deduc- 
tively, biology  is  striving  to  establish  inductively,  — 
the  Unity  of  Nature.  Truly,  the  ideal  is  very  far  from 
realisation,  but  every  year  sees  some  corner  of  the 
picture  filled  in.  In  a  true  sense,  biology  is  thus 
approaching  one  aspect  of  the  theologian's  idea  of 
God. 

(b)  Emotional.     Though    science    is   not   in    itself 
75 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

emotional,  being  supposed  to  be  purely  intellectual, 
its  ideal  has  an  emotional  aspect,  for  accurate  know- 
ledge is  incomplete  without  good  feeling  and  right 
conduct.  This  world  is  not  a  stony  sphinx,  but  a 
throbbing  life,  which  to  know  is  to  love.  It  must  be 
granted  that  the  man  of  dominantly  scientific  mood 
goes  on  with  his  business  of  making  the  world  trans- 
lucent, not  primarily  that  emotion  may  be  thrilled  by 
the  glimmer  of  the  indefinable  light  that  shines 
through,  but  because  of  his  inborn  inquisitiveness, 
his  repugnance  to  obscurities,  his  craving  for  an 
intellectual  system  in  which  phenomena  are  provi- 
sionally unified.  But  he  cannot  help  feeling  all  the 
time  that  he  is  working  at  a  picture  which  will  not 
merely  inform  but  gladden  the  eyes.  In  short,  he 
agrees  with  the  theologian  that  his  "  chief  end  "  in- 
cludes enjoying  as  well  as  knowing,  as  the  Shorter 
Catechism  puts  it. 

It  may  be  granted,  too,  that  science,  like  a  child 
pulling  a  flower  to  bits,  is  apt  —  and  biology  is  one 
of  the  worst  of  the  offenders  —  to  dissect  more  than 
it  constructs,  and  to  lose  in  its  analysis  the  vision  of 
unity  and  harmony  which  the  artist  has  ever  before 
his  eyes.  Perhaps,  however,  if  the  artist  has  patience, 
he  would  often  find  that  science  restores  the  unity 
with  more  significance  and  more  beauty  in  it  than  it 
had  before.  As  biology  passes  from  the  structural, 
the  morphological  point  of  view,  to  the  functional,  the 
physiological  one,  as  it  escapes  from  the  static  to 
the  kinetic,  as  it  returns  from  the  formal  to  the  vital, 
when  it  resumes  both  these  contrasted  aspects  of 
organic  unity  in  the  study  of  development  and  evolu- 

76 


A  Biological  Approach 

tion,  it  condones  its  destructive  analysis  by  showing 
that  things  are  more  wondrously,  beautifully,  intensely 
alive,  than  even  Pan-zoism  suspected.  In  this  pro- 
cess of  renewal,  this  return  from  formalism,  as  kindred 
papers  in  this  volume  point  out,  sociology  has  much  to 
say,  education  yet  more  to  do.  The  partial  pursuit  of 
certain  paths  may  sometimes  dull  or  even  play  false 
to  healthy  emotion,  but  the  general  result  and  ideal  of 
biology  is  to  deepen  our  wonder  in  the  world,  our 
love  of  beauty,  our  joy  in  living.  The  modern  botan- 
ist is  in  a  very  real  sense  more  aware  of  the  Dryad  in 
the  tree  than  the  Greek  could  be.  Our  point  is  that 
biology,  by  its  revelation  of  the  mystery,  wonder,  and 
beauty  of  life,  its  intricacy  and  subtlety,  its  history, 
its  tragedy  and  comedy,  approaches  another  aspect 
of  the  Idea  of  God. 

(c)  Practical.  Although  science  is  not  in  itself 
practical,  any  more  than  artistic  or  emotional,  there 
is  a  practical  note  in  its  ideal.  Knowledge  for  knowl- 
edge's sake  is  not  a  humanly  satisfying  motive,  though 
the  idea  often  fills  the  horizon  for  an  hour,  or  a  day, 
a  year,  or  a  life-time,  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
man.  Comte's  great  aphorism,  "  Savoir  pour  pre- 
voir,  prevoir  pour  pourvoir,"  is,  on  the  whole,  a  no 
less  accurate  appreciation  of  the  ideal  of  biology  as 
it  is  of  that  of  the  physical  or  the  social  sciences. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  man's  first  relations 
with  Nature  were  doubtless  predominantly  practical, 
that  not  only  many  sciences  have  their  roots  in  prac- 
tical lore,  but  that  fresh  vigour  still  often  comes  to 
science  by  a  tightening  of  its  contact  with  the  affairs 
of  daily  life.     We  need  hardly  instance  such  a  signal 

77 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

example  as  Pasteur,  for  it  has  been  more  or  less 
obvious  through  the  whole  of  history  that  science  is 
most  progressive  when  it  recognises  —  consciously  or 
sub-consciously  —  that  science  is  for  life,  not  life  for 
science.  At  the  same  time,  we  cannot  even  for  a 
moment  allow  that  a  science,  as  a  science,  should 
ever  submit  to  the  practical  man's  judgment,  almost 
necessarily  short-sighted,  which  makes  immediate  util- 
ity the  criterion  of  worthiness.  Over  and  over  again, 
it  has  been  shown  that  lines  of  scientific  research,  ap- 
parently abstract  and  remote  from  human  life,  have 
been  in  their  practical  issue  most  momentous,  even 
revolutionary.  "  Vulcan,  the  god  of  industry,  wooed 
science  in  the  form  of  Minerva,  but  the  chaste  god- 
dess never  married,  although  she  conferred  upon 
mankind  nearly  as  many  arts  as  Prometheus." 

That  biology  is  increasingly  justifying  itself  by 
practical  works,  no  one  can  question  who  knows  its 
contributions  in  relation  to  health  and  disease,  the 
supply  of  food  and  other  necessaries,  the  utilisation 
of  plants  and  animals,  and  so  forth.  Moreover,  it 
affords  an  educational  discipline,  the  practical  value 
of  which  is  only  beginning  to  be  appreciated ;  and  it 
tends  to  remove  obscurities  which,  if  unillumined, 
would  at  least  impede,  if  not  mislead,  human  progress 
along  practical  lines. 

Most  of  all,  however,  would  we  emphasise  the  fact, 
that  biology  has,  at  least  partially,  formulated  certain 
general  conceptions  of  life  and  health,  of  growth 
and  development,  of  order  and  progress,  —  centred 
in  the  evolving  idea  of  Evolution,  —  which  are  not 
only  attempts  to  see  more  clearly  what  is  true,  but 

78 


A  Biological  Approach 

which  make  for  the  ascent  of  man,  the  betterment 
of  life. 

This  aspect  of  the  biological  ideal  might  be  devel- 
oped at  length;  but  we  venture  to  submit  without 
further  evidence  our  third  proposition  under  this  head, 
that  biology  in  revealing  possibilities  of  betterment, 
of  saving,  strengthening,  regenerating  men,  again 
approaches  another  aspect  of  the  Idea  of  God. 

So  far  then,  for  the  present,  we  may  go  with  this 
attempted  contribution  towards  a  better  understand- 
ing between  theologian  and  evolutionist.  Are  we 
suggesting  that  biology,  with  all  its  approved  place  in 
positive  synthesis,  is  less  irreconcilably  removed  even 
from  traditional  theology  than  may  have  seemed? 
its  return  to  the  fold,  of  natural  theology  at  least,  less 
hopeless?  Or  perhaps  rather  that  the  development 
of  the  theologian,  and  of  theology  itself  may  be  rec- 
ognised as  the  continual  endeavour  to  express  and 
symbolise,  for  the  individual  and  for  the  race,  the 
mystery,  the  process,  the  ecstasy,  the  agony,  the 
progress,  and  the  ideals  of  Life?  It  is  something  if 
the  controversy  thus  emerge  anew,  cleared  of  some 
past  misunderstandings,  and  open  for  a  discussion  in 
which  each  seeks  to  take  the  other  at  his  best.  Their 
struggle  may,  indeed  must,  long  continue,  yet  increas- 
ingly upon  a  higher  plane,  a  rising  wave,  an  ascend- 
ing spiral  —  that  of  the  Culture  of  Existence  ;  and 
this  as  a  process  not  of  thought  merely,  be  it  of  natu- 
ralist or  symbolist,  but  of  Action ;  one  expressed 
therefore  not  merely  in  doctrine  but  in  Life.  Their 
initial  contrast  of  mental  attitudes,  their  divergences 

79 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

therefore  of  interpretation  also,  must  correspondingly 
develop  respective  aspirations  and  policies  of  individ- 
ual influence  and  of  social  guidance,  yet  these  with 
less  sectarian  dispute,  with  more  personal  meditation, 
more  promotion  of  the  human  weal.  This  great  old 
controversy  then,  with  its  mutually  exclusive  for- 
malists, we  are  thus  beginning  to  see  as  a  passing 
scene,  a  phase  of  a  larger  drama,  of  which  each  is 
but  an  awakening  spectator,  a  stumbling  actor,  — 
that  of  the  birth,  the  struggle,  the  death,  yet  the 
renewal  and  ascent  of  the  Ideal  in  Evolution.  Thus 
biological  science  must  indeed  become  the  handmaid 
of  religion,  as  the  theologian,  again  thinker  and  sym- 
bolist, can  offer  her  the  interpretation  of  Life. 

J.   ARTHUR  THOMSON. 
PATRICK   GEDDES. 


80 


A    PSYCHOLOGICAL    APPROACH 

PROFESSOR   JOHN    H.   MUIRHEAD,   M.  A. 

Professor  of  Philosophy,  University  of  Birmingham 

THE  quarrel  which  Plato  was  the  first  to  name 
between  Poetry  and  Philosophy  —  between 
the  claim  to  affinity  with  the  world  around  us  as  with 
a  larger  self,  and  the  attempt  to  verify  in  detail  the 
foundations  on  which  it  rests  —  may  be  said  to  be 
the  cause  cePcbre  of  man's  intellectual  history.  It 
repeats  itself  under  different  forms  in  different  ages, 
the  intelligent  jury  who  are  the  leaders  of  public 
opinion  swaying  now  to  this  side  and  now  to  that  as 
the  verification  has  seemed  more  or  less  remote.  In 
our  own  time  it  has  assumed  the  form  of  a  conflict 
between  Religion  and  Science.  During  the  eight- 
eenth and  the  greater  part  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  evidence  seemed  to  be  gradually  massing  itself  in 
favour  not  only  of  a  verdict  of  "  not  proven,"  but  of 
an  interdict  to  all  attempt  at  proof.  Religion,  like 
poetry,  of  which  it  is  the  finer  spirit,  has  its  roots 
in  the  felt  affinity  between  our  purposes  and  ideals 
and  the  general  course  of  Nature,  —  the  response  of 
the  real  world  to  the  deepest  needs  of  the  soul.  At 
its  highest,  it  is,  as  Professor  James  says,  an  "  enthu- 
siastic temper  of  espousal  towards  the  universe ;  "  at 
its  lowest,  it  is  the  conviction  that  "  all  is  not  vanity 
6  81 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

in  this  universe,  whatever  the  appearances  may  sug- 
gest." Throughout  the  whole  scale  it  represents  so 
many  variations  of  the  theme,  that  the  standard  of 
reality  is  to  be  sought  for,  not  in  the  shadows  of  sense, 
but  in  the  mind's  demand  for  some  satisfying  totality 
of  experience.  But  it  was  just  this  belief  in  the 
ultimate  kinship  between  the  soul's  ideals  and  the 
reality  of  the  world  that  the  prevailing  philosophy  of 
the  last  two  centuries  with  its  bias  towards  mechan- 
ical connexion  seemed  bent  on  rendering  untenable. 

The  mechanical  explanation  of  the  universe  is  not, 
of  course,  a  modern  discovery.  The  first  sketch  of 
the  atomic  theory,  with  its  corollaries  of  the  inde- 
structibility of  matter  and  energy,  was  already  before 
the  world  in  the  fifth  century  B.  C,  and  by  the  end 
of  the  era  it  had  been  developed  into  a  system  of 
materialism  as  complete  as  any  that  has  since  been 
seen.  What  is  characteristic  of  the  modern  form  of 
the  doctrine  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  reinforcement 
it  seems  to  have  received  from  a  brilliant  period  of 
progress  in  every  field  of  research,  and,  on  the  other, 
the  theory  of  agnosticism  as  to  the  ultimate  nature 
of  reality  with  which  in  its  leading  representatives  it 
has  been  combined. 

The  first  impulse  towards  the  modern  theory  is 
traceable  to  Descartes.  Descartes  himself  was  a  sup- 
porter of  a  spiritualistic  conception  of  the  world,  but 
in  two  ways  he  opened  the  way  to  another  interpre- 
tation of  it.  In  agreement  with  Galileo,  he  laid  the 
foundation  of  the  modern  view  of  motion  as  the  all 
important  reality  of  which  matter  is  merely  the  vehi- 
cle.    By  teaching,  further,  that  animals   were  auto- 

82 


A  Psychological  Approach 

mata,  he  suggested  a  theory  of  conscious  life  that  was 
bound,  sooner  or  later,  to  be  extended.  If  animals 
were  machines,  why  not  man?  was  a  burning  question 
in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.1  But  it  was 
not  till  the  restatement  of  the  atomic  theory  by  Bosco- 
wich,  and  its  application  to  chemistry  by  Dalton,  fol- 
lowed by  the  formulation  and  experimental  proof  of 
the  law  of  the  Conservation  of  Energy  in  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  that  the  theory  began  to 
assume  its  modern  form.  This  result  was  hastened  by 
the  discoveries  of  Bernard  and  Ludwig  in  physiology, 
of  Darwin  and  Wallace  in  biology,  and  finally  by  the 
claim  put  forward  by  Comte  and  Mill  from  the  side  of 
psychology  and  sociology,  by  Buckle  from  the  side 
of  history  and  statistics  on  behalf  of  a  science  of 
human  life  and  mind  based  upon  rigid  natural  neces- 
sity. In  view  of  these  advances  of  the  positive  spirit, 
it  is  not  surprising  to  find  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  like  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century 
only  far  more  deeply  marked  by  a  widespread  feeling 
that  the  key  to  the  world  of  phenomena  in  every  field 
was  contained  in  the  one  fundamental  assumption  of 
the  existence  of  matter  and  energy.  This  feeling 
found  expression  in  a  host  of  materialistic  works  of 
which  Buchner's  Force  and  Matter  is  probably  the 
best  known.2  In  England,  this  idea  may  be  said  to 
have  come  to  a  head  and  received  its  most  trium- 
phant, if  not  its  most  carefully  worded,  statement  in 

1  In    1748   La   Mettrie    published    his    book,   the   Human 
Machine. 

2  It  is  said  to  have  run  through   sixteen  editions  in  thirty 
years,  and  to  have  been  translated  into  thirteen  languages. 

83 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

Professor  Tyndall's  well-known  address  to  the  British 
Association  in  1 874.  "  Trace  the  line  of  life  backwards, 
and  see  it  approaching  more  and  more  to  what  we 
call  the  purely  physical  condition.  We  come  at 
length  to  the  protogenes  of  Haeckel.  Can  we  pause 
here?  We  break  a  magnet  and  find  two  poles  in 
each  of  its  fragments.  And  when  we  can  break  no 
longer,  we  prolong  the  intellectual  vision  to  the  polar 
molecules.  Believing,  as  I  do,  in  the  continuity  of 
Nature,  I  cannot  stop  abruptly  where  our  micro- 
scopes cease  to  be  of  use.  Here  the  vision  of  the 
mind  authoritatively  supplements  the  vision  of  the 
eye.  By  an  intellectual  necessity  I  cross  the  bound- 
ary of  the  experimental  evidence  and  discern  in  that 
Matter  which  we  in  our  ignorance  of  its  latent  powers, 
and  notwithstanding  our  professed  reverence  for  its 
Creator,  have  hitherto  covered  with  opprobrium,  the 
promise  and  potency  of  all  terrestrial  Life."  * 

In  spite  of  the  continuous  scientific  advance  based 
upon  the  assumption  of  the  unity  of  Nature  and  our 
ability  to  express  the  laws  of  material  phenomena  in 
one  or  two  fundamental  formulae,  which  has  taken 
place  since  this  celebrated  pronouncement  was  made, 
the  present  day  has  witnessed  a  remarkable  reaction 
against  the  mechanical  interpretation  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  life  and  mind,  and  the  religious  agnosticism 
associated  with  it.  Among  the  leaders  of  science 
themselves  the  confident  tone  of  a  generation  ago 
has  given  place  to  a  distrust  of  all  claims  to  finality 
on  behalf  of  scientific  conceptions,  accompanied  by 

1  Address  1874,  p.  55,  condensed. 
84 


A  Psychological  Approach 

a  renewed  sympathy  with  ideas  in  their  essence  relig- 
ious. And,  speaking  generally,  it  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  religion  in  the  wider  sense  of  the  word  exer- 
cises a  stronger  hold  on  the  mind  of  the  civilised 
world  to-day  than  it  has  done  at  any  period  since  the 
Reformation. 

While  there  can  be  little  doubt  as  to  the  fact,  there 
is  less  general  agreement  as  to  the  cause  of  this  sur- 
prising change.  Probably,  as  in  all  complex  move- 
ments, many  influences  have  combined  to  produce  it. 
With  some  who  have  lived  through  both  of  these 
phases,  it  is  the  outcome  of  practical  experience,  and 
the  felt  insufficiency  of  the  formulae  of  jubilant  ag- 
nosticism with  which  they  started  in  life.  With  others, 
perhaps,  it  is  the  result  of  the  enlargement  of  the  in- 
tellectual horizon  which  a  general  sense  of  the  un- 
limited possibilities  of  human  discovery,  whether  in 
the  field  of  nature  or  of  mind,  has  brought  with  it. 
Whatever  may  be  the  cause,  the  main  question  that 
concerns  philosophy  is  of  the  justification  of  the 
present  religious  reaction.  Is  it  possible  to  find  any 
solid  ground  for  the  belief  that  somehow  or  other  the 
path  to  a  more  spiritual  view  of  the  world,  which  a 
generation  ago  seemed  to  be  rapidly  closing,  has  once 
more  been  reopened?  The  object  of  this  paper  is  to 
point  to  the  fact  that  in  the  field  of  life  in  general, 
and  of  the  human  mind  in  particular,  the  progress  of 
thought  has  tended  to  show  that  mechanical  law  is 
of  strictly  limited  application,  and  that,  so  far  as  psy- 
chology is  concerned,  the  evidence  points  to  the 
open  door. 

I  shall  begin  by  stating  more  clearly  than  I  have 
85 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

hitherto  done  what  is  to  be  understood  by  natural 
law.  So  long  as  natural  law  was  conceived  of 
vaguely  as  complete  determination  by  antecedent 
conditions,  and  opposed  to  the  free  design  of  an 
artistic  Creator,  it  is  easy  to  understand  the  domi- 
nance it  obtained.  But  the  advance  of  science  has 
meant  not  only  the  extension  of  the  idea  of  physical 
causation  to  an  ever-widening  range  of  phenomena, 
but  the  deepening  of  the  idea  of  what  is  meant  by 
physical  causation  itself.  Superficially,  and  as  it  is 
conceived  of  by  popular  thought,  a  cause  stands  for 
a  thing  operating  upon  another  which  is  wholly  inde- 
pendent of  it.  When  one  billiard  ball  strikes  another, 
it  is  sufficient  for  ordinary  purposes  to  say  that  it  is 
the  cause  of  the  resulting  motion.  At  a  further  stage 
of  reflection,  it  is  noted  that  the  cause  of  an  event 
is  not  a  thing  but  a  previous  event  or  condition  of 
things.  And  this,  when  more  closely  scanned,  is 
seen  to  be  resolvable  into  a  number  or  system  of 
such  conditions.  A  cause,  says  Hobbes,  is  "  the 
aggregate  of  all  the  accidents,"  and  he  is  followed 
by  Mill,  when  he  defines  a  cause  as  "  the  sum  of 
the  conditions."  By  the  time  this  stage  has  been 
reached,  it  has  become  obvious  that  one  of  the  con- 
ditions is  the  reaction  of  that  on  which  the  cause 
is  supposed  to  operate,  and  that  the  distinction 
between  a  cause  and  an  effect,  temporally  divided 
from  each  other,  except  as  phases  of  a  single  con- 
tinuous process,  is  more  or  less  arbitrary.  At  this 
level,  the  motions  of  the  billiard  balls  is  explained  in 
terms  of  a  system  of  forces  in  which  any  distinction 
between    cause   and   effect   tends    to    disappear.     A 

86 


A  Psychological  Approach 

further  stage  still  is  reached  when  the  series  of  events 
represented  by  the  cause  and  its  effect  is  conceived 
of  as  the  phenomenal  aspect  of  a  system  of  mutually 
acting  and  reacting  particles  in  which  alike  the  mate- 
rial substratum  and  the  force  or  energy  exerted  by 
them  is  constant.  What  takes  place  in  the  billiard 
balls  is  a  transference  of  energy  in  which  the  loss  in 
the  one  is  precisely  equivalent  to  the  gain  in  the  other, 
and  is  expressible  in  a  mathematical  formula.  While 
thus  undergoing  a  process  of  refinement,  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  our  conception  of  mechanical  causation 
ever  wholly  loses  the  traces  of  its  more  rudimentary 
forms,  and  whether  these  ought  not  rather  to  be  re- 
garded as  elements  which  it  contains,  than  as  phases 
through  which  it  has  passed.  So  interpreted,  it  may 
be  said  to  imply :  (tf)  the  determination  of  an  event 
by  an  antecedent  different  from  itself,  (£)  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  two  events  expressible  as  a  transmission 
of  energy,  (V)  the  quantitative  equivalence  of  the 
energies :  "  no  energy  is  lost  and  the  sum  of  energy 
is  the  same." 

The  materialistic  theory  of  the  universe  assumes  that 
the  form  of  causation  here  described  is  the  type  to 
which  each  and  every  kind  of  phenomenon  is  ulti- 
mately reducible.  It  is  true  that  before  they  can  be 
taken  as  constituents  of  the  universe,  our  billiard  balls 
must  be  reduced  by  millions  upon  millions,  and  re- 
baptised  first  as  atoms,  then  as  electrons,  perhaps  by 
and  by  as  something  else.  Further  that  their  move- 
ments have  to  be  conceived  of  as  storable  in  the  form 
of  latent  energy,  as  in  the  pendulum  at  the  end  of  its 
swing,   and    again    as   transformable   into    molecular 

87 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

motion,  as  in  heat  or  magnetism.  But  the  underly- 
ing conception  of  quantitatively  determinable  masses, 
acting  upon  one  another  from  without  in  definite, 
quantitatively  determinable  ways  is  the  same  as  that 
described  above.  Returning  therefore  to  our  sub- 
ject, the  question  before  us  is  of  the  extent  to  which 
recent  advances  in  the  sciences,  other  than  those 
commonly  classed  as  physical,  has  been  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  confirmation  of  the  universal  applicability 
of  naturalistic  explanation. 

On  this  question,  as  it  concerns  such  science  as 
Chemistry  and  Biology,  an  outsider  can  hardly 
venture  to  have  opinion.  Yet  he  may  note  the 
obstacles  to  mechanical  explanation  that  are  patently 
acknowledged  by  experts  themselves.  The  success 
of  the  atomic  theory  in  chemistry  forms  a  brilliant 
record,  and  seems  to  contain  a  reliable  promise  of  the 
ultimate  and  not  very  distant  triumph  of  the  mechani- 
cal theory  in  this  department.  But  before  acknowledg- 
ing the  victory,  we  have  to  insist  on  the  establishment 
of  a  clear  continuity  between  what  are  understood  as 
mechanical  and  chemical  energies.  In  view  of  this 
requirement,  laymen  may  be  permitted  to  hesitate 
before  the  admission  of  experts  that  "  deep-going 
changes  take  place  at  the  entry  of  substances  into 
chemical  combination  by  reason  of  which  the  rela- 
tion of  the  qualities  of  a  compound  to  those  of  its 
constituent  parts  can  never  be  quite  perspicuous." 

The  difficulty  already  felt  in  chemistry  increases  as 
we  pass  to  the  phenomena  of  life.  Recent  observa- 
tions of  bacillic  forms  seem  to  show  that  the  impulse 
under  which  they  act  is  of  quite  a  different  order  from 

88 


A  Psychological  Approach 

that  of  purely  physical  agents.  They  are  sensitive  to 
stimuli  from  their  environment,  direct  themselves  to 
food,  avoid  obstacles,  and  in  other  ways  exhibit 
behaviour  bearing  a  much  closer  analogy  to  human 
purposes  than  to  physical  energies.  It  is  not  merely 
that  no  case  has  been  established  for  the  genesis  of 
the  living  cell  from  lifeless  matter.  No  stress  need 
be  laid  on  the  breakdown  of  the  case  for  abiogenesis. 
Even  though  the  evidence  were  stronger  than  it  is,  it 
would  still  be  possible  to  maintain  that  it  pointed 
rather  to  the  existence  of  an  element  of  sensitivity  in 
what  we  now  call  lifeless  matter,  than  to  the  origin  of 
the  sensitive  from  the  insensitive.  The  point  to  be 
emphasised  is  that  the  living  cell,  at  all  stages  of  its 
development,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  organ- 
isms, exhibits  phenomena  for  the  explanation  of 
which  the  conception  of  constancy  of  energy  in  a 
system  of  material  or  ethereal  particles  is  coming 
more  and  more  to  be  recognised  as  inadequate. 
There  seem,  indeed,  to  be  already  signs  of  a  curious 
reversal  of  the  current  of  speculation.  Instead  of 
insisting  upon  atoms  and  energy  as  the  Bed  of  Pro- 
crustes into  which  all  phenomena  must  be  forced  to 
fit,  the  physicist  seems  on  the  point  of  recognising 
an  inner  principle  of  adaptation  even  in  material 
particles  hitherto  regarded  as  subject  only  to  influ- 
ences from  without.1 

Passing  from  facts  usually  classified  as  physical  to 
those  which  are  acknowledged  to  be  psychical,  we 
may  begin  by  recalling  the  general  attitude  of  the 

1  In  connexion  with  this,  the  investigations  of  physicists  on 
the  "  fatigue  "  of  metals  is  suggestive. 

89 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

earlier  period.  By  some,  the  mind  was  frankly  de- 
scribed as  a  "  secretion  "  of  the  brain.  Others  sought 
to  mitigate  the  harshness  of  such  crude  comparisons 
by  assigning  it  a  decorative  function  as  an  "  epiphe- 
nomenon,"  standing  to  material  process  as  the  escape 
of  steam  or  the  flicker  of  light  over  a  locomotive 
stands  to  the  machinery,  —  a  sign  of  real  operations 
going  on  below,  but  without  significance  either  as  a 
cause  or  a  guide  of  force  and  motion.  But  the  gen- 
eral result  was  the  same :  mind  was  generally  treated 
as  an  adjunct  to  the  brain,  either  as  another  form, 
or  as  a  function  of  molecular  motion. 

There  is  no  more  striking  change  in  the  attitude  of 
science  at  the  present  day  than  the  recognition  of  the 
confusion  underlying  all  such  metaphors,  and  of  the 
futility  of  the  attempt  to  establish  any  real  continu- 
ity between  brain  processes  and  mental  experience, 
or  any  real  analogy  between  physical  and  mental 
causation. 

i.  With  the  disappearance  of  the  idea  of  soul  as 
a  substance  has  gone  the  idea  that  its  relation  to  the 
body  can  be  at  all  adequately  conceived  of  as  that 
of  one  thing  acting  upon  another.  We  experience 
things  as  substances  external  to  one  another:  our 
own  bodies,  for  instance,  as  outside  the  objects 
around  them;  but  in  what  intelligible  sense  can  we 
say  that  our  "experience,"  which  is  the  most  general 
term  for  our  mind,  is  outside  of  the  things  it  appre- 
hends? As  well  might  we  speak  of  the  picture  as 
outside  the  canvas,  the  form  outside  the  marble. 
Of  the  things  thus  apprehended,  the  brain  and  its 
changes  are  a  part:  they  only  have  meaning  within 

90 


A  Psychological  Approach 

an    experience,    and    it    is    merely   a   psychological 
"  bull "  to  speak  of  them  as  external  to  it. 

A  similar  difficulty  faces  us  from  the  side  of  the 
second  of  the  aspects  under  which  we  viewed  physi- 
cal causation,  —  continuity  between  cause  and  effect. 
A  physiological  movement — a  change  in  the  dis- 
position of  the  molecules  of  nerve  and  brain  —  may 
perhaps  be  said  to  be  continuous  with  ethereal  or 
atmospheric  waves,  but  all  trace  of  continuity  seems 
to  vanish  when  we  pass  from  molecular  movements 
to  sensations  of  light  and  sound.  We  pass  here 
from  one  world  into  another  far  more  widely  sepa- 
rated from  it  than  is  the  most  distant  star  in  the 
deserts  of  space  from  our  planet  and  the  system  to 
which  it  belongs.  This  has  been  admitted  by  the 
most  consistent  advocates  of  naturalism.  "  The  pas- 
sage," writes  Tyndall,  "  from  the  physics  of  the  brain 
to  the  corresponding  facts  of  Consciousness  is  un- 
thinkable." In  spite  of  this  admission,  Tyndall,  we 
have  seen,  believes  in  the  ultimate  reducibility  of 
mental  to  atomic  changes,  and  if  the  mere  absence  of 
intuitable  continuity  were  the  only  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  assimilation,  we  might  ignore  it  in  view  of  what 
might  be  considered  the  overwhelming  probability 
of  the  case.     But  other  difficulties  remain. 

The  third  requirement  in  physical  explanation  is 
measurement.  In  physical  science  there  is  here  no 
difficulty  in  principle.  A  standard  unit  is  a  familiar 
conception.  In  psychical  intensities,  feelings,  sensa- 
tions, efforts,  the  case  is  different.  Here  everything 
is  fluid,  everything  relative.  It  is  true  that  Fechner 
in  the  middle  of  last  century  conceived  the  hope  of 

91 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

establishing  a  law  of  quantitative  equivalence  be- 
tween the  stimulus  and  the  sensation,  and  the  attempt 
has  been  persistently  renewed  from  time  to  time. 
The  controversy  is  surrounded  with  some  technical 
difficulty,  turning  upon  the  question  of  the  sense  in 
which  we  can  speak  of  quantity  at  all  in  relation  to 
our  feelings  and  sensations,  but  the  balance  of 
opinion  among  psychologists  leans  weightily  to  the 
side  of  abandoning  as  unmeaning  the  attempt  to  es- 
tablish a  quantitative  relation  between  the  physical  and 
the  mental,  and  of  substituting  the  well-recognised 
law  of  relativity  for  anything  which  has  the  remotest 
affinity  with  physical  causation  and  the  conservation 
of  energy.1 

So  far,  it  may  be  admitted  that  the  argument  has, 
on  the  whole,  been  fatal  to  the  application  of  the  laws 
of  mechanics,  as  we  understand  them  in  the  physical 
sciences,  to  the  phenomena  of  mind.  But  the  "  me- 
chanical philosophers  "  of  our  own  day  are  not  likely 
to  accept  such  demonstration  as  disposing  of  the 
question.  Granting  it  to  have  been  proved  that 
psychology  is  no  subtle  annexe  of  physics  and  me- 

1  That  mental  states  have  a  quantitative  aspect  is  clear.  We 
speak  of  an  intenser  sensation  of  light  or  colour,  of  one  plea- 
sure as  greater  than  another.  But  when  we  seek  to  assign  an 
exact  meaning  to  these  phrases,  we  are  met  with  the  insur- 
mountable difficulty  of  discovering  any  unit  of  measurement 
corresponding  to  the  units  of  extension  or  number.  As  we  pass 
from  a  whitish  pink  to  a  deep  red,  in  what  sense  can  we  be 
said  to  be  experiencing  more  units  of  redness  ?  Close  analysis 
of  such  an  experience  seems  to  suggest,  as  Professor  James  ex- 
presses it,  rather  a  sense  of  greater  and  greater  distance  from  a 
limit  than  of  more  and  more  of  the  same  sensation. 

92 


A  Psychological  Approach 

chanics,  it  may  still  be  asked  whether  any  step  has 
thereby  been  gained  towards  the  proof  that  it  is  a 
science  of  the  spiritual,  in  any  sense  that  can  be  of 
service  to  religion.  Our  ideas  are  not  determined  by 
physical  movements,  but  if  they  can  be  shown  to  be 
the  effect  of  previous  ideas  in  such  wise  that  their 
course,  and  the  course  of  the  conduct  which  results 
from  them,  is  fixed  as  inevitably  and  (as  we  shall 
perhaps  by  and  by  discover)  as  calculably  as  the 
distribution  of  energy  at  any  moment  in  a  material 
system  is  determined  by  the  previous  distribution, 
what,  it  may  be  asked,  has  been  proved?  what  ground 
has  been  reclaimed  from  the  reign  of  natural  law  that 
is  worth  referring  to  as  a  gain  to  religion? 

2.  The  answer  to  this  contention  brings  us  to  the 
second  and,  for  the  subject  of  this  paper,  the  more 
important  of  the  generally  accepted  results  of  recent 
psychology.  Psychologists  in  general  admit  that  the 
idea  of  a  mechanics  of  the  mind  not  only  has  had  a 
great  history  in  the  past,  but  within  clearly  defined 
limits  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  one.  But  the  day  has 
gone  past  when  these  limits  could  be  ignored,  and  it 
could  be  claimed  that  our  mental  life  can  be  "  ex- 
plained "  by  the  laws  of  the  association  of  ideas  on 
the  analogy  of  the  physical  sciences.  No  one  has 
done  more  than  Professor  Miinsterberg  to  develop  a 
mechanics  of  the  mind  in  the  above  sense,  but  no  one 
has  recognised  more  clearly  or  stated  more  power- 
fully the  provisional  and  strictly  limited  application 
of  such  a  psychology.  After  pointing  out  that  mind 
is  essentially  will  and  purpose,  Professor  Miinster- 
berg goes  on  to  show  that  in  this  sense  it  is  not  a 

93 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

perceivable  object  and  therefore  neither  a  cause  nor 
an  effect.  The  psychology  that  treats  it  as  such 
"  may  be  and  in  this  century  indeed  has  been  the 
last  word  of  a  naturalistic  attitude  towards  the  world. 
But  it  degenerates  into  an  unphilosophical  psychol- 
ogism,  just  as  natural  science  degenerates  into  mate- 
rialism, if  it  does  not  understand  that  it  works  only 
from  one  side  and  that  the  other  side  is  the  primary 
reality."  Opposed  to  this  is  a  psychology  which 
insists  that  "  we  ought  to  abandon  exaggerated  devo- 
tion to  the  physical  world,  that  we  ought  to  look  out 
for  our  inner  world.  A  good  psychology  is  the  most 
important  supplement  to  those  sciences  which  con- 
sider the  inner  life  not  as  an  existing  describable, 
explainable  object,  but  as  a  will  system  to  be  inter- 
preted and  to  be  appreciated.  Psychology  is  an  end 
as  the  last  word  of  the  naturalistic  century  which  lies 
behind  us ;  it  may  become  a  beginning  as  the  intro- 
ductory word  of  an  idealistic  century  to  be  hoped 
for."1 

Fully  to  develop  the  thought  that  underlies  this 
passage  would  lead  us  into  a  discussion  of  the  mod- 
ern doctrine  of  volition  far  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
present  paper.  The  point  at  which  this  doctrine 
becomes  of  essential  importance  to  our  argument  is 
the  distinction  which  it  establishes  between  physical 
processes,  as  a  series  of  casually  related  events  in 
time,  and  mental  processes,  at  whatever  stage  of 
development  we  chose  to  take  them,  as  the  expres- 
sion of  the  permanent  systems  of  ideas  and  senti- 

1  Psychology  a?id  Life,  by  Hugo  Miinsterberg. 
94 


A  Psychological  Approach 

ments  which  we  call  the  self.  My  sitting  before  the 
piece  of  paper  on  which  I  write  these  words  is  in  a 
sense  the  outcome  of  my  past  life.  Certainly  if  I 
had  no  past,  I  should  have  no  present.  But  it  is  in 
a  far  truer  sense  the  result  of  the  interest  I  take  in 
the  subject  under  discussion,  and  in  the  means  of 
expressing  it.  Voluntary  action  has  been  described 
as  determination  by  the  future  as  contrasted  with 
physical  action,  or  determination  by  the  past.  But 
the  point  that  requires  to  be  emphasised  is  rather 
that  time  sequence  is  here  irrelevant.  In  volition  I 
am  not,  strictly  speaking,  determined  by  any  event 
at  all.  I  am  not  acted  upon,  but  I  act  under  the 
sense  of  the  value  of  the  object  to  a  self  "whose 
borders,"  as  has  been  finely  said,  "  are  washed  by 
time,"  but  which,  as  a  whole,  reflecting  itself  in  its 
actions  as  a  picture  does  in  its  parts,  or  an  organism 
in  its  members,  stands  in  a  quite  definite  sense  above 
all  time  sequence.  This  is  somewhat  obscured  by 
the  use  of  the  term  "motive,"  which  is  commonly 
taken  in  the  sense  of  something  external  to  the  will. 
Reflection  shows  that  our  motives  ought  not  to  be 
conceived  of  as  forces  acting  on  the  mind  from  with- 
out, but  as  deriving  their  efficacy  from  the  response 
they  meet  with  from  the  organised  structure  of  the 
will,  which  we  call  our  character.  As  a  man  sees 
only  what  he  comes  prepared  to  see,  and  therefore 
may  already  be  said  to  have  seen,  so  he  is  moved 
only  by  what  he  is  prepared  to  accept  as  his  motive 
and  may  already  be  said  in  a  sense  to  possess  or 
to  be. 

The  general  result  of  the  analysis,  now  generally 
95 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

accepted  in  psychology,  that  is  here  condensed  is 
the  vindication  for  the  mind  of  a  reality  of  its  own, 
independent  of  the  physical  order.  But  if  this  were 
all,  the  reality  thus  claimed  might  still  be  held  to  be 
precarious,  resting  on  our  present  ignorance  of  any 
method  of  co-ordinating  the  two  worlds  of  mind  and 
matter.  At  best,  it  might  be  said  we  have  merely 
broken  our  world  into  two,  assigning  one  part  to  the 
reign  of  natural  law,  the  other  to  the  freedom  of 
choice.  It  leaves  us  with  two  worlds  held  apparently 
in  some  sort  of  equipoise,  but  with  no  discoverable 
centre  of  gravity,  —  no  point  from  which  their  unity 
can  be  rendered  intelligible.  And  if  this  be  so,  how- 
ever justifiable  the  refusal  to  acquiesce  in  material- 
ism, yet  from  the  side  of  psychology  at  least,  there 
seems  no  opening  to  the  comprehensive  view  of  the 
world  resting  on  the  priority  of  mind  which  we  have 
seen  to  be  the  presupposition  of  religion.  But  the 
clue  which  psychological  analysis  places  in  our  hand 
does  not  leave  us  here.  It  leads  to  a  further  step 
that  is  of  fundamental  importance  in  any  attempt  to 
take  stock  of  present  day  intellectual  tendencies. 
Any  statement  of  it  at  this  stage  of  a  paper  like  the 
present  must  necessarily  be  condensed  and  unsatis- 
factory. What  follows  is  intended  merely  as  an  in- 
dication of  its  general  nature  and  bearing.  For  a 
fuller  statement,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  treat- 
ment of  the  subject  of  the  External  World  by  the 
best  psychologists  of  the  present  time.1 

1  For  example,  Professor  Stout's  chapter  on  "The  External 
World  as  Ideal  Construction."  Manual  of  Psychology,  Bk.  IV. 
c.  VI. 

96 


A  Psychological  Approach 

Our  result,  so  far,  is  that  the  attempt  to  explain 
the  universe  in  terms  of  physical  energy  has  brought 
to  us  a  ri impasse.  This  suggests  the  question  whether 
the  attempt  has  not  been  a  misguided  one  from  the 
outset,  and  whether  we  might  not  have  fared  better, 
had  we  reversed  the  process  and  taken  as  our  start- 
ing point,  instead  of  the  atomic  structure  of  matter 
and  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  the  struc- 
ture of  our  own  wills  and  the  system  of  ends  of  which 
consciousness  in  its  essence  consists.  At  a  point  in 
the  development  of  astronomy,  the  world  was  invited 
by  the  heliocentric  theory  to  reverse  all  its  former 
ideas.  Psychology  has  to-day  arrived  at  conclusions 
which  invite  a  similar  reversal  of  customary  modes 
of  thinking.1  In  bare  outline,  the  Copernican  theory 
of  the  relation  of  mind  and  matter  may  be  stated  as 
follows : 

The  characteristic  of  mental,  as  opposed  to  material 
action  is  that  it  is  guided  by  purpose.  After  what 
has  been  said,  we  need  not  pause  over  this.  Neither 
need  we  enter  on  the  question  of  the  ruling  purpose 
of  conscious  beings.  All  are  agreed  that,  for  ordi- 
nary ends,  it  is  sufficient  to  describe  it  as  our  own 
happiness  or  perfection.  It  is  further  unnecessary 
at  this  time  of  day  to  spend  words  in  proving  that 
human  life,  in  its  best  representatives,  whether  indi- 
viduals or  societies,  means  development  of  faculty,  — 
the  ever  fuller  expression  of  the  powers  and  capabili- 
ties of  human  nature.  But  in  proportion  as  we  admit 
these  conclusions,  we  seem  also  to  be  bound  to  admit 

1  Hegel  defined  philosophy  in  general  as  an  invitation  to 
stand  upon  our  heads. 

7  97 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

that  the  law  of  human  life,  so  far  from  being  a  law  of 
conservation,  is  a  law  of  constantly  increasing  energy 
—  of  increased  efficiency.  In  this  increase,  called  in 
leading  articles  "  the  march  of  civilisation,"  one  of 
the  most  conspicuous  factors  is  increased  power  over 
nature,  as  represented  by  our  tools  and  machines, — 
in  a  word,  by  the  whole  labour-saving  apparatus  of 
life  and  the  scientific  ideas  that  have  made  them 
possible.  The  former  of  these  we  are  accustomed  to 
consider  our  own  creations,  and,  in  the  strict  sense, 
instruments  for  purposes  that  lie  beyond  them.  We 
are  accustomed,  on  the  other  hand,  to  think  of  our 
mathematical  and  physical  conceptions  as  something 
given  independently  of  human  actions  and  the  ends 
they  serve.  Yet,  strictly  speaking,  they  are  essentially 
of  the  same  character  as  these  material  tools,  results 
of  the  same  process  of  selection  and  construction. 
This  has  long  been  recognised  by  thinkers  to  be 
true  of  mathematical  conceptions.  The  lines,  circles, 
and  uniform  dimensions  with  which  geometry  deals 
are  generally  acknowledged  to  be  ideal  constructions 
to  which  nothing  corresponds  in  the  concrete  world 
of  our  sense-experience.  The  definitions,  axioms, 
propositions  with  which  Euclid  makes  us  familiar, 
are  instrumental  conceptions  whose  validity  is  guaran- 
teed to  us  by  no  independent  existence,  but  by  the 
extent  to  which  they  answer  in  experience  to  the 
demands  we  make  upon  them.  So  far,  however,  is 
the  Euclidean  system  from  being  accepted  as  an 
expression  of  any  absolute  independent  truth  that  it 
is  asserted  by  some  mathematicians  to  be  merely  one 
of  many  possible  systems  which,  under  other  circum- 

98 


A  Psychological  Approach 

stances,    might   come   to    be    regarded    as   of  equal 
validity. 

But  the  arguments  which  apply  to  mathematical 
conceptions  apply  equally  mutatis  mutandis  to  those 
of  physics.  The  uniform  strains,  pressures,  energies, 
quantitative  equivalents,  atomic  structures,  with  which 
science  is  upon  so  familiar  terms,  although  they  are 
suggested  by  sensory  experience,  are  in  no  sense  data 
of  it,  but  are  arrived  at  by  the  same  process  of  selec- 
tion and  idealising  construction  as  are  the  uniform 
spaces  and  numerical  series  of  mathematics.  Like 
the  latter,  they  are  working  conceptions,  tools  of  the 
mind,  keys,  as  they  are  often  called,  to  the  secrets  of 
nature.  So  far  as  they  serve  the  purpose  and  fit  the 
lock,  they  are  accepted  by  us  as  real.  Where  they 
fail  to  act  or  serve  any  useful  purpose,  as  organising 
principles,  we  rightly  speak  of  them  as  illusory  and 
set  them  aside  in  favour  of  others.  By  this  it  is  not 
of  course  meant  that  the  orderly  arrangement  of 
events  in  their  sequences  is  merely  an  idea  in  the 
mind  of  the  investigator,  that  there  is  nothing  ob- 
jectively real  in  matter,  force,  and  energy.  It  is  true 
that  man  has  but  recently  made  any  considerable 
progress  in  reducing  the  complicated  facts  of  nature 
to  the  simple  expressions  which  are  the  counters  of 
science  in  discovering,  as  we  say,  her  laws.  But  the 
laws  of  nature  antedated  man's  discovering  mind: 
they  are  in  no  way  dependent  on  it  for  their  crea- 
tion. But  what  follows  from  this?  Not  that  the 
real  world,  as  we  thus  come  to  know  it  in  science, 
exists  as  something  that  could  ever  become  manifest 
to  our  sense-organs,  but  that  as  a  system  of  thoughts 

99 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

it  corresponds  to  our  thoughts,  and  that  in  thus 
thinking  it  we  are  reproducing  its  intelligible  pattern 
in  ourselves.  Kepler  discovered  the  true  —  or  at  any 
rate  the  relatively  true  —  concepts  that  explained  the 
motions  of  the  planets,  but  he  did  so  in  his  own  words, 
because  God  had  had  these  thoughts  before  him,  and 
he  could  thus  think  them  "  after  Him." 

The  conclusion  to  which  all  this  points  is  that 
physical  conceptions  are  keys  which  have  been  put 
into  our  hands  for  the  interpretation  of  a  definite 
order  of  facts.  But  as  we  have  found  or  formed 
these  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  intelligible  to  our- 
selves and  controlling  one  order,  we  may  very  well 
have  to  find  or  fashion  others,  where  a  different 
order  of  facts  is  concerned.  This  is  the  contention 
of  the  present  paper.  I  have  tried  to  show  that  such 
a  "  transition  into  another  order"  takes  place  when 
we  pass  from  inorganic  matter  to  life  and  mind,  from 
the  physical  to  the  mental,  from  an  abstracted  ele- 
ment of  our  experience  to  our  experience  as  a  con- 
crete whole.  We  use  a  saw  to  make  a  fiddle ;  we 
throw  it  aside  when  we  come  to  play  upon  it.  In 
somewhat  the  same  way,  we  use  the  law  of  causation 
from  without  and  the  conservation  of  energy,  when 
we  seek  to  explain  to  our  minds  the  material  world ; 
we  have  to  look  for  some  other  conception  when  we 
come  to  the  action  of  the  mind  itself.  There  is  a 
theological  heresy  known  in  the  prayer-book  as  that 
of  "  confounding  the  substances."  The  heresy  in 
philosophy  I  have  been  trying  to  deal  with  is  of 
somewhat  the  same  kind.  It  is  one  that  those  who 
occupy   themselves   exclusively  with   physical   phe- 

ioo 


A  Psychological  Approach 

nomena  are  especially  prone  to.  As  we  have  seen, 
it  was  widely  spread  in  the  seventies  of  last  century, 
when  for  a  moment  leading  scientists,  to  use  Words- 
worth's prophetic  description,  became  the 

"  slaves 
...  of  that  false  Secondary  Power 
By  which  we  multiply  distinctions,  then 
Deem  that  our  puny  boundaries  are  things 
That  we  perceive  and  not  that  we  have  made." 

I  have  tried  to  show  that  our  own  time  is  marked 
by  a  different  spirit.  At  the  end  of  a  period  of 
unequalled  success  in  physical  science,  indeed  as  a 
last  phase  of  it,  a  wider  intellectual  horizon  is  open- 
ing out,  in  view  of  which  the  general  truths  of  natural 
science  are  coming  to  be  recognised,  in  the  words  of 
a  pioneer  in  this  field,  as  "  themselves  a  sort  of  ele- 
ments or  agents  under  processes  subordinate  helpers 
of  the  human  mind."1  This  does  not  mean  their 
degradation.  On  the  contrary,  it  asserts  their  true 
dignity  by  assigning  to  them  a  place  in  the  hierarchy 
of  creative  concepts  in  apprehending  which  the 
human  mind  reflects  the  divine. 

How  precisely  they  do  this,  in  other  words,  in  what 
relation  the  human  stands  to  the  Universal  Mind, 
which  is  the  object  of  religion,  it  is  not  the  work  of 
psychology  to  explain.  Psychology  has  done  its 
work,  so  far  as  religion  is  concerned,  in  removing  the 
difficulty  that  comes  from  the  opposition  of  the  physi- 
cal to  the  mental,  and  from  the  apparent  secondari- 
ness  of  the  latter  in  the  order  of  creation.     It  remains 

1  Professor  Royce,  in  The  World  and  the  Individual. 
101 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

for  philosophy  to  lead  us  the  further  step,  and  show, 
as  it  may,  that  the  purposes  of  humanity  can  only 
be  rendered  self-consistent  and  comprehensible  when 
taken  as  part  of  a  larger  scheme  which  embraces 
and  reconciles  them. 

JOHN   H.  MUIRHEAD. 
Birmingham. 


102 


A   SOCIOLOGICAL    APPROACH 
TOWARDS    UNITY 

VICTOR  V.  BRANFORD,   M.A. 
Honorary  Secretary,  The  Sociological  Society 

I 

TO  the  sociologist  the  relation  of  Religion  and 
Science  is  a  particular  case  of  a  more  general 
one.  In  the  first  place,  the  relation  may  be  one  of 
conflict  or  co-operation,  of  antagonistic  multiplicity  or 
of  unity,  of  mutual  exclusion  or  of  alternating  opposi- 
tion and  reconciliation.  Whether  it  is  viewed  under 
one  or  more  of  these  aspects,  depends  of  course  upon 
conditions  of  time  and  place,  upon  the  mood  or  per- 
sonality of  the  investigator,  and  upon  his  method  of 
investigation ;  it  depends  too  upon  the  character  of 
the  individuals  taken  as  representatives  of  religious 
and  scientific  interests,  and  also  upon  the  definitions 
of  those  interests  from  which  the  investigator  sets 
out.  In  the  second  place,  the  relation  of  Religion 
and  Science  is  sociologically  one  amongst  other 
cases  of  cultural  differentiation,  and  the  general  study 
of  these  is  surely  a  condition  necessary  to  the  under- 
standing of  any  particular  one  of  them. 

As  the  naturalist  thinks  of  animals  not  only  as  united 
into  a  "  kingdom,"  but  also  as  divided  into  more  or  less 

103 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

definable  groups  with  distinctive  characters  common 
to  the  members  of  a  given  group,  so  the  sociologist 
thinks  of  any  given  society  not  only  as  a  social  unity, 
but  also  as  a  whole  divisible  into  social  groups  pos- 
sessing common  group-interests.  The  sociologist's 
handling  of  Religion  and  Science  thus  begins  by 
asking  what  social  groupings  are  brought  about  by 
the  interests  called  Religious  and  Scientific.  Here 
the  practical  difficulties  of  the  investigation  at  once 
come  into  view.  Turn  to  the  Census  Reports,  and 
you  find  that  governments  do  not  know  how  to  ask, 
and  the  people  do  not  know  how  to  answer,  ques- 
tions about  either  Religion  or  Science.1  And  the 
statisticians,  who  should  instruct  both  the  govern- 
ments and  the  people  in  these  matters,  are  themselves 
slow  to  grow  out  of  their  sociological  long-clothes, 
and  apt  to  remain  content  with  mathematical  toys. 
Driven  back  on  his  own  resources,  the  sociologist 
utilizes  such  material  as  the  contemporary  state  of 
his  own  study  affords. 

To  identify  Religion  with  Priestcraft  is  a  fallacy 
surviving  in  popular  thought  from  pre-sociological 
(notably  eighteenth  century)  philosophy.  Yet  the 
sociologist  may,  without  in  any  way  committing  him- 
self to  that  fallacy,  utilize  the  element  of  truth  that 
has  caused  it  to  be  believed.  That  element  of  truth 
is  briefly  this:  that  where  the  study  and  the  in- 
culcation of  Religion  is  the  occupation   of  a  group 

1  The  Australian  census  schedules  ask  the  question :  "  What 
is  your  religion?"  It  is  said  that  many  people  reply,  quite 
truthfully,  no  doubt,  "  I  don't  know."  Others,  with  admirable 
insight  and  candor,  reply,  "  £.  s.  d." 

104 


A  Sociological  Approach 

of  persons  —  the  Priesthood  —  there  is  a  tendency 
for  religious  interests  to  become  differentiated  from 
the  social  interests  of  the  whole  community.  The 
Priesthood  professes  to  represent  the  religious  in- 
terests of  the  community,  and  at  its  best  periods,  and 
in  the  long  run,  doubtless  does  so  with  more  or  less 
completeness.  But  in  the  making  of  the  constantly 
required  adjustments  and  re-adjustments  between 
group-interests  and  communitary  interests,  there  must, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  be  endlessly  repeated  oppor- 
tunities for  conflict  and  antagonism.  The  law  of 
evolution,  formulated  by  Hegel  as  a  generalization 
from  the  Kantian  categories,  applies  here  as  else- 
where —  differentiation  and  integration  alternating  as 
correlative  parts  of  a  continuing  process  of  spiral 
development. 

In  addition  to  the  Priesthood,  other  social  groups 
arise  and  organise  themselves,  each  representing  some 
communitary  interest.  For  the  purpose  of  the  pres- 
ent argument,  and  in  application  to  the  present  phase 
of  occidental  civilisation,  these  other  groups  may  per- 
haps be  reckoned  as  follows : l 

(i)   Scientists;  (4)   Politicians; 

(2)  Industrialists;  (5)   Historians; 

(3)  Literary  Men  and  Artists  ;       (6)   Philosophers. 

And  lest  the  more  important  half  of  Western 
Humanity  be  still  unrepresented  in  the  classification, 

1  This  classification  is  borrowed,  in  a  modified  form,  from 
one  of  the  many  unpublished  sociological  essays  of  Professor 
Geddes.  Doubtless  are  derived  from  the  same  source  more  of 
the  ideas  in  the  text  than  the  writer  is  aware  of,  and  the  latter 
are  not  few. 

105 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

there   should  be   added    a  seventh  group,  —  that   of 
women, —  the  Feminists. 

But,  omitting  the  Feminist  Group,  for  want  of 
knowing  whether  it  is  sociologically  equivalent  to 
any  one  of  the  others  or  to  all  of  them  together,  and 
awarding  to  Religion  (for  the  present,  without  exam- 
ination) the  central  place  it  traditionally  claims,  the 
position  might  be  diagrammatically  represented  thus : 


CO 


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u 


*& 


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**. 


</> 


$\t 


o^ 


«* 


,\»» 


^ 


fc* 


tsS- 


& 


V 


Co 


Or£j 


4$y 


V+o 


'%> 


/ 


tf 


A 


CO 


Notwithstanding  the  profession  of  social  unity,  it  is 
manifest  that  in  each  case  the  Group-Interest  is  likely 
to  be,  under  normal  circumstances,  more  or  less  diver- 

106 


A  Sociological  Approach 

gent  from  the  Communitary  Interest,  and  that  har- 
mony can  only  be  approached  by  a  process  which 
implies  a  certain  degree  of  conflict  and  sacrifice. 
The  subdivision  of  thought  and  action,  the  speciali- 
sation of  occupation  and  of  leisure,  have,  amongst 
western  nations,  proceeded  so  far  that  the  social 
groups  enumerated  above  are  substantially  distinct 
collections  of  different  individuals.  The  group  boun- 
daries are,  to  be  sure,  in  no  case  sharply  defined. 
There  are  individuals  common  to  two  or  more,  or 
even  to  all  of  the  groups.  But  this  overlapping  is 
not  —  even  in  the  case  of  groups  most  nearly  related 
—  sufficient  to  insure  a  free  passage  and  circulation 
of  ideals  from  group  to  group.  These  ideals  are  com- 
plementary and  harmonious,  or  exclusive  and  dis- 
cordant, according  to  circumstance.  The  larger  the 
number  of  individuals  at  any  one  time  whose  thought 
and  interest  are  effective  in  two,  or  three,  or  more 
groups,  the  more  complementary  and  harmonious  is 
likely  to  be  the  aggregate  of  group-ideals ;  the  fewer 
such  men,  the  poorer,  the  more  exclusive  and  antago- 
nistic the  ideals  of  all.  And  this  so,  not  merely  be- 
cause of  the  contagion  of  ideas  in  the  mingling  of 
diverse  individuals,  but  more  especially  because  ideals 
can  only  grow  out  of  the  experience  to  which  they 
are  relevant. 

II 

As  an  example  of  cultural  differentiation,  which  has 
to  be  compared  with  the  relation  of  Religion  and 
Science,  contrast  the  ideals  of  Science  and  of  Indus- 
try.    Here,  in  the  opposition  of  the  man  of  theory 

107 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

and  the  man  of  practice,  the  abstract  thinker  and  the 
concrete  worker,  we  have  one  of  the  most  deep-seated 
of  human  antagonisms,  perhaps  the  most  elemental 
of  all,  next  to  the  antagonism  of  sex,  yet,  like  it, 
capable  of  blending  into  the  most  intimate  and  fruit- 
ful union.  In  proof  of  the  intimacy  and  fruitfulness 
of  this  union,  one  needs  only  to  cite,  amongst  recent 
types,  such  cases  as  that  of  Darwin,  breeder  and 
naturalist;  Pasteur,  peasant,  chemist,  physiologist, 
bacteriologist ;  Kelvin,  mathematician  and  instrument 
maker;  Hooker,  gardener  and  botanist.  Amongst 
older  examples,  recall  Lavoisier,  chemist  and  farmer ; 
Linnaeus,  shoemaker,  gardener,  and  naturalist;  John 
Napier  (inventor  of  logarithms),  farmer  and  mathe- 
matician ;  Galileo,  astronomer  and  mechanic ;  Simon 
Stevin,  engineer  and  mathematician.  In  proof  of 
the  opposition,  there  is  the  historical  fact  that  while 
Industry  is  the  oldest  of  organised  human  activi- 
ties, Science  is  the  youngest.  The  priests,  the  poli- 
ticians, the  literary  men,  the  artists,  the  historians, 
the  philosophers,  all  constituted  themselves  into 
recognised  social  groups,  long  before  the  man  of 
science  secured  his  footing  in  the  scheme  of  things. 
It  is  only  in  a  small  part  of  the  globe  that  he  has 
done  so  yet,  and  even  there  under  narrow  restric- 
tions. Science,  as  an  occupation,  as  a  career,  is,  in 
its  own  home  in  the  culture  centres  of  the  western 
world,  officially  tolerated  if  it  sponges  on  charity, 
and  socially  encouraged  and  acclaimed  if  it  riots 
into  importance  and  respectability  on  the  produce 
of  patent  fees. 

The   slow  growth   of  the  scientific  conception  of 
108 


A  Sociological  Approach 

causation  in  the  human  mind  and  the  restriction  of 
its  sphere  of  application  is,  to  be  sure,  a  social  phe- 
nomenon of  the  most  general  kind,  by  no  means  con- 
fined to  the  industrial  class.  It  is  indeed  in  the  mind 
of  the  manual  worker  that  the  sense  of  an  impersonal 
mechanical  sequence  in  phenomena,  spontaneously 
arises  and  develops  up  to  a  certain  point.  Adam 
Smith  remarked  that  amongst  no  people  is  found  a 
God  of  Weight;  and  if  modern  anthropology  discovers 
one,  it  will  be  not  amongst  savage  tribes,  but  amongst 
the  devotees  of  the  New  Chemistry,  or  the  New 
Astronomy.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  point  of  insist- 
ence here  is  that  in  the  mind  of  the  working  indus- 
trialist the  sense  of  mechanical  sequence,  though  an 
integral  part  of  his  occupational  outfit,  yet  tends  to 
operate  merely  as  a  subconscious  power  —  like  respi- 
ration or  any  other  physiological  function.  It  is  part 
of  his  system  of  physiological  thought,  inherited  and 
acquired.  It  belongs  to  his  instinct  of  workmanship, 
—  of  which  indeed  it  is  the  psychic  counterpart.  It 
is  a  means  to  an  end,  —  the  end  being  the  produc- 
tion of  an  object  for  material  use. 

Thus,  in  respect  of  primary  human  origin,  the  idea 
of  causation  has  apparently  been  initially  generated 
in  the  mind  of  the  workman ;  and  that  by  his  occu- 
pational experience.  But  to  the  scientist,  as  abstract 
thinker,  has  been  left  the  development  of  the  work- 
man's sense  of  mechanical  sequence  into  an  explicit 
Principle  of  Causation.  In  his  hands  the  conception 
of  causation  has  become  a  tool  of  conscious  thought, 
a  methodological  device  of  the  highest  utility  in  the 
effort  to  understand  Nature. 

109 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

Here  also  it  is  a  means  to  an  end.  But  the  im- 
mediate end  is  one  not  of  work,  but  of  abstract 
thought,  that  is,  it  is  spiritual  and  not  material.  It  is 
a  vision  of  the  world  —  but  a  vision  of  the  world 
with  its  elements  of  Work  and  Play,  of  Accident  and 
Design,  of  Personality  and  of  Mystery,  all  eliminated 
by  the  very  postulate  of  its  method.  It  is  a  picture 
of  a  world  in  which  the  sum  total  of  phenomena, 
past,  present,  and  future,  is  seen  as  endless  chains  of 
causation  linked  in  mechanical  sequence,  colourless, 
impersonal,  quantitatively  determined. 

The  idea  of  the  principle  of  causation  as  a  methodo- 
logical convention  requiring  for  its  effective  use  to  be 
consciously  elaborated  by  the  mind,  as  the  mason's 
chisel  requires  to  be  sharpened  on  the  grindstone,  is 
a  conquest  achieved  for  the  race  by  generations  of 
abstract  thinkers.  The  full  and  free  use  of  this  scien- 
tific tool,  the  competent  handling  of  this  principle  of 
causation,  is  a  rare  quality  possessed  by  relatively  few 
people.  Its  possession  by  the  scientist  spiritually  dif- 
ferentiates him  from  the  worker.  And  it  is  morally  con- 
gruent with  this  deep  distinction  between  the  abstract 
thinker  and  the  concrete  worker,  between  Science 
and  Industry,  that  the  occupational  conduct  of  the 
industrial  group  is  governed  by  traditions  of  reserve 
and  secrecy,  and  that  of  the  scientific,  by  traditions 
of  freedom  and  publicity.  The  group-morality  or- 
dains that  the  industrialist  shall  keep  the  use  of  his 
tools  a  group-secret,  and  permits  it  as  an  individual 
secret.  His  traditional  group-morality,  on  the  other 
hand,  compels  the  scientist  to  teach  the  use  of  scien- 
tific tools,  to  all  who  are  willing  to  learn  —  and  to  a 

no 


A  Sociological  Approach 

good  many  others  who  are  not.  In  the  long  pro- 
tracted struggle  with  the  problems  of  science,  the 
efforts  of  generations  of  abstract  thinkers  to  devise 
and  perfect  tools  of  thought  and  to  teach  to  others 
the  use  of  these  new  organs  of  spiritual  power,  there 
has  grown  up  —  as  is  the  way  of  human  evolution  — 
a  vast  complexity  of  Craft- Symbolism  and  Craft- 
Custom.  In  its  most  general  and  abstract  form  this 
Craft-Symbolism  and  Custom  is  Mathematics  and 
Logic. 

The  formalism  of  Mathematics  and  Logic,  with  its 
apparent  absence  of  objective  ritual,  may  seem  at 
first  sight  to  be  the  farthest  possible  removed  from 
those  observances,  which,  in  Conduct  and  Religion, 
are  called  ceremonial.  But  the  essence  of  ceremo- 
nial is  the  symbolic  representation  of  ideas  and  emo- 
tions. The  degree  of  objectivity  attaching  to  the 
ritual  is  incidental.  In  ordinary  religious  ceremonial 
it  varies  from  (say)  the  stage  machinery  of  a  Passion 
Play  to  the  imaginary  marking  of  a  cruciform  sign  in 
empty  space.  Now  the  modern  notion  of  mathe- 
matical space  and  time  as  not  identical  with,  but  as 
symbolically  related  to  empirical  space  and  time, 
makes  it  clear  that  the  ceremonial  concept  is  to  be 
found  in  the  very  heart  of  mathematics.  Logical 
reasoning  is  doubtless  similarly  related  to  empirical 
reasoning.  It  would  be  an  undue  stretching  of  lan- 
guage to  say  that  Mathematics  and  Logic  are  the 
ceremonialism  of  science.  What  is  contended  is  that 
the  formalism  of  Mathematics  and  Logic  is,  in  the 
scientific  group,  the  spiritual  homologue  of  what,  in 
the  religious  group,  is  ceremonialism.     And,  more- 

iii 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

over,  is  it  not  the  case  that  the  extreme  refinement 
and  attenuation  of  the  ceremonial  element  in  Mathe- 
matics and  Logic  tends  to  increase  rather  than 
diminish  the  danger  which  accompanies  all  symbolic 
expression,  the  danger  of  exalting  the  sign  above  the 
thing  signified,  of  subordinating  the  idea  or  the 
emotion  to  the  form  of  the  expression?  To  say  that, 
does  not  mean  that  Mathematicians  and  Logicians 
are  necessarily  formalists  —  they  are  organisers  of 
formalism  in  the  service  of  Science.  The  driver  of 
fat  oxen  need  not  himself  be  fat  —  though  doubtless 
there  is  a  considerable  tendency  that  way. 

It  is  a  defect  of  the  natural  man  and  a  habit  of  the 
educated  man  to  commit  moral  suicide  with  the  im- 
plements of  their  own  making,  in  their  different  ways. 
That,  to  be  sure,  is  an  absurd  upshot  for  a  rational 
being's  activity.  But,  as  Hobbes  pointed  out,  it  is 
the  capacity  for  absurdity  no  less  than  the  capacity 
for  rationality,  that  distinguishes  man  from  the  ani- 
mals. In  respect  of  both  these  distinguishing  char- 
acteristics, the  scientist  is  amongst  the  least  animal 
of  men.  The  particular  absurdity  to  which  the  scien- 
tist is  prone,  is,  psychologically  speaking,  a  certain 
loss  of  memory.  He  forgets  his  postulates.  He 
forgets  that  the  Principle  of  Causation,  most  potent 
of  thought  engines  though  it  is,  yet  is  but  a  methodo- 
logical convention  of  the  scientific  mind.  He  forgets 
those  elements  which  by  postulatory  assumption  he 
omitted  at  the  outset  from  his  scheme  of  thought. 
Especially  is  he  liable  to  forget  altogether  the  ele- 
ment of  Personality,  undefinable  because  unique,  and 
the    element   of  Mystery,  immeasurable    and    unde- 

112 


A  Sociological  Approach 

termined,  but  subtly  pervading  all  things  as  an  in- 
exhaustible factor.  More  strange  still  perhaps,  he 
forgets  the  elements  of  Work  and  Play.  He  even 
descends  sometimes  to  a  contemptuous  allusion  to 
the  vulgarity  of  utilitarian  motives,  and  then,  with  the 
consistency  of  the  caviller,  he  complains  of  the  use- 
lessness  of  Literature  and  Art.  With  reciprocating 
contempt  and  misunderstanding,  the  Worker  and 
the  Artist  retaliate  by  calling  the  scientist  "  a  mere 
theorist,"  a  "  dry-as-dust  pedant." 

The  scientist  who,  by  overspecialisation,  or  through 
stunting  of  early  culture,  declines  into  this  state  of 
obliviousness  has  become  the  slave  of  his  own  methods. 
In  that  condition  the  scientist  is  a  thorough-going 
formalist  —  a  type  known  to  theological  discussion  as 
an  Idolater.  Now  to  the  slave  there  is  only  wanting 
the  opportunity  to  become  a  tyrant;  and  it  would  be 
mere  foolhardiness  to  deny  that  there  are  scientists 
who  covet  and  would  grasp  the  territory  of  all  the 
other  cultural  groups.  That  Science  should,  with  its 
ideas,  its  formulae,  and  its  methods  always  pervade 
and  sometimes  invade  the  domain  of  Philosophy, 
History,  and  Literature,  is  natural,  inevitable,  and 
highly  productive  of  useful  results.  But  the  scientist 
is  at  once  obscurantist  and  tyrannical,  if  he  denies 
legitimacy  to  the  various  methodological  conventions 
which  generations  of  philosophers  and  historians, 
writers  and  poets,  artists  and  women,  have  devised 
for  dealing  with  their  particular  order  of  problems. 
The  dialectic  of  philosophy,  the  aesthetic  induction 
(to  use  the  phrase  of  Helmholtz)  of  the  historian 
and  the  literary  man,  the  intuition  of  the  poet  and 
8  IJ3 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

the  woman,  are  all  of  them  conscious  or  subconscious 
methods  of  knowledge,  which,  rightly  used,  stand  in 
supplementary  and  not  exclusive  relation  to  the 
scientific  principle  of  Causation.  Of  the  positive 
value  and  function  of  dogma,  nothing  need  here  be 
said,  for  Theology  has  no  monopoly  of  that  useful 
method  of  research.  And,  to  be  fair,  it  must  be 
added  that  Science  has  no  monopoly  of  the  misuse 
of  dogma.1 

The  sociological  position  of  the  scientist  becomes 
more  intelligible  if  we  regard  the  type  as  comprised 

1  The  student  of  methodology  treats  as  a  rare  and  precious 
specimen  the  scientific  writer  who  shows  any  clearness  of  per- 
ception, in  respect  of  the  borderland  which  separates  scientific 
proof  from  dogmatic  utterance.  It  is  one  of  the  saddest  and 
most  damaging  reproaches  against  the  scientific  group,  that, 
with  all  their  insistence  on  method  and  nomenclature,  yet 
neither  their  methodology  nor  their  terminology  takes  formal 
account  of  the  process  by  which  practical  precepts  and  maxims 
of  conduct  are  derivable  from  scientific  generalisations.  This 
defect  explains  not  a  little  of  the  misunderstanding  between 
Science  and  Religion,  for  the  relation  of  conduct  to  general 
truths  is  the  special  field  of  theological  dogma.  The  few  who, 
as  sociologists,  have  tried  to  cultivate  this  field  scientifically, 
have  been  sooner  or  later  condemned  by  the  congregations  of 
Scientists  and  Philosophers,  and  forthwith  excommunicated 
—  their  books  put  on  the  Index,  themselves  persecuted  as 
heretics.  That  is  why,  for  two  generations,  sociologists  have 
wandered  as  pariahs  amongst  the  outcasts  of  Science  and 
Philosophy.  The  history  of  the  persecutions  of  innovators  by 
the  pontifical  officialdom  of  Science  and  Philosophy  has  yet  to 
be  written.  The  materials  are  ample  and  daily  increasing. 
Plus  ca  change,  plus  c'est  la  meme  chose.  And  yet  the  pion- 
eers of  sociology  did  not  enjoy  the  good  fortune  of  St.  Augus- 
tine, who,  it  is  well  known,  escaped  excommunication  by  taking 
the  precaution  of  being  an  Early  Father. 

114 


A  Sociological  Approach 

of  two  varieties.  And  if  we  call  one  the  "  Naturalist " 
and  the  other  the  "  Logician,"  l  that  must  not  be  taken 
to  imply  any  exclusive  differentiation  between  the  two 
varieties,  but  only  a  predominant  tendency  in  each. 
The  scientific  type  itself  stands  for  a  certain  attitude 
of  man  towards  nature,  —  an  attitude  in  which  the 
intellectual  is  at  its  maximum  and  the  emotional  at 
its  minimum.  In  the  "  naturalist,"  the  emotional 
element  persists  with  sufficient  intensity  to  raise  from 
among  his  occupational  ideas,  human  ideals,  poten- 
tial if  not  active.  In  the  "  logician,"  the  emotional 
element  tends  to  be  reduced  to  vanishing  point,  and 
when  that  happens  the  investigator  becomes  a  victim 
of  his  intellectual  machinery,  —  he  becomes,  in  fact, 
a  mere  formalist.  This  psychological  distinction  is 
important  sociologically,  because  it  is  a  chief  factor 
in  determining  the  associations  between  the  scientific 
and  other  social  groups,  —  their  alliances  and  their 
hostilities;  their  possibilities  of  co-operation  or  of 
conflict. 

Ill 

The  groups  previously  enumerated  as  sociologically 
co-ordinate  with  the  Scientists  were  —  it  will  be  re- 
membered—  the  Industrialists,  the  Literary  Men  and 
Artists,  the  Politicians,  the  Historians,  and  the  Phil- 
osophers. It  is  contended  that  the  individuals  com- 
posing each  of  these  groups  may  be  psychologically 

1  If  it  were  permissible  to  coin  a  word,  "  logicist "  would  be 
preferable  in  order  to  avoid  confusion  with  the  professed  logi- 
cian, who  is  usually  a  philosopher  strayed  into  the  camp  of  the 
scientists. 

115 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

classified  on  a  basis  of  division  similar  to  that  applied 
to  the  scientists  —  and  with  corresponding  sociologi- 
cal implications.  In  other  words,  the  representative 
type  of  personality  in  each  group  may  be  treated  as 
one  or  other  of  two  varieties.  In  the  one  variety, 
the  more  emotional,  the  group-ideals  are  relatively 
concrete,  and  hence  being  more  capable  of  expres- 
sion, artistic  or  other,  they  predominate  in  thought 
and  action  over  the  group-formalism.  In  the  other 
variety,  the  group-ideals  are  subordinated  to  those 
methodological  conventions  which  constitute  the 
group-formalism;  and  the  individual's  course  of 
life  and  conduct  may  thus  come  to  be  very  differ- 
ently directed.  The  former  variety  may  be  called 
Idealist  and  the  latter  Formalist *  —  provided,  as  al- 

1  The  objections  to  this  usage  of  these  two  familiar  words 
are  obvious  and  real.  Both  words,  however  plastic  in  mean- 
ing, have  yet  a  connotation  more  definite  and  limited  than 
is  here  intended.  The  difficulty  can  only  be  met,  and  that 
partially,  by  new  coinages.  For  the  type  of  personality  here 
designated  Formalist,  Mr.  William  Macdonald  suggests  the 
word  Formulist,  —  a  person  whose  faith  is  in  Formula.  Mr. 
Macdonald  writes:  "As  to  a  substitute,  I  think  the  coinage 
'formulist,'  as  the  designation  of  all  those  who  deal  with 
knowledge  on  the  Chinese  assumption  that  it  has  reference  to 
a  static  system  of  things  and  an  immutable  consent,  and  who 
deal  with  facts  at  that  stage  at  which  they  have  become  figures, 
and  with  figures  at  that  stage  at  which  they  have  become 
algebraic  expressions — for  these  people,  I  say,  or  for  people 
in  this  phase  of  mind,  the  word  '  formulist '  would  be  a  good 
descriptive  designation  and  brand  of  infamy.  '  Formulism '  is 
absolutely  accurate  as  to  meaning  and  has  the  advantage  of 
being  pure,  antiseptic,  neutral,  trolled  by  a  sense  of  humour." 
For  "  idealist "  in  the  text  Mr.  Macdonald  suggests  "  vitalist." 

116 


A  Sociological  Approach 

ready  said,  that  these  designations  are  taken  to  imply 
merely  a  predominant  tendency  in  the  one  or  other 
direction,  and  are  not  understood  as  drawing  a  sharp 
line  of  demarcation  which  puts  on  the  right,  a  num- 
ber of  persons  devoid  of  formalism,  and  on  the  left, 
persons  without  idealism.  In  every  individual  the 
two  qualities  are  manifestly  mingled.  But  it  is  im- 
portant, both  for  practical  and  for  theoretical  pur- 
poses, to  be  able  to  distinguish  between  those  in 
whom  the  one  or  other  quality  predominates. 

Space  prescribed  forbids  any  adequate  demonstra- 
tion of  the  grounds  of  this  classification  here  adduced 
as  of  general  validity.  But  the  mere  dogmatic  state- 
ment of  the  thesis  has  its  uses.  Propounded  to  an 
Idealist,  no  matter  of  what  group,  it  will  generally 
be  found  to  receive  his  assent.  On  the  other  hand, 
let  the  proposition  be  advanced  in  the  presence  of  a 
Formalist,  then,  whether  he  be  a  philosopher  or  a 
man  of  affairs,  a  historian  or  a  politician,  a  scientist 
or  an  artist,  he  will,  in  all  probability,  say  it  is  rub- 
bish. Thus,  in  the  hands  of  those  practically  con- 
cerned with  the  classification  of  their  fellow-men,  it 
may  serve  as  a  touchstone  of  character.  The  prin- 
ciple is  doubtless  well-known  to  students  of  Pastoral 
Theology. 


IV 

In  the  case  of  the  industrial  group,  a  classification  of 
psychological  types  has  been  worked  out,  and  their 
social  evolution  traced,  by  Mr.  Thorstein  Veblen  in 

117 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

a  remarkable  book.1  To  have  combined  in  one  trea- 
tise something  of  Herbert  Spencer's  philosophical 
massiveness,  of  William  James'  psychological  subtlety, 
of  Karl  Marx's  power  of  reconstructing  economic 
formulae,  and  to  have  brightened  the  whole  from  a 
new  vein  of  humour  is  a  feat  of  which  American 
Sociology  may  reasonably  boast.  Mr.  Veblen's 
thesis  is  briefly  this :  The  earliest  subdivision  of 
labour,  arising  out  of  and  superimposed  on  that  of 
sex,  is  a  division  of  occupations  into  those  that  are 
of  the  nature  of  exploit  and  prowess,  and  those  that 
are  of  the  nature  of  drudgery.  The  corresponding 
psychological  types  are  characterised  by,  on  the  one 
hand,  audacity  and  predaciousness,  and  on  the  other 
by  timidity  and  submission.  The  correlative  socio- 
logical grouping  is  into  a  higher  class  engaged  in 
"  honorific  occupations,"  and  a  lower  class  engaged 
in  "  humilific  occupations."  The  military  occupation 
is  manifestly  one  that  is  highly  honorific,  not  only 
because  it  serves  to  display  audacity  and  prowess,  but 
also  because  by  affording  opportunity  for  the  accu- 
mulation of  loot,  it  provides  means  for  a  peaceful 
occupation  that  is  also  highly  honorific,  —  the  "  per- 
formance of  leisure."  And  with  the  growth  of  civili- 
sation, the  increase  of  wealth,  the  further  subdivision 
and  specialisation  of  labour,  numerous  refinements 
of  honorific  occupation  become  possible.  The  per- 
formance of  leisure,  for  instance,  at  first  only  under- 
taken   by    the    superior    person    himself,    may    be 

1  "  The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class,  —  an  Economic  Study- 
in  the  Evolution  of  Institutions,"  by  Thorstein  Veblen.  New 
York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1899. 

118 


A  Sociological  Approach 

increasingly  assisted  by  others,  wife,  family,  and  in- 
creasing circles  of  dependents,  at  length  quite  vicari- 
ously performed,  —  as  by  engaging  a  stalwart  Hercules 
to  serve  as  a  Footman.  Moreover,  this  vicarious 
performance  of  leisure  has  the  further  advantage  of 
setting  free  the  Master  Man  himself  to  satisfy  those 
universal  human  instincts  of  workmanship  which,  in 
the  higher  class  scheme  of  life,  tend  to  be  countered 
by  the  exigencies  of  honorific  leisure.  Having  taken 
adequate  precautions  against  the  derogation  of  his 
gentlemanly  status  (primarily,  by  the  copious,  regu- 
lar, and  manifest  consumption  of  costly  goods,  in  his 
person,  and  if  possible  also  vicariously,  by  his  atten- 
dants and  household),  the  man  of  higher  class,  now 
clearly  distinguished  by  this  process  of  "  conspicu- 
ous waste,"  permits  himself  to  relax  from  the  per- 
formance of  leisure,  and  engage  in  occupations  that 
otherwise  might  mark  him  with  the  taint  of  drudgery. 
Particularly  is  this  the  case  when  the  industrial  system 
reaches  that  stage  of  development  where  it  bases 
itself  on  a  money  economy.  A  change  from  the 
system  of  payment  in  kind  to  payment  in  money, 
means  a  revolution  in  the  methodological  conventions 
of  the  industrial  system.  And  this  revolution  is  in 
the  direction  of  a  more  facile  exaltation  of  method  at 
the  expense  of  ideal.  It  involves  great  possibilities 
of  wealth  acquisition  by  audacious  manipulation  of 
the  symbols  and  tokens  of  industrial  values.  Here, 
in  fact,  are  new  and  abundant  opportunities  for 
achievements  of  exploit  and  prowess  (cunning  in- 
creasingly aiding  force)  ;  and  their  gains  conse- 
quently admit  of  the  creation  and  multiplication  of 

119 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

new  occupations,  honorific  and  other.  These  whole 
later  refinements  of  the  progress  of  civilisation  are 
broadly  spoken  of  as  Financiering. 

Such,  in  too  scanty  outline,  is  Mr.  Veblen's  theory.1 
It  is  cited  here  as  affording  grounds  for  a  sociological 
subdivision  of  the  Industrial  group  parallel  to  that 
of  the  Scientific  group.  Attending  the  evolution  of 
honorific  occupations  there  has  been  a  luxuriant  cul- 
tural growth  of  formalism.  The  distinction  between 
honorific  and  humilific  occupations  is  manifestly  the 
economic  correlative  of  the  juristic  distinction  be- 
tween Status  and  Contract.  And  the  elaborate  and 
ever-increasing  organisation  of  formalism  into  cere- 
monialism, which  everywhere  accompanies  a  system 
of  Status,  adorning  and  supporting  it,  is  too  univer- 
sally known  to  need  illustration.  On  this  adamantine 
crust  of  custom,  which  envelopes  the  well-baked  cake 
of  status,  innovating  genius  has  countless  times 
broken  its  teeth. 

What  is  the  economic  need  and  consequent  aim  of 
a  system  based  on  status?  It  is,  in  the  talk  of  the 
home,  the  possession  of  "  private  means  ; "  in  the 
language  of  the  modern  market-place,  it  is  the  "  hold- 
ing of  investments ;  "  in  the  cultural  terminology  and 
aspiration  of  the  learned  world,  it  is  the  creation  of 
pecuniary  "  endowments."  Contrast  this  with  the 
economic  aim  of  those  engaged  in  humilific  occupa- 

1  It  will  be  observed  that  Mr.  Veblen's  theory  reaches  a 
larger  and  perhaps  a  more  fruitful  economic  generalisation  than 
that  of  Comte  and  Spencer  — the  economic  law  of  development 
from  militarist  to  industrial  civilisation  being  included  and 
transcended  in  Mr.  Veblen's  theory,  its  apparent  reversions 
becoming  explained. 

120 


A  Sociological  Approach 

tions.  What  does  the  workman  ask  but  a  job  ?  What 
remuneration  does  he  seek  but  pay  for  work  done? 
The  inherent  social  inferiority  is  obvious.  Yet  is 
this  inferiority  after  all  so  desirable?  If  not,  is  it 
inevitable,  is  it  permanent? 

To  these  simple  and  common  economic   ends  of 
job  and  pay,  there  only  needs  to  be  added  an  equally 
simple  and  common  conception,  yet  one  not  only  in- 
dustrial, but  aesthetic,  scientific,  and  moral  also,  that 
of  a  "  good  job,"  and  these  humble  aims  straightway 
rise  and  extend  to  the  level  of  a  social  ideal,  potential 
or  actual.     The  social  and  ideal  aspects  of  a  good  job 
are  doubtless,  in  the  minds  of  the  great  majority  of 
workers,  latent;    they  exist  nevertheless  in  subcon- 
scious  motivation.     And  in  the  very  fact   of  their 
present  unconsciousness  lies  their  importance  for  us 
here,  since  it  reveals  natural  processes  at  work  tend- 
ing to  the  harmonisation  of  individual  interests  with 
group-interests,  and  of  group-interests  with  the  largest 
social    interests.     The    master-discovery   of  spiritual 
man   lies   in   the    awakening    of   these    subconscious 
social    ideals  and   in  devising    means    for   educating 
them    into    the    richest    blossomings   of  regenerative 
social  service.     It  is  noteworthy  that  the  great  "  ac- 
coucheurs  d'esprit"  throughout   history  have   been, 
almost  without  exception,  persons  given  to  humilific 
occupations,  —  either  by  inheritance,  or  by  personal 
predilection. 

The  workers,  to  be  sure,  are  already  not  without 
their  own  organisation  of  symbol  and  of  custom. 
And  a  tough  and  unprogressive  formalism  and  cere- 
monialism it  largely  is.     Yet  looking  at  it  in  the  large 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

historic  way,  their  group-formalism  shows  a  tendency 
to  be  subordinated  to  group-idealism.  Must  not  the 
contrary  be  said  of  that  variety  of  the  industrial  type 
represented  by  the  Pecuniary  Culture?  The  endowed 
individual  may  himself  rise  to  exalted  heights  of 
social  idealism.  But  in  process  of  doing  so,  he  con- 
stantly loses  or  resigns  his  privileges  of  endowment. 
Otherwise  it  is  only  by  a  miracle  of  moral  sensitive- 
ness that  he  can  respond  to  the  general  sense  of 
social  solidarity.  In  the  mere  fact  of  endowment, 
there  is  a  certain  degree  of  social  isolation,  which,  if 
not  in  the  individual,  yet  in  the  course  of  two  or  three 
generations  does  and  must  tend  to  produce  anti- 
social elements  in  the  subconscious  motivation  of 
conduct.  Sociologically,  the  individual  is  a  member 
of  a  group,  an  item  in  a  series,  a  punctuation  in  a 
system.  The  present  contention  is  that,  within  the 
Industrial  Group,  there  is  at  work  a  methodological 
principle,  of  which  the  apparatus  and  process  —  that 
of  Financiering  —  tend  to  produce  a  variety  of  the 
group-type,  in  which  Idealism  is  subordinated  to 
Formalism  and  Ceremonialism. 

The  conflict  between  Religion  and  Science,  much 
in  evidence  though  it  has  been  during  the  past  three 
or  four  centuries,  is  thus  but  a  mushroom  affair  com- 
pared with  that  conflict  between  Religion  and  the 
pecuniary  interest  above  analysed ;  so  that  we  may 
now  identify  the  ponderous  general  enunciation  which 
we  have  just  reached,  as  a  tardy  sociological  restate- 
ment of  a  time-worn  aphorism  of  religion:  "Ye 
cannot  serve  God  and  Mammon."  The  early  Chris- 
tian thought  about  the  difficulty  of  the    rich   man 


A  Sociological  Approach 

entering  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  and  the  apparent 
exaggeration  of  the  love  of  money,  as  the  root  of 
all  evil,  crystallised  in  the  mediaeval  Catholic  Church 
into  a  definite  pronouncement  of  the  Canon  Law, 
that  Commerce  "  displicet  Deo."  Of  the  many  appli- 
cations of  this  principle  by  religion,  one  of  the  most 
ancient  and  wide-spread  is,  of  course,  the  attempt 
made  not  only  by  the  Christian,  but  by  other  churches, 
to  extinguish,  or  to  mitigate  usury. 

Here,  in  the  opposition  of  the  church  to  the  pecu- 
niary interest,  is  incidentally  revealed  one  of  the  many 
sources  of  conflict  between  Religion  and  Science. 
The  ecclesiastical  condemnation  of  the  rich  man  is 
doubtless  a  theoretical  deprecation,  tempered  in  prac- 
tice by  copious  adulation.  But  the  point  to  observe 
is  just  this  — that  it  is  theoretical;  that  there  is  im- 
plicit in  theological  doctrine  a  moral  theory  of  the 
use  of  wealth.  The  religious  attitude  to  wealth  em- 
phasises what  in  economic  terminology  is  termed 
consumption,  as  against  production.  Precisely  the 
contrary  is  the  traditional  attitude  of  the  science  of 
economics,  —  if,  by  the  courtesy  of  physicists  and 
biologists,  economics  may  be  counted  in  the  circle  of 
the  sciences.  Until  the  present  generation,  economic 
science  not  only  offered  no  theory  of  consumption, 
but  even  repudiated  the  need  for  one.  When  eco- 
nomic science  is  able  to  formulate  a  theory  of  con- 
sumption,—  and  it  is  now  beginning  to  do  so,  —  it 
does  not  of  course  follow  that  the  scientific  theory 
will  square  with  that  implicitly  contained  in  Chris- 
tian doctrine.  But  a  purely  obscurantist  element  of 
conflict  between  Religion  and  Science  will  be  elimi- 

123 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

nated,  and  the  way  prepared  for  an  unbiassed  discus- 
sion of  common  ground. 

Now  it  is  fair  to  generalise  this  instance  as  typical 
of  many  cases  of  conflict  between  Religion  and 
Science.  Generations  of  empirical  observers,  using 
subconscious  or  semi-conscious  methods,  have  dimly 
reached  many  deep-seated  truths  and  incorporated 
them  —  it  may  be  in  vague  and  approximate  form  — 
in  religious  doctrine.  And  it  frequently  happens 
that  this  sort  of  truth  is  the  last  to  be  consciously 
reached  by  the  scientist  and  formulated  in  verifiable 
shape.  Yet,  meanwhile,  Science,  with  the  ready  as- 
surance of  youth,  is  too  apt  to  oppose  to  the  claim 
of  Religion  to  holiness  of  thought  its  own  immature 
synthesis  of  totality  —  which  proves,  on  further  ex- 
amination, to  be  not  a  genuine  whole,  but  a  partial 
and  fragmentary  aspect  of  the  truth. 


AFTER  the  Industrial,  the  remaining  Groups  that  have 
to  be  considered  in  respect  of  a  possible  distinction 
into  Idealists  and  Formalists,  are  the  Literary  and 
Artistic,  the  Political,  the  Historical,  and  the  Philo- 
sophical. In  any  adequate  scheme  of  treatment,  the 
questions  to  be  asked  about  each  of  these  would  be 
somewhat  as  follows:  What  particular  aspects  of 
human  nature  constitute  the  special  group-interest  ? 
How  does  it  come  about  that  this  particular  interest 
gets  established  as  an  end  of  group-activities?  What 
means  —  what  special  methodological  conventions  — 

124 


A  Sociological  Approach 

have  been  devised  by  the  collective  group-experience, 
to  achieve  its  specific  ends?  We  should  have  to  in- 
quire also,  under  what  conditions  the  methodological 
conventions  of  the  group  develop  into  an  organised 
formalism,  and  under  what  conditions  this,  with  its 
associated  ceremonialism,  may  hinder  or  favour  the 
evolution  of  group  ends  into  social  ideals.  And  all 
these  general  inquiries  would,  were  an  adequate 
sociological  investigation  here  possible,  be  the  theo- 
retic accompaniment  of  actual  observation.  Such 
observation  would  be  directed  to  ascertain  what  in- 
dividuals are,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  arrested  in  their 
spiritual  development  by  getting  enmeshed  within 
the  nets  of  group-formalism ;  and  what  individuals 
do,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  pass  in  the  opposite  direction, 
from  the  quest  of  individual  ends  to  group  ends, 
and  from  these  to  the  striving  for  social  ideals.  The 
latter  —  the  idealists  —  in  their  individual  lives  run 
the  full  course  of  the  racial  development  of  the 
group;  the  former  —  the  formalists  —  by  failure  of 
educational  process  or  by  defect  of  inheritance,  never 
get  awakened  to  the  higher  spiritual  stages  of  racial 
evolution.  These  inquiries  and  investigations  ob- 
viously cannot,  however,  be  now  entered  upon.  It 
must  here  suffice  if  we  deal  with  the  remaining 
groups  in  the  briefest  possible  way. 

In  Literature,  the  distinction  between  the  Formal- 
ists or  Stylists  and  the  Humanists  is  familiar  to  all, 
as  an  example  of  the  psychological  analysis  here 
attempted ;  the  Stylists  making  method  an  end  in 
itself,  and  the  Humanists  making  it  serve  as  a  means 
to  an  end.     Equally  familiar  in  other  departments  of 

125 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

aesthetics  are  the  doctrine  and  practice  of  "  Art  for 
Art's  sake."  But  it  is  not  so  widely  recognised, 
that  the  pictorial,  the  plastic,  and  other  fine  arts,  as 
well  as  the  Literary,  oppose  their  humanists  to 
their  stylists.  Erasmus  and  Melancthon  have  their 
strict  homologues  in  Leonardo  and  Michael  Angelo; 
Goethe  and  Emerson,  in  Corot  and  Millet,  in 
Beethoven  and  Wagner.     The  Stylists  are  manifestly 

—  in  the  terms  of  our  analysis  —  the  Formalists;  and 
the    Humanists,    the    Idealists  —  potential    or   actual 

—  of  the  Literary  and  Artistic  Group.  As  a  typical 
example  of  the  relation  of  this  group  to  the  Religious, 
take  Matthew  Arnold's  "  Literature  and  Dogma," 
where  the  Humanists  of  Literature  are  depicted  as 
in  harmony  with  the  Idealists  of  Religion,  and  in 
conflict  with  the  Dogmatists  of  Religion. 


VI 

In  Politics,  it  is  not  difficult  to  decipher  the  Ideal- 
ists and  the  Formalists.  Politicians  have  been  ac- 
cused of  inefficiency  in  all  departments,  save  indeed 
one,  that  of  advertisement.  Thanks  to  their  efficiency 
in  securing  publicity,  politicians  of  all  types  are 
known  to  every  one  who  reads  history,  or  absorbs 
fiction.  Thus  it  is  easy  to  instance  well-known  ex- 
amples of  every  variety  of  politician,  even  of  idealists 
astray  in  that  group.  But  first  it  is  necessary  to  say 
a  word  in  this  case  also  as  to  group  ends  and  group 
means. 

The  aim  of  the  group  activity  called  Politics  is  the 
126 


A  Sociological  Approach 

organisation  of  social  selection.  Taking  the  phrase 
in  its  largest  sense,  natural  selection,  to  be  sure,  in- 
cludes social  selection  and  manifests  itself  as  such, 
under  certain  conditions.  But  that  is  a  form  of 
language  which  sociologists  use  and  biologists  gener- 
ally abuse.  The  biologist  only  earns  his  right  to  the 
use  of  such  a  nomenclature  by  turning  sociologist 
pro  tern.  These  subtleties  apart,  the  fact  remains  that 
there  exists  a  powerful  and  abiding  group  of  persons 
devoting  themselves  to  the  organisation  of  selective 
processes,  by  which  certain  group  and  individual 
types  are  encouraged,  and  others  eliminated. 

As  in  other  cases,  occupational  experience,  accu- 
mulating through  generations  of  politicians,  has  de- 
vised highly  specialised  means  towards  the  attainment 
of  group  ends.  This  highly  specialised  development 
of  group  organs  (chiefly  prehensile)  is  the  system  of 
Law.  Jurisprudence  is  the  methodology  of  Politics. 
Legalism  is  the  Formalism  of  Politics. 

This  is  not  to  say  all  lawyers  are  formalists.  That 
is  far  from  being  the  case.  As  every  sociological 
observer  must  be  aware,  there  are  to  be  found 
amongst  the  members  of  that  immemorial  profession 
many  political  idealists,  especially  among  those 
lawyers  who  have  early  in  life  given  up  practice. 
Nor  is  it  to  deny  that  multitudes  of  political  formal- 
ists are  to  be  found  outside  the  legal  profession.  In 
fact,  the  typical  formalist  of  Politics  is  not  the  lawyer, 
but  the  policeman.  In  the  policeman  we  see  group 
ends  completely  subordinated  to,  or  perhaps,  one 
should  say,  identified  with,  group  means.  Whatever 
of  social  selection  proceeds  from  him,   is  exercised 

127 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

automatically  by  uniform  and  baton.  This  truth 
finds  unconscious  expression  in  that  growing  usage 
of  political  nomenclature  by  which  the  body  of  police 
is  spoken  of  as  "  the  force."  In  the  identification  of 
means  and  end,  of  symbol  and  process,  which,  philo- 
sophically speaking,  supports  the  police  scheme  of 
social  selection,  the  orthodox  biologist  will  recog- 
nise the  principle  of  Natural  Selection,  and  the 
progressive  theologian  will  recognise  the  principle 
of  idolatry. 

But  who  are  the  idealists  of  Politics?  Here,  we 
may,  without  offence,  have  recourse  to  illustrative 
examples.  Many  familiar  pictures  will  at  once  sug- 
gest themselves  from  history.  Take,  for  instance, 
more  than  one  Roman  Emperor  of  the  second  cen- 
tury, consciously  applying,  with  a  superb  heroism, 
the  maxims  of  the  stoical  philosophy,  both  to  per- 
sonal conduct  and  to  political  Government,  having  at 
command  every  resource  of  refined  luxury,  but 
choosing  in  externals  the  simplicity  of  a  peasant's 
life,  often  on  foot,  bare-headed,  unattended,  in  end- 
less perambulations,  ceaselessly  supervising  the  cities 
of  the  vast  domain ;  or  take  Charlemagne,  creating 
local  administration,  organising  the  resources  of  a 
complex  culture,  strenuous  to  infect  every  one  with 
his  own  simple  and  frugal  habits,  his  own  zeal  for 
hard  work,  his  own  passion  for  culture;  or  King 
Alfred,  after  expelling  the  foreign  invaders,  devoting 
himself  to  the  organisation  of  education,  setting  up 
schools,  seeing  to  the  publishing  of  suitable  literature 
for  the  people ;  or  Cromwell,  selecting  his  Parliament 
from  those   whom  he    believed  to  be  the  wise,   the 

128 


A  Sociological  Approach 

honest,  and  the  good ;  or  Frederick  the  Great  (after 
the  experience  of  war  had  taught  him  its  horrors  and 
futilities),  living  without  parade  in  a  cottage,  working 
like  a  galley-slave  in  the  public  service,  selecting  his 
friends  from  amongst  philosophers  and  scientists, 
acting  on  his  own  maxim,  that  "  a  man  that  seeks 
truth  and  loves  it,  must  be  reckoned  precious  in  every 
society;  "  or  Jefferson,  striving  to  unite  political  phil- 
osophy with  practical  administration,  and  thus  com- 
bine in  the  creation  of  a  new  nation  the  qualities  both 
of  patriotism  and  cosmopolitanism,  while  rejecting 
the  defects  of  each,  so  that  "  every  man  might  have 
two  countries,  his  own  and  France." 

Tis  needless  to  multiply  examples.  The  point  is, 
to  observe  something  of  the  process  by  which  group 
ends  may  be  transmuted  into  social  ideals.  In  Poli- 
tics, as  elsewhere,  the  dynamic  of  progress  remains, 
as  yet,  a  more  than  half-concealed  secret.  But  one 
factor  at  least  is  conspicuous  in  the  lives  of  political 
idealists.  And  that  is  the  indomitable  quest  and  per- 
sistent utilisation  of  moral  and  intellectual  forces  that 
reside  in  the  activities  characteristic  of  other  social 
groups  than  their  own.  Hence  the  lavish  encourage- 
ment of  cultural  agencies  by  idealist  politicians,  their 
reliance  on  education,  their  organised  efforts  to 
democratise  the  sources  of  culture.1  (Educationists, 
generally  speaking,  are  not  politicians,  but  idealist 

1  "  It  becomes  every  day  more  evident  how  hopeless  is  the 
task  of  reconstructing  political  institutions,  without  the  previous 
remodelling  of  opinion  and  life."  General  View  of  Positivism, 
trans.  J.  H.  Bridges,  p.  2.  This  was  no  new  doctrine  in  1848, 
but  there  are  fewer  likely  to  dispute  it  now  than  then. 

9  129 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

politicians  are  necessarily  educationists.)  Hence 
also  their  sparing  and  cautious  use  of  juristic  means 
either  for  the  purpose  of  bettering  bad  customs  or 
of  confirming  good  ones.  On  its  negative  side,  the 
political  ideal  is  tersely  put  in  that  letter  of  Trajan 
to  Pliny  the  younger  when  Governor  of  Bithynia,  — 
much  quoted,  but  always  worth  quoting  again,  — 
"  Let  the  people  alone,  do  not  interfere  with  their 
customary  rights  of  self-government.  See  that  no 
new  local  taxes  are  imposed  and  that  there  is  no 
waste  or  jobbery :  but  otherwise  let  them  manage  for 
themselves."  A  customary  modern  example  of  crea- 
tive idealism  by  politicians  is  the  establishment  of 
the  University  of  Berlin,  as  a  primary  step  in  the  re- 
organisation of  a  devastated  country.  A  relatively 
perfected  combination  of  these  two  aspects  —  the 
negative  and  the  positive  —  of  political  idealism,  is 
seen  in  the  life  of  Turgot.1  But  it  is  arguable  that 
the  highest  achievements  of  political  idealism  have 
been  reached  by  men  not  reckoned  as  of  the  political 
group  —  in  former  times,  for  instance,  by  the  organ- 
isers of  the  great  monastic  institutions ;  in  recent 
times,  by  great  administrators  —  at  once  temporal 
and  spiritual  —  like  Thomas  Chalmers,  or  even  — 
though  it  smacks  of  paradox  to  say  it  —  by  Robert 

1  "  The  most  memorable  example  in  modern  times  of  a  man 
who  united  the  spirit  of  philosophy  with  the  pursuits  of  active 
life,  and  kept  wholly  clear  from  the  partialities  and  prejudices 
both  of  the  student  and  of  the  practical  statesman,  was  Turgot, 
who  will  long  remain  the  wonder  not  only  of  his  age,  but  of  all 
history,  for  his  astonishing  combination  of  the  most  opposite, 
and  (judging  from  common  experience)  almost  incompatible 
excellences."    J.  S.  Mill,  West.  Rev.  xxvi.  p.  25. 

130 


A  Sociological  Approach 

Owen.  With  a  degree  more  of  audacity,  it  might 
be  maintained  that  the  archetype  of  idealist  politician 
is  the  common  or  domestic  housewife.  The  subordi- 
nation of  personal  to  social  ends,  and  of  intellect  to 
feeling,  which  psychologically  characterises  woman, 
has  its  sociological  correlate  in  a  combination  of 
devoutness  in  ceremonial  observance,  with  a  high 
degree  of  potentiality  for  idealism.  In  this,  as  in 
a  certain  habit  of  clothing,  the  Priest  mimetically 
approaches  the  Woman.  And  thereby  he  acquires 
something  of  that  primal  magic  of  sex  —  the  mys- 
terious moralising  or  demoralising  force  which,  ac- 
cording to  circumstances,  is  a  chief  determinant  in 
spiritual  progress  or  degeneration.1 

In  regard  to  the  conflict  between  Church  and 
State  a  single  point  only  can  be  noted.  Where,  as  in 
existing  occidental  civilisation,  Politics  and  Religion 
are  occupationally  represented  by  organised  groups, 
then  a  certain  degree  of  opposition  between  Political 
and  Religious  interests  would  appear  to  be  inevitable 
and  perennial.  There  will,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be 
found  in  both  groups,  individuals  whose  interests  are 
mainly  material,  and  individuals  whose  interests  are 
mainly  spiritual.  The  former  are,  in  the  terms  of 
the  analysis  here  attempted,  the  formalist  or  cere- 
monialist  variant  of  the  group  type,  and  the  latter, 
the  idealist  variant.  The  interests  of  the  Politicians 
as  a  group,  on  the  whole,  are  doubtless  material,  and 
those  of  the  Priestly  group,  on  the  whole,  spiritual. 

1  It  is  noteworthy  that  of  all  the  great  centralised  Govern- 
ments, the  only  one  which,  according  to  current  rumour,  has  its 
finances  in  thoroughly  sound  order  is  the  Vatican. 

131 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

And  hence,  on  this  ground  alone,  a  tendency  to 
group-conflict,  as  well  as  to  group-co-operation. 
But  circumstances  constantly  arise  in  which  the 
cleavage  between  the  two  varieties  —  the  formalist 
and  the  idealist  —  in  each  group  will  prove  greater 
than  any  inter-group  opposition.  The  idealists  of 
each  group  will  then  tend  to  ally  against  the  form- 
alists of  each.  The  conflict  between  the  temporal 
and  the  spiritual  power  thus  tends  to  become  more 
and  more  a  conflict  of  individual  types  rather  than  of 
occupational  groups. 

VII 

In  respect  of  the  Historians,  it  may  help  us  to  our 
sociological  classification  to  recall  the  early  times 
when  the  historical  group  was  only  partially  differ- 
entiated from  the  Literary  and  Artistic  on  one  side 
and  the  Priestly  group  on  the  other.  The  annalists 
and  chroniclers  of  those  days  had  recourse  to  a 
simple  process  of  itemised  enumeration  —  a  naive 
application  of  primitive  mathematical  resources  to 
the  record  of  phenomena  in  time.  The  early  annal- 
ists and  chroniclers  had  many  merits.  Their  chief 
defects  were  two.  They  enjoyed  a  nicety  of  discrimi- 
nation which  insured  the  almost  invariable  omission 
from  their  record,  of  the  more  important  phenomena. 
In  the  second  place,  they  had  a  sense  of  causation 
which  was  embryonic  or  defective.  The  old  annalist 
type  survives  in  living  examples,  numerous  and  con- 
spicuous. It  was  the  prevalence  of  this  type  and  its 
spiritual  homology  with  the  formalist  of  science  that 

132 


A  Sociological  Approach 

prompted  Matthew  Arnold's  prophecy,  that  if  he 
lived  to  be  eighty  years  of  age,  he  would  be  the  only 
person  in  England  who  read  anything  beside  news- 
papers and  scientific  transactions.  He  forgot,  how- 
ever, that  the  formalists  of  Literature,  Theology,  and 
Philosophy  have  an  army  of  printers  in  their  service. 

A  highly  specialised  and  invaluable  variant  of  this 
annalist  type  is  the  statistician.  He,  to  be  sure,  is, 
in  the  higher  examples  of  the  variety,  by  no  means 
deficient  in  the  sense  of  causation,  but  rather  has 
gone  to  the  other  extreme,  and  suffered  a  hypertro- 
phied  development  of  it,  accompanied  by  correspond- 
ing atrophy  of  faculty  for  using  other  methods  of 
historical  research.  Statistics  by  no  means  comprises 
the  whole  methodology  of  history,  but  it  is  a  large 
part  of  it.  And  he  who  over-indulges  in  the  statis- 
tical method,  runs  that  risk  of  spiritual  paralysis 
which  insidiously  lurks  in  all  subordination  of  ends 
to  means.  He  is,  in  short,  on  the  high  road  to 
becoming  a  historical  formalist. 

There  is  a  modern  myth  which  tells  how  even  the 
most  eminent  and  gifted  of  investigators  may,  under 
certain  circumstances,  become  the  victim  of  the  statis- 
tical habit.  There  was,  so  the  story  runs,  a  certain 
Cantabrian  who,  in  his  youth,  achieved  great  emi- 
nence in  the  mathematical  sciences.  He  was  also  a 
man  of  noble  presence.  A  single  glance  at  his  coun- 
tenance showed  him  to  be  a  man  of  inspiration  and, 
moreover,  not  only  a  born  idealist,  but  also  a  born 
leader  of  idealists.  Interested  in  the  activities  of 
every  social  group,  he  himself  made  illuminating 
researches,  not  only  in   his  own  subject  of  mathe- 

133 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

matical  science,  but  also  in  many  others,  especially 
in  history.  By  an  accident  of  occupational  exigency, 
he  undertook  the  production  of  an  exhaustive  treatise 
on  the  History  of  the  Theory  of  Numbers.  By  a  few 
years  of  intense  effort  he  produced  a  monumental 
work,  such  as  might  legitimately  have  used  up  the 
lives  of  half-a-dozen  senior  wranglers.  But  the  effect 
of  this  over-specialisation  was  disastrous  on  the  per- 
sonality of  the  Cantabrian  himself.  He  had  become 
hypnotised  by  numbers.  Numbers  filled  his  vision 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  else  he  had  previously  cher- 
ished. His  power  of  statistical  investigation  became 
little  short  of  miraculous.  But  where  previously  he 
had  arduously  sought  soul-satisfying  ideals,  he  was 
now  content  with  the  husks  of  formalism.  Like  the 
American  who  retired  from  business  after  making  a 
fortune  in  saw-milling,  but  soon  returned  to  spend  his 
leisure  in  building  new  saw-mills  up  and  down  his 
disforested  country,  because  "  he  did  not  know  what 
else  to  do ;  "  so  this  gifted  mathematician  might  be 
said  to  have  spent  his  later  life  in  statistical  investi- 
gation, because  he  had  forgotten  that  the  very  things, 
the  importance  or  interest  of  which  had  launched 
him  on  his  great  career  of  calculating  about  them, 
still  continued  to  exist  in  the  world,  and  were  still 
interesting  on  their  own  account ! 

He  repeated  constantly  the  favourite  prayer  of  his 
youth :  "  Give  us,  O  Creator,  good  men."  But  that  it 
had  become  little  more  than  an  empty  formula  was 
evident.  For  whenever  a  Good  Man  presented  him- 
self, the  Cantabrian  promptly  asked :  "  Are  you  a 
Number?"     And  when  the  Good  Man  modestly  re- 

i34 


A  Sociological  Approach 

plied  that  he  was  commonly  counted  something  more 
than  a  cipher,  the  Cantabrian  was  wont  to  sigh  and 
say  sadly,  there  was  no  use  in  the  intellectual  world 
for  anything  but  numbers.  But  sometimes  there 
would  flash  into  his  eye  a  gleam  of  the  old  crusading 
zeal,  and  then  the  Cantabrian  would  promptly  dismiss 
the  Good  Man,  condemning  him,  with  a  pontifical 
utterance,  to  eternal  perdition. 

This  story  manifestly  belongs  to  the  mythology  of 
the  Pervert. 

Who  are  the  idealists  of  the  historical  group? 
What  is  the  end  of  their  group-activity?  Is  it  not 
the  ever-widening  and  more  verified  knowledge,  the 
ever-deepening  consciousness  of  the  process  of  Be- 
coming, in  Man  and  Nature?  And  what  individuals 
have  contributed  most  to  the  growing  knowledge  of 
evolutionary  processes?  To  ask  the  question  is  to 
think  of  Vico  and  Herder,  of  Kant  and  Hegel,  of 
Comte  and  Spencer;  of  Buffon  and  Lamarck  also,  of 
Lyell  and  Darwin,  with  their  forerunners  and  their 
continuators.  Are  we  then  to  say  that  the  evolu- 
tionists are  the  idealists  of  the  historical  group? 
Psychologically  that  is  doubtless  so.  But  sociologi- 
cally, they  are  still  rather  potential  than  actual  idealists. 
To  transmute  group  ends  into  social  ideals,  there 
must  be  added  some  element  of  emotional  interest 
derived  from  a  wider  experience  than  that  of  the 
group.  We  must  seek  a  knowledge  of  evolutionary 
processes,  not  only  for  itself,  but  also  for  its  human 
applications.  We  must  generalise  experience  of  the 
past,  not  only  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  present, 
but  also  of  the  future ;    not  only  from  the  point  of 

135 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

view  of  Nature,  but  also  of  Man.  In  order  to  aid  the 
development  of  any  given  type,  animal  or  human 
(that  is,  to  educate  it),  we  must  know  much  of  the 
law  and  the  limit  of  its  general  process  of  evolution. 
It  is  the  search  for  this  knowledge  (human  and  natu- 
ral), with  a  view  to  its  practical  application  to  social 
regeneration,  that  lies  at  the  root  of  historical  ideal- 
ism. In  respect  of  conscious,  deliberate,  systematic 
efforts  in  this  direction,  the  two  great  sociological 
pioneers  are  Condorcet  and  Auguste  Comte. 

Condorcet's  "  Sketch  of  the  Progress  of  the  Human 
Mind "  is  not  a  purely  historical  and  theoretical 
work.  It  contains,  in  a  long  final  chapter,  an  at- 
tempt to  [deduce  maxims  of  social  organisation  and 
precepts  "of  individual  conduct,  from  the  principles 
previously  reached  by  inductive  historical  generalis- 
ation. This  last  part  of  the  "Sketch"  has  to  be 
taken  along  with  Condorcet's  plan  of  national  educa- 
tion, drawn  up  for  the  Constituent  Assembly,  and 
with  his  "  Atlantide,"  or  scheme  for  the  organisation 
of  scientific  research.  All  these  are  fragmentary 
parts  of  systematic,  but  uncompleted,  efforts  to  build 
up  a  practical  social  Art  of  regeneration  on  a  basis 
of  a  social  science,  theoretical  and  historical.  The 
same  conception  —  at  once  evolutionary  and  regen- 
eratory  —  of  developmental  continuity  from  the  Past 
through  the  Present  into  the  Future,  dictated  the 
scheme  of  Comte's  life  and  work.  The  six  theoreti- 
cal and  historical  volumes  of  "The  Positive  Phil- 
osophy" were  followed  by  the  four  practical  and 
idealistic  volumes  of  the  "Positive  Polity."  There 
was  thus  conceived  the  art  of  constructing  idealistic 

136 


A  Sociological  Approach 

Utopias,  based  no  longer  on  poetic  dreams  and 
personal  aspirations,  but  on  a  systematic  study  of 
immediate  possibilities  disclosed  by  scientific  and 
historical  investigation.  It  is  a  branch  of  Applied 
Sociology  which,  after  a  century  of  cultivation  in 
France,  is  gaining  its  first  notable  exponent  amongst 
the  English-speaking  peoples,  in  Mr.  H.  G.  Wells. 


VIII 

It  is  the  boast  of  philosophers  that  they  are  the 
masters  of  all  intellectual  methods  and  slaves  of 
none.  If  this  were  universally  and  literally  true, 
there  would  be  no  need  to  look  for  the  formalist 
type  in  the  philosophical  group,  for  none  would  be 
found.  But  there  are  few  of  us  whose  circle  of  ac- 
quaintance is  so  narrow  as  not  to  have  met  the  unphil- 
osophical  philosopher.  He  may  be  seen  flourishing 
in  any  well-endowed  University.  In  academic  seclu- 
sion, he  is  recognised  by  an  unusual  tranquillity  of 
mind,  by  the  superiority  of  his  culture,  by  the  reality 
of  his  convictions,  or  at  least  by  his  convictions  about 
reality.  Faced  with  the  problems  of  practical  life,  he 
displays  the  full  complement  of  vacillation  and  pre- 
judice which,  according  to  Novalis,  it  is  the  chief 
object  of  philosophy  to  expel.  Equipped  with  a 
smattering  of  positive  knowledge  and  a  first-rate 
classical  education,  he  demonstrates  the  existence  (or 
the  non-existence)  of  God,  Freedom,  and  Immortal- 
ity, in  a  treatise  of  consummate  dialectical  skill  and 
prodigious   learning.     Sociologically,   the  type   is   a 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

product  of  endowed  Schools  of  Philosophy,  —  though 
that  is  not  to  deny  other  modes  of  generation  or  other 
products  to  these  schools.  Psychologically,  the  type 
is  the  resultant  and  victim  of  a  highly  specialised  oc- 
cupational methodology.  The  dialectical  method  is 
a  powerful  instrument  of  research  in  the  hands  of  a 
master.  In  the  hands  of  a  bungler,  it  is  a  weapon, 
at  worst  murderous,  at  best  suicidal.  The  ensuing 
tragedy  is  the  sacrifice  of  an  individual  in  the  develop- 
ment of  a  psychological  process  socially  useful.  The 
mere  dialectician  is,  in  short,  a  piacular  victim  of 
philosophical  formalism. 

To  apply  to  the  opposite  type  of  philosopher  the 
designation  "  idealist "  is  apt  to  be  particularly  mis- 
leading, because  that  word  is  already  appropriated 
as  a  technical  characterisation  by  a  particular  school 
of  intellectual  thought.  The  reference  here,  how- 
ever, is  to  personality  and  not  to  intellectual  postu- 
lates or  methods.  The  psychological  type  here 
characterised  as  a  philosophical  "  idealist,"  is  very 
much  what  popular  instinct  recognises  as  the  wise 
man  or  sage,  —  the  man  whose  life  and  conduct 
attest  the  sincerity  of  his  communion  with  the  all- 
pervading  mystery  of  the  universe.  From  Socrates 
to  Spencer,  the  history  of  Philosophy  yields  copious 
illustration  of  the  sage.  And  the  lesson  afforded 
by  the  study  of  their  lives  is  that,  given  a  tolerable 
ancestry  and  the  experience  of  an  honest  job,  then 
a  man  may  hope  by  the  pursuit  of  philosophy  to 
achieve  the  Platonic  ideal  of  "  bringing  forth  not 
images  of  beauty  but  realities,"  and  thus  become 
"  the  Friend  of  God." 

138 


A  Sociological  Approach 

The  case  of  Spinoza,  the  lens-polisher,  is  partic- 
ularly instructive  in  respect  of  the  present  argument, 
because  of  its  immediate  bearing  on  the  evolution  of 
Religion.  Philosophy  has  so  often  served  to  mediate 
between  Science  and  History  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Religion  on  the  other,  that  we  may  consider  that 
office  to  be  a  large  part  of  the  essential  and  charac- 
teristic function  of  the  philosophical  group.  The 
permanent  exhortation  of  the  Philosopher  to  the 
Priest  is,  in  the  phrase  of  Diderot,  "  Enlargissez 
Dieu  !  "  A  not  dissimilar  idea  was  behind  the  words 
of  Leibnitz,  when  he  said  that  he  only  studied  science 
and  history  in  order  that  he  might  speak  with  au- 
thority in  Philosophy  and  Religion.  It  means  to  say 
that  the  Spiritual  Ideal  of  the  Religious  Group  must 
be  expanded  in  harmony  with  the  growth  of  verified 
knowledge,  or  it  will  fall  away  from  its  state  of  holi- 
ness and  become  partial  and  fragmentary,  dispersive 
and  particularist.  The  priesthood,  as  the  group 
traditionally  organised  for  the  guardianship  of  com- 
munitary  spiritual  interests,  is  deeply  concerned  with 
Science  and  History,  for  what  are  Science  and  His- 
tory, as  represented  by  the  Idealists  of  the  two  groups, 
but  phases  and  manifestations  of  human  spirituality? 
It  is  here  that,  in  his  mediatory  office,  the  philosopher 
may  and  should  intervene,  testing  and  refining  the 
spiritual  innovations  offered  by  Science  and  History 
(and  by  Literature  and  Art  also)  for  incorporation 
within  the  scheme  of  religious  ideals. 

It  was  this  service  which,  in  the  name  of  philosophy, 
Spinoza  offered  the  churches  of  the  day.  What  he 
practically  said  to  the  churches  of  his  day  was  just 

i39 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

the  counsel  of  Diderot,  as  of  every  other  "  idealist " 
philosopher,  but  it  was  accompanied  by  a  detailed 
prescription  for  carrying  it  out.1     He  not  only  de- 

1  The  gist  of  his  teaching  —  his  conception  of  idealism  and 
its  methodology  —  is  stated  in  the  following  extract  from  that  in- 
spiring autobiographical  fragment,  the  unfinished  "  Essay  on  the 
Improvement  of  the  Mind,"  trans.  Elwes.  II.  pp.  6  and  7  :  "  I 
will  here  only  briefly  state  what  I  mean  by  true  good,  and  also 
what  is  the  nature  of  the  highest  good.     In  order  that  this  may 
be  rightly  understood,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  terms  good 
and  evil  are  only  applied  relatively,  so  that  the  same  thing  may 
be  called  both  good  and  bad,  according  to  the  relations  in  view, 
in  the  same  way  as  it  may  be  called  perfect  or  imperfect.    Noth- 
ing regarded  in  its  own  nature  can  be  called  perfect  or  imper- 
fect; especially  when  we  are  aware  that  all  things  which  come 
to  pass,  come  to  pass  according  to  the  eternal  order  and  fixed 
laws  of  nature.     However,  human  weakness  cannot  attain  to 
this  order  in  its  own  thoughts,  but  meanwhile  man  conceives  a 
human  character  much  more  stable  than  his  own,  and  sees  that 
there  is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  himself  acquire  such  a 
character.     Thus  he  is  led  to  seek  for  means  which  will  bring 
him  to  this  pitch  of  perfection,  and  calls  everything  which  will 
serve  as  such  means  a  true  good.     The  chief  good  is  that  he 
should  arrive,  together  with  other  individuals  if  possible,  at  the 
possession  of  the  aforesaid  character.     What  that  character  is 
we  shall  show  in  due  time,  namely,  that  it  is  the  knowledge  of 
the  union  existing  between  the  mind  and  the  whole  of  nature. 
This,  then,  is  the  end  for  which  I  strive,  to  attain  to  such  a  char- 
acter myself,  and  to  endeavour  that  many  should  attain  to  it  with 
me.     In  other  words,  it  is  part  of  my  happiness  to  lend  a  help- 
ing hand,  that  many  others  may  understand  even  as  I  do,  so 
that  their  understanding  and  desire  may  entirely  agree  with  my 
own.     In  order  to  bring  this  about,  it  is  necessary  to  understand 
as  much  of  nature  as  will  enable  us  to  attain  to  the  aforesaid 
character,  and  also  to  form  a  social  order  such  as  is  most  con- 
ductive  to  the  attainment   of  this  character   by  the   greatest 
number  with  the  least  difficulty  and  danger.    We  must  seek  the 

140 


A  Sociological  Approach 

clared  that  the  ideals  of  religion  must  expand  with 
the  growth  of  scientific  and  historical  studies,  but  he 
also  offered  a  new  synthesis,  harmonising  the  larger 
spiritual  interests  with  the  contemporary  state  of 
scientifically  verified  experience.  And  the  religious 
value  of  his  doctrine  —  in  awakening  the  mind  to 
ideal  issues,  in  lifting  it  to  a  high  moral  plane  and 
sustaining  it  there  —  he  attested  by  his  own  life  and 
conduct.  But  the  churches  would  have  none  of  it. 
His  own  excommunicated  him,  and  the  others,  what- 
ever their  differences,  agreed  in  this,  that  Spinoza 
was  "  a  systematic  atheist." 


IX 

A  CENTURY  and  a  half  passed,  and  then  there  arose 
within  the  Protestant  church  a  spiritual  descendant 
of  Spinoza,  who,  more  than  any  other  individual, 
inaugurated  that  renascence  of  theological  recon- 
struction, which,  after  a  century  of  ebb  and  flow,  is 
now  perhaps  approaching  full  tide.  The  keynote  of 
this  renascence  —  on  its  positive  and  constructive 
side — is   Schleiermacher's   arresting   utterance  that, 

assistance  of  Moral  Philosophy  and  the  Theory  of  Education ; 
further,  as  health  is  no  insignificant  means  for  attaining  our  end, 
we  must  also  include  the  whole  science  of  Medicine,  and,  as 
many  difficult  things  are  by  contrivance  rendered  easy,  and  we 
can  in  this  way  gain  much  time  and  convenience,  the  science  of 
Mechanics  must  in  no  way  be  despised.  But,  before  all  things, 
a  means  must  be  devised  for  improving  the  understanding,  and 
purifying  it,  as  far  as  may  be  at  the  outset,  so  that  it  may  appre- 
hend things  without  error,  and  in  the  best  possible  way." 

141 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

"  If  our  view  of  the  world  is  defective  our  notions  of 
Deity  will  not  advance  beyond  the  mythological  stage" 
Here  is  Spinozism  concentrated  into  a  single  sen- 
tence. The  significance  of  that  utterance  is  great, 
for  its  endorsement  by  the  advanced  wing  of  the 
Theological  Group  is  an  implicit  invitation  to  an 
alliance  with  the  Scientific  and  Historical  Groups. 

To  talk  of  alliances  is  to  think  of  diplomacy.  Now 
diplomacy,  being  a  methodological  device  of  the 
Politician,  is  distrusted  by  the  plain  man.  But  there 
is  a  way  by  which  diplomacy  may  be  subtly  trans- 
muted into  an  ideal  instrument  of  peaceful  negotia- 
tion. And  that  is  by  reversing  the  customary  usage 
of  the  Formalist.  Let  the  diplomatist  expose  the 
weakness  of  his  own  case,  and  expound  the  strength 
of  his  opponent's.  Then  if  the  opponent  is  an  ideal- 
ist, he  will  not  be  outdone  in  magnanimity.  He  will 
promptly  discover  and  reveal  unsuspected  weaknesses 
in  his  own  case,  and  unseen  strength  in  his  rival's. 
At  worst,  this  idealist  usage  of  diplomacy  will  serve 
as  a  touchstone  of  character.  Should  it  happen  that 
your  opponent  turns  out  to  be  psychologically  a 
formalist,  then  you  are  at  once  informed  of  the  fact. 
For  he  will  accept  your  rendering  of  the  situation 
and  immediately  propose  a  treaty  on  the  basis  of  it. 
The  formalist  thus  having  revealed  himself,  it  is  then 
that  the  idealist  knows  he  must  requisition  all  the 
courage  and  resource  of  which  he  is  capable,  for, 
assuredly,  he  has  to  do  with  a  mortal  enemy. 

Now  this  essay,  professing  to  be  written  from  the 
point  of  view  of  other  groups  (for  the  most  part  the 
scientific  and  the  historical)  than  the  religious,  has 

142 


A  Sociological  Approach 

purposely  emphasised  their  defects.  And  what  has 
been  said  in  recognition  of  merits  has  been  little 
more  than  the  admission  that  there  is  discoverable 
in  the  functional  activities  of  each  group,  an  intru- 
sive religious  element  —  the  idealising  tendency.  And 
the  thesis  has  been  diplomatically  maintained  that 
this  intrusive  religious  element  is  the  chief  factor  in 
converting  group  or  sectional  activity  into  socialising 
action.  It  is  the  advantage  of  this  sort  of  diplomacy 
that  while  retaining  courtesy  it  does  not  divorce 
truth. 


X 

What  space  remains  will  be  devoted  to  a  cursory 
indication  of  the  sociological  strength  of  the  religious 
position.  The  group  which  occupationally  represents 
religion  is  the  Priesthood,  and  the  strength  of  their 
case,  sociologically,  lies  in  their  historic  contribution 
to  what  might  be  called  the  Great  Psychic  Lift  of  the 
Race. 

The  psychological  division  of  priestly  types  into 
formalist  and  idealist  has  a  sociological  significance 
somewhat  different  from  the  corresponding  division  in 
the  other  groups.  This  derives  from  the  primitive- 
ness  of  the  distinction  in  the  religious  group.  It  is 
historically  and  genetically  antecedent  to  the  corre- 
sponding distinction  in  the  other  groups.  The  har- 
monisation  of  ideal  and  form  is,  morally  viewed,  a 
phase  of  the  relationship  of  Initiative  to  Custom,  of 
Individuality  to  Society,  of  Variation  to  Heredity,  of 
Progress  to  Order.    All  of  these  are  aspects  of  a  prob- 

143 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

lem  of  the  most  pressing  practical  importance,  but 
theoretically  beset  with  difficulties  calculated  to  daunt 
any  investigator  but  a  hero  or  a  fool.  The  moral 
aspect  of  the  problem  manifestly  has  the  more  im- 
mediate urgency.  Hence  it  is,  that  an  approximate 
working  solution  of  this  was  long  ago — more  than 
two  thousand  years  since —  reached.  This  discovery, 
proclaimed  by  certain  pioneers  of,  or  connected  with 
various  religious  groups,  is  the  great  spiritual  achieve- 
ment of  the  race.  It  brought  clearly  into  conscious- 
ness, for  the  first  time  in  history,  the  possibility  of 
a  distinction  between  formalist  and  idealist  types  of 
personality. 

The  formalist  of  religion  is  the  ceremonialist  par 
excellence.  Now  ceremonial  consists  first  in  the  sym- 
bolisation  of  psychic  states  and  processes,  and  sec- 
ondly in  the  systematisation  of  the  symbolic  data, 
with  a  view  to  routine.  This  definition,  it  may  be 
objected,  confuses  ceremonial  with  art.  It  is,  on  the 
contrary,  intended  to  bring  the  distinction  into  promi- 
nence. Art  also  is  concerned  with  the  symbolic  rep- 
resentation of  ideas  and  emotions,  but  with  a  view  not 
to  routine  but  to  initiative.  Art  is  primarily  con- 
cerned with  individuality,  with  initiative,  with  varia- 
tion, with  progress,  and  secondarily  with  socialisation, 
with  custom,  with  heredity,  with  order;  whereas  the 
contrary  is  true  of  ceremonial.  The  psychic  pro- 
ducts and  processes  of  human  evolution  (Language 
and  Literature,  Science  and  the  Fine  Arts,  Industrial 
aptitude  and  Religious  capacity)  have,  in  their  earlier 
phases  at  least,  been  developed  mainly  by  art  and 
transmitted  mainly  by  ceremonial.     Art  and  ceremo- 

144 


A  Sociological  Approach 

nial  may,  from  a  certain  standpoint,  be  regarded  as 
sociological  structures,  corresponding  to  what  psy- 
chologically is  the  function  of  educability;  and  edu- 
cability  itself  is,  as  Professor  Ray  Lankester  has  well 
shown,  the  psychological  correlate  of  what  biologi- 
cally is  a  surplusage  of  cerebral  development  beyond 
the  needs  of  a  material  struggle  for  life.  Thus  cere- 
monial, in  this  large  sense,  may  be  considered  as 
the  root-stock  out  of  which  the  several  formalisms 
have  grown,  by  a  process  in  part  evolutionary  and  in 
part  degeneratory.  Religious  ceremonial  largely  pre- 
serves the  primitive  characteristics. 

In  the  mental  evolution  both  of  the  race  and  of  the 
individual,  the  distinction  between  structure  and  func- 
tion, between  symbol  and  process,  is  very  slow  to  rise 
into  consciousness.  In  fact,  the  distinction  is  never 
complete.  Even  in  the  most  illuminated  minds,  a 
prepossession  persists  of  there  being  some  irreducible 
element  of  identity.  Witness  the  perennial  recru- 
descence of  the  nominalist-realist  controversy;  and 
especially  the  fact  that  a  form  of  that  controversy  is 
at  the  present  moment  agitating  —  of  all  people  in 
the  world  —  the  mathematicians,  in  respect  of  the 
validity  of  mathematical  proof. 

The  ceremonialism  of  religion  is  differentiated  — 
especially  from  the  formalism  of  science  —  by  two  fea- 
tures. In  the  first  place,  it  frankly  recognises  and 
builds  upon  the  inexhaustible  element  of  mystery 
in  symbolism.  In  the  second  place,  it  is  packed 
with  survivals  characteristic  of  those  early  phases  of 
mental  evolution  when  symbol  and  process,  sign  and 
thing  signified,  were  regarded  as  practically  identical. 
io  145 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  these  psychological 
survivals  of  the  age  of  myth  and  magic,  in  religious 
ceremonial,  are  now  necessarily  functionless. 

The  aim  of  religious  ceremonial  is  the  inspiration 
and  maintenance,  in  the  mind  of  the  individual,  of  a 
worshipful  attitude  towards  what  has  received  a  social 
sanction  of  sacredness.  In  the  selection  of  objects, 
qualities,  relations,  and  persons  to  be  regarded  as 
sacred,  the  Priesthood  has  stood  between  two  difficul- 
ties, on  the  one  hand  the  progressiveness  and  insta- 
bility of  the  culture  mind,  and  on  the  other,  the 
unprogressiveness  and  stability  of  the  folk  mind. 
There  thus  arises  the  perennial  theological  prob- 
lem of  combining  two  apparent  incommensurables  — 
"  solidarity  of  salvation  "  and  "  a  dynamic  heaven." 
A  practical  solution  by  compromise  was  possible,  as 
long  as  the  priests  were  the  only  organised  repre- 
sentatives of  spiritual  interests,  and  other  cultural 
groups  like  the  philosophical,  literary,  historical, 
and  scientific  had  not  yet  been  differentiated,  or 
had  only  been  partially  differentiated  from  the  social 
body. 

The  Priesthood  being  the  only  representatives  of 
cultural  interests,  it  was  possible  to  experimentally 
maintain  an  esoteric  doctrine,  and  as  its  coherence 
and  adaptability  became  more  fully  verified,  gradually 
transmit  it  to  the  folk-mind  by  successive  modifica- 
tions of  sanctioned  creed  or  formula  and  ceremonial 
observance,  accompanied  by  an  explanation  of  these, 
usually  exoteric,  yet  not  without  hints  and  devel- 
opments of  higher  meanings.  It  was  under  this 
spiritual  regime  that  there  was  achieved  the  advance 

146 


A  Sociological  Approach 

characterised  above  as  the  Great  Psychic  Lift  of  the 
Race. 

Mr.  Stuart  Glennie  appears  to  have  been  the  first 
to  call  attention  to  the  synchronism  and  similarity  of 
a  series  of  religious  revolutions  occurring  between  the 
seventh  and  the  fifth  century  B.  C.  amongst  the  more 
advanced  peoples  from  China  to  Italy,  and  associated 
in  historic  tradition  especially  with  such  names  as 
Isaiah,  Pythagoras,  Zoroaster,  Buddha,  Confucius  and 
Laotse.1 

There  was  then  made  an  organised  endeavour  to 
introduce  into  popular  worship  those  principles 
which  constitute  the  great  spiritual  discovery  of  the 
race.  To  call  this  great  moment  the  advent  of  the 
Psychology  of  Idealism  would  be  to  apply  to  an 
apparently  empirical  event  of  the  ancient  world,  the 
distinctive  nomenclature  of  modern  philosophy,  pro- 
fessedly rational.  But  that  anachronism  may  be 
pardoned,  if  it  aids  in  the  comprehension  of  the 
revolutionary  moral  change   implied   in  an  advance 

1  J.  Stuart  Glennie,  "  The  New  Philosophy  of  History*' 
*873>  pp.  208-216  and  384-401.  It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  able  to 
call  attention  to  this  —  one  of  many  innovating  researches  by  a 
writer,  the  importance  and  originality  of  whose  work  in  History 
and  Philosophy  are  far  from  being  adequately  recognised.  The 
particular  discovery  of  Mr.  Glennie  here  instanced  would 
seem  to  be  now  generally  taken  as  verified.  In  reference  to 
the  simultaneity  of  this  great  moral  revolution  in  different  and 
widely  separated  civilisations,  Professor  Rhys  Davids  in  "  Bud- 
dhist India"  (1902),  p.  239,  asks  :  "  Is  there  a  more  stupendous 
marvel  in  the  whole  history  of  mankind?  Does  anymore  sug- 
gestive problem  await  the  solution  of  the  historian  of  human 
thought  ? " 

147 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

from  an  External  Religion  of  Custom  to  an  Internal 
Religion  of  Conscience.  In  respect  of  canons  of 
sanctity,  it  meant  a  change  in  the  assessment  of 
sacred  values,  in  the  direction  of  substituting  idealist 
criteria  for  formalist  or  ceremonialist  criteria.1 

Great  advances  in  mental  and  moral  progress  were 
an  obvious  and  necessary  preliminary  to  any  attempts 
to  substitute  a  religion  of  internal  sanction,  based  on 
human  idealism,  for  a  religion  of  external  sanction, 
based  on  magic  and  myth.  Before  any  consciously 
organised  endeavour  towards  such  a  revolution  could 
be  even  attempted,  several  great  psychological  and 
sociological  discoveries  had  need  to  be  made.  The 
spiritual  truths  then  empirically  reached  have  been 
more  or  less  verified  by  modern  scientific  investiga- 
tion. Stated  dogmatically  and  in  modern  terminol- 
ogy, they  may  be  put  as  follows:  (i)  The  ultimate 
criterion  of  social  well-being  is  to  be  sought  in  the 
psychic  life  of  the  individual;  (2)  The  psychic  life 
of  the  individual  ranks  in  sanctity  in  proportion  to 
its  response  to  social  ideals  grown  up  in  History,  or 
created  by  Art,  —  religion  thus  acting  repressively 
and  negatively  in  subordinating  the  individual  to  the 
community,  positively  and  educationally  in  develop- 
ing the  unique  personal  aptitudes  of  the  individual 

1  A  commonplace  example  of  the  surviving  practice  of  assess- 
ing sacred  values  by  formalist  or  ceremonialist  criteria  is  the 
custom  of  snobbery.  The  modern  reverence  of  social  rank  is 
in  obvious  continuity  with  certain  forms  of  taboo  in  primitive 
religion.  Whatever  its  use  in  early  civilisation,  its  manifesta- 
tion in  contemporary  western  society  is  interpretable,  psycho- 
logically, as  a  misjudgment  of  sanctity. 


A  Sociological  Approach 

in  the  service  of  the  community;  (3)  Ceremonial  is 
mainly,  if  not  exclusively,  methodological  in  char- 
acter; (4)  Religious  ceremonial  has,  (a)  a  commem- 
orative function,  in  preserving  social  ideals,  (b)  an 
initiatory  function,  in  awakening  the  mind  of  the 
individual  to  the  ideals  of  the  race,  (c)  a  routine 
function,  in  sustaining  conduct  at  a  high  social  level 
of  thought  and  conduct;  (5)  The  chief  dynamic  of 
creative  idealism  (that  is,  of  spiritual  progress)  is  (a) 
in  the  early  stage  of  life,  individual  and  racial,  the 
sex  element,  which  in  later  stages  of  life,  individual 
and  racial,  develops  into  emotions  and  conceptions 
of,  (b)  family  (the  domestication  of  the  individual), 
and  of  (c)  society  and  humanity  (socialisation  of  the 
individual). 

The  question  of  the  origin  of  these  great  truths  is 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  apparently  at  about  the 
time  the  psychic  evolution  of  the  race  had,  in  its  fore- 
most manifestations,  reached  these  levels,  there  were 
beginning  to  be  differentiated  other  cultural  groups 
than  the  priestly  one.  This  was  particularly  so  in 
China,  India,  and  Greece.  But  the  credit  of  the  long 
and  arduous  preliminary  preparation  belongs — in  so 
far  as  it  belongs  to  any  group  —  to  the  occupational 
representatives  of  religious  interests,  the  Priesthood. 
A  more  important  question,  however,  than  the  origin 
of  the  discoveries,  is  the  use  that  has  been  made  of 
them  in  the  intervening  historical  period. 

In  the  movement  of  civilisation  during  the  past  two 
millenniums  and  a  half,  there  have  been  vast  migrations 
of  peoples,  there  have  been  advancing  and  reactionary 
phases  of  human  thought  and   activity,  there  have 

149 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

been  ascent  and  decline,  progress  and  recession, 
evolution  and  degeneration.  Everywhere,  and  at  all 
times,  the  priestly,  like  other  social  groups,  has  ab- 
sorbed and  reflected  the  tone  and  temper  of  their 
epoch,  their  race,  their  country,  their  times.  Thus 
there  have  been  many  creeds,  and  many  variations  of 
the  same  creed.  But  amongst  the  civilised  peoples 
of  the  West,  there  has  seldom  been  a  time  when  the 
Priests  have  not  proved  to  be  the  guardians  of  the 
principles  of  the  great  primary  religious  revolution, 
and  indeed  sought  to  apply  them,  if  not  always  in 
the  spirit,  then  in  the  letter. 

The  parallelism  between  the  history  of  the  race 
and  the  life  of  the  individual  only  holds  good  psychi- 
cally up  to  a  certain  point.  Every  individual,  as  we 
know  with  increasing  clearness  and  certainty  from 
the  nascent  science  of  Child-Study,  is  born  into  a 
world  of  myth,  magic,  and  unsocialised  desires.  It 
is  not  every  one,  it  is,  in  some  generations  appar- 
ently, only  a  select  few,  who  individually  participate 
in  the  great  psychic  lift  of  the  race.  If  any  given 
society  is  to  be  kept  free  of  survivals  of  the  lower 
pre-revolutionary  psychic  type,  the  spiritual  revolu- 
tion of  the  race  must  be  repeated  afresh  in  each 
individual  life.  But  to  effect  that  is  apparently  a  task 
vastly  beyond  the  culture-apparatus  of  even  the  best 
equipped  nations.  Count,  as  not  only  the  churches, 
but  as  all  other  culture-institutions  have  been  willing 
to  do,  the  multitudes  of  merely  ceremonial  adhe- 
rences  or  even  "  conversions,"  and  there  remain,  in 
the  most  civilised  of  nations,  still  greater  multitudes 
of  the  unawakened,  the  unsocialised. 

i5° 


A  Sociological  Approach 

There  is  no  denying  a  strong  and  general  tendency 
for  the  individual  in  his  personal  development  to  stop 
far  short  of  the  higher  spiritual  stages  of  racial  evolu- 
tion. This,  looked  at  from  the  point  of  view  of 
origins,  —  which  is  the  characteristic  attitude  of  Sci- 
ence,—  has  the  appearance  of  being  an  arrestment  of 
development,  or  a  reversion  to  archaic  type.  Looked 
at  from  the  point  of  view  of  social  achievement  and 
human  consummation,  —  which  is  the  characteristic 
attitude  of  Religion,  —  it  has  the  appearance  of  being 
a  fall  from  an  idealist  state.  The  remedial  practical 
measures  dictated  by  the  latter  point  of  view  are  of 
the  nature  of  salvation  and  regeneration.  The  prac- 
tical remedial  measures  that  ensue  from  the  former 
point  of  view,  what  are  they?  The  confession  has  to 
be  made  that  hitherto  Science,  in  so  far  as  it  is  bio- 
logical and  human,  has  been  so  fully  occupied  with 
theoretical  questions  of  generation  and  degeneration 
as  to  have  had  little  time  for  the  practical  problems 
of  regeneration.  That  is  doubtless  an  apology  that 
many  scientists  would  offer.  But  the  truth  is,  it  is, 
on  the  part  of  the  Scientists,  not  time  that  has  been 
wanting,  but  inclination.  The  idealists  in  the  scien- 
tific group  have  been  too  few  to  adequately  leaven 
the  collective  mass.  In  many  of  the  social  groups, 
and  notably  in  those  of  Science  and  History,  the 
characteristic  functional  activities  of  the  group  have 
normally  been  determined  by  the  formalist  members. 
And  these  formalist  members  are  themselves,  from 
the  large  psychic  standpoint  of  racial  evolution,  un- 
awakened,  unsocialised  types.  They  are  themselves 
survivals  of  that  archaic  spiritual  regime  which  be- 

I51 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

longs  to  a  Religion  of  Custom.  They  remain  unre- 
sponsive to  the  higher  racial  ideals.  Nowhere  has 
the  need  of  religious  observance  been  so  much  re- 
pudiated as  in  the  scientific  group.  And  nowhere 
has  the  worship  of  methodological  group  idols  been 
more  devoutly  observed. 

The  formalist  or  ceremonialist  pre-social  type  is 
plentifully  and  at  all  times  found  in  positions  of 
authority  and  leadership  in  every  group,  not  exclud- 
ing the  ecclesiastical.  The  regeneration  of  this  idola- 
trous or  heathen  type  (as  it  might  be  called)  is  a 
social  problem  greatly  complicated  by  the  facility 
with  which  the  formalist  wing  of  the  Priestly  Group 
detaches  itself  for  a  temporary  alliance  with  the 
formalists  of  any,  or  all  other  groups.  The  ecclesias- 
tical, like  other  groups,  has  occasional  recourse  to 
that  primitive  protest  of  moral  inertia,  —  the  stoning 
of  the  idealists.  And  when  the  formalists  of  all  seven 
groups  combine  and  join  their  forces,  then  is  the 
work  of  the  Devil  consummated. 

Well-organised  formalist  aggregates  (slightly  adul- 
terated with  idealism)  of  selected  types  for  educa- 
tional purposes  are  practically  what  makes  up  a 
University ;  the  conservatism  familiar  in  such  institu- 
tions thus  becomes  clearly  explained.  The  perma- 
nent idealist  element  in  a  University  is  customarily 
concealed  on  the  remote  shelves  of  the  Library.  By 
good  luck,  the  student  sometimes  finds  it;  it  would 
of  course  always  find  the  student,  if  the  University 
were  actively  alive.  Universities  are  saved  from  spir- 
itual sterility  (or  worse),  in  part  by  the  occasional 
presence  of  an  exceptional  teacher,  but  chiefly  by  the 

*52 


A  Sociological  Approach 

bare  biological  fact  that  there  is  a  never-failing  per- 
centage of  undergraduates  whom  not  even  degrees 
and  scholarships  can  keep  away  from  the  sources  of 
culture. 

If  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  meet  the  always 
latent,  and  academically  patent,  combination  of  inter- 
group  formalism  against  the  higher  spiritual  interests, 
it  behoves  the  idealists  of  every  group  to  pool  their 
resources,  to  act  in  concert,  or  at  least  in  mutual 
support  when  possible,  and  this  not  only  in  ordinary 
life,  but  in  education,  in  all  its  agencies  and  at  all  its 
levels.  Happily  the  difficulties  are  less  than  at  first 
sight  they  seem,  in  the  way  of  such  spiritual  alliances, 
such  co-operative  campaigns  on  behalf  of  the  uni- 
versal interest  and  stake  of  mankind  in  the  fortunes 
of  idealism  upon  this  planet  and  in  our  time.  Occu- 
pational jealousy,  vested  interests,  traditional  routine, 
social  caste,  are  all  things  that  count,  but  they  count 
least  where  the  interests  of  idealism  are  concerned. 
And,  moreover,  as  closer  personal  observation  is 
made  of  the  idealist  wing  of  each  group,  it  is  seen 
that  there  is  a  far  larger  commingling  of  individuals 
than  is  commonly  supposed.  Wherever  different 
groups  converge  in  society  to  a  common  centre,  and 
in  thought  to  their  common  source  (as  they  do  in  the 
unity  of  the  individual  life),  there  is  a  freer  circula- 
tion here  of  ideals,  there  also  of  idealists.  The 
nearer  the  individual  gets  to  the  elemental  sources  of 
experience,  the  wider  is  the  possible  range  of  sympa- 
thetic understanding.  But  some  personal  participa- 
tion in  the  characteristic  activities  of  many  and  varied 
groups  is  necessary  for  each  of  us  severally,  if  we  seek 

*53 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

to  cultivate  sympathetic  understanding,  at  any  rate 
up  to  the  point  of  creative  idealism.  Does  not  this 
actuality  of  personal  participation  in  the  characteristic 
life-experience  of  other,  and  if  possible  of  every 
typical  group,  lie  at  the  very  root  of  the  psychology 
of  idealism?  How  otherwise  is  it  possible  to  pre- 
serve in  the  life  of  the  individual  that  all-round 
functioning  of  the  entire  being  which  Biology  insists 
upon  as  Health,  and  Psychology  as  Sanity,  which 
Philosophy  seeks  as  Synthesis,  Ethics  as  Sympathy, 
and  which  Religion,  reversing  this  order  and  starting 
from  Love,  co-ordinates  and  idealises  as  Holiness? 

Is  there  not  here  a  basis  of  common  organisation 
for  the  meeting  and  alliance  of  the  idealists  of  all 
groups? 

XI 

The  whole  preceding  analysis  and  criticism  of  group 
activities,  and  the  distinction  of  formal  and  vital  among 
these,  may  now  be  summed  up  and  the  suggested  so- 
ciological approach  to  a  unification  of  scientific  and 
religious  ideals  may  now  also  be  summarised  in  the 
following  diagram.  This,  it  will  be  observed,  is  a 
development  of  that  on  page  106  with  which  we  set 
out. 

Not  only  the  thesis  of  the  essay,  but  also  its  practi- 
cal application,  will  be  manifest  from  an  inspection 
of  the  diagram.  The  practical  policy  obviously  re- 
vealed in  this :  Let  the  Religious  Idealists,  purging 
themselves  of  formalism,  laying  aside  desanctified 
ceremonialism,  take  the  lead  in  combining  the  Natu- 

i54 


A  Sociological  Approach 

ralists,  the  Workers,  the  Humanists,  the  Education- 
ists, the  Evolutionists,  and  the  Sages  into  one  joint 
movement  for  the  awakening  of  the  Young,  for  the 


salving  of  the  Degenerate,  for  the  conversion  of  the 
Unregenerate.  And  the  diagram  also  conspicuously 
shows  in  what  quarters  amongst  the  adult  popula- 
tion the  Unregenerate  are  to  be  searched  for  and 
found. 

iS5 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

It  may  be  pardoned  to  the  writer  to  say  to  those 
who  are  contemplating  a  practical  step  towards  a  mu- 
tual understanding,  that  a  common  ground  for  the 
discussion  of  inter-group  interests  is  afforded  by  the 
Sociological  Society  recently  formed  in  London. 

VICTOR  V.    BRANFORD. 

5  Old  Queen  Street, 
Westminster,  S.  W. 


156 


T 


AN    ETHICAL    APPROACH 

HON.    BERTRAND    RUSSELL 
Author  of  "  The  Principles  of  Mathematics,"  etc. 

O  Dr.  Faustus  in  his  study  Mephistopheles  told 
the  history  of  the  Creation,  saying: 

"  The  endless  praises  of  the  choirs  of  angels  had  begun  to 
grow  wearisome  ;  for,  after  all,  did  he  not  deserve  their  praise  ? 
Had  he  not  given  them  endless  joy?  Would  it  not  be 
more  amusing  to  obtain  undeserved  praise,  to  be  wor- 
shipped by  beings  whom  he  tortured?  He  smiled  in- 
wardly, and  resolved  that  the  great  drama  should  be 
performed. 

"  For  countless  ages  the  hot  nebula  whirled  aimlessly 
through  space.  At  length  it  began  to  take  shape,  the  cen- 
tral mass  threw  off  planets,  the  planets  cooled,  boiling  seas 
and  burning  mountains  heaved  and  tossed,  from  black 
masses  of  cloud  hot  sheets  of  rain  deluged  the  barely  solid 
crust.  And  now  the  first  germ  of  life  grew  in  the  depths  of 
the  ocean,  and  developed  rapidly  in  the  fructifying  warmth 
into  vast  forest  trees,  huge  ferns  springing  from  the  damp 
mould,  sea  monsters  breeding,  fighting,  devouring,  and 
passing  away.  And  from  the  monsters,  as  the  play  un- 
folded itself,  Man  was  born,  with  the  power  of  thought,  the 
knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  and  the  cruel  thirst  for  wor- 
ship. And  Man  saw  that  all  is  passing  in  this  mad  mon- 
strous world,  that  all  is  struggling  to  snatch,  at  any  cost,  a 
few  brief  moments  of  life  before  Death's  inexorable  decree. 

157 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

And  Man  said :  '  There  is  a  hidden  purpose,  could  we  but 
fathom  it,  and  the  purpose  is  good ;  for  we  must  reverence 
something,  and  in  the  visible  world  there  is  nothing  worthy 
of  reverence.'  And  Man  stood  aside  from  the  struggle,  re- 
solving that  God  intended  harmony  to  come  out  of  chaos 
by  human  efforts.  And  when  he  followed  the  instincts, 
which  God  had  transmitted  to  him  from  his  ancestry  of 
beasts  of  prey,  he  called  it  Sin,  and  asked  God  to  forgive 
him.  But  he  doubted  whether  he  could  be  justly  forgiven, 
until  he  invented  a  divine  Plan  by  which  God's  wrath  was 
to  have  been  appeased.  And,  seeing  the  present  was  bad, 
he  made  it  yet  worse,  that  thereby  the  future  might  be 
better.  And  he  gave  God  thanks  for  the  strength  that 
enabled  him  to  forego  even  the  joys  that  were  possible. 
And  God  smiled ;  and  when  he  saw  that  man  had  become 
perfect  in  renunciation  and  worship,  he  sent  another  sun 
through  the  sky,  which  crashed  into  Man's  sun ;  and  all 
returned  again  to  nebula." 

"  '  Yes,'  he  murmured,  '  it  was  a  good  play,  I  will  have  it 
performed  again.'  " 

Such,  in  outline,  but  even  more  purposeless,  more 
void  of  meaning,  is  the  world  which  Science  presents 
for  our  belief.  Amid  such  a  world,  if  anywhere,  our 
ideals  henceforward  must  find  a  home.  That  Man  is 
the  product  of  causes  which  had  no  prevision  of  the 
end  they  were  achieving ;  that  his  origin,  his  growth, 
his  hopes  and  fears,  his  loves  and  his  beliefs,  are  but 
the  outcome  of  accidental  collocations  of  atoms  ;  that 
no  fire,  no  heroism,  no  intensity  of  thought  and  feel- 
ing, can  preserve  an  individual  life  beyond  the  grave; 
that  all  the  labours  of  the  ages,  all  the  devotion,  all 
the  inspiration,  all  the  noonday  brightness  of  human 

158 


An  Ethical  Approach 

genius,  are  destined  to  extinction  in  the  vast  death  of 
the  solar  system,  and  that  the  whole  temple  of  Man's 
achievement  must  inevitably  be  buried  beneath  the 
debris  of  a  universe  in  ruins  —  all  these  things,  if  not 
quite  beyond  dispute,  are  yet  so  nearly  certain,  that 
no  philosophy  which  rejects  them  can  hope  to  stand. 
Only  within  the  scaffolding  of  these  truths,  only  on 
the  firm  foundation  of  unyielding  despair,  can  the 
soul's  habitation  henceforth  be  safely  built. 

How,  in  such  an  alien  and  inhuman  world,  can  so 
powerless  a  creature  as  Man  preserve  his  aspirations 
untarnished?  A  strange  mystery  it  is  that  Nature, 
omnipotent  but  blind,  in  the  revolutions  of  her  secu- 
lar hurryings  through  the  abysses  of  space,  has 
brought  forth  at  last  a  child,  subject  still  to  her 
power,  but  gifted  with  sight,  with  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil,  with  the  capacity  of  judging  all  the  works 
of  his  unthinking  Mother.  In  spite  of  Death,  the 
mark  and  seal  of  the  parental  control,  Man  is  yet 
free,  during  his  brief  years,  to  examine,  to  criticise, 
to  know,  and  in  imagination  to  create.  To  him 
alone,  in  the  world  with  which  he  is  acquainted,  this 
freedom  belongs ;  and  in  this  lies  his  superiority  to 
the  resistless  forces  that  control  his  outward  life. 

The  savage,  like  ourselves,  feels  the  oppression  of 
his  impotence  before  the  powers  of  Nature;  but,  hav- 
ing in  himself  nothing  that  he  respects  more  than 
Power,  he  is  willing  to  prostrate  himself  before  his 
gods,  without  inquiring  whether  they  are  worthy  of 
his  worship.  Pathetic  and  very  terrible  is  the  long 
history  of  cruelty  and  torture,  of  degradation  and 
human  sacrifice,  endured  in  the  hope  of  placating  the 

i59 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

jealous  gods :  surely,  the  trembling  believer  thinks, 
when  what  is  most  precious  has  been  freely  given, 
their  lust  for  blood  must  be  appeased,  and  more  will 
not  be  required.  The  religion  of  Moloch  —  as  such 
creeds  may  be  generically  called  —  is  in  essence  the 
cringing  submission  of  the  slave,  who  dare  not,  even 
in  his  heart,  allow  the  thought  that  his  master  de- 
serves no  adulation.  Since  the  independence  of 
ideals  is  not  yet  acknowledged,  Power  may  be  freely 
worshipped,  and  receives  an  unlimited  respect  despite 
its  wanton  infliction  of  pain. 

But  gradually,  as  morality  grows  bolder,  the  claim 
of  the  ideal  world  begins  to  be  felt;  and  worship,  if 
it  is  not  to  cease,  must  be  given  to  gods  of  another 
kind  than  those  created  by  the  savage.  Some, 
though  they  feel  the  demands  of  the  ideal,  will  still 
consciously  reject  them,  urging  that  naked  Power  is 
worthy  of  worship.  Such  is  the  attitude  inculcated 
in  God's  answer  to  Job  out  of  the  whirlwind :  the 
divine  power  and  knowledge  are  paraded,  but  of  the 
divine  goodness  there  is  no  hint.  Such,  also,  is 
the  attitude  of  those  who,  in  our  own  day,  base  their 
morality  upon  the  struggle  for  survival,  contending 
that  the  survivors  are  necessarily  the  fittest.  But 
others,  not  content  with  an  answer  so  repugnant  to  the 
moral  sense,  will  adopt  the  position  which  we  have 
become  accustomed  to  regard  as  specially  religious, 
maintaining  that,  in  some  hidden  manner,  the  world  of 
fact  is  really  harmonious  with  the  world  of  ideals. 
Thus  Man  creates  God,  all-powerful  and  all-good,  the 
mystic  unity  of  what  is  and  what  should  be. 

But  the  world  of  fact,  after  all,  is  not  good ;  and,  in 
160 


An  Ethical  Approach 

submitting  our  judgment  to  it,  there  is  an  element  of 
slavishness,  from  which  our  thoughts  must  be  purged. 
For  in  all  things  it  is  well  to  exalt  the  dignity  of 
Man,  by  freeing  him,  as  far  as  possible,  from  the 
tyranny  of  non-human  Power.  When  we  have  real- 
ised that  Power  is  largely  bad,  that  man,  with  his 
knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  is  but  a  helpless  atom 
in  a  world  which  has  no  such  knowledge,  the  choice 
is  again  presented  to  us :  Shall  we  worship  Force,  or 
shall  we  worship  Goodness?  Shall  our  God  exist 
and  be  evil,  or  shall  he  be  recognised  as  the  creation 
of  our  own  conscience? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  very  momentous, 
and  affects  profoundly  our  whole  morality.  The 
worship  of  Force,  to  which  Carlyle  and  Nietzsche 
and  the  creed  of  Militarism  have  accustomed  us,  is 
the  result  of  failure  to  maintain  our  own  ideals  against 
a  hostile  universe:  it  is  itself  a  prostrate  submission 
to  evil,  a  sacrifice  of  our  best  to  Moloch.  If  strength 
indeed  is  to  be  respected,  let  us  respect  rather  the 
strength  of  those  who  refuse  that  false  "  recognition 
of  facts  "  which  fails  to  recognise  that  facts  are  often 
bad.  Let  us  admit  that,  in  the  world  we  know,  there 
are  many  things  that  would  be  better  otherwise,  and 
that  the  ideals  to  which  we  do  and  must  adhere  are 
not  realised  in  the  realm  of  matter.  Let  us  preserve 
our  respect  for  truth,  for  beauty,  for  the  ideal  of  per- 
fection which  life  does  not  permit  us  to  attain,  though 
none  of  those  things  meet  with  the  approval  of  the 
unconscious  universe.  If  power  is  bad,  as  it  seems  to 
be,  let  us  reject  it  from  our  hearts.  In  this  lies 
Man's  true  freedom :  in  determination  to  worship 
ii  161 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

only  the  God  created  by  our  own  love  of  the  good, 
to  respect  only  the  heaven  which  inspires  the  insight 
of  our  best  moments.  In  action,  in  desire,  we  must 
submit  perpetually  to  the  tyranny  of  outside  forces ; 
but  in  thought,  in  aspiration,  we  are  free,  free  from 
our  fellow-men,  free  from  the  petty  planet  on  which 
our  bodies  impotently  crawl,  free  even,  while  we  live, 
from  the  tyranny  of  death.  Let  us  learn,  then,  that 
energy  of  faith  which  enables  us  to  live  constantly  in 
the  vision  of  the  good;  and  let  us  descend,  in  action, 
into  the  world  of  fact,  with  that  vision  always  before 
us. 

When  first  the  opposition  of  fact  and  ideal  grows 
fully  visible,  a  spirit  of  fiery  revolt,  of  fierce  hatred  of 
the  gods,  seems  necessary  to  the  assertion  of  freedom. 
To  defy  with  Promethean  constancy  a  hostile  universe, 
to  keep  its  evil  always  in  view,  always  actively  hated,  to 
refuse  no  pain  that  the  malice  of  Power  can  invent, 
appears  to  be  the  duty  of  all  who  will  not  bow  before 
the  inevitable.  But  indignation  is  still  a  bondage,  for 
it  compels  our  thoughts  to  be  occupied  with  an  evil 
world;  and  in  the  fierceness  of  desire  from  which  re- 
bellion springs,  there  is  a  kind  of  self-assertion  which 
it  is  necessary  for  the  wise  to  overcome.  Indigna- 
tion is  a  submission  of  our  thoughts,  but  not  of  our 
desires ;  the  Stoic  freedom  in  which  wisdom  consists 
is  found  in  the  submission  of  our  desires,  but  not  of 
our  thoughts.  From  the  submission  of  our  desires 
springs  the  virtue  of  resignation;  from  the  freedom 
of  our  thoughts  springs  the  whole  world  of  art  and 
philosophy,  and  the  vision  of  beauty  by  which,  at  last, 
we  half  reconquer  the  reluctant  world.    But  the  vision 

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An  Ethical  Approach 

of  beauty  is  possible  only  to  unfettered  contemplation, 
to  thoughts  not  weighted  by  the  load  of  eager  wishes ; 
and  thus  Freedom  comes  only  to  those  who  no  longer 
ask  of  life  that  it  shall  yield  them  any  of  those  per- 
sonal goods  that  are  subject  to  the  mutations  of 
Time. 

Although  the  necessity  of  renunciation  is  evidence 
of  the  existence  of  evil,  yet  Christianity,  in  preaching 
it,  has  shown  a  wisdom  exceeding  that  of  the  Prome- 
thean philosophy  of  rebellion.  It  must  be  admitted 
that,  of  the  things  we  desire,  some,  though  they  prove 
impossible,  are  yet  real  goods ;  others,  however,  as 
ardently  longed  for,  do  not  form  part  of  a  fully  puri- 
fied ideal.  The  belief  that  what  must  be  renounced 
is  bad,  though  sometimes  false,  is  far  less  often  false 
than  untamed  passion  supposes ;  and  the  creed  of 
religion,  by  providing  a  reason  for  proving  that  it  is 
never  false,  has  been  the  means  of  purifying  our 
hopes  by  the  discovery  of  many  austere  and  priceless 
truths. 

But  there  is  in  resignation  a  further  good  element  : 
even  real  goods,  when  they  are  unattainable,  ought 
not  to  be  fretfully  desired.  To  every  man  comes, 
sooner  or  later,  the  great  renunciation.  For  the 
young,  there  is  nothing  unattainable;  a  good  thing, 
desired  with  the  whole  force  of  a  passionate  will,  and 
yet  impossible,  is  to  them  not  credible.  Yet,  by 
death,  by  illness,  by  poverty,  or  by  the  voice  of  duty, 
we  must  learn,  each  one  of  us,  that  the  world  was  not 
made  for  us,  and  that,  however  beautiful  may  be  the 
things  we  crave,  Fate  may  nevertheless  forbid  them. 
It  is  the  part  of  courage,  when  misfortune  comes,  to 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

bear  without  repining  the  ruin  of  our  hopes,  to  turn 
away  our  thoughts  from  vain  regrets.  This  degree  of 
submission  to  Power  is  not  only  just  and  right:  it  is 
the  very  gate  of  wisdom. 

But  passive  renunciation  is  not  the  whole  of  wis- 
dom ;  for  not  by  renunciation  alone  can  we  build  a 
temple  for  the  worship  of  our  own  ideals.  Haunting 
foreshadowings  of  the  temple  appear  in  the  realm 
of  imagination,  in  music,  in  architecture,  in  the 
untroubled  kingdom  of  reason,  and  in  the  golden 
sunset  magic  of  limpid  lyrics,  where  beauty  shines 
and  glows,  remote  from  the  touch  of  sorrow,  remote 
from  the  fear  of  change,  remote  from  the  failures  and 
disenchantments  of  the  world  of  fact.  In  the  con- 
templation of  these  things  the  vision  of  heaven  will 
shape  itself  in  our  hearts,  giving  at  once  a  touchstone 
to  judge  the  world  about  us,  and  an  inspiration  by 
which  to  fashion  to  our  needs  whatever  is  not  incapa- 
ble of  serving  as  a  stone  in  the  sacred  shrine.  At 
times  of  such  inspiration  we  seem  to  hear  the  strange, 
deep  music  of  an  invisible  sea,  beating  ceaselessly 
upon  an  unknown  shore.  Could  we  but  stand  on 
that  shore,  we  feel,  another  vision  of  life  might  be 
ours,  wider,  freer,  than  the  narrow  valley  in  which  our 
private  life  is  prisoned. 

Except  for  those  rare  spirits  that  are  born  without 
sin,  there  is  a  cavern  of  darkness  to  be  traversed 
before  that  ocean  can  be  seen.  The  gate  of  the  cav- 
ern is  despair,  and  its  floor  is  paved  with  the  grave- 
stones of  abandoned  hopes.  There  Self  must  die; 
there  the  eagerness,  the  greed,  of  untamed  desire 
must  be  slain,  for  only  so  can  the  soul  be  freed  from 

164 


An  Ethical  Approach 

the  empire  of  Fate.  But  out  of  the  cavern  the  Gate  of 
Renunciation  leads  again  to  the  daylight  of  wisdom, 
by  whose  radiance  a  new  insight,  a  new  joy,  a  new 
tenderness,  shine  forth  to  gladden  the  pilgrim's  heart. 
When,  without  the  bitterness  of  impotent  rebellion, 
we  have  learnt  both  to  resign  ourselves  to  the  outward 
rule  of  Fate,  and  to  recognise  that  the  non-human 
world  is  unworthy  of  our  worship,  it  becomes  possible 
at  last  so  to  transform  and  re-fashion  the  unconscious 
universe,  so  to  transmute  it  in  the  crucible  of  imagi- 
nation, that  a  new  image  of  shining  gold  replaces  the 
old  idol  of  clay.  In  all  the  multiform  facts  of  the 
world  —  in  the  visual  shapes  of  trees  and  mountains 
and  clouds,  in  the  events  of  the  life  of  man,  even  in 
the  very  omnipotence  of  Death  —  the  insight  of 
creative  idealism  can  find  the  reflection  of  a  beauty 
which  its  own  thoughts  first  made.  In  this  way  mind 
asserts  its  subtle  mastery  over  the  thoughtless  forces 
of  nature.  The  more  evil  the  material  with  which  it 
deals,  the  more  thwarting  to  untrained  desire,  the 
greater  is  its  achievement  in  inducing  the  reluctant 
rock  to  yield  up  its  hidden  treasures,  the  prouder  its 
victory  in  compelling  the  opposing  forces  to  swell  the 
pageant  of  its  triumph.  Of  all  the  arts,  Tragedy  is 
the  proudest,  the  most  triumphant;  for  it  builds  its 
shining  citadel  in  the  very  centre  of  the  enemy's 
country,  on  the  very  summit  of  his  highest  mountain  ; 
from  its  impregnable  watch-towers,  his  camps  and 
arsenals,  his  columns  and  forts,  are  all  revealed ; 
within  its  walls  the  free  life  continues,  while  the 
legions  of  Death  and  Pain  and  Despair,  and  all  the 
servile  captains  of  tyrant  Fate,  afford  the  burghers  of 

165 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

that  dauntless  city  new  spectacles  of  beauty.  Happy 
those  sacred  ramparts,  thrice  happy  the  dwellers  on 
that  all-seeing  eminence.  Honour  to  those  brave 
warriors  who,  through  countless  ages  of  warfare,  have 
preserved  for  us  the  priceless  heritage  of  liberty, 
and  have  kept  undefiled  by  sacrilegious  invaders  the 
home  of  the  unsubdued. 

But  the  beauty  of  Tragedy  does  but  make  visible 
a  quality  which,  in  more  or  less  obvious  shapes,  is 
present  always  and  everywhere  in  life.  In  the  spec- 
tacle of  Death,  in  the  endurance  of  intolerable  pain, 
and  in  the  irrevocability  of  a  vanished  past,  there  is 
a  sacredness,  an  overpowering  awe,  a  feeling  of  the 
vastness,  the  depth,  the  inexhaustible  mystery  of 
existence,  in  which,  as  by  some  strange  marriage  of 
pain,  the  sufferer  is  bound  to  the  world  by  bonds 
of  sorrow.  In  these  moments  of  insight,  we  lose  all 
eagerness  of  temporary  desire,  all  struggling  and 
striving  for  petty  ends,  all  care  for  the  little  trivial 
things  that,  to  a  superficial  view,  make  up  the  com- 
mon life  of  day  by  day;  we  see,  surrounding  the 
narrow  raft  illumined  by  the  flickering  light  of  human 
comradeship,  the  dark  ocean  on  whose  rolling  waves 
we  toss  for  a  brief  hour ;  from  the  great  night  without 
a  chill  blast  breaks  in  upon  our  refuge ;  all  the  loneli- 
ness of  humanity  amid  hostile  forces  is  concentrated 
upon  the  individual  soul,  which  must  struggle  alone, 
with  what  of  courage  it  can  command,  against  the 
whole  weight  of  a  universe  that  cares  nothing  for  its 
hopes  and  fears.  Victory,  in  this  struggle  with  the 
powers  of  darkness,  is  the  true  baptism  into  the 
glorious  company  of  heroes,  the  true  initiation  into 

166 


An  Ethical  Approach 

the  overmastering  beauty  of  human  existence.  From 
that  awful  encounter  of  the  soul  with  the  outer  world, 
renunciation,  wisdom,  and  charity  are  born  ;  and  with 
their  birth  a  new  life  begins.  Those  who  have  passed 
through  that  valley  of  darkness  emerge  at  last  into  a 
country  of  unearthly  beauty,  where  the  air  is  calm, 
and  the  pale  sun  coldly  illumines  a  frosty  landscape ; 
and  there  the  deep-toned  paean  of  freedom  vibrates  in 
the  soul  that  has  conquered  fear.  To  take  into  the 
inmost  shrine  of  the  soul  the  irresistible  forces  whose 
puppets  we  seem  to  be  —  Death  and  change,  the 
irrevocability  of  the  past,  and  the  powerlessness  of 
man  before  the  blind  hurry  of  the  universe  from 
vanity  to  vanity  —  to  feel  these  things  and  know 
them  is  to  conquer  them. 

This  is  the  reason  why  the  Past  has  such  magical 
power.  The  beauty  of  its  motionless  and  silent  pic- 
tures is  like  the  enchanted  purity  of  late  autumn,  when 
the  leaves,  though  one  breath  would  make  them  fall, 
still  glow  against  the  sky  in  golden  glory.  The  Past 
does  not  change  or  strive  ;  like  Duncan,  after  life's  fit- 
ful fever  it  sleeps  well ;  what  was  eager  and  grasping, 
what  was  petty  and  transitory,  has  faded  away,  the 
things  that  were  beautiful  and  eternal  shine  out  of  it 
like  stars  in  the  night.  Its  beauty,  to  a  soul  not 
worthy  of  it,  is  unendurable ;  but  to  a  soul  which  has 
conquered  Fate  it  is  the  key  of  religion. 

The  life  of  man,  viewed  outwardly,  is  but  a  small 
thing  in  comparison  with  the  forces  of  Nature.  The 
slave  is  doomed  to  worship  Time  and  Fate  and  Death, 
because  they  are  greater  than  anything  he  finds  in 
himself,  and  because  all  his  thoughts  are  of  things 

167 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

which  they  devour.  But,  great  as  they  are,  to  think 
of  them  greatly,  to  feel  their  passionless  splendour,  is 
greater  still.  And  such  thought  makes  us  free  men ; 
we  no  longer  bow  before  the  inevitable  in  Oriental 
subjection,  but  we  absorb  it,  and  make  it  a  part  of 
ourselves.  To  abandon  the  struggle  for  private  hap- 
piness, to  expel  all  eagerness  of  temporary  desire, 
to  burn  with  passion  for  eternal  things  —  this  is 
emancipation,  and  this  is  the  free  man's  worship. 
And  this  liberation  is  effected  by  a  contemplation  of 
Fate;  for  Fate  itself  is  subdued  by  the  mind  which 
leaves  nothing  to  be  purged  by  the  purifying  fire  of 
Time. 

United  with  his  fellow-men  by  the  strongest  of  all 
ties,  the  tie  of  a  common  doom,  the  free  man  finds 
that  a  new  vision  is  with  him  always,  shedding  over 
every  daily  task  the  golden  light  of  love.  The  life  of 
man  is  a  long  march  through  the  night,  surrounded 
by  invisible  foes,  tortured  by  weariness  and  pain, 
towards  a  goal  that  few  can  hope  to  reach,  and  where 
none  may  tarry  long.  One  by  one,  as  they  march, 
our  comrades  vanish  from  our  sight,  seized  by  the 
silent  orders  of  omnipotent  Death.  Very  brief  is  the 
time  in  which  we  can  help  them,  in  which  their 
happiness  or  misery  is  decided.  Be  it  ours  to  shed 
sunshine  on  their  path,  to  lighten  their  sorrows  by 
the  balm  of  sympathy,  to  give  them  the  pure  joy  of  a 
never-tiring  affection,  to  strengthen  failing  courage, 
to  instil  faith  in  hours  of  despair.  Let  us  not  weigh 
in  grudging  scales  their  merits  and  demerits,  but  let 
us  think  only  of  their  need  —  of  the  sorrows,  the  dif- 
ficulties,   perhaps    the    blindnesses,    that    make    the 

168 


An  Ethical  Approach 

misery  of  their  lives ;  let  us  remember  that  they  are 
fellow-sufferers  in  the  same  darkness,  actors  in  the 
same  tragedy  with  ourselves.  And  so,  when  their 
day  is  over,  when  their  good  and  their  evil  have 
become  eternal  by  the  immortality  of  the  past,  be  it 
ours  to  feel  that,  where  they  suffered,  where  they 
failed,  no  deed  of  ours  was  the  cause ;  but  wherever 
a  spark  of  the  divine  fire  kindled  in  their  hearts,  we 
were  ready  with  encouragement,  with  sympathy,  with 
brave  words  in  which  high  courage  glowed. 

Brief  and  powerless  is  man's  life;  on  him  and  all 
his  race  the  slow  sure  doom  falls  pitiless  and  dark. 
Blind  to  good  and  evil,  reckless  of  destruction,  omni- 
potent matter  rolls  on  its  relentless  way;  for  Man, 
condemned  to-day  to  lose  his  dearest,  to-morrow 
himself  to  pass  through  the  gate  of  darkness,  it  re- 
mains only  to  cherish,  ere  yet  the  blow  falls,  the  lofty 
thoughts  that  ennoble  his  little  day;  disdaining  the 
coward  terrors  of  the  slave  of  Fate,  to  worship  at  the 
shrine  that  his  own  hands  have  built ;  undismayed  by 
the  empire  of  chance,  to  preserve  a  mind  free  from 
the  wanton  tyranny  that  rules  his  outward  life ; 
proudly  defiant  of  the  irresistible  forces  that  tolerate, 
for  a  moment,  his  knowledge  and  his  condemnation, 
to  sustain  alone,  a  weary  but  unyielding  Atlas,  the 
world  that  his  own  ideals  have  fashioned  despite  the 
trampling  march  of  unconscious  power. 

BERTRAND  RUSSELL. 


169 


AN    EDUCATIONAL   APPROACH  — 
A   TECHNICAL   APPROACH 

PROFESSOR  PATRICK  GEDDES 

University  Hall,  Edinburgh 

I 

THE  approach  to  common  ideals  through  educa- 
tion may  not  at  first  sight  seem  the  most  promis- 
ing one.  Education  seems  rather  to  divide  us  than  to 
unite ;  yet  our  own  Churchman  and  Nonconformist 
exhibit  but  the  mildest  domestic  differences  com- 
pared with  the  fiercer  almost  revolutionary  strife  of 
clerical  and  anti-clerical  education  upon  the  conti- 
nent. So  self-contained  these  days  are  the  great 
nations  that  we  may  have  strongly  contrasted  move- 
ments on  opposite  sides  of  a  narrow  frontier  :  witness 
England  strengthening  her  Church  schools,  while 
France  is  suppressing  the  teaching  of  her  religious 
orders. 

Under  such  circumstances  and  in  such  times,  how 
can  the  religious  and  the  secular  teacher  find  any 
common  ground  without  the  abandonment  of  one  or 
other  characteristic  standpoint?  Yet  are  they  not 
agreed  in  aim,  at  least  so  far  as  this  can  be  quite 
generally  stated?  However  each  may  upbraid  the 
other  with  self-seeking,  and  though  the  cynic  may 
sometimes   group   the  new  endowment   of  research 

170 


A  Educational  Approach 

with  the  old  search  of  endowment,  still  there  are 
gentler  moods  in  which  each  critic  must  surely 
sometimes  sympathise  with  the  other  as  a  well-mean- 
ing and  hard-working  professional  brother,  struggling 
to  communicate  to  a  reluctant  generation  what  seems 
to  him  the  broadest  truth,  the  deepest  beauty,  the 
highest  good  of  which  he  knows.  But  within  this 
general  agreement  our  respective  interpretations  of 
nature  and  man  may  and  do  differ  profoundly;  our 
thought  regarding  the  mystery  behind  these  is  no 
less  different;  our  ideas  therefore  of  the  self,  of  so- 
ciety, and  of  the  meaning  and  use  of  life,  must  there- 
fore differ  also.  Hence  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at 
that  one  school  of  educationists  should  desire  and 
strive  to  overpower  and  replace  the  other.  To  be  of 
any  use,  then,  our  Eirenikon  must  go  further  and 
deeper  than  we  have  yet  done. 

Not  merely  to  avoid  wounding  sentiment  at  home, 
nor  for  the  sake  of  the  fresh  eye,  with  its  help 
towards  more  completely  escaping  from  our  own 
bias,  but  because  of  the  present  sharpness  of  the 
contrast  of  clerical  and  lay,  let  us  speak  for  a  little 
of  French  schools  rather  than  of  British  ones,  and 
make  the  acquaintance  of  one  or  two  of  these,  as  we 
may  so  easily  do  upon  a  holiday.  These  might  be 
chosen  anywhere,  but  say  for  preference  in  Brittany, 
where  the  feud  of  clerical  and  anti-clerical  has  run 
fiercest.  The  two  types  of  teacher  are  at  first  glance 
distinguishable  enough,  in  face  and  bearing  as  in 
costume;  while  the  schoolroom  of  each  bears  no 
less  distinctly  its  sacred  or  secular  label. 

The  state  teacher  and  his  friends  vigorously  sum 
171 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

up  for  us  all  the  criticisms  of  the  Left  upon  the 
Right.  They  remind  us  of  the  essential  points  of 
the  case  against  the  education  of  the  Church,  its 
obscurantism  in  science,  its  reaction  in  practical  af- 
fairs. Its  stand  for  Ptolemy  against  Copernicus  and 
Galileo,  for  Aristotle  or  at  best  with  Linnaeus  against 
Darwin,  is  vigorously  brought  up.  Still  worse  is 
its  long  maintenance  of  feudal  privilege  against 
modern  freedom,  its  more  than  lingering  sympathies 
despite  all  democratic  concessions.  Most  strongly 
of  all  is  urged  the  deadening  effect  upon  young 
intellect  of  its  dogmatic  instruction,  of  its  inculcation 
of  authority  against  reason,  the  darkening  effect  of 
setting  sentiment  against  science.  Leaving  criticism 
and  passing  to  construction,  our  interlocutor  con- 
cludes with  a  lucid  and  persuasive  exposition  of  the 
need  and  value  of  each  of  the  positive  sciences,  of 
the  claims  of  practical  life  and  industry,  of  modern 
citizenship ;  and  all  this  with  a  clearness  and  force 
which  remind  us  of  Mr.    Spencer's  "  Education." 

Repressing  some  temptation  to  be  satisfied  with 
this  as  obviously  sufficient,  we  hear  the  other  side. 
Its  fervid  restatement  of  Catholic  ideals,  its  lamenta- 
tions over  the  religious  indifference  of  the  State  and 
of  the  times  may  leave  us  comparatively  cold;  and 
who  is  not  indifferent  when  compared  with  the 
Breton?  But  our  attention  becomes  more  keenly 
roused  by  the  remark  that  even  if  the  State  schools 
be  at  present  somewhat  superior  in  scientific  infor- 
mation and  outfit,  their  own  have  the  advantage  in 
manners  and  in  morals.  More  pointed  still  seems 
the  criticism  that  the  State  schools  are  designed  and 

172 


An  Educational  Approach 

inspired  essentially  from  the  standpoint  of  an  inexor- 
able logic,  applied  and  supervised  with  a  relentless 
uniformity;  and  that  they  disregard  not  simply  the 
general  course  of  history  as  the  Church  understands 
it,  but  the  actual  regional  conditions,  types,  and  tem- 
peraments as  even  the  geographer  understands  these ; 
so  tending  to  flatten  out  all  that  we  think  and  find 
most  characteristic  and  most  admirable  in  Breton 
life  into  a  dull  and  dreary  reflection  of  Parisian  uni- 
formity. To  this  too  purely  urban  and  intellec- 
tualist  education  is  ably  traced  a  large  influence  in 
the  depopulation  of  the  village,  the  too  frequent 
demoralisation  of  its  character,  of  course  with  a 
corresponding  depression  of  agriculture.  In  fact 
this  indictment  of  the  prevalent  State  education  is, 
though  in  different  ways,  more  severe  and  sweeping 
than  that  of  the  Republican  against  the  Church. 
And  putting  the  two  pleadings  side  by  side,  do  we 
not  feel  that  each  side  largely  merits  the  criticisms 
made  against  it  by  the  other?  Or  looking  at  both 
constructively,  we  see  that  each  has  a  partial  ideal, 
and  in  so  far  a  good  one. 

It  is  natural  to  begin  with  the  former,  the  observa- 
tion of  our  neighbours'  defects  being  always  easier 
than  the  recognition  of  their  virtues.  As  we  ramble 
on  through  town  after  town,  village  after  village,  and 
look  about  us  at  the  schools  of  both  kinds,  does 
there  not  grow  up  the  idea  not  only  of  their  teachers 
as  hard-working,  well-intentioned,  kindly  folk  alike, 
but  of  their  work  as  being  too  much  a  dismal,  futile 
child-imprisonment,  singsong  of  reading-book  in  the 
one  being,  after  all,  so  very  much  like  singsong  of 

173 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

catechism  in  the  other.  Does  it  really  matter  very 
much,  though  in  the  one  school  there  be  a  feeble 
lithograph  of  a  sacred  picture,  and  in  the  other  an 
ugly  icon  of  a  sacred  president?  —  that  the  one  room 
be  a  little  more  tawdry,  the  other  a  little  more 
dreary,  if  the  decoration  of  both  be  bad  anyhow? 
Does  it  matter  either  to  religion  or  to  science 
whether  the  children  are  learning  by  rote  the  names 
of  ancient  saintly  personages  for  the  bishop,  or  the 
names  of  chemical  elements  for  the  inspector?  Is 
the  bishop  —  "Monseigneur  "  of  whom  the  Church 
schoolmaster  speaks  with  bated  breath  so  very  dif- 
ferent from  "  Monsieur  l'lnspecteur"  who  evidently 
inspires  a  still  deeper  if  less  spiritual  dread  on  the 
part  of  his  lay  rival?  For  it  is  plain  that  neither 
one  teacher  nor  the  other  knows  that  which  has 
given  the  German  professor  his  dignity,  his  world- 
pre-eminent  efficiency;  his  independence,  his  "  Lehr- 
freiheit,"  his  freedom  from  inspection  and  supervision 
and  criticism  by  any  official  authority  whatsoever  ; 
his  responsibility  therefore  to  his  peers  and  to  his 
pupils,  but  most  of  all  to  inward  ideals,  to  truth,  pro- 
gress, and  the  general  weal. 

Even  the  most  convinced  protestant  and  liberal  of 
our  party,  to  whom  the  existence  of  any  monastic 
vows  seems  an  anachronism  of  the  worst  sort,  may 
begin  to  wonder  if  it  is  altogether  an  advantage  to  have 
the  very  same  triple  vows  now  practically  imposed 
by  the  State.  For  is  poverty  so  much  more  desirable 
or  beneficial  when  externally  compelled  instead  of 
voluntarily  accepted?  In  the  same  way  celibacy,  for 
the  average  schoolmistress   at   least,    is    practically 

i74 


An  Educational  Approach 

maintained,  though  no  longer  from  an  internal  vow; 
while  obedience  to  hierarchical  superiors,  as  definite 
as  ever  it  can  have  been,  is  admittedly  inspired  by 
dread  of  destitution. 

Liberty,  Equality,  Fraternity,  it  is  true,  are  written 
upon  the  school  buildings  in  letters  fair  to  see ;  but 
as  the  teacher  grows  older  he  sees  that  after  each  the 
static  full  stop,  the  ironic  "point"  may  be  added. 
For  liberty  is  exactly  what  he  is  not  allowed ;  equal- 
ity with  his  hierarchical  superior  is  not  even  dreamed 
of;  and  fraternity  of  combination  with  his  fellows  is 
not  possible.  Nor  probably  on  the  whole  is  that 
promotion  to  a  larger  sphere  of  usefulness,  which  is 
the  legitimate  ambition  of  every  efficient  worker, 
more  easily  satisfied  in  the  State  schools  than  in  the 
ecclesiastical  ones.  For  in  the  Church,  promotion  is 
possible  from  the  village  up  towards  Rome ;  but  in 
the  State  the  promoted  come  down  from  Paris.  The 
teacher  is  growing  conscious  of  his  lot;  witness  the 
success  of  "Jean  Coste."  "We  feel  a  little  tired, 
sometimes,"  says  to  me  the  dean  of  the  leading 
faculty  in  one  of  the  greatest  of  provincial  univer- 
sities, "  of  always  being  governed  as  a  conquered 
country  by  two  million  Parisians." 

As  we  go  into  these  matters  further  we  find  that 
the  tide  of  opinion  has  turned,  so  they  may  soon  be 
mending  fast.  As  France  has  commonly  been  the 
first  of  countries  to  evolve  each  new  system  of  tem- 
poral and  spiritual  ideals,  or  at  any  rate  to  express 
these  most  clearly,  and  most  rapidly  and  logically  to 
work  them  out  to  their  fullest  development,  even 
their  bitterest  end,  so  she,  naturally  next  experienc- 

i7S 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

ing  all  their  evils,  begins  earliest  or  most  clearly  the 
reaction  against  them,  and  to  think  of  construction 
anew.  Hence,  especially  during  the  last  decade,  it 
has  been  coming  about  that  the  secular  teachers  are 
more  and  more  turning  to  the  education  of  the  spirit- 
ual life,  as  the  wide  and  ever-widening  circulation  of 
a  paper  like  the  Bulletin  pour  V Action  Morale  may 
show;  while  it  is  no  less  the  fact  that  in  social  science 
at  least  the  "  clerical  "  schoolmasters  are  often  think- 
ing their  way  practically  ahead  of  their  Positivist 
antagonists,  much  more  of  our  rival  political  econo- 
mists, our  British  or  American  Spencerians.  As  in- 
stance, witness  the  books  of  M.  Demolins,  himself 
but  a  foremost  yet  partial  expositor  of  the  larger 
influence  of  Le  Play. 

So  deep  and  so  spreading  are  these  changes  among 
the  younger  generation  in  each  party  that  they  may 
have  their  unseen  share  in  the  present  intensifications 
of  strife  between  their  older  leaders.  The  "  Principes 
de  '89"  the  bureaucracy  of  the  Napoleonic  period, 
are  still  in  power,  and  seem  to  stand  as  sharply  con- 
trasted as  ever  with  the  old  dogmatism  of  the  Ultra- 
montanes;  but  is  it  not  just  because  both  parties  are 
old,  are  nearing  their  end,  that  they  have  thus  em- 
bittered and  exasperated  each  other  into  open  war? 
Instances  of  this  are  not  wanting  either  in  political 
or  religious  history. 

Repressing,  then,  as  far  as  may  be,  our  national 
habit  of  thanking  God  that  we  are  not  as  these  French- 
men, let  us  come  back  to  look  with  a  freshened  eye 
at  our  own  machinery.  Until  a  generation  ago, 
people  used  to  cite  as  one  such  awful  example  of 

176 


An  Educational  Approach 

French  ways  the  story  of  some  minister  of  education 
pulling  out  his  watch  and  saying:  "At  this  moment 
every  child  in  France  is  saying  the  same  lesson." 
But  what  else  was  the  aim  of  our  own  codes  and  time- 
tables, only  now  relaxing?  Are  we  not  reminded  of 
the  bitter  word  of  Metternich,  "  When  you  Eng- 
lish become  bureaucratic,  you  become  the  most 
mechanical  of  all"?  For  who  that  knows  and  cares 
anything  for  education  can  look  back  over  British 
history  for  the  last  thirty  years  and  not  see  as  its 
representative  and  organising  type,  in  that  sense  its 
true  "  Hero,"  a  certain  Robert  Lowe,  Lord  Sher- 
brooke?  But  we  see  him  now  as  having  been  essen- 
tially a  tardy  French  bureaucrat,  concretely  importing 
the  centralising  hierarchy,  the  examination-machine, 
the  inspectorial  steam-roller,  although  no  doubt  im- 
parting to  all  these  a  due  local  colour;  thus  for  in- 
stance more  perfectly  adapting  Napoleonised  France 
to  mammonised  England,  by  help  of  his  characteris- 
tic invention  of"  payment  by  results."  The  ingenuity 
of  this  principle  has  never,  perhaps,  been  sufficiently 
appreciated.  It  was  not  merely  an  ingenious  combi- 
nation of  current  economics  with  lay  catechism-mon- 
gering,  but  involved  a  further  complexity,  that  of  the 
incorporation  of  the  formerly  solely  ecclesiastical 
crime  of  simony  with  the  formerly  merely  domestic 
crime  of  baby  farming,  and  then  nationalising  the 
whole  as  a  junior  state  religion.  It  is  true,  of  course, 
that  this  system  has  lately  been  transformed,  though 
not  yet  its  moral  results;  for  while  the  centralisation 
and  hierarchic  depression  of  the  general  body  of  the 
educational  profession  is  still  no  less  thoroughly  en- 
12  i77 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

sured,  the  effects  of  serfdom  cannot  be  cancelled  by 
even  the  most  generous  ukase. 

What  is  this  whole  national  education-machine  but 
essentially  a  new  priestcraft,  with  its  multitude  of 
working  Levites  at  the  bottom,  and  its  well-to-do 
scribes  in  their  boards  and  education  offices  at  the 
top?  And  to  such  a  neo-ecclesiastical  organisation 
what  matters  any  lay  administrative  council,  be  it  of 
school  board  or  county  council,  since  anyhow  mainly 
of  amateur  lawyers,  absorbed  and  controlled  by  the 
letter  of  their  code,  and  so  without  having  the  time, 
even  had  they  the  purpose  and  knowledge,  the  sym- 
pathy and  insight  to  approach  the  realities  of  educa- 
tion at  all,  or  to  encourage  teachers  or  children  to 
do  so? 

Who,  then,  can  seriously  deny  that  the  essentials  of 
the  characteristic  forms  of  modern  education,  as  yet 
most  in  power  either  abroad  or  at  home  —  are  not 
deeply  akin  to  those  they  have  been  v/ont  to  complain 
of  in  past  religious  organisations?  Might  not  this  be 
traced  into  details,  beginning  with  the  grim  asceti- 
cism, the  worse  than  cloister-like  dulness  of  the 
gardenless  schoolyard  cage,  the  shoving-yard  or 
Hooliganeum,  officially  termed  playground?  That 
the  monastic  building  is  the  expression  of  meditative 
abstraction  from  all  interrupting  sense  stimulus,  while 
the  lay  building  has  only  the  excuse  of  a  sordid  and 
shortsighted  economy,  does  not  surely  improve  the 
comparison?  Again,  in  a  Jesuit  school  the  director 
could  and  did  throw  himself  into  the  work  of  shaping 
the  young  life  towards  his  ideal,  sharpening  reason, 
pointing  will,  and  bringing  feeling  to  the  ice-brook's 

i7s 


An  Educational  Approach 

temper;  but  the  modern  board  school  headmaster  is 
no  longer  entrusted  with  these  powers.  For  a  man, 
who  despite  State  conditions  has  won  his  way  to  such 
high  responsibility,  might  indeed  master  his  school. 
So  the  subconscious  self-preserving  instinct  of  his 
bureaucratic  superiors,  who,  however  high  officials, 
are  at  best  but  scholastic  amateurs,  naturally  guides 
them  to  keep  him  occupied  with  clerkly  details ;  so 
that  in  many  a  higher  grade  school  the  rector  at  fifty 
corresponds  precisely  to  a  small  child  of  five  kept  in, 
and  relieving  his  solitude  by  marking  X's  and  O's 
upon  a  gridiron  of  squares  upon  his  ruled  exercise 
book.  It  is  no  doubt  expedient  that  this  one  man 
should  die  for  these  superior  people. 

One  more  parallelism,  this  time  of  interest  to  the 
student  of  comparative  religion,  and  we  have  done 
with  this  long  opening  of  our  subject.  It  is  a  re- 
markable evolution  of  our  State  education  systems, 
nothing  less  than  the  reappearance  of  sham  oracles. 
In  common  with  other  past  faiths  which  had  lost  their 
internal  light,  their  prophetic  leading,  and  had  fallen 
back  upon  books  and  codes,  upon  precedents  and 
castes,  an  education  authority  is  now  accustomed  to 
invoke  on  due  occasions  unseen  and  occult  beings; 
so  that  when  one  asks  them  any  question,  the  reply, 
be  it  of  polite  acquiescence  or  gentle  evasion,  of 
solemn  nullity  or  obscurantist  procrastination,  as 
the  case  may  be,  is  not  couched  and  signed  in  the 
ordinary  straightforward  manner  of  man  to  man,  as 
when  one  receives  a  communication  from  the  colo- 
nial office  or  the  like.  It  is  majestic,  oracular,  as 
befits   what   comes    from   the   occult   beings   afore- 

179 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

said:  "  My  Lords"  (Adona'i?)  "have  considered" 
this;  "  My  Lords"  (Elohim?)  "have  consulted" 
(doubtless  Urim  and  Thummim)  upon  that;  "  My 
Lords  have  decided "  (doubtless  by  the  sacred 
method  of  lot,  perhaps  in  its  modern  form  of  tossing 
up)  ;  and  they  "  have  the  honour  to  be  "  — .  How 
long,  O  Lord,  how  long  shall  these  Things  be? 

Harmless  official  formalities  like  so  many  more? 
Partly,  perhaps.  Even  useful  in  a  way,  since  preserv- 
ing order?  Yes  —  maintaining  the  feelings  which 
have  so  long  kept  school  boards  and  schoolmasters 
in  their  respectively  lower  places.  But  to  us  out- 
siders—  scientific  men,  workers,  women  of  common 
sense,  as  to  the  teachers  and  even  to  the  intelligent 
child,  it  none  the  less  is  at  best  a  mode  of  bluff.  But 
this  is  at  once  pretentious  and  timid  —  an  ugly  form 
of  deceit  that  has  now  sufficiently  had  its  day. 

Of  course  all  this  is  not  to  say  that  an  education 
office,  a  South  Kensington,  is  a  mere  den  of  "  budget- 
ivores,"  as  the  corresponding  French  gibe  goes,  or 
its  individuals  mere  "  ronds  de  cuir" —  mere  tops  for 
stools,  though  some  may  develop  that  way.  On 
the  contrary  we  must  fully  recognise  not  only  good 
men  struggling  with  their  bonds,  but  a  certain  hope 
and  possibility  in  their  organisation ;  which  may  yet 
preserve  all  its  usefulness  and  escape  its  evils.  And 
if  we  be  asked  no  longer  to  criticise  merely,  but  to 
say  how  we  would  construct,  the  reply  is  clear —  by 
transformation  into  the  type  as  yet  best  represented 
by  the  United  States  Commissioner  of  Education  and 
his  department.  For  this  represents  the  national 
educational  consciousness  and  conscience:    it  is  an 

1 80 


An  Educational  Approach 

intelligence  department  at  once  local,  regional,  na- 
tional and  world-wide,  and  hence  an  agency  of  in- 
cessant and  searching  comparison  and  criticism,  of 
diffusion  of  ideas,  of  practical  impulse,  or  inspiring 
idealism  also.  With  its  keen  criticism,  its  manifold 
suggestiveness,  without  the  powers  or  ambitions  of 
either  that  administrative  or  that  financial  control 
which  characterise  the  education  ministries  of  Eu- 
rope, but  which  are  here  happily  impossible  consti- 
tutionally, it  is  thus  the  best  extant  type  of  what  a 
central  and  national  institution  for  the  advancement 
of  education  may  and  should  be.  Hence  our  own 
public  interest  in  a  small  recent  storm  between  the 
English  Education  Office  and  its  Intelligence  De- 
partment; whatever  may  have  been  the  minor  merits 
of  the  case,  the  two  principles  above  discussed  were 
here  in  conflict,  the  Napoleonic  and  the  American, 
and  the  immediate  victory  of  the  first  was  thus  intel- 
ligible enough.  So,  however,  is  the  possible  ultimate 
victory  of  the  second. 

It  is  not  the  present  question  whether  the  apparatus 
of  educational  government  —  of  which  education 
offices  have  been  taken  merely  as  the  largest  and 
most  prominent  type,  but  to  which,  of  course  mutatis 
mutandis,  we  might  add  the  public  schools  and  the 
universities  —  can  be  transformed  or  no.  The  pur- 
pose of  all  this  has  been  to  bring  out  the  essential 
identity  in  degeneration  of  educational  ideals,  whether 
they  set  out  in  modern  times  from  the  side  of  modern 
science  and  enlightenment,  or  in  older  days  from  that 
of  religions.  Be  it  in  Church  schools  or  in  State 
ones,  dry-rot  is  dry-rot  still. 

181 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

So  far  this  long  discussion  has  been  bringing  out 
that  the  question  before  us  is  not  really  one  of  the 
conventional  parties :  it  is  not  being  solved  by  them; 
it  is  not  even  being  fully  seen  or  treated.  Whether 
the  educationist  is  to  wear  the  ecclesiastical  cassock 
or  the  academic  gown,  the  every-day  business  cos- 
tume, the  laboratory  jacket,  or  the  workshop  apron, 
is  not  the  real  question.  That  lies  deeper;  it  strips 
off  each  garment  in  turn,  it  sounds  and  tests  the  life 
below. 

I  remember  a  saying  attributed  to  the  professor  of 
divinity,  which  ran  through  the  university  like  a  crack 
through  ice:  "You  ask  me,  What  is  a  theologian? 
There  are  two  sorts  of  theologians :  those  who  have 
read  the  books  of  other  theologians,  and  those  who 
have  had  a  spiritual  experience."  The  essential,  the 
ideal  lies,  then,  not  in  the  subject,  in  the  faculty,  or  the 
profession,  the  occupation  or  specialism,  not  in  this 
religion  nor  in  that  science ;  it  is  in  the  inmost  self, 
and  in  the  measure  and  character  of  its  action  and 
reaction  with  the  vital  realities  of  the  subject,  what- 
ever that  subject  be.  The  eternal  ideals  may  be 
reached  by  every  road,  are  open  upon  it;  yet  may 
be  lost  at  every  sign-post,  despite  the  would-be  plain- 
est lettering,  even  from  one  who  had  himself  found 
the  way. 

See  this  poor  puzzled  British  parent,  his  no  less 
puzzled  boy,  confused  between  the  choice  of  "  the 
classical  or  the  modern  side;"  little  matter  so  long 
as  in  either  bundle  there  is  so  little  genuine  and  un- 
mouldered  hay.  If  it  is  a  choice  between  parroting 
the  catechism  or  the  list  of  chemical  elements,  Latin 

1S2 


An  Educational  Approach 

rules  or  French  ones,  Euclid  instead  of  Natural 
Orders,  and  the  Punic  Wars  instead  of  a  "  period  " 
of  English  History,  there  is  little  wonder  that  the 
parent  still  prefers  to  accept  the  older,  the  classical 
side,  as  likely  to  be  the  less  badly  taught  of  the 
two,  modern  though  his  own  interests  generally  are. 
Hence  largely  the  reversion,  nowadays  so  common, 
that  of  the  son  of  the  scientific  or  practical  man,  still 
making  Latin  verses:  it  is  not  a  mere  timid  con- 
formity, a  mere  ritual  of  status. 

For  there  is  no  real  difference :  "  plus  ca  change, 
plus  c'est  la  meme  chose."  This  so-called  science, 
this  chemical  analysis  or  flower-dissecting  is  still 
mostly  mere  spelling,  mere  parsing  under  a  new 
name:  most  of  this  workshop  exercising  —  too  often 
nowadays  fine  finishing  of  wooden  surfaces  and 
joints,  afterwards  useless,  and  only  fit  to  be  burned 
—  is  even  worse  than  the  old  Latin  exercises  which 
dulled  and  sickened  and  wasted  our  youth.  For 
since  we  cannot  live  by  Latin  alone,  on  leaving 
school  we  could  throw  this  aside,  and  still  be  fresh  to 
learn  to  work;  but  when  we  have  done  with  such 
workshop  exercises,  or  won  half  the  certificates  of 
South  Kensington  "art"  and  "science"  we  never 
wish  to  touch  plane  or  pencil,  retort  or  scalpel  again. 
There  has  been  no  one  like  your  "  technical  educa- 
tionist "  for  breaking  the  spring  of  industry  and  art  in 
the  young  life  for  good  and  all :  even  your  botanist 
cannot  more  perfectly  kill  his  subject  for  all  con- 
cerned. 

Happily  we  are  escaping  from  this  period  of  static 
analysis,  and  we  are  all  escaping  together.     The  liv- 

183 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

ing  scholar  who  excavates  Delphi  or  Crete,  or  the 
naturalist  who  explores  New  Guinea,  whether  he 
bring  us  a  priceless  statue  or  a  passionate  grotesque, 
has  here  a  living  experience  to  offer,  and  his  pupils, 
nay,  his  pupils'  pupils'  pupils,  may  also  vitally  share 
in  this.  Few  can  repeat  for  themselves  a  Darwin's 
Voyage,  or  take  part  in  a  Challenger  or  a  Cambridge 
Expedition ;  yet  every  child  in  Cambridge  can  find 
strange  monsters  in  the  fen,  every  kindergarten  mis- 
tress may  find  exploring  grounds  for  her  children  in 
the  nearest  garden  or  park ;  nay,  what  child  does  not 
instinctively  long  both  for  geologic  observation  and 
for  engineering  experience,  for  a  free  access  and 
hand  in  the  nearest  gutter.  What  is  essential,  then, 
is  not  the  mileage  of  the  voyage,  but  the  mental  atti- 
tude of  the  explorer.  Gilbert  White  found  Nature 
in  his  garden;  but  the  tourist,  the  globe-trotter, 
wears  the  same  town-smoked  spectacles  wherever  he 
goes. 

Hence,  of  course,  a  great  factor  in  the  prevalent  re- 
action. If  we  are  to  submit  to  authority,  let  us  select 
some  authority  better  worth  submitting  to  than  "  my 
Lords  " :  let  us  return  to  the  Church,  the  Pope,  the 
Fathers,  to  Aristotle  or  Moses.  If  we  are  to  memo- 
rise a  catechism  at  all  there  may  be  as  much  educa- 
tive result  in  mastering  that  of  the  Westminster 
Assembly  of  Divines  as  all  the  cram-books  in  pub- 
lisherdom.  This  is  a  simple  point  enough;  and  may 
well  seem  not  worth  labouring ;  yet  it  is  no  mere 
fighting  of  extinct  creeds. 

Where  are  there  more  slavish  devotees  than  the 
candidates  for  London  or  Edinburgh  examinations? 

184 


An  Educational  Approach 

Who  ever  more  anxiously  or  unreflectively  have 
believed  in  committing  almost  to  memory  the  words 
of  their  text-book  or  master,  and  who  have  oftener 
told  each  other  that  they  must  assent  to  its  or  his 
particular  theories  or  be  "ploughed"?  So  chang- 
ing are  the  times  that  there  seems  nowadays  to  be 
more  independent  and  speculative  thinking  among 
the  aspirants  to  the  Scottish  ministry,  once  so  strict, 
than  among  those  of  the  university  faculties  of  medi- 
cine, once  and  again  so  comparatively  free :  at  any 
rate,  since  Robertson  Smith,  there  has  probably  been 
less  general  ignorance  of  the  results,  and  even  of  the 
methods  of  scientific  research  among  the  students  of 
the  older  faculty  than  of  the  more  modern  one. 

The  student  of  science  no  less  than  the  teacher 
may  thus  look  around  him  in  the  history  and  present 
of  his  own  subject  for  that  dry-rot  with  which  he 
reproaches  the  theological  world  :  he  may  next  make 
a  step  towards  the  treatment  of  it. 

Take,  for  instance,  that  very  science,  which  of  all 
others  should  surely  seem  most  difficult  of  desicca- 
tion and  mistreatment,  —  the  study  of  seed  and  bud 
and  leaf,  of  flower  and  fruit,  of  the  garment  of  earth 
in  all  its  protean  beauty.  Yet  what  science  may  be 
made  more  repellent?  and  this  alike  to  student  and 
to  child ;  so  that  the  very  name  of  botany  stinks  in 
the  nostrils  of  the  public,  and  suggests  a  mere  far- 
rago of  dog-latin  labels  upon  mouldering  hay?  Yet 
when  we  do  not  forget  this  in  our  winter  haylofts, 
called  herbaria,  museums,  laboratories,  libraries,  it  is 
the  goodly  pageant  of  the  seasons,  the  ever-returning 
drama  of  the  floral  year  which  has  suggested  alike 

i»5 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

the  oldest  nature  poetry  and  the  latest  nature  insight ; 
of  this  it  is  that  Hesiod  and  Virgil,  Linnaeus  and 
Darwin  have  each  opened  a  new  page  of  exposition 
or  interpretation.  Yet  as  Virgil  became  "  lines  "  and 
Linnaeus  an  artificial  mnemonic,  so  now  we  have 
Darwin's  great  and  luminous  thought  turned  into  an 
all-sufficient  justification  of  every  evil  in  life  or  deed. 
Even  in  recent  instruction  we  have  Darwin's  foremost 
paladin,  Professor  Huxley,  stereotyping  as  the  "  Ele- 
mentary Course  of  Biology,"  authoritative  now  for 
thirty  years,  not  this  teaching  of  his  master,  nor  even 
the  embryology  of  Von  Baer  or  Spencer,  but  mainly 
a  questionable  reselection  from  the  type-system  of 
Cuvier,  the  obscurantist  of  evolutionism.  In  a  word, 
then,  this  desiccation  of  science  ever  returns.  But 
if  so,  the  investigation  of  the  educational  fragility 
of  our  own  science  may  usefully  occupy  us,  in  the 
intervals  of  the  more  pleasing  task  of  throwing  stones 
at  the  stained-glass  houses  of  the  theologians. 

Fixing  and  freezing  forms,  we,  too,  are  losing  sight 
of  life  and  function,  ere  long  worshipping  idols;  and 
so  our  scientific  conviction  of  clarified  dogma  or 
body  of  "  laws "  all-sufficient  for  assured  salvation 
from  ignorance  begins  to  give  place  to  a  poignant 
consciousness  of  shortcomings,  inefficiency,  and  even 
error,  with  wrong  action  in  consequence,  which 
begins  to  give  us  some  idea  of  what  the  preachers  of 
our  boyhood  called  the  confession  of  backsliding 
and  the  conviction  of  sin.  We  begin  to  see  that  we 
have  no  less  literally  than  symbolically  made  our 
museums  of  skeletons,  our  herbaria,  our  cabinets  of 
fossils  or  of  microscopic  sections,  into  idols  and  bur- 

186 


An  Educational  Approach 

dens,  which  tend  year  by  year  to  shut  us  out  from 
the  old  openness  to  living  nature,  to  weigh  us  down, 
in  turn  to  fossilise  into  its  past. 

But  as  during  the  study  of  letters  there  have  ever 
been  men,  even  generations,  for  whom  the  lexicon 
ceases  to  smother  the  literature  and  grammar  poetry, 
and  when  these  are  seen  again  in  their  true  place  as 
helps,  not  substitutes  and  hindrances ;  so  after  each 
wintry  period  of  our  science  there  comes  a  new  tide 
of  spring.  Such  a  period  is  again  beginning  among 
us.  Witness  the  freshening  even  of  logical  and 
mathematical  study  and  teaching  so  long  stereotyped 
after  schoolman  and  Alexandrian ;  witness  the  newer 
chemistry,  or  that  marvellous  modification  of  our 
physical  theories  which  is  now  in  progress  ;  witness 
new  doctrines  in  medicine  and  in  biology,  yet  more 
in  psychology,  as  this  rises  beyond  its  strict  bondage 
to  brass  instruments  ;  and  latest,  yet  perhaps  most 
vitalising  of  all,  that  profound  renewal  of  social 
studies  of  which  current  popular  discussions  are  but 
the  advertisement  and  prologue. 

More  than  in  the  ponderous  stiff-jointed  university 
we  see  this  transformation  beginning  in  the  school ; 
even  among  the  dark  places  of  the  earth,  like  the 
public  schools  of  England,  we  see  here  and  there 
some  bold  and  bright  initiative  —  some  Abbotsholme 
rising  in  its  day  and  generation,  as  Rugby  or  Up- 
pingham or  Loretto  had  arisen  before,  to  emphasise 
its  fresh  outlook,  and  force  its  active  example  of  this 
and  that  vitally  needed  improvement  upon  a  sleepy 
and  reluctant  world. 

In   the   larger,    freer,    keener    atmosphere    of  the 

i87 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

American  schools,  such  initiatives  are  less  rare  to 
seek.  See  Stanley  Hall  and  his  colleagues  and  dis- 
ciples with  their  child-study;  Colonel  Parker  with  his 
training  of  teachers ;  Professor  James  with  his  "  Talks 
to  Teachers ;  "  Professor  Dewey  with  his  industrial 
recapitulations  of  race-experience.  Fruitful  examples 
of  educational  reawakening  come  to  us  also  from  the 
continent;  not  only  from  Jena  or  Paris,  but  from 
Madrid  to  Christiania.  Since  the  days  of  Rousseau, 
of  Pestalozzi  and  Frcebel  the  educational  world  has 
had  no  such  general  awakening;  and  this  time  it 
cannot  leave  out  John  Bull. 

While  we  are  on  this  line  of  thought  the  case  of 
the  Frcebelians  may  be  peculiarly  instructive.  For  in 
a  single  half  century  we  have  seen  this  doctrine  in  its 
way  through  martyrdom  to  power,  yet  there  too  com- 
monly to  fossilise  into  a  slavish  literalism  of  elemen- 
tary gifts,  of  doggerel  rhymes ;  and  these  frozen  into 
a  wooden  ritual,  a  shallow  mysticism  —  at  best  an 
arrested  phase  of  "  Naturphilosophie,"  of  the  teach- 
ing of  Oken  —  mechanically  perpetuated  by  teachers 
who  have  often  never  heard  of  either  the  movement 
or  the  man. 

This  bondage,  no  doubt,  the  superior  minds  of  the 
kindergarten  have  largely  or  wholly  escaped  from; 
and  even  at  its  worst,  it  has  doubtless  been  an  im- 
provement upon  what  it  replaced.  Yet  it  is  only 
with  the  current  return  of  a  direct  and  first-hand 
nature-study,  a  more  genuine  appreciation  of  produc- 
tivity in  art,  and  a  contact  with  the  reality  of  handi- 
craft, that  the  Frcebelians  as  a  body  are  escaping  from 
the  position  of  an  estimable  but  somewhat  supersti- 

188 


An  Educational  Approach 

tious  sect,  and  are  becoming  reabsorbed  with  all  that 
was  vital  in  their  master,  into  the  rising  current  of 
general  education.  Thus  they  die  to  live  more  fully ; 
for  what  is  the  best  university  laboratory  but  a 
kindergarten  of  larger  growth? 

We  see,  then,  how  it  comes  about  that  at  this  time 
everywhere  the  educationist  is  again  looking  around 
him,  warned  by  the  failure  of  each  specialism  and 
specialist;  the  failure  still  more  of  the  sham  syntheses 
which  as  "  codes  "  and  "  programmes  "  increasingly 
imposed  upon  the  past  century.  He  must  yet  seek 
for  some  co-ordinating  principle,  some  master-thought 
to  guide  his  choice  of  subjects,  his  method  in  educa- 
tion. Where  and  how  shall  we  seek  this?  Is  not 
this  being  found  in  the  common  endeavour,  more 
and  more  consciously  beginning  among  the  special 
workers  of  every  sort,  to  escape  from  the  preliminary 
static  and  analytic  treatment  of  their  subject  to  the 
kinetic  one,  the  synthetic  view?  —  to  see  the  stream 
as  it  moves,  no  longer  content  merely  to  map  its 
plan,  or  measure  its  section  as  something  assumed 
at  rest?  So  while  utilising,  continuing,  revising  the 
whole  analytic  researches  of  the  past,  we  have  now 
also  to  unite  and  harmonise  these  towards  an  ever- 
growing synthesis  —  albeit  one  open  to  branch  forth 
anew.  The  past  of  each  scientific  specialism  has 
largely  necessarily  been  occupied  with  the  construc- 
tion of  its  instruments,  and  with  the  isolated  manipu- 
lation of  each.  Now  we  begin  to  see  again  more  and 
more  clearly  the  possibility  of  orchestrating  these ; 
and  thus  create  here  and  there  the  beginning  of  a 
school  of  educational  art.     Such  schools  are  already 

189 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

beginning,  each  absorbing  into  itself  all  it  needs  from 
the  present  medley  of  specialisms,  and  so  advancing 
consciously  or  unconsciously  beyond  the  dominant 
German  university  principle,  half  true,  half  deficient 
in  its  unlimited  but  unco-ordinated  and  fragmentary 
specialisings  —  now  popularised  in  this  country  at 
all  levels,  from  "  Tit-Bits  "  to  its  giant  rival  encyclo- 
paedia; for  all  three  are  alike  the  direct  and  literal 
descendants  and  representatives,  for  their  respective 
sections  of  the  public,  of  the  "  Grande  Encyclopedic" 
In  their  logic  and  their  science,  for  instance,  such 
schools  must  transcend  even  the  Hegelian,  the  Posi- 
tivist,  or  the  Spencerian  pro-synthesis,  each  too  in- 
complete, too  unrelated,  too  infertile  in  specialist 
advance,  yet  must  succeed  in  uniting  the  essential 
qualities  of  all,  and  so  in  losing  the  characteristic 
defects  of  each.  Of  this  true  school,  this  renascent 
university  of  the  opening  future,  we  may  find  the 
fullest  prototype  in  the  great  schools  of  early  philo- 
sophy—  Cortona,  the  Academy,  the  Lyceum;  each 
seeking  to  see  nature  and  life  as  a  living  whole,  each 
meeting  this  in  some  characteristic  way,  each  at  once 
adapted  to  the  times,  and  yet  transcending  them. 

Such  an  ideal  of  organised  culture  may  and  does 
indeed  too  often  seem  hopeless  alike  to  the  professed 
philosopher  and  to  the  man  of  science.  But  is  not 
the  latter  too  much  absorbed  by  his  immediate  task 
of  spinning  or  winding  this  one  or  that  of  the  many- 
coloured  and  absolutely  distinct  warp-threads  of 
analysis,  to  see  it  may  be  even  the  possibility,  at  any 
rate  the  actual  place  and  power,  of  the  flying  shuttle 
of  synthesis    as    it  weaves  the   woof?     The   whole 

190 


An  Educational  Approach 

movement  of  modern  specialism  and  division  of 
labour  is  but  this  spinning,  dyeing,  fixing  of  warp- 
threads;  while  the  complementary  weaving  process, 
always  intermittent,  and  for  the  past  generation  too 
largely  arrested,  save  for  a  philosopher  or  a  live 
educationist  here  and  there,  is  now  being  increas- 
ingly resumed,  and  will  before  long  be  again  para- 
mount in  the  world.  But  for  this  the  philosopher 
must  no  longer  be  content  with  throwing  his  shuttle 
in  sublime  metaphor  or  gesture  merely,  not  even 
with  sketching  out  on  essay  paper  the  pattern  he 
would  weave :  he  must  now  go  forth  among  men  to 
the  concrete  task  of  realising  it,  and  this  without 
missing  or  breaking  a  thread. 

After  all,  this  movement  only  tends  to  complete 
upon  a  more  educated  level  the  familiar  antithesis  of 
the  faddist  and  the  man  of  the  world.  Intensively 
educate  and  encourage  your  faddist,  and  he  becomes 
your  eminent  specialist;  extensively  educate  and 
develop  your  man  of  the  world  in  general  interests 
and  sympathies,  and  he  becomes  increasingly  syn- 
thetic; or  extend  his  experience  in  practical  life  and 
he  becomes  a  statesman,  at  once  reconciling  and 
advancing  the  manifold  interests  of  his  working 
fellows. 

Given  the  preceding  criticism  of  studies,  and  the 
advancing  co-ordination  of  the  school  and  university, 
progress  may  now  be  more  systematically  conceived 
—  the  preceding  conception  of  the  school  being 
essentially  applicable  to  the  university,  its  various 
faculties  and  departments.  The  freedom  of  teaching 
and  learning  ("  Lehrfreiheit  und  Lernfreiheit ")  won 

191 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

by  German  professor  and  student  in  the  beginning  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  and  since  extending  through- 
out the  higher  education  of  the  world,  has  now  widely 
to  diffuse  into  secondary  and  primary  education. 
Hence  the  liberation  of  the  teacher;  with  a  corre- 
sponding disappearance  of  external  authority,  in  fact 
the  resorption  of  government.  And  since  "  Lehrfrei- 
heit"  involves  "  Lernfreiheit,"  the  pupil  also,  in  a 
degree  commonly  undreamed,  must  become  respon- 
sible for  the  conduct  of  his  personal  education,  as 
determined  by  the  selection  of  his  own  ideals.  For 
as  honour  is  found  to  rise  in  proportion  to  responsi- 
bility, so  intelligence  also.  It  is  the  teacher  with  the 
most  personal  and  spiritual  freedom  who  most  fully 
concedes  this  to  his  pupils  —  say,  rather,  evokes  this. 

With  this  evolution  of  school  as  of  university,  with 
this  disappearance  of  the  mandarin  enforcing  memo- 
rising, reappears  the  ideal  of  the  teacher  proper, 
that  of  the  thinker  inducing  thought,  the  musician 
music,  the  spirit  spirit — Poeta  poetagens. 

Are  we,  then,  to  define  the  pupil's  own  develop- 
ment? the  student's?  It  is  for  him  to  form  his  own. 
The  planted  and  watered  seed  must  ever  select  for 
its  own  needs,  and  grow  toward  its  own  light;  must 
blossom  and  fruit  from  within. 

By  the  application  and  development  of  such  prin- 
ciples and  methods,  our  ideal  school  of  educational 
art  is  seen  to  be  capable  of  definite  design  and 
material  organisation.  Yet  no  longer  by  any  single 
authority,  or  even  example,  as  there  is  no  one  ideal 
style  of  building,  but  as  many  as  there  are  places  and 
needs,  materials  and  architects  worthy  of  the  occasion. 

192 


An  Educational  Approach 

Such  schools  have  characterised  every  period  of 
educational  advance,  and  are  again  coming  into  evi- 
dence, and  this  in  almost  every  country  ;  and  each 
with  its  own  characteristics,  influence,  and  example. 
Even  in  apparently  commonplace  schools  teachers  of 
individuality  are  largely  redeeming  the  situation ;  while 
throughout  the  mass  of  tradition-  or  authority-ridden 
schools,  and  even  among  their  externally  most  con- 
formist teachers,  the  aspiration  towards  freedom  is 
rarely  wholly  extinct. 

Hence,  at  every  level  is  needed  the  euthanasia  of 
external  and  centralised  authority,  with  the  corre- 
sponding calling  forth  of  the  resources,  aptitude,  and 
insight  of  teachers  and  parents,  and,  most  of  all,  of 
each  school  and  group  of  children  —  as  students  and 
workers,  as  playmates  and  artists,  learning  and  loving 
—  in  short,  as  more  and  more  fully  living.  Vivendo 
discimns. 

The  principles  we  have  been  pleading  for  thus 
hardly  agree  with  the  practice  either  of  State  schools 
or  Church  ones.  Yet  are  they  not  being  accepted  by 
the  one,  and  even  claimed  by  the  other?  Each  has 
now  a  full  experience  of  what  a  dead  dogmatic 
synthesis  may  be ;  and  each  alike,  at  its  best,  claims 
to  be  seeking  a  more  open  and  living  one.  Only  to 
the  mere  Mandarin  of  State  can  the  teacher's  conse- 
quent claim  of  freedom  seem  an  anarchist  dream,  as 
only  to  the  withered  bigot  heresy.  Epictetus  and 
Antoninus,  slave  and  emperor  alike,  knew  that  free- 
dom lay  in  the  mind  itself;  and  what  more  have  we 
been  trying  to  prove  than  that  the  "  Kingdom  of 
Heaven  is  within  you"?  What  more  to  plead  for 
13  J93 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

than  to  "  suffer  the  little  children  "  ?  For  the  ideal  to 
which  the  child  is  dragged  or  driven  is  no  ideal  at  all, 
but  only  its  wooden  image  at  best. 

The  last  of  these  educational  propositions  is  the 
same  on  every  level,  each  scientific  man's  insistence 
upon  laboratory  work  in  his  subject  being  only  his 
specialist  way  of  proving  that  we  must  live  the  life  if 
we  would  know  the  doctrine. 

The  choice  is  thus  no  longer  between  "  classical 
and  modern  sides " :  these  we  see  have  too  much 
been  but  rival  death's-heads  —  there  a  post-mortem 
study  of  a  literature,  there  the  corresponding  post- 
mortem of  a  science.  Yet  all  these  dry  bases  can 
live,  are  more  than  stirring;  the  current  —  say  rather 
the  incipient  —  improvement,  both  of  humanist  and 
of  naturalist  teachings,  being  at  once  a  resurrection 
and  a  re-birth  —  the  renascence  of  the  Renaissance. 

Another  process  in  the  education  of  the  man  of 
science,  as  in  the  scientific  growth  of  the  education- 
alist, is  indicated  by  his  attitude  to  magic  and  romance. 
The  fairy  tales  of  science  are  often  thus  spoken  of, 
and  the  science  of  fairy  tales  has  long  been  an 
accredited  branch  of  anthropology,  but  our  meaning  is 
more  literal  still.  We  are  constantly  being  reminded, 
but  are  still  too  slowly  learning,  how  much  old  magic 
and  witchcraft  was  really  skilful  art,  often  founded 
upon  subtler  science  than  we  lately  knew: — who 
knows  whether  sometimes  subtler  than  we  have  yet 
recovered?  The  illustration  of  the  rise  of  hypnotism 
from  a  despised  quackery  to  an  accredited  branch 
of  psychologic   science,    of  medicine,   and    even   of 

194 


An  Educational  Approach 

educational  and  moral  art,  is  a  familiar  case  in  point, 
but  not  the  only  one.  The  psychologist  is  constantly 
finding  that  he  has  himself  more  to  learn  as  well  as 
more  to  teach.  It  is  easy,  no  doubt,  for  the  experi- 
menter to  reproduce  its  elementary  process  of  hyp- 
notism by  help  of  a  glistening  button  or  other  simplest 
mechanical  device;  but  when  we  learn  that  an 
ancestor  of  Charcot's  in  the  fourteenth  century  was 
sufficiently  eminent  as  a  wizard  to  be  burned  with  all 
due  formalities,  we  feel  more  ready  to  admit  the 
possibility  of  ascribing  something  to  individual  and 
hereditary  aptitudes  and  powers.  And  I  take  it  that 
many  ordinary  working-men  of  science,  though  like 
the  writer  without  time  or  even  inclination  to  take  per- 
sonal part  in  psychological  studies,  have  come  to  feel 
less  sceptical  of  their  usefulness,  less  contemptuous 
and  intolerant  towards  even  their  boldest  experimen- 
talists or  speculators,  than  I  am  afraid  we  did  twenty, 
or  even  ten  years  ago.  We  are  at  any  rate  more 
ready  to  believe  there  are  still  some  things  in  heaven 
and  earth  not  yet  in  our  philosophy.  That  recent 
progress  of  physical  research,  of  which  Rontgen  rays 
or  radium  ones  are,  after  all,  but  the  most  salient  and 
best  popularised  examples,  not  by  any  means  the  only 
ones,  is  widely  operating,  and  must  increasingly  op- 
erate in  the  education  of  the  man  of  science  from  his 
too  common  belief  that  the  great  generalisations  of 
the  permanence  and  definiteness  of  matter,  and  of  the 
conservation  and  dissipation  of  energy  had  practically 
completed  our  notion  of  the  physical  constitution  of 
the  universe,  and  left  only  minor  investigations  to  be 
pursued ;  while  it  has  justified  in  principle  the  specu- 

195 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

lative  thinking  and  teaching  of  profounder  physicists, 
too  long  suspected  of  mere  mystic  or  occultist  dream- 
ing apart  from  science  altogether.  There  is  here, 
of  course,  no  justification  for  the  fears  or  hopes  that 
the  existing  generalisations  of  science  have  been  dis- 
credited, and  that  a  period  of  mere  alchemist-like 
speculations  has  returned.  Yet  the  most  advanced 
physicist  and  chemist  is  now  once  more  reviewing 
the  teaching  of  the  old  alchemists,  as  indeed  Berthe- 
lot  did  not  so  long  ago :  and  he  may  again  probably 
interpret  things  which  formerly  seemed  absurd  or 
meaningless,  again,  perhaps,  find  suggestions  toward 
renewed  research.  Something  similar  seems  to  be 
the  case  as  regards  biological  science,  as  discoveries 
and  speculations  such  as  those  of  Pasteur  or  Brown- 
Sequard,  of  Roux  or  Metchnikoff,  have  shown. 

On  every  line  of  research  we  see  science  thus  rising 
into  art  and  art-magic.  The  breeder  has  long  been 
at  work,  not  only  experimenting,  but  succeeding  as 
the  literal  creator  of  new  varieties,  as  every  cattle 
show  or  flower-stall  proves.  The  biologist  begins  to 
see  yet  further;  at  any  rate  he  seeks  not  only  to 
penetrate  the  secrets  of  heredity  but  to  pierce  below 
these  to  the  deeper  secrets  of  protean  transformation. 
So  he  may  yet  understand  some  of  those  great  lifts 
in  the  evolution  of  life  which  seem  to  have  taken 
place  in  the  past,  perhaps  —  who  knows  —  again 
experimentally  produce  such.  But  this  is  reviving 
the  dream  of  the  transmutation  of  Life,  the  fairy  tale 
of  Proteus,  side  by  side  with  the  search  for  the  elixirs 
of  its  renewal. 

It  is  true  that  magic  is  not  always  favourably  viewed 
196 


An  Educational  Approach 

by  religion  :  some,  indeed,  contrast  these  sharply,  and 
so  far  with  truth.  For  while  magic  is  increasing 
power  over  nature,  religion  sees  rather  the  mystery 
of  nature  and  shrinks  from  the  boldness  which  unveils 
and  takes  her  captive.  Yet  since  our  late  master  of 
scientific  synthesis  has  given  recognition  in  his  system 
to  the  mystery  of  things  as  his  Unknowable,  and  even 
his  most  convinced  critics  have  more  or  less  recog- 
nised that  the  indefinitely  expanding  sphere  and  sur- 
face of  the  Known  must  thereby  come  into  wide  and 
wider  contact  with  the  Unknown ;  hence  there  is  less 
ground  for  this  criticism  of  science  from  the  side  of 
religion.  The  frank  acceptance  of  every  element  of 
applied  science  as  it  appears  is  no  longer  seriously 
resisted  in  the  name  of  religion.  In  this  way  one  of 
the  oldest  quarrels  in  world-history  seems  approach- 
ing its  conclusion;  its  rival  thesis  and  antithesis 
beginning  to  establish  a  synthesis,  and  this  an  ex- 
panding one. 

Let  us  return,  then,  to  the  life-magic  we  were 
above  discussing.  In  the  recent  GirTord  lectures  of 
Professor  William  James  at  Edinburgh,  republished 
as  his  "  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,"  he  some- 
what fluttered  the  assembled  medical  and  religious 
orthodoxy  of  Edinburgh  by  saying  a  word  for  the 
soul  of  goodness  which  appears  to  lie  in  faith-heal- 
ing, Christian  Science,  and  other  revivals  of  primitive 
Christianity,  as  of  earlier  and  later  magic  and  super- 
stition; and  he  further  threw  out  the  pregnant  re- 
minder that  many  great  religious  uplifts  of  the  past 
had  been  preceded  by,  and  associated  with,  kindred 
developments  of  healing.     By  cleansing  also  ;  witness 

197 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

the  marvellous  detailed  parallelism  which  may  be 
drawn  between  the  antiseptic  rituals  of  Pasteur  and 
Lister,  still  more  of  the  latest  aseptic  surgeons,  and 
the  old-world  purifications,  Mosaic  or  Brahmin. 
Hence  in  the  every-day  education  of  the  young 
Indian  physician  in  our  Edinburgh  or  London  hos- 
pitals, there  lies  not  only  the  immediate  application 
of  Western  medical  science  to  the  lagging  Orient,  but 
a  coming  reinterpretation  of  Oriental  symbolism 
and  ritual,  with,  it  may  be,  some  fresh  contribution 
from  this  recovered  point  of  view  to  Western  science. 
It  may  indeed  be  no  small  gain  to  the  immediate 
future,  both  of  sciences  and  religions,  this  rapid 
coming  into  maturity  of  such  investigators  of  old 
races,  yet  therefore  of  new  type.  For  they  will  com- 
bine the  specialist  scientific  training  and  the  practical 
energy  of  the  Western  world  with  that  early  famil- 
iarity, that  matured  and  critical  appreciation  of  the 
historic  development  of  the  East,  which  we  Westerns 
lack  even  to  meet  its  present  needs,  much  more  to 
renew  its  possibilities. 

A  young  Japanese  critic,  of  whom  we  shall  probably 
hear  more,  Mr.  Okakura,  in  his  recent  "  Ideals  of  the 
East "  holds  manifestly  a  thesis  which,  stripped  of  its 
characteristic  national  courtesy  and  reserve,  may  be 
expressed  broadly  to  the  following  effect:  You  Medi- 
terranean and  Baltic  peoples,  in  your  outlying  penin- 
sula of  Asia  which  you  isolate  as  Europe,  in  the  pride 
of  your  recent  advances  in  knowledge  and  material 
civilisation,  are  still  accustomed  at  times  to  recognise 
that  the  deepest  and  most  general  statement  of  ideals 
which  you  claim  for  one  of  yourselves,  apart  from  the 

,198 


An  Educational  Approach 

religious  developments  you  acknowledge  to  Asia,  is 
that  of  the  thinker  who  came  nearest  to  us,  alike  in 
time  and  place  and  thought:  it  is  Plato's  philosophic 
revelation  —  the  triad  of  good  and  beautiful  and  true. 
Now  without  undervaluing  your  own  Greek  or  Chris- 
tian art  —  each  eminent  in  its  way  —  you  have  for  the 
last  generation  been  learning  that  it  is  in  Japan  that 
there  has  been  longest  and  most  generally,  in  many 
ways  also  most  subtly  and  most  deeply,  the  sense 
of  Beauty.  You  begin  to  learn,  too,  that  it  is  the 
Indian  mind  which  longest,  most  generally,  and  most 
profoundly  has  pursued,  like  Plato  himself,  the  inward 
search  of  Truth,  and  the  contemplation  of  its  light; 
while  you  forget  for  the  moment,  though  you  have 
never  historically  denied,  that  it  is  yet  another  vast 
Eastern  group  of  nations,  which,  woman-like,  has 
specially  sought  the  Good ;  has  best  lived  out  the 
doctrine  of  her  greatest  teacher,  with  homely  industry 
and  practical  insight  threaded  upon  the  golden  rule. 
It  is  China,  then,  which  has  longest,  most  generally, 
and  most  fully  raised  the  ideals  of  the  artist  and  of 
the  philosopher  into  that  of  the  sage,  with  a  resultant 
harmony  of  individual  virtue  and  of  social  good  ; 
which,  despite  elements  of  temporary  arrest  or  deca- 
dence, and  still  more  of  disorder  —  caused  largely  by 
your  ruthless  interference  —  are  still  the  longest 
continued  and  best  diffused  peace  and  prosperity, 
the  completest  "  happiness  of  the  greatest  number" 
which  the  records  of  humanity  have  to  show.  To 
the  school  of  China,  therefore,  go  also,  as  to  that  of 
India  and  of  Japan ;  and  when  you  appreciate  her 
world-preeminent  recognition  and  realisation  of  the 

199 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

Good,  you  may  then  also  help  each  of  us  to  complete 
our  Triad,  to  renew  and  add  to  each  of  its  elements. 

So  far,  then,  the  half-latent  thesis  of  this  new  sociolo- 
gist; which  must  come  with  some  arousing  freshness 
to  a  generation  whose  mental  images  of  the  East  have 
been  too  much  compounded  from  the  crude  present- 
ments of  trader  and  raider,  of  missionary,  military, 
or  official  expansionist,  of  revengeful  war-lord  or 
brazen  minstrel,  each  in  some  varying  combination 
of  what  he  himself  appears  to  the  Oriental  —  "  half 
devil  and  half  child."  After  all  it  is  but  a  restatement 
of  the  old  saying,  "  Ex  Oriente  Lux;  "  but  with  its 
call  to  a  widening  of  our  respect  and  sympathy  it 
indicates  one  of  the  most  notable  ways  in  which  the 
scientific  man  and  the  religious  may  anew  resume 
and  advance  their  anthropological  and  historical 
education,  and  with  this  their  recovery  of  philosophic 
and  moral  ideals. 

We  are  ever  told  that  the  East  is  now  but  the 
sepulchre  of  its  noble  past,  and  we  set  our  legiona- 
ries to  watch  it  as  they  may;  yet  who  shall  say  its 
buried  ideal  cannot  arise,  may  not  even  now  have 
arisen?  The  dream,  the  resolve  of  Eastern  pilgrim- 
age thus  in  very  deed  returns ;  nor  can  we  fail  of 
reconciling  both  aims,  the  religious  and  the  scien- 
tific, nor  these  again  with  Education,  in  thus  seeking 
the  truth  in  love ;  in  thus  discerning  that  the  meshes 
of  the  net  of  Peter  were  the  parallels  and  the  meridi- 
ans of  a  wider  world-sweep  than  we  knew. 

Wherever  man  wins  power  over  nature,  there  is 
Magic ;    so,  wherever  he  carries  out  an  ideal  into  life, 

200 


An  Educational  Approach 

there  is  Romance.  In  the  common  reactionary  criti- 
cism of  the  spread  of  public  libraries,  laments  over 
the  reading  of  novels  is  a  stock  element.  But  even 
from  the  side  of  natural  and  healthy  recreation, 
what  better  can  people  do  than  utilise  the  principal 
art-form  of  their  age  ;  from  the  side  of  moral  edu- 
cation, what  could  be  more  desirable  than  the  power 
of  now  wholly  forgetting  our  own  personal  self  and 
cares  in  one's  interest  in  another's ;  or  again  of  see- 
ing one's  own  life  and  ideals,  personal  or  social,  in 
those  of  others?  But  no:  he  should  read  the  mar- 
vels of  chemistry,  the  triumphs  and  possibilities  of 
engineering;  and  above  all  things  become  acquainted 
with  those  dazzling  revelations  of  recent  economic 
science  —a  science  once  dismal  in  working  garments, 
but  nowadays  scarlet  and  brazen  with  military 
metaphor.  For  thus  he  may  prepare  to  play  his 
patriotic  part  in  the  approaching,  ever-victorious 
Tariffades  by  which  megalopolitan  wealth  and  im- 
perial greatness  are  to  be  assured,  and  by  means 
of  which  all  our  enemies,  retaliation  duly  adminis- 
tered, will  thereafter  submissively  live  and  labour 
under  our  footstool. 

Yet  if  the  life  be  more  than  meat  and  the  body 
than  raiment,  so  the  eye  is  more  than  all  these  new 
radiances;  even  Quantity  of  Empire  to-day  may  be 
less  than  Quality  of  Race  to-morrow.  Here  then  is 
the  vital  point  of  opening  science,  practical  as  well 
as  speculative.  It  is  easy  to  sneer  at  Mary  Jane  and 
her  "  Family  Herald,"  with  their  simple  tales  of 
Edwin  and  Angelina ;  but  like  the  earliest  romance 
and  fairy  tale,  these  contain  not  only  deeper  essen- 

20I 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

tial  facts  of  life,  but  greater  and  more  urgent  prob- 
lems of  practical  policy  than  have  ever  been  fairly 
realised  by  any  modern  political  party. 

Squire  and  manufacturer  have  had  their  day  of 
political  prominence;  and  proconsul  and  promoter 
are  now  having  theirs.  But  are  these  not  bringing 
out  even  more  fully  than  did  their  predecessors  that 
the  fundamental  questions  are  beyond  them  also, — 
that  these  are  not  territorial  and  administrative,  not 
military,  not  financial  and  fiscal,  any  more  than  they 
were  merely  manufacturing  or  mercantile;  but  that 
they  are  organic  upon  one  side,  racial  upon  another; 
and  evolutionary  or  degenerative  upon  each  and  all. 

Leaving,  then,  the  pleas  of  art  and  recreation,  we 
must  ask  what,  in  the  name  of  progressive  science, 
biological  and  sociological  alike,  is  at  this  moment 
more  needed  than  the  general  practical  acceptance 
and  scientific  development  of  this  standpoint  of  the 
novel-reader?  Especially  is  this  needed  among  the 
great  classes  indicated  above,  who  take  themselves  so 
seriously,  yet  who,  if  truth  be  told,  live  far  more  in  a 
dream-world  than  ever  did  or  can  Mary  Jane.  That 
the  novelist  may  see  nearer  the  facts  of  life  than  the 
politician  is  not  denied,  since  it  was  flashed  upon  the 
world  by  Zola.  But  this  was  indeed  not  once  only, 
but  many  times,  and  by  many  men  more  than  he. 
Familiar  recent  examples  also  may  be  found  in  the 
evolution  of  writers  of  our  own,  like  Mr.  Wells  and 
Mr.  Bernard  Shaw,  from  their  former  very  different 
thought-worlds,  to  the  popularisation  and  advance 
of  current  biological  enquiry,  and  its  application  to 
the  problems  of  human  race  and  breed. 

202 


An  Educational  Approach 

Here,  then,  new  and  strange  partnerships  are  open- 
ing ;  as  of  romancist  and  of  dramatist  with  statistician 
and  insurance  actuary;  each  and  all  preparing  to  go 
into  practical  politics :  and  whatever  conventional 
Conservative  or  Liberal,  Labour  or  Irish  member 
may  fail  to  think  or  say,  it  is  for  them  either  to  fit 
themselves  to  face  such  new  post-fiscal  questions  and 
all  they  bring  with  them,  or  to  give  way  to  succes- 
sors who  can. 

The  organic  aspects  of  this  matter  are  for  the 
biologist ;  but  the  psychological  and  the  ethical 
have  always  been  claimed  and  as  yet  mainly  treated 
by  the  Church ;  so,  following  upon  the  heels  of 
satirists  or  statisticians  and  to  the  support  of  Wells 
and  Shaw,  of  Francis  Galton  and  Karl  Pearson,  will 
soon  be  coming  not  only  naturalists  of  all  specialisms 
from  one  side,  but  clergy  of  all  denominations  from 
the  other. 

Even  the  approach  of  these  unwonted  allies  will  be 
largely  a  common  one,  and  this  at  all  levels  —  alike 
beginning  with  the  protest  against  that  physical 
degeneration,  of  which  we  now  begin  so  clearly  to 
know  the  cause  and  the  cure,  in  respective  adapta- 
tion to  environment  of  slum  or  garden,  so  that  our 
cities  are  to  scatter  and  to  build  anew.  In  this  trans- 
formation, then,  at  once  material  and  moral,  biologist 
and  parson  will  soon  practically  be  working  together, 
without  even  the  time  to  compare  notes  as  to  their 
speculative  differences. 

But  beyond  this  a  further  co-operation  begins  to 
come  into  view.  The  biologist  begins  for  the  first 
time  to  understand  the  cleric  —  to  discern  what  he 

203 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

stands  for  in  the  world.  In  the  development  of 
human  life  there  is  no  mere  gentle  daily  change: 
there  are  also  great  transformations  and  crises. 
Birth,  childhood,  adolescence,  youth,  maturity,  mar- 
riage, parenthood,  age,  and  death  are  not  merely  or- 
ganic phases,  but  psychic  phases  also  ;  and  each  with 
their  normal  and  pathological  aspects,  their  evolu- 
tionary and  degenerative  possibilities. 

This  being  so,  as  the  biologist  and  sociologist  begin 
to  confer  on  human  breed,  they  must  awake  to  a  new 
interest  even  in  the  anthropomorphic  ideals  of  reli- 
gions, pagan  or  Christian,  and  this  in  unexpected 
completeness  of  details.  For  what  are  the  gods  of 
Hellas  but  thought-sculptures  of  each  phase  of  human 
life  at  its  fairest?  And  what  better  could  the  most 
anti-theological  evolutionist  desire  for  human  well- 
being  than  some  renewal  for  modern  maidenhood  of 
her  old-world  Messianic  hope? 

The  biologist  has  been  long  enough  anatomising 
the  individual  at  every  period  of  his  development; 
but  his  science  is  more  than  a  vast  post-mortem  ex- 
amination of  man  and  nature.  He  claims  to  have 
learned,  to  be  learning,  more  of  the  secrets  of  evolu- 
tion than  the  older  arts  of  medicine,  education,  of 
temporal  and  spiritual  government  and  guidance 
have  yet  possessed.  But  to  take  part  in  their  re- 
newal to  which  he  begins  to  aspire  he  must  himself 
comprehend  their  general  purpose,  indeed  increas- 
ingly share  their  point  of  view. 

Long  indeed  he  has  been  accompanying  the  phy- 
sician in  his  attendance  upon  practically  every  phase 
of  human  development  from  birth  to  death;  and  now 

204 


An  Educational  Approach 

with  the  hygienist,  both  are  becoming  awake  to  all 
the  normal  ones.  Since  all  are  learning  that  mind 
and  body  are  more  intimately  related  than  we  knew, 
they  join  company  with  the  mental  physician  in 
his  studies  of  defective  and  morbid  minds,  and 
with  the  educationist  in  his  labours  for  intellectual 
development. 

So  far,  however,  to  the  scientific  worker,  the  priest 
of  every  denomination  seems  at  least  as  unrelated  to 
this  movement  as  he  can  seem  to  theirs.  Yet  are  we 
not  now  ready  for  a  mutual  understanding?  Recent 
studies,  like  those  of  psychologists  and  anthropolo- 
gists upon  the  moral  and  religious  development  of 
the  individual,  are  preparing  him  for  a  fresh  under- 
standing of  the  clerical  profession,  as  that  which 
seeks  (successfully  or  unsuccessfully  is  not  here  the 
question)  to  aid  and  guide  these  developments  of 
the  human  spirit,  for  a  consideration  of  which  the 
comparative  study  of  religion,  and  the  biographic 
analysis  of  individual  experience,  are  now  preparing 
him. 

Here,  then,  once  more  the  scientific  educationist 
begins  to  find  himself  in  unexpected  general  under- 
standing with  parson  and  priest.  For  he  cannot 
exclude  his  growing  conception  of  an  evolutionist 
art,  which  shall  increasingly  aid  and  regulate  human 
life.  The  Socratic  ideal  of  the  "  birth-helper,"  the 
Christian  ideal  of  the  Good  Shepherd,  must  thus  re- 
appear in  our  scientific  and  practical  evolutionism. 
Our  opening  line  of  advance  plainly  shows  that  those 
who  continue  it  will  be  those  who  recapitulate  and 
continue  as  fully  as  they  may  the  personal  evolution 

205 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

of  those  who  have  already  so  mightily  laboured  for 
the  psychic  lift  of  the  individual  and  of  the  race. 
With  both  Hellenist  and  Hebraist,  therefore,  our 
modern  spiral  of  evolution  is  again  bringing  us  into 
unexpected  parallelisms  —  parallelisms  romantic  in 
more  than  their  revivals  of  the  past,  parallelisms 
magical  not  only  in  their  insight  into  the  present,  but 
their  prevision,  their  control  of  the  opening  future. 

Enough,  then,  of  these  parallelisms  between  the 
new  ideals  of  education  pleaded  for  on  modern  evo- 
lutionary grounds,  and  these  old  ideals  commonly 
defended  for  more  ancient  reasons.  There  is  little 
danger  that  any  will  exaggerate  their  importance  for 
immediate  practical  purposes;  or  expect  the  evolu- 
tionary naturalist  to  enroll  himself  under  the  banner 
of  some  historic  ecclesiasticism  any  more  than  the 
modern  ecclesiastic  hastily  to  transform  church  into 
laboratory. 

But  it  is  something  if  as  scientific  men  we  come  to 
see  in  general  education,  as  in  each  and  every  special 
science,  that  Idea  and  Form  must  be  harmonised  into 
living  Art.  Failing  this,  as  another  essay  in  this  vol- 
ume points  out,  they  must  freeze  into  Ceremonialism 
as  dead  as  any  against  which  we  or  our  predecessors 
have  protested  in  Church  or  in  State.  And  further, 
as  science  rises  into  art,  and  thus  not  only  specialism 
into  practice,  but  realism  into  idealism,  this  scientific 
idealism  gives  us  a  new  understanding  and  sympathy 
with  the  past  and  present  idealism  of  older  schools, 
discerning  beneath  what  may  have  seemed  but  dead 
ceremonial  an  ever  renascent  Symbolism. 

206 


An  Educational  Approach 

Men  of  science  and  men  of  religion,  it  is  true,  are 
far  from  reconciled.  Let  them  discuss,  therefore, 
frankly  and  fully ;  but  above  all  let  each  keep  mov- 
ing. The  problems  at  issue  can  seldom  be  really 
touched  by  the  self-sufficiency  of  either  the  mere 
logical  debater  or  of  the  practical  man  of  either 
party :  they  need  sympathy,  insight,  and  interpreta- 
tion from  the  beginning.  This  realised,  the  ideal 
revelations  of  the  past,  even  their  social  creations 
also,  no  less  than  the  phases  of  arts  and  sciences,  may 
again  be  interpreted  in  the  present,  and  their  vital 
elements  transmitted  to  the  future. 


II 

The  Approach  through  Technical  Education 

Lastly  a  word  of  technical  education  and  the  ap- 
proaches it  may  present  to  the  ideals  we  are  seek- 
ing. Yesterday  in  town  I  met  an  old  friend,  who 
tells  me  his  son  is  soon  leaving  school  with  classical 
honours,  to  win  scholarships  and  glory  in  like  manner 
at  Oxbridge.  There  in  due  course  he  will  become 
a  don,  and  perhaps  cultivate  the  muses  with  the 
best ;  at  any  rate  he  can  always  become  an  athlete 
or  a  library  lounger,  or  an  examiner,  or  coach,  or 
common-room  gossip,  with  the  larger  mediocrity. 
Or  the  boy  himself  may  have  views ;  he  can  at  any 
rate  become  a  high  mandarin,  say  in  the  education 
office  or  the  Indian  civil  or  colonial  service. 

"  And  how  is  your  boy,  and  what  is  he  doing,  since 
he  is  not  at   school?"   I   am  asked  in   turn.     "He 

207 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

does  some  lessons  at  home;  and  he  is  learning  to 
be  a  pretty  fair  gardener."  "  Ah !  and  will  that  be 
enough  for  him  by  and  by?  "  "  Oh,  no,  not  quite  !  " 
said  I;  "when  I  left  him  he  was  making  a  box." 
"  Ah !  "  said  my  friend  again,  and  dropped  the  con- 
versation, evidently  thinking  nothing  could  be  made 
of  my  surly  and  paradoxical  impracticability. 

Yet,  to  my  mind,  there  are  indeed  two  main  pieces 
of  work  in  a  boy's  education;  and  one  of  these  is  to 
garden,  and  the  other  is  to  make  boxes.  When  our 
boys  can  do  these,  and  not  till  then,  they  "have  got 
their  essential  education  for  their  work  in  the  world : 
for  as  all  labour,  all  occupations  and  professions  may 
be  broadly  classed  as  of  one  type  or  the  other,  as 
either  rustic  or  urban,  youths  preparing  to  enter  the 
directive  classes  may  well  have  some  experience  of 
both.  If  not  constructive  work  of  some  kind  in  the 
country,  then  constructive  work  of  some  sort,  direct 
or  indirect  in  the  town,  is,  let  us  hope,  their  destiny: 
the  world  is  beginning  to  show  symptoms  of  being 
a  little  less  tolerant  of  the  amusers,  the  talkers,  and 
other  foremost  percentagers  upon  the  passing  order. 
Each  does  best  what  he  enjoys,  and  he  enjoys  best 
what  he  has  done  long,  what  he  did  as  a  child ; 
hence  this  impulse  toward  constructive  work  in  child- 
hood ;  and  hence  there  is  a  growing  minority  of  edu- 
cationists who  think  that  this  —  not  the  three  R's, 
though  we  may  henceforth  take  these  for  granted  — 
may  be  the  most  vital  endowment  with  which  our 
young  folks  can  face  the  world.  One  cannot  always 
fully  predict  whether  a  lad's  future  fortune  and  work 
will   lie    in   town    or   country;    but   for   health    and 

208 


An  Educational  Approach 

culture  both  in  due  proportion  are  desirable;  even 
in  these  simple  ways  a  boy  may  be  more  seriously 
preparing  for  the  coming  life-work  and  life-battle 
than  to  the  conventional  may  at  first  sight  appear. 

The  joy  of  making  something  with  one's  hands  is 
much  the  same  for  the  simple  box-maker  as  for  the 
finer  cabinet-maker;  and  for  both  as  for  the  artist; 
the  "  good  job,"  which  expresses  the  pleasure  alike 
of  maker  and  user,  being  for  ordinary  purposes  as  far 
as  we  need  get  in  the  definition  of  Art. 

To  get  the  true  hand,  the  true  eye,  one  must  get 
them  early.  The  great  masters  of  the  Renaissance, 
the  smaller  artists  of  to-day,  how  do  they  differ? 
Very  largely  in  that  the  master  began  his  apprentice- 
ship as  a  boy  of  twelve  or  fourteen  at  most,  while 
the  hand  and  brain  centres  were  still  fully  adaptable; 
while  we  make  our  contemporaries  wait  to  begin 
their  artistic  education  until  late  adolescence  or  even 
manhood ;  that  is,  until  it  is  physiologically  too  late 
to  make  high  skill  an  organic  and  subconscious  func- 
tioning of  brain  and  hand.  When  by  exception,  with 
much  industry,  they  still  reach  a  fair  standard,  this 
tends  to  fall  off  at  middle  age,  instead  of  continuing 
and  developing  throughout  the  utmost  length  of  life, 
like  Hokusai  or  Leonardo  or  Titian.  Of  course 
high  skill  may  never  be  attained  even  by  our  boy- 
workman,  yet  has  he  not  a  timely  and  needed  school- 
ing in  resourcefulness  and  common  sense,  which  are 
surely  not  among  the  least  important  qualifications 
in  the  world?  Box-making  develops  this  as  books 
can  never  do. 

Another  great  advantage  about  box-making,  be- 
14  209 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

sides  in  these  simple  ways  helping  the  young  worker 
to  become  "  one  whose  hands  have  made  him  wise," 
is  the  deeper,  the  truly  moral  education  of  it.     This 
is  immediate  and  direct,  from  the  clean  fit  and  the 
straight-planed    surface,    and    the    true    right-angle, 
small  and  simple  ethical  elements  perhaps,  yet  enough 
for  the  freemason  to  have  developed  almost  into  a 
religion.     But  there  is  also  the  larger  social  outlook. 
I  do  not  here   refer   to   organisation  of  labour,  co- 
operation, guildry,  or  the  like  —  I  know  not  how  far 
these  are  as  yet  adaptable  in  education  at  all;  but 
I  would  insist  upon  the  simpler  immediate  sense  of 
social  usefulness,  with  which  a  youngster  makes  or 
shelves  his  box,  to  be  thereafter  useful  as  bookcase 
or  what-not  to  some  other  member  of  the  household, 
or  given   away  to   some   remoter   purpose.     As  yet 
such  simple  labour  has  not  been  made  either  con- 
structively attractive  or  socially  and  morally  attrac- 
tive to  the  mass  either  of  your  working  or  directing 
community:  they  have  missed  both  its  artistic  and 
its  social  pleasures,  and  thus  it  is  their  work  is  done 
for  pay;   and  in  adult  life  the  pay  comes  alone,  or 
almost  alone,  to  matter,  whereas  with  the  boy's  box, 
it  is  obvious  that  its  make  and  its  use,  its  artistic  fin- 
ish and  its  social  application  are  the  essential  points ; 
while  as  to  payment  or  reward  this  comes  only  in  the 
form  of  more  wood  and  tools,  and  in  the  encourage- 
ment to  make  more  boxes  and  still  better  ones. 

Some  educationists  favour  payment  for  school  or 
home  work  as  a  means  of  introduction  to  the  finan- 
cial order  of  things,  which  the  children  of  course 
must  meet;   but  is  not  the   important   thing   rather 

210 


An  Educational  Approach 

to  postpone  this,  at  any  rate  until  both  the  artistic 
and  social  pleasures  have  become  instinctive,  habitual, 
organic,  through  the  habit  and  experience  of  years? 

Here,  in  passing,  a  concrete  point  of  domestic 
detail  may  be  mentioned  as  quite  worthy  the  atten- 
tion of  home  educators,  and  it  may  be  of  school 
ones;  certainly  of  scientific  and  moral  ones,  here 
specially  in  view.  There  are  few  houses  but  can  do 
with  more  shelving,  more  cupboards  and  bookcases. 
These  cost  money,  so  one  puts  off  getting  them  : 
meantime  books  accumulate  in  disorder,  papers  go 
astray,  and  so  on.  To  buy  from  one's  grocer  his 
egg  or  soap  boxes,  and  to  shelve  these  by  cutting 
up  their  lids,  is  to  furnish  not  only  an  elementary 
workshop  exercise,  but  a  useful  article  of  furniture, 
and  furthermore  a  lesson  in  order  to  boot,  which 
is  none  the  less  of  scientific  value  because  a  practical 
one.  The  boxes  of  course  can  be  shelved  in  various 
proportions,  with  two,  three,  or  four  divisions;  and 
when  finished,  can  be  used  as  units,  built  up  into 
various  forms,  and  screwed  together  to  fit  all  sorts  of 
places,  from  the  smallest  nook  or  garret  space  to 
erections  against  the  largest  wall  —  in  fact  a  bookcase 
proper.  Staining  or  paint  is  of  course  applied  with 
advantage;  leather  binding  can  be  added  along  the 
shelves  with  clean  and  neat  result:  a  moulding  can 
be  run  round  the  top  or  base,  and  a  vase  or  bust  put 
on  top.  This,  in  short,  with  an  expenditure  of  a 
couple  of  shillings  for  a  dozen  boxes,  with  a  trifle  for 
nails,  stain,  and  varnish,  and  a  very  moderate  expen- 
diture of  time  and  pains,  enables  a  boy  to  produce  a 
piece  of  furniture  just  as  serviceable  as  things  for 

211 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

which  we  may  have  paid   pounds,  and  in  its  plain 
way  it  may  be  even  a  good  deal  more  seemly. 

That  our  boy  should  make  his  own  bookcases, 
as  well  as  some  for  other  people,  might  next  be 
followed  into  educational  issues,  like  that  of  the  vast 
importance  of  the  beginning  of  good  book-collections 
sufficiently  early  in  life.  Does  not  your  great  biblio- 
phile, your  librarian,  go  back  to  his  childish  book- 
case as  his  real  start  in  life,  just  as  the  naturalist 
to  his  first  collection  of  stones  or  shells,  the  artist 
to  his  first  drawing-book  with  its  soldiers  and  horses, 
its  moo-cows  and  puff-puffs?  Moreover,  it  is  too 
seldom  remembered  that  the  great  lesson  of  "  a  place 
for  everything,  and  everything  in  its  place  "  can  only 
be  taught  when  the  place  is  provided;  and  this 
means  shelves  and  pigeonholes,  boxes  and  drawers, 
far  beyond  the  ordinary  resources  of  a  child,  even  in 
roomier  homes  than  most.  Here,  then,  is  a  bit  of 
technical  education  worth  more  than  the  more  pre- 
tentious customary  ones. 

Coming  now  to  garden  work  and  its  value,  much 
might  be  said.  But  those  who  know  its  lessons  do 
not  need  to  be  told  them;  those  who  do  not  must 
first  learn  by  experience.  Such  work  over  and 
above  lessons  leaves  too  little  time  for  play?  Some- 
times that  is  quite  true:  save  for  a  brief  romp  be- 
tween lessons  at  mid-day,  before  or  after  work  in  the 
afternoon,  there  is  sometimes  no  long  play  time  at 
all  in  the  day.  Yet  is  not  the  work  play  while  the 
worker  is  enjoying  it?  and  even  if  sometimes  it  feels 
a  little  hard,  is  there  not  a  time  for  everything?  and 
so  even  now  and   then  to  work  on  all  day  without 

2X3 


An  Educational  Approach 

play?  Is  not  that  also  one  of  the  experiences  and 
needed  powers  of  maturer  life?  one  therefore  which 
it  may  be  well  to  learn  when  young?  There  is  a 
time  for  everything,  and  a  time  there  must  be  —  an 
ample  time  —  assuredly,  for  play.  Throw  box  and 
spade  alike  aside;  romp,  and  chase;  and  hide  out 
of  doors;  to  dance  and  play,  to  sing  and  act  within; 
give  plenty  of  time  to  each.  Now  they  are  contriv- 
ing and  stage-carpentering  a  play;  now  utilising  all 
the  garden  hiding-places ;  and  here  is  for  our  young 
folks  an  entering  into  the  fruit  of  their  labours,  a 
devising  of  new  ones  also.  To  encourage  each  of 
these  amusements  to  be  carried  out  to  the  full, 
even  at  the  expense  of  lessons  and  of  work  alike, 
is  the  surest  way  to  send  them  back  to  work  with 
a  new  zest.  In  such  genial  and  natural  alternation 
of  work  and  play  is  the  true,  that  is  the  natural,  the 
psychological,  time-table ;  and  the  experience  of  our 
little  home  school  regularly  proves  it  is  one  which 
in  practice  is  adaptable  enough  with  reasonable 
regularity  also. 

To  work  constructively,  artistically,  and  sociably, 
and  this  in  both  the  rustic  and  urban  world  by  turns, 
as  circumstances  and  needs,  season  and  weather, 
mood  or  opportunity  may  settle,  for  four  or  even 
five  afternoons  in  the  week,  to  play  and  romp  or 
ramble  for  at  least  one  whole  afternoon,  to  make 
music  and  dance  at  least  one  evening,  all  this  with 
the  morning  routine  of  lessons,  together  with  per- 
sonal reading,  and  the  ordinary  claims  of  home  life, 
make  up  a  busy  enough  week. 

What  is  wanting  for  the  Sunday?     Complete  free- 
213 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

dom  from  ordinary  lessons  and  labour  being  of  course 
assumed,  may  we  not  touch  the  much  discussed  sub- 
ject of  moral  and  religious  education  by  help  of 
the  most  vividly  didactic  elements  of  the  whole 
Hebrew  literature,  the  Proverbs  and  the  Parables? 
For  what  are  the  Proverbs?  What  but  the  homely 
yet  poetic  wisdom  of  the  rustic  and  urban  labour, 
of  the  every-day  domestic  economy  of  the  people, 
yet  also  of  their  result  in  national  economy  and 
statesmanship,  in  personal  and  national  destiny. 
What  are  the  Parables  if  not  primarily  subtler  and 
more  spiritualised  interpretations  of  the  same  homely 
experience,  drawn  from  the  same  every-day  familiar- 
ity with  simple  and  educative  toil? 

When  in  the  autumn  holiday  there  comes  the 
chance  of  helping  with  the  stooks,  the  verse,  "  He 
that  sleepeth  in  harvest  is  a  son  that  causeth  shame," 
may  be  a  lifelong  lesson ;  while  "  Wisdom  hath 
builded  her  house "  will  have  a  new  meaning  for 
the  youngsters  who  have  built  so  much  as  a  summer- 
house  in  a  corner  of  the  garden,  or  a  Robinson  hut 
under  a  tree.  Though  the  Proverbs  have  long  been 
fathered  upon  the  traditionally  wisest  of  kings,  we 
note  that  he  never  speaks  of  learning  his  wisdom, 
like  other  kings,  from  hunting  or  its  normal  develop- 
ment of  war,  but  from  planting  and  building.  And 
is  it  not  worthy  of  note  that  our  true  British  Solo- 
mon —  not  the  crowned  one  ironically  so  called,  but 
him  of  the  advancement  of  learning  —  was,  as  his 
essays  show,  one  of  the  master-builders  and  planters 
of  his  own  or  any  day. 

It  may  be  said    that   Solomon's  or  even   Bacon's 
214 


An  Educational  Approach 

building  and  planting  was  upon  a  very  grandiose 
scale  ;  but  this  really  matters  little :  in  both  cases 
theirs  was  the  husbandman's  lore,  the  peasant's  wis- 
dom, and  the  Egyptians  and  the  Chaldeans  them- 
selves had  no  more.  Let  our  youngster  tug  out  the 
coarsest  weeds,  or  weary  himself  carrying  water  for 
his  little  garden  ;  he  is  ready  for  the  ethic  of  Zoroaster 
in  its  high  idealism,  yet  constructive  intensity  —  an 
agricultural  wisdom  if  ever  there  was  one.  It  is  only 
after  reclaiming  the  tiniest  bit  of  waste  as  garden 
that  he  is  really  ready  for  the  greatest  of  all  lessons 
in  the  world's  geography :  that  which  fills  the  pupil's 
imagination  from  the  teacher's  own  with  the  mighti- 
est of  human  tasks  ;  that  of  the  coming  combination 
under  geographer  and  moralist  of  statesman,  finan- 
cier, engineer,  labourer,  forester,  peasant,  gardener, 
architect,  and  singer,  which  will  yet  regenerate  whole 
climates  and  populations;  not  only  those  of  the 
Mediterranean,  from  Spain  to  Syria,  but  from  the 
Sahara  to  the  Gobi  desert. 

That  the  Sahara  is  actually  beginning  to  be  re- 
claimed, to  be  here  a  eucalyptus  forest  and  there 
a  vineyard,  its  sands  increasingly  jewelled  with  in- 
numerable date-oases,  which  spring  like  fairyland 
from  each  new  artesian  well ;  and  that  the  same 
constructive  progress  has  yet  to  pass  through  Arabia 
and  Persia  into  Central  Asia  and  thence  into  China 
far  beyond  —  these  are  lessons  for  which  your  boy- 
gardener  is  prepared,  — and  your  boy-gardener  alone, 
as  boys  are  educated  at  present. 

Since  many  think  little  of  small  tasks,  let  them 
note  that  this  vast  world  Eutopia,  this  reconstruc- 

215 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

tion  of  the  ruined  East,  this  mastery  of  nature,  is 
something  impossible  to  kings  or  conquerors,  but 
will  need  the  personal  toil  and  co-operation  of  moral- 
ised millions  through  generations  and  centuries  yet 
to  come.  And  the  only  way  of  preparing  these,  of 
disciplining  these  industrial  armies,  for  this  greatest 
imaginable  planetary  result,  will  be  to  begin  with  the 
small  tasks  within  the  child's  means  and  strength. 

Returning  to  the  question  of  technical  and  ethical 
schooling  upon  a  more  familiar  plane,  do  we  not  see 
in  most  of  these  Parables  the  very  essence  of  homely 
experience,  of  rustic  wisdom;  and  in  that  of  the 
house  foundations,  the  reflective  experience  of  the 
urban  craftsman  as  well?  That  the  carpenter  of 
Nazareth  had  shared  both  rustic  and  urban  labour 
as  a  boy  is  surely  plain.  In  the  education  of  practi- 
cal life,  then,  as  in  that  of  thought,  our  modern  sec- 
tion of  the  long  spiral  evolution  sweeps  strangely 
parallel  to  that  of  the  past,  asunder  though  these 
segment-curves  may  seem. 

PATRICK  GEDDES. 


216 


APPROACHES     THROUGH     FAITH 


A  PRESBYTERIAN    APPROACH 

The  Rev.  JOHN   KELMAN,  M.A. 
Author  of  «  The  Faith  of  Robert  Louis  Stevenson"  etc. 

NO  fact  is  more  familiar  to  the  student  of  history 
than  the  long  rivalry  and  conflict  between  sci- 
ence and  religion.  Yet  it  is  not,  prima  facie,  apparent 
either  that  this  is  a  necessary  or  that  it  will  be  a 
permanent  state  of  matters.  On  the  contrary,  one  is 
impressed  by  the  great  number  of  interests,  methods, 
and  ideals  which  they  have  in  common.  Each  of 
them  aims  at  the  discovery,  the  unification,  and  the 
orderly  presentation  of  human  knowledge.  Each 
ultimately  rests  on  faith,  inasmuch  as  each  is  forced 
back  upon  convictions  which  are  beyond  the  possi- 
bility of  further  analysis  or  proof.  Every  one  asserts 
this  of  religion,  but  it  is  not  always  remembered  that 
it  is  equally  true  of  science.  The  reality  of  an  ex- 
ternal world,  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect,  the 
reliability  of  the  enquirer's  powers  of  observation  and 
reasoning,  are  fundamental  elements  in  knowledge  of 
the  same  kind  as  the  ultimate  data  of  religion.  Even 
the  methods  of  their  advance  are  common  to  the  two, 
for  although  the  deductive  method  is  usually  associ- 
ated with  religion,  it  is  often  used  by  science ;  and  all 
living  religious  faith  is  continually  verifying  and  cor- 
recting  its  beliefs  by   experience,  using  just   those 

219 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

methods  of  hypothesis  and  experiment  which  in- 
ductive science  uses.  Many  ideals  also  —  ideals  of 
civilisation,  culture,  and  philanthropy — they  hold 
in  common,  where  either  is  properly  understood. 

Their  characteristic  mood  or  spirit  is  the  same.1 
It  is  sometimes  imagined  that  the  scientific  spirit  is 
proud  and  masterful,  while  the  religious  spirit  is  one 
of  humility  and  submission.  It  might  with  equal  truth 
be  affirmed  that  science,  discovering  law,  has  for 
its  characteristic  word  obedience,  and  that  religion 
teaches  men  to  regard  themselves  as  kings  unto  God. 
The  scientific  spirit  has  been  finely  described  as  that 
of  "  absolute  temper,  patience,  and  gentleness  neces- 
sary in  order  to  obtain  fine  results,"  but  these  are 
the  very  qualities  in  which  religion  recognises  the 
fruits  of  the  Spirit.  Both  religion  and  science  have 
transgressed  their  own  rules  and  suffered  for  their 
transgression.  If  religion  has  dogmatised  beyond 
knowledge  in  her  impatience  to  complete  her  sys- 
tems, has  not  science  also,  in  such  imaginations  as 
the  philosopher's  stone  and  the  elixir  of  life,  "  at- 
tempted to  reach  a  great  law  at  once,  leaping  for 
the  top  of  the  ladder"?  If  credulity  still  hampers 
science  by  the  hasty  acceptance  or  arbitrary  rejec- 
tion of  new  theories,  can  any  system  of  religion  as 
yet  boast  that  it  has  quite  freed  itself  from  a  like 
credulity? 

Yet  there  are  many  persons  who  suppose  that  the 
two  are  essentially  antagonistic;    that   the  war  be- 

1  For  many  points  in  this  paragraph  the  writer  gladly  acknowl- 
edges his  indebtedness  to  a  most  luminous  and  suggestive  address 
delivered  by  Miss  Maynard  of  Westfield  College. 

220 


A  Presbyterian  Approach 

tween  them  is  without  quarter  and  to  the  death.  Mr. 
Mallock  asserts  that  "  the  quarrel  between  Science 
and  Religion  is  direct  and  open,"  and  there  are  many 
who  share  his  opinion.  It  must  indeed  be  acknowl- 
edged that  there  is  much  in  the  history  of  the  past 
to  confirm  such  a  statement.  Century  after  century 
each  new  discoverer  was  looked  upon  as  a  kind  of 
infernal  counterpart  of  Prometheus,  stealing  the 
nether  fires  for  the  use  of  mortals ;  and  the  Church 
anticipated  with  its  tortures  the  vulture  of  Jove.  On 
the  other  hand,  science  has  often  been  irrationally 
and  even  violently  anti-religious.  In  our  own  time,  to 
quote  but  one  instance  of  the  breach,  sociology  has 
sometimes  despised  the  philanthropic  efforts  of  the 
Church,  and  the  Church  has  ignored  and  even  con- 
demned the  work  of  sociology.  The  loss  has  been 
mutual.  Science,  losing  reverence,  has  often  fallen 
into  the  vulgarity  of  a  wholly  material  utilitarianism ; 
religion,  losing  usefulness  and  touch  with  actual  life, 
has  gone  a-dreaming. 

But  the  time  has  come  when  signs  may  be  seen  of 
a  rapprochement  such  as  has  never  been  witnessed  in 
the  past.  It  is  now  forty  years  since  Dr.  Martineau 
wrote :  "  Science  discloses  the  method  of  the  world, 
but  not  its  cause :  Religion  its  cause,  but  not  its 
method;  and  there  is  no  conflict  between  them  ex- 
cept when  either  forgets  its  ignorance  of  what  the 
other  alone  can  know."  During  the  years  since 
these  words  were  written  there  has  been  an  increas- 
ing recognition  of  their  truth  by  the  most  intelligent 
men  on  both  sides.  It  is  interesting  and  instructive 
to  lay  alongside  each  other  the  following  two  utter- 

221 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

ances,  published  in  the  present  year  by  professors 
of  Edinburgh  University,  than  whom  no  fairer  or 
more  competent  judges  could  be  quoted.  Dr.  Flint, 
emeritus  Professor  of  Divinity,  writes  of  "  that  long 
and  deplorable  war  between  superstition  and  reason 
which  is  so  often  most  erroneously  represented  as 
the  conflict  of  religion  and  science,  and  in  which 
every  seeming  victory  of  the  former  was  necessarily 
a  real  defeat."  Dr.  Chiene,  Professor  of  Surgery, 
writes :  "  There  can  be  no  antagonism  between  true 
science  and  true  religion :  they  clash  only  when  they 
are  false.  Their  present  antagonism  is  only  another 
word  for  our  ignorance." 

We  may,  indeed,  go  further  than  the  denial  of  their 
antagonism,  and  the  advocacy  of  their  mutual  toler- 
ance and  appreciation  and  their  alliance  in  the  pur- 
suit of  common  ideals.  All  truth  is  one,  and  science 
and  religion  are  at  one  in  the  deeper  sense  of  being 
but  different  aspects  of  that  same  search  for  truth 
which  all  wise  and  good  men  accept  as  a  main  part 
of  their  destined  task  in  life.  Believing  this  to  be 
the  case,  our  aim  in  the  present  chapter  will  be  to 
trace  in  rough  and  fragmentary  outline  the  general 
course  of  the  relations  between  science  and  religion 
in  the  Presbyterian  Church,  in  order  that  we  may 
discover  the  causes  of  their  former  misunderstanding 
and  the  lines  along  which  we  may  hope  to  see  them 
now  approach  and  co-operate.  That  the  field  of  our 
enquiry  may  be  at  once  representative  and  at  the 
same  time  sufficiently  small  and  manageable,  we  may 
be  permitted  to  confine  our  attention  to  the  history 
of  the  Presbyterian  Church  in  Scotland. 

222 


A  Presbyterian  Approach 

It  may  be  added  that  it  is  no  part  of  the  writer's 
aim  to  advocate  the  claims  of  Presbyterianism  against 
those  of  any  of  the  other  Churches  of  Christendom. 
Each  Church  has  its  own  special  advantages  and 
disadvantages  in  regard  to  this  question,  but  these 
do  not  concern  our  present  purpose.  Consequently 
we  shall  not  stay  to  count  heads,  or  to  attempt  any 
list  of  Presbyterians  living  or  dead  who  might  be 
cited  as  eminent  scientists.  Every  reader  who  has 
even  a  slight  knowledge  of  the  subject  will  be  able 
to  recall  a  number  of  names  very  fully  sufficient  to 
justify  the  claim  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  to  a 
voice  in  the  discussion.  In  further  support  of  that 
claim  it  may  be  permissible  to  remind  the  reader 
that  this  Church  has  from  the  first  given  special 
attention  to  the  education  of  its  ministry,  insisting 
upon  a  course  varying  from  six  to  eight  years  in 
the  study  of  Arts  and  Divinity  for  every  student. 
A  further  consideration  which  may  render  the 
study  of  this  section  of  Church  History  useful  to 
the  general  discussion  is  that  in  the  main  its  out- 
ward conditions  have  been  rather  moderate  than 
extreme. 

Behind  John  Calvin,  the  founder  of  Presbyterian- 
ism, there  lay  much  that  is  of  primary  significance 
for  our  enquiry.  It  is  true  that  "  in  mediaeval  times 
physical  science  was  neglected,  and  the  physical 
world  itself  viewed  as  a  degraded  and  disorderly 
thing."  Yet  even  the  Scholastic  Theology  of  the 
so-called  "  Dark  Ages  "  had  done  much  for  science. 
That  conception  of  unity  which  is  the  essential  ele- 
ment  in  science    is    largely  a  gift   to   her  from  the 

223 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

mediaeval  Church.  Prof.  T.  M.  Lindsay,  one  of  the 
greatest  living  Presbyterian  authorities  on  Church 
History,  points  out  that  the  science  of  the  pagan 
world  was  never  on  a  par  with  its  philosophical 
speculations,  and  he  goes  on  to  say:  "The  truth 
seems  to  be  that  science  requires  to  build  on  a  foun- 
dation supplied  by  Christianity,  and  which  paganism 
is  unable  to  furnish,  or  at  least  has  never  yet  fur- 
nished. Science  presupposes  and  rests  on  the  idea 
of  the  oneness  and  uniformity  of  the  universe,  and 
this  idea  is,  strictly  speaking,  a  Christian  conception. 
Aristotle,  the  most  scientific  of  the  ancients,  was 
unable  to  conceive  the  uniformity  of  nature,  or  the 
totality  of  things,  in  anything  like  the  sense  which 
these  phrases  have  to  modern  thinkers.  .  .  .  Chris- 
tianity did  not  propose  to  itself  the  solution  or  even 
the  statement  of  scientific  problems,  but  its  yearning 
to  get  near  God  enabled  it  to  see  deeper  into  the 
problem  of  the  basis  of  science  than  the  whole  of 
pagan  thought  had  been  able  to  do.  The  Christian 
doctrine  of  creation  and  the  Christian  doctrine  of 
providence  furnish  the  foundations  on  which  modern 
science  rests."  These  doctrines,  affirming  the  abso- 
lute dependence  of  all  things  upon  God  both  for 
their  origin  and  in  their  endurance,  "  gave  that  basis 
for  the  thought  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  which 
science  demands." 

The  Renaissance  and  the  Reformation  added  new 
forces  and  afforded  new  scope  for  the  great  truth 
which  mediaeval  Christianity  had  "  kneaded  into 
human  thought."  Physical  science  addressed  itself 
to  the  task   of  working  out  the  principle    of  unity 

224 


A  Presbyterian  Approach 

in  connection  with  its  successive  discoveries.  But 
apart  from  all  specific  problems,  the  intellectual  curi- 
osity of  man  was  awakened,  and  along  with  it  the 
demand  for  liberty  of  thought. 

In  tracing,  so  far  as  our  limits  will  permit,  the 
relations  of  science  and  religion  in  the  history  of 
Presbyterianism,  it  will  be  seen  that  there  has  been 
much  alienation.  Yet  no  page  of  history  more 
clearly  reveals  the  fact  that  that  alienation  was  not 
due  to  anything  inherent  either  in  religion  or  in 
science,  but  to  mistaken  conceptions  of  them  enter- 
tained by  those  who  represented  them,  and  to  ad- 
ventitious causes  arising  from  the  circumstances  of 
the  times.  And  it  will  be  possible  to  show  with 
equal  clearness  that  beneath  the  alienation  there 
always  lay  a  deeper  unity  whose  full  significance  and 
effect  are  only  now  becoming  manifest. 

John  Calvin  (i  509-1564)  does  not  appear  at  first 
sight  to  have  made  much  contribution  to  our  sub- 
ject. He  was  a  jurist  rather  than  a  scientist,  and  his 
youth  seems  to  have  been  wholly  occupied  with  legal 
studies.  His  conflict  with  Servetus,  a  Spanish  phy- 
sician of  the  mystical  school  of  the  time,  has  been 
quoted  as  a  notable  instance  of  the  war  between 
science  and  religion,  and  indeed  Servetus  himself 
taunted  Calvin  in  Geneva  with  his  want  of  scientific 
knowledge.  His  condemnation  of  the  heretic,  judged 
by  whatever  standards  and  seen  under  whatever 
light,  of  course  remains  an  act  directly  opposed  to 
the  scientific  spirit.  The  time  was  as  yet  far  distant 
when  the  right  of  private  judgment  could  be  fully 
recognised  or  even  rightly  understood. 
15  225 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  age  of  Calvin, 
and  indeed  the  period  after  his  death  for  four  gener- 
ations, were  such  as  to  concentrate  the  interest  of 
churchmen  rather  on  questions  of  government  than 
on  theories  of  knowledge.  Government,  like  all 
other  organisation  and  machinery,  is  most  in  evi- 
dence when  it  is  least  perfect.  During  the  seven- 
teenth century  the  British  Constitution  was  finding 
itself  and  settling  some  of  its  fundamental  principles 
in  Church  and  State.  During  the  sixteenth  century, 
in  Calvin's  time,  the  churches  of  the  Reformation 
were  finding  and  settling  theirs.  Thus  it  came  to 
pass  that,  whatever  might  have  been  their  aptitudes 
and  their  tastes,  ecclesiastical  leaders  then  had  no 
course  open  to  them  except  attention  to  the  burning 
and  immediate  questions  of  government.  Calvin's 
great  work  was  his  Institutes,  a  book  of  Systematic 
Theology  and  of  Church  Government  conceived  and 
executed  on  a  colossal  scale. 

Yet  though  Calvin's  work  does  not  bear  directly 
upon  scientific  problems,  there  is  that  in  it  which 
gives  it  a  place  of  first  importance  and  significance 
in  our  present  study.  "  Luther  had  created,  it  was 
left  for  Calvin  to  fashion,"  as  the  contrast  between 
the  two  men  has  been  aptly  expressed.  Calvin  found 
the  ideas  and  forces  of  the  Reformation  scattered ; 
he  bent  his  strength  to  give  them  unity ;  and  the 
result  was  what  has  been  called  by  one  of  the  ablest 
of  his  critics,  "  a  majestic  and  comprehensive  sys- 
tem." His  watchword  was  order,  the  very  master- 
principle  of  science.  It  is  this  fact  which  Rudyard 
Kipling   grasps    and    so    forcibly   expresses    in    his 

226 


A  Presbyterian  Approach 

"  McAndrew's   Hymn,"  where  the  Scotch   engineer 
sings  of  his  engines :  — 

"Now  a'together,  hear  them  lift  their  lesson  —  theirs  an'  mine 
Law,  Order,  Duty  an'  Restraint,  Obedience,  Discipline.  .  . 
From  coupler-flange  to  spindle-guide  I  see  Thy  Hand,  O  God  — 
Predestination  in  the  stride  o'  yon  connectin'-rod. 
John  Calvin  might  ha'  forged  the  same  —  enormous,  certain, 

slow  — 
Ay  wrought  it  in  the  furnace-flame  —  my  Institutio." 

Opinions  will  always  differ  as  to  the  truth  or  error 
of  the  Calvinistic  system,  but  no  fair  critic  will  refuse 
to  admit  that  it  was  one  of  those  tremendous  attempts 
at  the  unification  of  knowledge  which  can  only  be 
ranked  among  the  greatest,  along  with  such  others  as 
Spinoza's,  Hegel's,  and  Herbert  Spencer's. 

John  Knox,  Calvin's  contemporary  and  greatest 
pupil,  was  a  man  of  wider  interests  than  his  master. 
The  juridical  bent  of  Calvin's  mind  found  the  work 
he  had  to  do  suitable  and  congenial;  Knox  might 
well  have  found  a  lifework  which  he  would  have  pre- 
ferred to  the  task  of  establishing  Presbyterianism  in 
Scotland.  What  he  might  have  done  in  the  field  of 
science  we  shall  never  know.  Not  very  much,  per- 
haps, for  the  scientific  awakening  in  Great  Britain 
was  slow  to  come,  and  even  Lord  Bacon  (  whose 
Novum  Organum  was  published  half  a  century  after 
Knox's  death)  was  before  his  time  in  England.  At 
all  events  the  fact  remains  that  Knox,  like  Calvin, 
had  his  thoughts  and  energies  diverted  from  other 
pursuits  by  the  exigencies  of  Church  Government  in 
his  times. 

The  seventeenth  century  witnessed  a  great  revival 
227 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

of  science  in  England.  It  was  the  age  of  Newton. 
Bacon's  work  was  telling  at  last,  after  he  was  dead. 
In  1652  the  Royal  Society  was  founded.  The  earlier 
English  Latitudinarians  —  Falkland,  Hales,  Chilling- 
worth,  Jeremy  Taylor,  and  others  —  had  watched 
and  sympathised  with  the  growing  spirit.  They,  like 
the  Latitudinarians  of  the  Restoration,  such  as 
Burnet,  Tillotson,  and  Butler,  discarded  the  authority 
of  the  Church  and  of  tradition  in  favour  of  that  of 
the  Bible  as  interpreted  by  human  reason,  proclaim- 
ing in  clear  language  the  doctrine  of  liberty  of  thought 
and  advocating  toleration. 

Meanwhile  the  Scottish  Presbyterian  divines  had 
other  work  to  do.  Before  the  Restoration  they  had 
to  carry  out  through  changeful  and  troubled  times 
the  work  of  Calvin  and  Knox,  both  in  regard  to  the 
doctrine  and  the  discipline  of  the  Church.  That  they 
used  their  power  in  a  manner  hostile  to  scientific 
advance  cannot  be  denied.  Emphasising  the  sterner 
aspects  of  their  faith,  they  exercised  a  tyrannous 
supervision  not  only  over  the  beliefs,  but  also  over 
the  public  and  private  life  of  the  people.  The  one 
instance  of  those  persecutions  for  witchcraft  whose 
cruelties  many  of  them  defended,  is  enough  to  show 
the  breach  between  their  conception  of  religion  and 
the  scientific  spirit.  No  one  who  has  read  George 
Sinclair's,  Satan's  Invisible  World  Discovered  or  Dal- 
yell's  Darker  Stcperstitions  of  Scotland  can  fail  to 
perceive  this.  The  chief  service  which  their  times 
demanded  from  them  was  the  working  out  and  form- 
ulating of  a  system  whose  immediate  effect  was  salu- 
tary in  the  main,  and  which  has  produced  magnificent 

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results  in  the  austere  strength  of  Scottish  national 
character.  But  it  would  be  as  vain  as  it  would  be 
unreasonable  to  look  to  them  for  such  a  share  in  the 
progress  of  science  as  they  would  doubtless  have 
taken  in  another  age.  There  were  among  them  men 
whose  intellectual  powers  were  adequate  to  high 
scientific  achievements.  Andrew  Melville  was  Prin- 
cipal of  Glasgow  University,  where  his  rare  scholarship 
enabled  him  to  teach  an  amazing  variety  of  subjects, 
among  which  was  included  Natural  History.  Boyd 
and  Calderwood  were  men  of  vast  learning.  The 
names  of  Rutherford,  Gillespie,  and  Henderson  might 
be  added,  and  many  more  besides.  But  they  had 
a  special  work  to  do  which  absorbed  all  their  energies, 
and  kept  their  interests  from  ranging  over  the  wider 
field. 

The  Restoration  was  followed  by  a  quarter  of  a 
century  of  war  and  persecution  in  Scotland.  Sir 
Walter  Scott's  picture  of  the  Covenanters  in  Old 
Mortality  is  well  known  and  has  been  often  quoted 
—  their  "  abhorrent  condemnation  of  all  elegant 
studies  and  innocent  exercises,  and  the  envenomed 
rancour  of  their  political  hatred."  However  much 
we  may  regret  the  one-sidedness  of  this  estimate,  and 
its  failure  to  do  justice  to  some  of  the  tenderest 
hearts  and  most  gracious  spirits  that  have  lived  in 
Scotland,  we  need  not  deny  that  there  were  much 
bitterness  and  narrowness  among  them,  and  that  one 
effect  of  these  was  rather  to  widen  than  to  heal  the 
breach  between  science  and  religion.  But  what 
would  you  have?  When  men  are  oppressed  and 
persecuted  they  naturally  turn  their  attention  to  the 

229 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

point  in  hand.  When  men  are  fleeing  for  their  lives 
upon  the  mountains,  or  marching  in  irons  to  the 
stake,  it  would  hardly  be  reasonable  to  expect  from 
them  any  considerable  contribution  to  scientific 
investigation,  or  even  any  consuming  interest  in  it. 

All  this  is  the  more  evident  when  we  remember 
that  one  result  of  the  general  upheaval  of  traditional 
beliefs,  both  scientific  and  religious,  produced  by  the 
Renaissance,  was  a  chaos  of  opinions  and  a  wide- 
spread scepticism.  When  the  Restoration  suddenly 
let  loose  the  pent-up  forces  which  Puritanism  had 
held  in  rigorous  suppression,  science  and  scepticism 
together  became  the  fashion  of  the  day.  Charles  II 
was  keenly  interested  in  science,  especially  in  Chem- 
istry and  Navigation.  In  his  person  and  in  his  court 
the  scientific  interest  was  associated  with  the  lowest 
depth  of  shameless  and  cynical  immorality.  When 
it  was  that,  and  that  as  the  character  of  their  per- 
secutors, which  was  the  form  in  which  science  pre- 
sented itself  to  the  Presbyterians,  it  is  still  less 
wonderful  that  they  looked  askance  at  it. 

Thus  here  again  it  must  be  affirmed  that  it  was  not 
anything  inherent,  but  simply  the  circumstances  and 
conditions  of  the  time,  that  were  responsible  for  the 
breach  between  science  and  religion.  In  that  age, 
for  these  men,  the  breach  was  inevitable.  And 
further,  here  again  we  see  beneath  the  surface  aliena- 
tion a  far  more  important  alliance  in  the  depths. 
While  apparently  in  opposite  camps,  yet  the  principle 
for  which  they  contended  was  the  same.  The  Scot- 
tish Presbyterians,  to  quote  the  words  of  Principal 
Rainy,  "  were  afraid  of  the  mass  and  bishops  because 

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they  were  jealous  for  liberty  of  thought."  No  doubt 
it  was  a  principle  which  they  had  not  thought  out  to 
its  conclusions,  and  which  many  of  them  conceived 
in  a  very  imperfect  and  one-sided  sense.  Yet,  being 
a  genuine  principle  of  liberty,  it  had  in  it  the  germ 
of  all  future  emancipation  for  science  as  well  as  for 
religion.  Lecky,  after  a  long  and  ghastly  account  of 
the  Presbyterian  persecutions  for  witchcraft,  adds, 
"The  Scotch  Kirk  was  the  result  of  a  democratic 
movement,  and  for  some  time,  almost  alone  in 
Europe,  it  was  the  unflinching  champion  of  political 
liberty.  It  was  a  Scotchman,  Buchanan,  who  first 
brought  liberal  principles  into  clear  relief.  It  was  the 
Scotch  clergy  who  upheld  them  with  a  courage  that 
can  hardly  be  overrated."  John  Morley  writes,  "  It  is 
not  their  fanaticism,  still  less  is  it  their  theology,  which 
makes  the  great  Puritan  chiefs  of  England  and  the 
stern  Covenanters  of  Scotland  so  heroic  in  our  sight. 
It  is  the  fact  that  they  sought  truth  and  ensued  it,  not 
thinking  of  the  practicable  nor  cautiously  counting 
majorities  and  minorities,  but  each  man  pondering 
and  searching  so  '  as  ever  in  the  great  Taskmaster's 
eye. '  "  If  these  testimonies  are  true  —  if  it  was  for 
liberty  and  for  truth  that  they  contended  —  any  im- 
perfections in  their  way  of  conceiving  these  may  well 
be  forgiven  them.  To  have  fought  that  fight  and  won 
it  was  to  have  done  more  for  science  than  to  have 
discovered  a  new  system  of  Astronomy  or  to  have 
founded  a  new  school  of  Logic. 

One  thing,  however,  must  be  said  on  the  other 
side.  It  shall  be  stated  in  the  words  of  the  late 
Prof.  J.  S.  Candlish.     In  the  passage  quoted  he   is 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

referring  to  Protestant  theologians  in  general,  but 
his  words  are  certainly  applicable  to  many  in  the 
Scottish  Presbyterian  Church.  He  writes,  "  The 
theologians  of  the  seventeenth  century  .  .  .  failed  to 
apprehend  a  deeper  principle  that  was  implicitly 
contained  in  the  Reformation  movement,  viz.,  that 
Christian  doctrines,  instead  of  preceding  Christian 
life  as  a  necessary  means  to  it,  must  come  after  its 
actual  experience.  Sound  doctrine  was  regarded  as 
the  preliminary  condition  of  spiritual  life;  and  as  it 
had  thus  to  be  established  apart  from  the  living 
experience  of  Christianity  in  the  soul,  it  must  rest  on 
purely  external  authority.  This  was  found  in  an 
extreme  and  one-sided  view  of  the  inspiration  of 
Scripture,  as  equivalent  to  verbal  or  literal  dictation, 
and  in  an  uncritical  and  indiscriminate  use  of  proof- 
texts  from  all  portions  of  Scripture,  without  due 
regard  to  their  historical  connection  and  scope. 
These  became  to  many  of  the  divines  of  that  age 
very  much  what  the  sentences  of  the  fathers  and 
councils  had  been  to  the  schoolmen;  and  an  undue 
weight  was  sometimes  allowed  even  to  the  avowedly 
human  forms  in  which  Protestant  doctrine  had  been 
expressed."  At  a  later  stage  we  shall  find  how 
largely  this  tendency,  especially  as  it  manifested  itself 
in  regard  to  the  Scriptures,  is  responsible  for  the 
misunderstanding  of  the  relations  between  science 
and  religion  in  the  Presbyterian  Church. 

Passing  to  the  eighteenth  century,  the  eye  is  caught 
at  once  by  the  great  blaze  of  the  "  Illumination  "  in 
France,  associated  with  the  names  of  Voltaire  and  the 
Encyclopedists.    Voltaire,  provoked  by  the  spectacle 

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of  many  abuses  and  hypocrisies,  devoted  all  the 
talents  of  a  singularly  brilliant  mind  to  a  crusade 
against  the  Christian  religion,  retaining,  however,  his 
belief  in  a  personal  God.  The  later  Encyclopedists 
spent  immense  learning  in  the  service  of  Materialism 
and  Atheism.  In  Britain,  Hume,  Gibbon,  and  Tom 
Paine  were  conspicuous  figures  —  Hume  calmest  and 
most  fascinating  of  sceptics,  Gibbon  terrible  with  the 
deadly  cold  of  his  sarcasm,  and  Paine,  the  populariser 
of  the  ideas  of  the  Revolution,  bitterly  hostile  to 
Christianity.  The  inevitable  effect  of  such  influences 
as  these  was  a  wide-spread  popular  impression  that 
science  and  religion  were  radically  incompatible  with 
one  another. 

The  Scottish  Church  during  this  century  was  stirred 
by  secessions  arising  out  of  questions  of  Church  Gov- 
ernment, and  by  great  revivals  of  religion,  which  have 
no  particular  bearing  on  our  present  subject.  Apart 
from  these,  the  general  tendency  was  towards  such 
lethargy  and  conventionality  as  might  naturally  be 
expected  to  follow  the  violent  history  of  the  preced- 
ing century.  The  accession  of  William  of  Orange 
had  secured  toleration  for  Presbyterians,  and  the 
legislation  of  Queen  Anne's  time  had  induced  slum- 
ber. There  were,  however,  many  representatives  of 
the  Church  of  Scotland  in  that  century  who  attained 
to  high  eminence  as  philosophers,  historians,  mathe- 
maticians, and  experts  in  other  scientific  studies. 
Some  of  these,  men  who  though  averse  to  enthu- 
siam  were  by  no  means  sceptics,  were  on  terms  of 
friendship  with  Hume  and  Gibbon,  and  interested 
themselves  in  the  scientific  spirit  of  the  time,  at  the 

233 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

risk  of  being  identified  by  their  critics  with  its  infi- 
delity. The  contemporary  defence  of  Christianity 
took  the  form  of  "  Evidences,"  intended  to  prove  the 
necessity  for  a  supernatural  revelation.  This  did 
good  service  in  its  time,  but  like  the  infidelity  it  was 
written  to  combat,  it  was  based  upon  an  inadequate 
conception  both  of  nature  and  of  the  supernatural, 
and  it  has  had  little  permanent  influence  on  the  rela- 
tions of  science  and  religion. 

The  tremendous  earthquake  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion shook  the  civilised  world,  and  set  free  a  multi- 
tude of  intellectual  forces  which  made  themselves  felt 
in  all  directions  during  the  early  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  All  the  sciences  were  studied  with 
fresh  interest,  and  a  rich  harvest  of  results  appeared. 
The  Church  of  Scotland  shared  in  the  general  awaken- 
ing, which  showed  itself  at  that  time  along  two  lines  in 
particular.  One  of  these  was  the  attempt  to  broaden 
the  theological  outlook  in  various  directions,  with 
which  such  men  as  John  MacLeod  Campbell  were 
identified.  The  other  was  a  great  outburst  of  Evan- 
gelical enthusiasm  which  led  to  the  most  varied  and 
far-reaching  results.  Among  these  results  was  the 
immediate  rise  and  spread  of  Foreign  Mission  enter- 
prise, a  factor  in  civilisation  destined  to  play  a  more 
important  part  in  the  development  of  science  than 
was  at  first  imagined.  Not  only  in  the  study  of 
Comparative  Religion  and  the  Evolution  of  Religious 
Beliefs  and  Customs,  but  in  such  secular  sciences  as 
Anthropology  and  Geography,  the  missionary  work 
of  the  Church  has  done  no  small  service. 

A  more  important  and  direct  alliance  between 
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science  and  religion  is  seen  in  the  new  conception  of 
Home  Mission  work  which  was  another  fruit  of  the 
evangelical  movement.  With  the  publication  of 
Adam  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations,  Sociology  had 
sprung  into  its  place  among  the  sciences  in  1776. 
The  French  Revolution  had  greatly  hastened  and 
increased  the  spread  of  new  social  theories  and  ideals 
throughout  the  world.  Every  living  and  generous 
spirit  was  caught  by  their  enthusiasm,  and  experi- 
ments of  all  kinds  were  set  on  foot.  In  the  Presby- 
terian Church,  the  man  who  did  most  for  the  alliance 
of  Sociology  with  religion  was  Thomas  Chalmers.  A 
man  of  distinguished  scientific  attainments,  he  was  for 
five  years  professor  of  mathematics  in  Saint  Andrews, 
and  his  Astronomical  Discourses  were  famous  in  their 
day.  His  work  as  a  Sociologist  has  been  before  the 
public  for  three-quarters  of  a  century,  and  he  is  still 
quoted  as  an  authority  by  experts  in  that  science. 
Many  of  his  ideas  remain  in  the  Home  Mission  work 
of  the  Presbyterian  Churches,  which  at  the  present 
time,  in  spite  of  all  its  defects,  is  showing  something 
of  that  grasp  of  principles  and  that  adaptability  to 
new  situations  which  so  conspicuously  marked  him 
out  as  a  true  scientist.  Chalmers  proved  conclusively, 
and  a  great  record  of  effective  work  in  the  Pres- 
byterian Churches  since  his  day  has  confirmed  it, 
that  in  the  field  of  Sociology  at  least,  religion  and 
science  need  not  be  kept  apart. 

All  these,  however,  were  but  alliances  in  special 
departments,  and  they  did  not  touch  the  fact  of  an 
apparently  radical  difference.  It  was  the  new 
Geology  that  brought  matters  to  a  crisis.     In  1830 

235 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

Lyell  published  his  Principles  of  Geology,  but  long 
before  that  date  Geology  had  been  demanding 
periods  of  time  for  its  operations  which  were  wholly 
incompatible  with  the  literal  acceptance  of  the  Mosaic 
account  of  creation  in  seven  days.  Chalmers,  with 
characteristic  insight,  had  many  years  previously 
said  that  "  the  writings  of  Moses  do  not  fix  the  an- 
tiquity of  the  globe."  On  the  other  hand,  of  course 
there  were  many  who  clung  to  their  old  belief,  and  de- 
nounced the  new  science,  while  there  must  have  been 
a  very  general  feeling  of  perplexity  and  uneasiness. 

At  length  a  school  arose  which  became  so  popular 
that  it  may  be  regarded  as  typical  of  Presbyterian 
thought  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
We  may  call  it  the  School  of  Reconciliation,  for  its 
object  was  to  so  explain  the  Bible  record  as  to  do  away 
with  the  apparent  contradictions  between  that  and 
the  ascertained  results  of  science.  Hugh  Miller  may 
be  taken  as  its  representative  exponent.  Originally 
a  stone-mason  in  the  north  of  Scotland,  he  was  a  man 
of  extraordinary  natural  gifts  and  of  wide  reading. 
Attracted  first  of  all  by  the  ripple-marks  on  the  bed 
of  a  quarry  where  he  was  working,  the  science  of  Geol- 
ogy became  first  his  relaxation  and  then  his  province 
of  expert  enquiry.  His  book  on  The  Old  Red  Sand- 
stone drew  the  applause  of  Mr.  Huxley.  His  most  sig- 
nificant doctrine,  and  that  which  best  represented  the 
views  of  the  Reconciliation  School,  is  that  the  Book 
of  Genesis  is  to  be  read  in  the  same  way  as  Prophecy, 
i.e.,  in  the  light  of  its  accomplishment.  "  The  hiero- 
glyphs that  speak  of  the  past  are  wonderfully  easy  to 
harmonise  —  those  for  the  future  are  invincibly  diffi- 

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cult  and  inexplicable."  In  his  Testimony  of  the  Rocks 
he  goes  on  to  apply  this  principle  to  Genesis.  The 
six  days  he  takes  to  be  six  periods  of  indefinitely 
long  duration,  representative  visions  of  the  progress 
of  creation.  He  adds,  "  rightly  understood,  I  know 
not  a  single  truth  that  militates  against  the  minutest 
and  least  prominent  of  its  (Genesis)  details." 

This  system  of  reconciliations,  which  clung  to  the 
scientific  accuracy  of  the  Scripture  record  and  yet 
interpreted  that  record  so  as  to  make  it  harmonise 
with  modern  discoveries,  was  as  we  have  stated  ex- 
tremely popular  in  its  day,  and  it  is  in  some  quarters 
popular  yet.  It  has  even  been  applied  to  Evolution, 
and  attempts  have  been  made  so  to  interpret  the  first 
chapters  of  Genesis  as  to  make  them  harmonise  with 
that  theory.  Hugh  Miller,  however,  held  the  doctrine 
of  development  to  be  irreconcilable  with  the  dogmas 
of  Christianity,  and  argued  against  it  in  favour  of  the 
miracle  of  creation.  When  in  1859  the  Origin  of 
Species  appeared,  the  great  majority  of  Presbyterians 
considered  that  its  teaching  could  not  possibly  be 
reconciled  with  the  Bible  record,  and  they  confidently 
believed  that  the  doctrine  of  Evolution  would  eventu- 
ally be  disproved  and  set  aside.  It  was  of  no  avail 
to  plead  that  Evolution  must  be  regarded  as  but 
a  method  of  creation,  and  that  it  did  not  affect  the 
ultimate  question  of  divine  agency,  for  to  the  majority 
of  its  critics  it  appeared  evident  that  it  was  not  the 
method  described  in  Genesis. 

It  is  surprising  that  so  precarious  an  apologetic 
should  completely  have  satisfied  the  minds  of  so  many. 
Certainly  there  could  be  no  permanent  stability,  no 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

feeling  of  intellectual  rest,  in  a  faith  which  was  calling 
for  constant  readjustment  of  this  sort.  No  one  could 
tell  what  a  day  might  bring  forth  of  new  scientific 
discovery  which  might  demand  of  faith  a  fresh  re- 
modelling of  interpretations  or  force  it  into  a  priori 
hostility.  A  further  objection  to  this  method  was  that 
it  tended  rather  to  strengthen  than  to  diminish  the 
already  exaggerated  estimate  of  the  moral  value  of 
orthodox  intellectual  opinions,  and  so  to  distract  men's 
minds  from  the  sense  of  the  value  of  truth  in  itself. 
This  exaggerated  moral  value,  with  its  background 
of  punishments  and  rewards  supposed  to  be  meted 
out  on  the  grounds  of  orthodoxy  or  heterodoxy,  could 
not  fail  to  bias  men's  minds  and  widen  the  breach. 
One  of  the  popular  advocates  of  this  point  of  view 
actually  sneered  at  "  the  idol "  of  Truth  which  clever 
men  were  worshipping.  Again,  it  greatly  fostered  the 
vicious  distinction  between  faith  and  reason,  when 
reason  was  permitted  only  to  deal  with  questions  on 
which  no  part  of  Scripture  pronounces,  and  Scripture 
was  established  as  a  kind  of  secret  court,  or  Star  Cham- 
ber, for  judging  all  matters  of  all  kinds  which  happen 
to  be  referred  to  within  the  boards  of  the  sacred  book. 
Finally,  in  those  cases  where  Scripture  had  to  be  re- 
interpreted, another  most  dangerous  principle  was 
introduced.  If  such  reinterpretation  be  necessary 
or  legitimate,  it  is  evident  that  Scripture  does  not 
mean  what  to  the  plain  man  it  seems  to  say.  There 
is  a  hidden  meaning,  symbolical  or  allegorical,  which 
lies  behind  the  apparent  sense  of  the  narrative,  and 
which  is  intelligible  only  to  the  initiated.  The  more 
ingenious  the  reinterpretation  is,  the  further  it  is  re- 

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moved  from  the  understanding  of  the  ordinary 
reader.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  logical  stopping- 
place  there  is  for  those  who  take  this  view,  short  of 
the  subtleties  of  Origen. 

All  through  this  history,  in  spite  of  casual  alliances 
and  fundamental  points  of  agreement,  it  has  been 
evident  that  something,  mysteriously  but  effectually, 
was  holding  religion  and  science  apart.  We  have 
already  had  broad  hints  as  to  what  that  thing  was ; 
it  became  plain  when  the  battle  of  the  Higher  Criti- 
cism came  to  be  fought  out  in  Scotland.  The  situation 
is  thus  described  by  the  late  Professor  Candlish :  — 
"  By  many  the  need  is  felt  of  more  thoroughly  carry- 
ing out  the  principles  of  the  Reformation  than  was 
done  in  the  succeeding  age,  so  as  to  place  the  dog- 
matic system  on  a  surer  basis.  ...  By  a  large  num- 
ber of  divines  it  has  been  felt  to  be  unsatisfactory 
to  base,  as  was  practically  done  formerly,  the  whole 
system  of  theology  on  the  one  doctrine  of  the  inspi- 
ration of  Scripture  ;  and  a  broader  foundation,  as  well 
as  a  more  living  conception,  has  been  sought  for  it, 
by  recognising  as  its  subject-matter,  not  merely  the 
sayings  of  Scripture,  but  that  living  Christianity 
which  it  is  the  direct  object  of  the  Bible  to  produce 
and  reveal.  This  is  really  a  taking  up  and  carrying 
out  more  fully  of  the  principles  of  the  Reformation." 
These  are  words  of  the  most  far-reaching  significance, 
but  it  is  especially  as  they  concern  inspiration  that 
we  have  to  do  with  them  here. 

Luther's  doctrine  of  inspiration  was  amusingly 
elastic,  and  his  canons  of  judgment  subjective  in  the 
extreme.     Calvin's  doctrine,  though  stricter  and  more 

239 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

articulate,  was  still  broad  and  free.  Afterwards  the 
doctrine  grew  rigid  and  the  controversies  of  the  six- 
teenth and  seventeenth  centuries  tended  to  embitter  it. 
The  seat  of  authority  in  religion  had  indeed  been 
shifted  from  the  Church  and  Tradition,  and  this  had 
been  done  on  the  plea  of  the  spiritual  man's  right  to 
judge  of  truth  for  himself.  But  that  right  was  imme- 
diately handed  over  to  the  inspired  Scriptures,  which 
became  the  new  seat  of  authority,  and  were  regarded 
more  and  more  rigidly  as  infallible  on  every  subject 
with  which  they  dealt,  a  province  closed  to  human 
reason.  Among  other  results  entailed  by  that  a  view 
was  this,  that  every  statement  in  the  Bible  which 
refers  to  the  facts  of  the  physical  universe  must 
be  regarded  as  uttering  the  accurate  scientific  truth 
upon  its  subject.  As  late  as  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, the  Hutchinsonians  in  England  maintained 
not  only  that  the  Bible  was  infallible  on  scientific 
matters,  but  that  it  was  the  only  reliable  authority  on 
Natural  Philosophy.  "  To  Newton's  Principia  they 
opposed  what  they  called  'Moses'  Principia.'  The 
former  they  regarded  as  thoroughly  false,  and  also 
as  materialistic  and  atheistic  in  tendency."  While 
Scottish  Presbyterianism  never  committed  itself  to 
any  such  absurdities,  it  is  significant  that  President 
Forbes  of  Culloden  looked  upon  the  Hutchinsonian 
system  with  favour. 

At  length,  in  the  later  years  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, the  Presbyterian  Churches  of  Scotland  faced  the 
question  of  the  inspiration  of  the  Bible.  The  smoke 
of  that  long  battle  has  hardly  yet  cleared  away,  and 
there  remain  many  differences  of  opinion.     There  are 

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A  Presbyterian  Approach 

those  who  still  hold  to  the  most  sweeping  doctrine 
of  the  infallibility  of  Scripture  in  regard  to  scientific  as 
to  all  other  truth.  Many  points  in  criticism  are  re- 
garded as  open  questions  by  almost  every  one,  and 
many  more  are  so  regarded  by  large  numbers  of  edu- 
cated Presbyterians.  But  one  point  at  least  has  been 
conceded  by  the  vast  majority,  viz.,  that  the  Bible  is 
no  longer  to  be  viewed  as  a  scientific  text-book  but  as 
the  record  of  a  spiritual  revelation.  That  revelation, 
which  God  made  of  Himself  to  man,  was  expressed 
(as  many  hold)  in  various  forms  of  myth,  poetry,  his- 
tory, and  others.  The  revelation,  which  its  record 
shews  growing  ever  clearer  and  fuller  with  the  growth 
of  the  nation's  life  and  thought,  is  an  eternal  and  divine 
thing ;  the  form  in  which  it  was  expressed  is  human  and 
temporary.  The  scientific  ideas  of  any  part  of  the  Bible 
are  simply  those  of  the  age  when  that  part  was  written 
—  neither  more  nor  less  accurate  than  the  rest  of  con- 
temporary science.  It  is  this  point  more  than  any 
other  which  bears  upon  our  subject.  The  battle  be- 
tween science  and  Scripture  is  one  thing,  the  battle 
between  science  and  religion  is  a  very  different  thing; 
yet  half  the  controversies  of  the  past  have  arisen 
solely  from  confounding  these  two.  Dr.  Flint  has 
said  that  "  so  long  as  men's  beliefs  as  to  things  were 
regulated  not  by  evidence  but  by  authority,  there 
could  be  no  science."  When  the  scientific  authority 
of  Scripture  is  surrendered,  science  is  set  free  to 
work  out  its  own  results ;  and  the  doctrine  of  inspira- 
tion, by  giving  up  the  claim  of  the  Bible  to  teach 
science,  has  saved  its  power  to  teach  religion. 

At  first  sight  this  might  appear  to  be  a  curtailing 
16  24i 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

and  narrowing  of  the  field  of  revelation,  but  on  re- 
flection it  is  seen  to  be  an  immense  widening  of  that 
field.  The  facts  of  science  may  not  be  the  facts  of 
Genesis,  but  (to  quote  the  memorable  words  of  Prin- 
cipal Rainy,  spoken  in  the  most  recent  debate  on 
this  subject)  "  the  facts  are  God's  facts."  So  far 
from  discrediting  revelation  by  refusing  to  regard  the 
science  of  the  Bible  as  part  of  it,  we  strengthen  the 
idea  of  revelation  and  honour  it.  The  Bible  remains 
the  unique  book  of  the  revelation  of  spiritual  knowl- 
edge :  but  the  book  of  Nature,  whose  pages  science 
turns,  is  also  seen  to  be  a  book  of  revelation.  Nay, 
so  far  as  its  subject  goes,  it  is,  as  Dr.  Flint  has  called 
it,  "  the  primary,  universal,  and  inexhaustible  text- 
book of  divine  revelation." 

Through  the  change  which  we  have  been  describ- 
ing it  has  become  possible  for  us  to  gather  in  the 
harvest  of  the  past.  We  have  seen  that  when  the 
doctrine  of  Evolution  was  first  propounded  by  Dar- 
win, it  was  generally  rejected  by  Presbyterian  Scots- 
men, because  it  could  not  be  harmonised  with  the 
creation  narratives  of  Genesis.  Now,  though  it  is  by 
no  means  the  case  that  all  Presbyterians  accept  the 
doctrine,  yet  the  general  tendency  is  toward  accept- 
ing it,  and  it  is  almost  universally  allowed  by  those 
who  are  competent  to  judge,  that  it  is  a  legitimate 
hypothesis,  to  be  proved  or  disproved  by  scientific 
evidence  alone.  The  brilliant  writings  of  the  late 
Prof.  Henry  Drummond  have  done  much  to  bring 
about  the  result  that  there  is  a  large  and  increas- 
ing number  who  find  in  it  a  friend  in  disguise — ■ 
an  instance  of  the  truth  of  Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour's  say- 

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A  Presbyterian  Approach 

ing,  that  "  a  theological  stumbling-block  may  be  a 
religious  aid."  To  quote  Dr.  Flint  once  more  — 
and  no  Presbyterian  writer  lives  whose  words  in  this 
connection  should  carry  more  weight  —  "Forty  years 
ago  the  fear  that  philosophy,  and  especially  theology, 
would  be  ruined  by  the  doctrine  of  Evolution  was 
widely  prevalent.  All  fear  of  the  kind  has  now 
almost  vanished,  and  there  are  few  educated  and 
intelligent  persons  who  do  not  recognise  that  what 
was  then  regarded  as  a  terrible  danger  to  religion 
and  theology  is,  and  must  be,  of  incalculable  value 
to  both."  To  the  majority  of  thinking  men  to-day  it 
offers  a  nobler  conception  of  the  divine  attributes  and 
methods,  and  it  supplies  them  with  one  of  the  most 
valuable  unifying  principles  which  they  possess. 

It  is  evidently  hopeless  in  one  short  chapter  to 
attempt  to  deal  with  anything  more  than  the  merest 
fragment  of  so  large  a  question.  It  has  seemed 
wisest  to  confine  our  enquiries  to  that  part  of  the 
conflict  and  rapprochement  with  which  the  Presby- 
terian Church  has  been  particularly  identified.  Be- 
yond this  there  lie  vast  fields  of  study  on  each 
of  which  the  rapprochement  must  be  and  is  being 
effected.  On  all  of  these  Presbyterianism  is  taking 
its  share  along  with  other  Christian  Churches,  in  the 
general  progress  of  thought.  Against  Agnosticism, 
it  asserts  that  the  knowledge  of  spiritual  realities  is  a 
real  department  of  knowledge,  in  the  strictest  sense 
rational.  In  this  there  can  be  no  conflict  with  science, 
which  also  rests  upon  knowledge  which  is  beyond 
the  sphere  of  sense-experience,  and  which  may  be 
rightly  classed  as  spiritual.     The  claim  of  real  knowl- 

243 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

edge  in  the  spiritual  region  is  also  its  answer  to 
Materialism,  which  appears  more  and  more  mani- 
festly to  be  an  obsolete  theory  of  the  universe ;  and 
whose  few  remaining  exponents,  finding  themselves 
left  behind,  are  growing  irritable.  The  relation  of 
the  religious  belief  in  prayer  and  in  miracles  to  the 
scientific  doctrine  of  law  and  of  the  unity  of  nature 
and  her  forces,  is  a  matter  which  as  yet  requires  to 
be  thought  out.  The  trend  of  thought  concerning 
these  questions  is  toward  a  view  in  which  they  will 
be  no  longer  regarded  as  breaches  of  natural  law, 
but  as  cases  in  which  a  greater  unity  reveals  itself  in 
the  operation  of  laws  of  a  higher  order  than  those  of 
Physics  and  Biology.  This  leads  to  the  considera- 
tion of  the  general  relations  of  mind  to  matter  and 
the  operation  of  psychical  and  higher  spiritual  forces: 
it  is  as  yet  almost  a  terra  incognita,  but  there  are 
many  signs  that  in  this  region  also  research  will  be 
rewarded  by  knowledge. 

So  far  as  we  have  gone,  the  history  of  the  past, 
viewed  by  the  light  in  which  the  newer  conception 
of  the  Bible  has  placed  it,  shows  that  at  the  present 
point  in  the  progress  of  thought,  science  and  religion 
are  not  in  the  least  degree  at  strife.  They  need  no 
reconciliation.  "The  facts  are  God's  facts,"  and  the 
scientific  knowledge  of  them  is  God's  ever  new  and 
wonderful  revelation,  unfolding  itself  not  in  one  book, 
closed  two  thousand  years  ago,  but  in  every  book 
written  to-day  by  any  honest  and  competent  investi- 
gator. Looking  forward,  we  wait  for  new  light,  not 
only  without  trembling  for  the  faith,  but  with  eager 
curiosity  that  we  may  understand  our  faith  more  per- 

244 


A  Presbyterian  Approach 

fectly.  Looking  back,  along  the  line  of  the  history 
of  Presbyterianism,  we  see  a  long  controversy,  due 
mainly  to  a  misunderstanding.  But  behind  and  be- 
neath all  the  controversy,  we  are  proud  to  recognise 
in  Presbyterian  faith  the  basal  principles  of  all  true 
science  —  the  demand  for  unity  and  order,  and  the 
assertion  of  the  rights  of  intellect. 

JOHN  KELMAN,  Jun. 
Edinburgh. 


!45 


A    CHURCH    OF    ENGLAND 
APPROACH 

The   Rev.    RONALD   BAYNE,   M.A. 
Editor  "  Hooker's  Laws  of  Ecclesiastical  Polity"  etc.,  Eifth  Book 

THE  phrase,  "  ideals  of  science  and  religion,"  im- 
plies that  science  as  well  as  religion  has  ideals. 
But  this  implication  is  a  large  one.  It  has  been  ar- 
gued by  many  philosophers  that  "  ideals  "  is  merely 
the  vaguest  and  most  general  term  to  express  those 
things  which  religion  describes  definitely  and  con- 
cretely as  God,  the  soul,  and  salvation.  According 
to  this  view,  if  words  are  used  exactly,  science  can 
have  no  ideals.  By  using  the  word  science  goes  be- 
yond what  is  and  what  she  observes  and  concerns 
herself  with  what  ought  to  be.  She  begins,  therefore, 
to  use  the  faculty  of  faith,  and  to  usurp  the  province 
of  religion. 

It  is  necessary  to  say  this  at  starting  because  a 
statement  of  the  ideals  of  the  Church  of  England,  if 
it  is  to  begin  at  the  beginning,  requires  a  statement 
of  the  general  philosophical  positions  involved  in  that 
Church's  theology.  Such  a  philosophical  sketch 
cannot  be  attempted  in  this  paper;  but  it  must  be 
premised  that  neither  religion  nor  science  can  give 
any  account  of  themselves,  without  philosophy;  and 
that,  although  few  men  arc  philosophers,  yet  all  men 

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A  Church  of  England  Approach 

rest  their  daily  work  and  conduct  upon  certain  broad 
conceptions  of  life  which  become  philosophies  as 
soon  as  they  are  enquired  into  and  systematised. 

It  is  also  necessary  to  note  on  the  other  hand  that 
a  scientific  man  might  reject  ideals  of  all  sorts  as  un- 
scientific and  tending  to  confuse  and  mislead  the 
mind,  so  that  for  science  as  well  as  for  religion  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  significance  of  ideals  should  precede 
the  use  of  the  word. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  scientific  men  as  a 
class  have  their  ideals.  In  one  of  Mr.  H.  G.  Wells' 
stories  of  the  days  to  come,  the  doctor  of  the  future 
explains  the  scientific  point  of  view  to  a  patient: 
"  We  get  on  with  research,"  he  says ;  "  we  give 
advice  when  people  have  the  sense  to  ask  for  it, 
and  we  bide  our  time.  .  .  .  We  hardly  know  enough 
yet  to  take  over  the  management.  .  .  .  Science  is 
young  yet.  It 's  got  to  keep  on  growing  for  a  few 
generations.  We  know  enough  now  to  know  we 
don't  know  enough  yet.  .  .  .  Some  of  us  have  a  sort 
of  fancy  that  in  time  we  may  know  enough  to  take 
over  a  little  more  than  the  ventilation  and  drains." 

The  scientific  man  in  this  passage  aspires  to  be  a 
priest  and  a  king.  He  is  not  content  to  look  upon 
science  as  research  only.  His  knowledge  is  to  be 
power.  Mr.  Wells  indeed  does  not  shrink  from 
criticism  of  the  ideals  of  management  which  may 
obtain  when  scientific  men  are  kings.  Few  readers 
will  forget  the  grim  picture  of  the  unskilled  labourer, 
lying  drugged  and  senseless  till  he  is  wanted  again, 
which  is  given  us  in  "The  First  Men  in  the  Moon." 
That  romance  is  in  the  main  an  effort  to  imagine  a 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

purely  intellectual  civilisation,  a  civilisation  evolved  by 
pure  science  where  there  are  no  emotions  to  interfere 
and  disturb.  Mr.  Wells,  as  in  the  main  a  sympathiser 
with  scientific  aspirations,  may  be  allowed  to  criticise 
them.  The  religious  man  must  not  forget  to  be  thank- 
ful first  that  there  are  aspirations  to  criticise.  He  must 
be  thankful  that  the  scientific  man  consents  to  have 
a  scheme  of  things  as  they  might  be  and  as  they  are 
not.  By  so  doing,  the  man  of  science  becomes  own 
brother  to  the  Christian,  however  much  his  scheme 
of  things  clashes  with  that  formulated  by  the  relig- 
ious temperament.  Mr.  Wells,  moreover,  in  the 
passage  first  quoted,  is  probably  wrong  in  the  sugges- 
tion that  science  will  take  charge  of  life  suddenly. 
Every  bit  of  clear  knowledge  gained  imposes  the  re- 
sponsibility of  acting  upon  that  knowledge  and  in- 
flicts a  penalty  for  its  suppression.  Science  must 
gain  its  control  as  it  goes  along,  and  in  fact  does  so 
gain  it.  And  it  is  a  delusion  that  only  clergymen 
and  religious  folk  refuse  to  apply  knowledge  to  life. 
No  man  escapes  that  temptation ;  least  of  all  men  of 
science.  In  so  far  as  men  of  science  are  in  contact 
with  actual  life,  as  doctors,  as  temperance  legislators, 
as  inspectors  of  factories  and  guardians  of  public 
health,  they  are  tempted  to  make  terms  with  the 
world  and  the  flesh,  which  even  when  the  devil  is 
ignored  as  illusory,  are  as  strong  as  ever  to  prevent 
the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth  from  pre- 
vailing among  men.  It  is  necessary  to  the  welfare 
of  the  world  that  men  of  science  should  have  ideals; 
that  they  should  be  eager  to  apply  their  knowledge 
to  life;  and  resolute  to  build  their  new  Jerusalem. 

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A  Church  of  England  Approach 

But  the  capacity  to  acquire  knowledge  is  not  the 
passion  to  impose  it  upon  an  unwilling  world.  There 
is  a  singular  passage  in  Browning's  "  Christmas  Eve," 
which  insists  that  the  worst  man  upon  earth  knows 
more  about  right  or  wrong,  although  he  does  not 
apply  his  knowledge  to  life,  than  the  best  man  suc- 
ceeds in  so  applying.  Man's  chief  need,  it  is  argued, 
is  a  motive  to  make  him  use  his  knowledge  ;  continu- 
ally that  hell  gapes  for  him  —  the  hell  of  complete 
knowledge  of  what  there  is  to  do  combined  with  an 
utter  inability  to  do  it.  Mr.  Wells,  for  all  his  sympa- 
thy with  science,  has  had  his  visions  of  that  dolorous 
place. 

Let  us  now  consider  this  matter  of  ideals  from 
another  side.  It  is  a  frequent  complaint  against  the 
orthodox  Christian  that  he  makes  one  book  of  the 
Bible.  He  is  told  that  it  is  a  library,  or  collection, 
or  anthology  of  the  literature  of  the  Jews,  with 
no  more  claim  to  be  considered  a  book  than  the 
"Oratores  Attici"  or  the  "  Corpus  Poetarum  Latin- 
orum ;  "  it  is,  in  fact,  a  more  heterogeneous  collection 
than  either  of  these  works.  The  sensible  Christian  will 
answer  that  neither  Greece  nor  Rome  made  such  an 
anthology  as  the  Bible  from  their  literature  ;  and  that 
while  the  external  form  of  the  books  of  the  Bible  is 
heterogeneous,  their  aim  and  spirit  overcome  differ- 
ences and  stamp  one  character  upon  the  collection. 
The  Bible  describes  man  as  failing  to  reach  the  level 
of  righteousness  demanded  by  his  conscience,  and 
God  as  intervening  to  help  man.  In  the  language  of 
orthodox  Christianity  it  is  the  history  of  man  as  the 
subject  of  redemption;  in  the  language  of  the  non- 
249 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

Christian  it  is  the  history  of  a  nation  conceived  of  as 
the  history  of  the  ideals  of  the  nation.  Even  though 
our  philosophy  compels  us  to  reject  ideals  as  illusory, 
the  Bible  must  always  be  unique  as  a  witness  to  their 
power.  Moreover,  the  fact  is  plain  that  neither  Greece 
nor  Rome  conceived  of  their  history  from  this  point 
of  view,  whereas  the  Bible  is  in  a  true  sense  one 
book  because  the  Jewish  race  did  so  conceive  of 
their  history.  Moreover,  this  book  was  not  written 
by  a  man,  but  in  sober  fact  by  a  nation.  That  gives 
the  result  externally  a  character  of  heterogeneity,  but 
makes  its  internal  homogeneity  all  the  more  vital 
and  satisfying.  The  book  describes  man's  effort  to 
establish  the  kingdom  of  God  ;  it  insists  that  God 
has  assisted  that  effort;  and  finally  crowned  it  by 
the  life  and  death  in  the  world  of  the  Son  of  God. 
The  Bible  throughout  puts  God  first.  It  never  con- 
ceives of  the  good  in  man  as  apart  from  God.  God 
is  the  power  which  continually  is  dragging  man  up- 
ward and  continually  compelling  man  to  realise  his 
true  destiny.  From  this  point  of  view  there  is  no 
other  phenomenon  in  the  world  at  all  like  the  Bible. 
That  is  the  accurate  fact.  When  that  fact  is  recog- 
nised opinions  about  it  may  be  divided  broadly  into 
three  classes.  First,  we  may  take  up  the  extreme 
materialist  position  that  ideals  are  delusions  and 
therefore  noxious,  and  that  even  if  they  have  been 
of  service  in  the  past  we  must,  as  far  as  may  be,  dis- 
card them  in  the  future.  Second,  we  may  hold  that 
these  ideals  are  nothing  but  man's  projection  of  him- 
self objectively  into  the  world  around  him ;  they 
come   from    man  himself;    man  himself  makes  the 

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A  Church  of  England  Approach 

God  who  is  a  Spirit,  just  as  he  made  the  God  of 
wood  or  stone  ;  but  yet  ideals  are  not  noxious  ;  they 
are  necessary  to  the  progress  of  the  race,  and  by  the 
help  of  them  man  continues  to  go  forward.  But, 
thirdly,  we  may  argue  that  ideals  owe  their  force 
entirely  to  our  faith  in  their  reality.  If  we  must  give 
that  faith  up  we  must  give  the  ideals  up  too.  We 
can  only  drift  with  the  stream  of  life,  we  cannot 
aspire  to  any  control  of  our  course.  God  made  by 
man  can  never  be  the  same  as  God  the  Maker  of 
man.  These  ideals  which  we,  metaphorically  speak- 
ing, throw  up  into  the  air,  can  only  fall  back  upon 
us  ;  they  cannot  draw  us  upward  as  a  Hand  can  held 
out  from  above.  Such  reasoning  insists  that  ideals 
must  be  true  if  they  are  to  lead  up  and  not  down, 
and  it  makes  the  value  of  the  ideals  of  the  Bible 
dependent  upon  the  reality  of  God  and  the  soul. 
Theists  and  Christians  belong  to  this  third  class. 

But  the  Bible  is  not  a  philosophical  treatise.  The 
scientific  man,  if  he  were  true  to  his  own  science, 
would  appreciate  and  approve  the  fact  that  the  Bible 
is  not  a  piece  of  reasoning  ;  it  is  an  experiment,  it  is 
an  action.  We  are  asked  to  accept  it  first  of  all  as 
happening.  Its  character  is  essentially  altered  if  it 
can  be  proved  to  be  historically  worthless.  This 
position,  indeed,  is  disputed  in  unexpected  quarters. 
It  has  been  argued  by  an  influential  and  able  school 
of  religious  thought  that  the  historical  character  of 
the  Bible  does  not  matter.  Kant  is  appealed  to  as 
teaching  that  the  practical  reason  which  apprehends 
and  acts  upon  religious  truth  is  a  different  faculty 
from  the  critical  reason  which  decides  what  the  facts 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

of  history  have  been.  But  this  is  a  disastrous  posi- 
tion for  the  religious  man  to  take  up.  It  is  probably 
impossible  for  the  practical  reason  to  make  any  judg- 
ment which  does  not  involve  to  some  extent  the 
critical  reason;  and  the  scientific  man  will  not  be 
encouraged  to  accept  religious  teaching  by  being 
told  that  his  critical  faculty  has  no  relation  to  it  and 
can  pass  no  judgment  upon  it.  It  cannot  be  a  matter 
of  indifference  whether  or  not  Jesus  was  deceived 
about  Himself,  or  whether  or  not  the  disciples  were 
deceived  about  His  resurrection,  any  more  than  it 
can  be  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  man  made 
God  or  God  made  man.  The  existence  of  Chris- 
tianity as  a  religion  is  involved  in  the  point.  It  is 
true  that  no  man  is  a  Christian  merely  because  he 
considers  it  proved  that  Jesus  rose  from  the  dead ; 
but  some  such  facts  which  depend  for  acceptance  upon 
the  exercise  of  our  critical  faculty,  are  the  bases  of  all 
our  fuller  judgments.  Just  because  the  religious  man 
goes  beyond  the  critical  reason  he  can  never  afford 
to  ignore  it.  Loyalty  to  it  is  the  beginning  of  all 
loyalty,  the  foundation  of  all  religion.  And  to  re- 
fuse metaphysic  is  to  make  "  the  great  refusal," 
whether  the  refusal  is  made  in  the  interests  of  science 
or  of  religion. 

This  digression  which  touches  hurriedly  upon  a 
matter  much  discussed  at  present,  started  from  the 
statement  that  the  Bible  is  a  record  of  facts.  The 
Old  Testament  records  the  effort  of  a  nation  to 
be  God's  chosen  people.  The  result  of  the  effort 
was  the  coming  of  the  Christ,  which  meant  that 
the  effort  was   transferred    from    one   nation   to    all 

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nations.  All  nations  in  the  New  Testament  are  in- 
vited to  accept  that  view  of  their  duty  and  destiny 
which  in  the  Old  Testament  is  put  forward  as  essen- 
tial to  the  spiritual  welfare  of  the  Jews.  But  this  is 
to  state  the  case  from  the  purely  analytic  and  critical 
point  of  view,  which  cannot  include  God  in  its  analy- 
sis, except  as  a  magnet  of  which  nothing  is  known 
but  its  attractive  power  upon  man's  character.  The 
Christian,  using  other  faculties  with  his  critical 
reason,  believes  that  the  Old  Testament  records  the 
effort  of  God  as  well  as  the  effort  of  man,  and  that  in 
the  New  Testament  God's  purpose  of  redemption 
culminates  in  Jesus,  who  is  God  and  Man,  and  in 
whom  the  will  of  God  and  the  will  of  Man  are  united 
in  a  perfect  service  and  a  perfect  freedom.  Jesus  is 
the  perfect  King,  and  He  is  also  the  perfect  people. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  popular  Chris- 
tianity has  been  able  to  persuade  itself  that  the  Gos- 
pels appeal  to  the  individual  only,  and  require  only 
that  he  should  make  his  own  peace  with  God  through 
trust  in  the  message  and  person  of  Jesus.  No  one 
can  compare  the  Pentateuch  and  the  Gospels  with- 
out perceiving  that  the  teaching  of  Jesus,  following 
up  in  this  respect  the  teaching  of  the  prophets,  en- 
riches and  enlarges  the  personality  of  the  individual, 
takes  him  out  of  his  family  clan  or  nation,  and 
isolates  him  in  a  new  reality  of  responsibility.  We 
carelessly  say  "  isolates  him,"  but  we  mean  "  creates 
him,"  "  makes  him  more."  If  the  individual  con- 
sents to  be  isolated  and  cuts  himself  off  from  the 
clan  or  corporation  that  has  bred  him,  his  develop- 
ment will  stop.     He  must,  on  the  contrary,  continu- 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

ally  react   on   his    clan,   on   his  station  and  duties, 
and  thus    produce   a   clan   and    a  kingdom   able   to 
breed  more  highly  developed  creatures  than  himself. 
A  candid  and   intelligent  study  of  the  Gospels  will 
admit  the  large  place  taken  up   in  the  teaching  of 
Jesus   by    His    exposition    of   the   Kingdom.      The 
Kingdom   of  the  heavens  or  the  Kingdom  of  God 
and  His  own  relation  to  this  Kingdom,  —  that  is  the 
sum  of  His  message;  and  He  begins  His  preaching 
with  the  announcement  of  the   Kingdom  as  some- 
thing which  the   Jews    ought   to    be    ready  for;  as 
something  which  their  history,  as  summarised  in  the 
Old  Testament,  has  prepared  them  for.     The  King- 
dom Jesus  proclaims   is  the   familiar  theocracy,  so 
feebly  realised  under  David  and  Josiah,  but  imagined 
by  the    prophets  with    great   depth  and    beauty  of 
spiritual  insight.     Jesus  recalls  the  right  ideal  of  this 
Kingdom,  renouncing  emphatically  the  additions  and 
distortions  of  pride  and  materialism,  but  essentially 
His  account  of  the  Kingdom  is  not  new  but  old, — 
the  final  form  and  fulfilling  of  the  ideals  of  Moses, 
David,  and  the  Prophets.     What  is  new  in  the  Gos- 
pels is  Jesus.     And   therefore   it  is  only  gradually 
that  Jesus    can    bring   forward   the   subject   of   His 
relation  to  the  Kingdom.     There  is  a  striking  con- 
trast between   the  challenge  of  the  Kingdom  flung 
down  among  the  Jews  as  an  ideal  familiar  to  their 
consciences,  and  the  cautious  suggestion  of  Himself 
as  the  appointed  means  by  which  alone  this  Kingdom 
can  be  realised   among  men.     Indeed  the  teaching 
of  Jesus  about  Himself  is  subordinated  to  the  facts 
about  Himself:   His  death,  His  rising  again,  and  the 

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coming  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  —  these  are  the  essentials 
by  which  we  men  are  enabled  to  carry  forward  the 
purpose  of  God  that  His  will  should  be  done  in 
earth  as  in  heaven,  and  earth  become,  like  heaven, 
God's  Kingdom.  Jesus  by  His  incarnation,  death, 
and  resurrection,  gives  to  the  citizen  of  His  Kingdom 
a  motive  for  service  incomparably  stronger  than  any 
afforded  to  the  Jew  of  the  Old  Testament;  and 
Jesus  gives  more,  —  He  gives  the  Holy  Ghost;  He 
rallies  the  will  of  the  citizen  who  enrols  himself  in 
the  Kingdom,  by  the  continual  gift  of  grace. 

This  the  Christian  believes.  And  he  claims  that 
Jesus  Christ  has  made  a  difference  in  the  history  of 
the  world  which  can  be  explained  only  by  the  truth 
of  the  faith  just  stated.  In  the  first  place  the  effort 
to  realise  the  Kingdom  of  God  upon  earth  was  by 
the  coming  of  Christ  transferred  at  once  from  Pales- 
tine to  the  whole  civilised  world.  When  Jesus  was 
alive  the  civilised  world  was  controlled  by  the  two 
races  of  Rome  and  Greece.  Politically  the  civilised 
world  was  controlled  by  Rome.  That  Graeco-Roman 
civilisation  represented  a  high-water  mark  of  human 
development.  It  is  only  quite  recently  that  we  have 
reached  again  the  same  point  of  intellectual  and 
practical  vigour.  The  odds  in  the  first  century  must 
have  seemed  tremendous  against  a  mere  barbarian 
Jew  converting  to  his  religion  the  Athenian  and  the 
Roman.  But  this  the  Christians  did,  as  their  obvious 
and  simple  duty,  without  flinching  or  faltering.  The 
Roman  control  of  the  world  became  a  means  for 
the  Christian  control  of  the  world.  The  old  theo- 
cratic  ideal   was   realised   in   an   empire   comprising 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

all  the  leading  races  of  the  world,  and  realised  more 
intimately  and  thoroughly  than  it  had  been  realised 
in  the  small  nation  of  the  Hebrews  in  Old  Testament 
times.  It  was  realised  so  thoroughly  that  the  theo- 
cratic kingdom  in  its  external  framework  persisted 
when  the  Roman  Empire  broke  up.  The  Roman 
Empire  handed  on  to  mediaeval  and  modern  times 
a  Church  which  in  its  outward  form  realised  the 
idea  of  a  single  world-empire  more  completely  than 
the  Roman  Empire  itself.  The  Christians  of  the 
early  centuries  had  not  a  number  of  separate  nations 
to  deal  with,  they  had  the  Roman  Empire  to  deal 
with;  and  they  succeeded  in  imposing  the  Chris- 
tian religion  upon  the  Roman  Empire.  That  their 
Kingdom  of  God  was  perfect  is  not  contended.  It 
was  too  big  and  too  concrete  a  thing  to  be  perfect. 
Too  many  minds  and  peoples  and  generations  co- 
operated in  the  work.  But  it  is  essential  that  God's 
Kingdom  be  concrete.  You  begin  to  make  it  come 
when  you  attack  some  kingdom-refusing  word,  like 
"  secular,"  or  "  civil,"  or  "  political,"  or  "  profane," 
or  "  state,"  or  "  temporal,"  and  annex  it  in  Christ's 
name.  You  begin  to  make  it  come  when  you  take 
some  piece  of  human  activity,  some  kind  of  work 
or  play,  in  which  men  act  together,  and  make  it, 
in  fact,  Christian,  —  obedient  to  Christ.  Especially 
do  you  begin  to  make  it  come  when  you  claim  for 
Christ  your  nation,  —  the  concrete  reality  which  is 
God's  challenge  to  you  to  make  His  Kingdom  come. 
For  an  individual  to  accept  Christ  is  one  thing;  for 
the  nation  to  which  the  individual  belongs  to  accept 
Christ    is    another.      And    this    is   the    plain    broad 

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meaning  of  the  Old  Testament  which  is  in  the  New 
Testament  impressed  upon  all  men,  that  the  indi- 
vidual is  not  to  rest  satisfied  unless  his  nation,  as 
well  as  himself,  is  striving  to  be  Christian.  Such 
a  Christian  nation  is  a  Christian  Church.  By  what 
arrangements  this  spiritual  fact  is  to  be  expressed 
is  a  matter  subordinate  to  the  fundamental  principle, 
to  the  vital  faith,  that  the  nation  ought  to  be  a 
Church  —  a  conscious  expression  of  God's  will.  It  is 
clear  in  the  New  Testament  that  Jesus  condemns  and 
rejects  much  of  the  Jewish  effort  to  realise  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  as  neither  spiritual  nor  righteous. 
The  Kingdom  as  Jesus  defines  it  is  not  to  be  main- 
tained by  force  or  violence;  the  desire  to  serve 
others  is  the  motive  of  its  rulers ;  a  desire  which 
culminates  in  the  willingness  to  suffer  for  others. 
This  desire  is  inspired  by  Jesus  Himself;  it  depends 
upon  the  surrender  of  the  heart  and  will  to  His 
message  of  God's  love  as  revealed  in  Himself.  This 
general  exposition  of  the  meaning  of  the  Kingdom 
must  be  understood  and  accepted  before  we  decide 
the  question  whether  Jesus  laid  down  for  His  King- 
dom any  special  institutions,  such,  for  instance,  as 
Baptism  and  the  Lord's  Supper.  These  are  not 
mentioned  in  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount.  But  it 
is  an  extraordinary  interpretation  of  the  Sermon 
on  the  Mount  to  suppose  that  it  is  intended  to  be 
practised  in  vacuo.  Jesus  gives  us  principles  which 
are  to  be  intruded  into  every  conceivable  activity 
of  the  human  spirit.  His  disciple  is  a  man  bent 
on  bringing  this  about.  To  lose  this  ambition  is 
to  lose  Christ.  It  will  not  be  found  that  the  sur- 
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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

render  of  the  soul  to  Christ  can  continue  if  the  soul 
declines  citizenship  in  Christ's  Kingdom ;  and  the 
narrower  and  more  selfish  a  man's  conception  of 
Christ's  Kingdom  and  its  claims,  the  smaller  his 
soul.  Christ's  Kingdom  is  not  come  till  everything 
in  human  life  and  society  is  " ordered"  by  God's 
will. 

In  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  the 
Puritan  insisted  that  in  the  sphere  of  conduct  Christ's 
teaching  was  to  be  followed.  But  because  he  con- 
ceived art  and  music  to  involve  evil  conduct  he  set 
his  face  against  these  activities.  It  is  important  to 
understand  clearly  where  the  Puritan  was  right  and 
where  he  was  wrong.  He  was  right  in  claiming 
society  and  politics  for  Christ.  Calvin's  attempt  to 
make  the  Kingdom  of  God  come  in  Geneva  was 
heroic  and  splendid,  in  spite  of  its  mistakes.  But 
such  an  effort,  being  most  difficult,  being  indeed  the 
ultimate  and  only  effort  demanded  from  man's  spirit, 
is  continually  deflected  from  its  true  goal  by  two 
temptations.  The  unspiritual  weapons  of  force  and 
expediency  are  not  rejected  ;  the  tired  and  depressed 
Christian  ceases  to  put  away  from  him  methods 
which  seem  short  cuts  at  times  when  his  spiritual 
eyesight  is  dimmed.  Moreover  in  his  desperation  he 
limits  the  field  of  his  endeavour.  When  men  are 
seeking  amusement  and  rest  the  temptation  is  strong 
to  relax  the  moral  standard.  The  Puritan  in  conse- 
quence conceives  of  amusement  as  essentially  indul- 
gence and  therefore  not  to  be  "  ordered  "  by  God's 
governance,  but  suppressed  altogether.  Art  and 
poetry  and  music  he  thinks  of  as  pleasure-giving  ac- 

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tivities.  It  is  easier  to  abolish  them  than  to  regulate 
them.  But  this  attitude  of  the  Puritan  is  a  refusal  to 
follow  Christ.  It  is  just  when  the  task  of  establish- 
ing Christ's  Kingdom  becomes  difficult  and  delicate 
that  it  becomes  real  and  spiritual.  The  world's  re- 
fusal to  belong  to  the  Kingdom  of  God  has  hardly 
retarded  it  more  than  the  saint's  anxiety  to  make 
man's  nature  small  enough  for  him  to  reform  it  easily 
and  quickly.  The  condemnation  of  any  natural 
activity  of  the  human  spirit  —  and  of  course  amuse- 
ment and  rest  are  kinds  of  activity,  —  is  a  blasphemy 
against  God.  We  have  learned  chiefly  from  the 
writings  of  John  Ruskin  to  perceive  the  blasphemy 
of  the  Puritan  attitude  towards  poetry,  music,  and 
art,  but  Evangelical  Christians  have  not  yet  under- 
stood with  any  proper  conviction  the  full  extent  of 
the  injury  done  to  their  efforts  to  realise  Christ's 
Kingdom  by  this  blasphemy.  The  injury  is  just  as 
obvious  and  deplorable  in  the  maimed  Kingdom  as 
in  the  unreclaimed  world. 

The  Jew  was  called  upon  to  establish  the  Kingdom 
of  God  in  his  own  nation.  The  primitive  Christian 
established  it  in  the  Roman  Empire.  The  Roman 
Empire  was  his  nation.  The  religious  and  social 
convulsion  which  we  call  broadly  the  Reformation 
was  in  part  an  effort  to  bring  the  mediaeval  Church 
into  more  vital  connection  with  the  nations  of  Europe. 
A  Church  which  had  been  a  sufficient  and  suitable 
organisation  to  give  scope  to  the  establishment  of 
God's  Kingdom  in  a  world-empire  was  in  many  ways 
unsuitable  for  the  same  task  in  a  company  of  rival 
nations,  all  of  them  in  their  beginnings  anxious  to 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

secure  their  own  national  life  and  character.     It  was 
not  surprising  that  the  mediaeval  Church  should  cling 
to  her  Empire  organisation  as  a  clear  fulfilment  of 
the  universality  of  the  Kingdom  proclaimed  by  Jesus, 
and  should  fail  to  perceive  that  in  fact  the  political 
Empire  caused  the  universal  frame  in  which  her  in- 
stitutions were  cast,  so  that  when  the  political  empire 
broke  up   a  new  task  was  set  for  the   Christian  to 
achieve.     No    honest  and  sensible  student  of  medi- 
aeval times  will  fail  to  perceive  how  truly  the  medi- 
aeval   "  Empire"-  Church   was    the    nursery   of    the 
European    nationalities.     The    European    nations    in 
their  beginnings  were  moulded  and  vitalised  by  the 
Christian  Church  to  an  extent  difficult  for  us  to-day 
to  realise   adequately.     But  when   the   nations  were 
full   grown,   a   new   problem   began  to  confront  the 
Christian.     It  is  not  easy  with  the  Bible  before  us  to 
argue   that   an  universal  Church   and    his   own  soul 
are  all  that  concerns  the  Christian.     If  that  universal 
Church  is  to  be  a  real  thing  it  must  be  an  aspect  of  a 
political  reality  existing  in  the  world.     If  there  is  no 
"  parliament  of  man,"  no  "  federation  of  the  world," 
there  can  for  the  time  be  no  world-church  in  the  con- 
crete sense  demanded  by  Jesus.     The  Roman  Church 
at   present  is  too  old  or  too   young.     She  has  not 
adapted    herself  successfully  to  the  political  condi- 
tions of  modern  Europe,  or  admitted  the  necessity  of 
such  an  adaptation.     The   Roman   Catholic  has    no 
more  warrant  from  Jesus  to  define  and  limit  the  forms 
of  political    development   among   nations    than   the 
Puritan  has  warrant  to  forbid  amusements  and  dis- 
courage art.     Both  Roman  and  Puritan  have  to  intro- 

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A  Church  of  England  Approach 

duce  the  Kingdom  of  God  everywhere,  —  into  all 
human  forms  of  government  —  plutocratic,  demo- 
cratic, aristocratic,  and  monarchical;  and  into  all 
moods  and  activities  of  the  human  mind.  So  soon 
as  this  general  principle  is  practised,  it  is  found  to  be 
in  useful  accord  with  the  other  general  principle,  that 
the  rulers  in  God's  Kingdom  are  servants  whose  rule 
vitally  and  finally  depends  upon  the  free  consent  and 
surrender  of  the  spirit  to  God's  will.  There  is  a 
sense  in  which  the  Christian  is  to  take  the  world  as 
he  finds  it  when  engaged  in  establishing  God's  King- 
dom. If  he  refuses,  he  finds  at  the  last  that  he  has 
limited  and  maimed  that  Kingdom. 

In  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  the  Church  of  England 
and  the  Church  of  Rome  severed  their  connection 
with  each  other  as  organisations.     It  is  well  to  bear 
in  mind  that  spiritual  bonds  cannot  be  cut.     Mother 
and  daughter  remain  mother  and  daughter  in  spite  of 
renouncings  and  disinheritings.     Any  two  organisa- 
tions, which  accept  honestly  the  Bible  and  the  Nicene 
Creed  as  documents  of  their  faith,  will  be  spiritually 
akin,  however  laboriously  and  elaborately  they  dis- 
tinguish themselves  in  externals.     But  in  Elizabeth's 
reign  the  effort  to  realise   God's   Kingdom   for  the 
English  nation  was  very  unanimously  by  Englishmen 
taken   out   of  the    control    of  the    Roman    Church. 
However  we  judge  daughter  and  mother,  we  cannot 
deny  that  the  daughter's  mind  was  clear.     In  Eliza- 
beth's reign  the  Church  of  England  was  the  English 
Church.     The   large    majority   of    laity   and    clergy 
acquiesced    in   the   Elizabethan    settlement.     Unless 
we  place  succession  in  the  bishops  alone,  we  shall 

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Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

feel  that  the  Church  of  England  has  been  a  continu- 
ous organism  ever  since  its  first  foundation  in  this 
country.  It  is  not  till  Commonwealth  times  that  its 
claim  to  be  the  nation's  Church  can  be  reasonably 
contested.  In  England  to-day  it  is  Nonconformity 
rather  than  Roman  Catholicism  which  in  the  eyes  of 
Englishmen  weakens  the  claim  of  the  Church  of 
England  to  be  the  Christian  Church  of  the  English 
people.  A  body  of  Englishmen  so  large  in  point  of 
numbers,  intelligence,  and  energy,  that  to  cut  it  out 
of  the  English  nation  maims  and  alters  that  nation, 
stands  aside  from  the  old  Church  of  the  nation,  and 
refuses  to  belong  to  it  or  to  use  it.  There  is  there- 
fore no  such  national  Church  to-day  in  England  as 
there  was  among  the  Jews  in  David's  time,  or  even 
as  there  was  in  England  in  mediaeval  times.  There 
is  no  such  national  Church  as  there  might  be  !  The 
trouble  is  that  nobody  minds.  To  be  the  only 
Church  in  England  rather  than  to  be  the  English 
Church  satisfies  some;  to  be  "free"  satisfies  others. 
It  is  difficult  to  connect  either  ideal  with  the  teach- 
ing of  Jesus  about  the  Kingdom.  In  Elizabeth's 
reign  men  thought  differently.  The  Elizabethan 
Nonconformist  even  more  passionately  than  the  Con- 
formist desired  an  English  Church.  As  soon  as  he 
could  he  established  his  vision  of  an  English  Church. 
We  Englishmen  to-day  have  very  largely  lost  this 
passion  for  the  establishment  in  our  nation  of  the 
Church  which  we  can  claim  to  be  our  national  realisa- 
tion of  God's  kingdom. 

The  Nonconformists  have  undergone  a  change  in 
their  aim  and  point  of  view ;  instead  of  suffering  and 

262 


A  Church  of  England  Approach 

dying,  that  their  conception  of  Christ's  Kingdom  may- 
be established  in  their  nation,  they  have  become  con- 
tented to  suffer  that  their  political  disabilities  may  be 
removed.  The  emancipation  of  spiritual  religion 
from  the  forms  of  political  life  is  the  modern  ideal. 
The  subjugation  of  the  forms  of  political  life  to  spirit- 
ual religion  was  the  ideal  of  the  sixteenth-century 
Puritan.  Can  there  be  any  doubt  which  is  the  nobler, 
which  is  the  truer  to  Christ's  teaching?  Can  a 
Christian  be  satisfied  with  the  general  impression  he 
gets  from  a  glance  at  Australia  and  the  United  States? 
That  general  impression  is  that  the  religious  bodies 
are  all  "free,"  all  severed  from  any  vital  connection 
with  political  life;  and  that  the  state  also  is  "free," 
free  in  the  sense  that  religion  is  less  and  less  any  of 
its  concern  as  a  state.  That  those  who  claim  to  be 
the  spiritual  descendants  of  Luther  and  Calvin  and 
Knox  are  satisfied  with  this  result  is  as  perplexing  as 
it  is  discouraging.  Our  only  consolation  is  that  we 
understand  tolerance  and  do  not  burn  and  slay  each 
other  as  men  did  in  the  sixteenth  century.  But 
what  is  the  moral  value  to  us  of  our  toleration?  It 
may  mean,  it  very  largely  does  mean,  merely  that  we 
think  more  of  comfort  and  less  of  duty  than  our  fore- 
fathers did.  Cruelty  is  a  detestable  vice ;  but  pain  is 
not  the  worst  evil ;  and  if  we  have  left  off  burning 
each  other  only  or  mainly  because  it  hurts,  we  are 
not  therefore  stronger  or  braver.  Softness,  not  holi- 
ness, is  our  achievement.  One  thing  is  certain,  that 
by  suffering,  by  patient  and  magnanimous  endurance 
of  persecution  and  ill-will,  Christ's  Kingdom  is  spread. 
The  Nonconformist  vitally  and  finally  leaves  the 
263 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

English  Church  when  he  gives  up  the  ambition  to 
have  a  national  Church.  If  we  had  space  we  might 
discuss  the  ethics  of  the  sixteenth-century  practice  of 
going  into  opposition  till  you  could  get  your  own 
way  about  the  nation's  Church.  That  at  all  events 
was  the  beginning  of  Nonconformity  as  we  know  it 
to-day.  It  was  at  first  emphatically  Nonconformity 
within  the  Church.  It  was  as  ardently  anxious  for 
a  national  Church  as  any  conformity  itself.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  the  English  Church  has  suffered,  like 
the  Nonconformists,  by  a  lowering  of  her  ideal  of 
dominion ;  she  has  confused  herself  with  tales  of  the 
wickedness  of  the  Inquisition  until  she  has  almost 
persuaded  herself  that  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  meant 
nothing  particular  or  concrete  or  visible  by  the  King- 
dom He  spoke  of.  She  has  ceased  to  care  for  and  to 
value  her  national  character  as  a  spiritual  responsibil- 
ity, —  a  spiritual  possibility.  The  jealousy  of  the  Jew 
and  the  Apostle,  of  the  Papist  and  the  Puritan,  for  the 
Kingdom  of  God  has  become  a  strange  thing  to  her. 
This  of  course  has  been  due  mainly  to  the  Noncon- 
formist exodus.  Let  there  be  no  glossing  of  the 
matter.  The  one  sin  of  the  Nonconformist  against  his 
national  Church  is  that  he  leaves  her.  He  brings  it 
about  that  the  Englishman  is  not  born  into  one 
Church  as  he  is  born  into  one  State.  He  is  born  into 
a  competing  complex  of  Kingdoms,  into  a  civil  war  of 
religions  ;  and  this  calamity  and  misfortune  he  is  asked 
to  regard  as  a  blessing.  There  are  now  five  or  six 
important  and  influential  Nonconformist  Churches  in 
England.  Each  one  began  from  small  beginnings. 
Generally  some  single  mind  of  strong  individuality 

264 


A  Church  of  England  Approach 

has  founded  the  new  sect.  He  has  seized  upon 
some  truth  or  aspect  of  the  truth  which  the  Church 
of  his  inheritance  has  obscured  or  neglected,  and  to 
get  that  truth  regarded  he  has  renounced  his  Mother 
Church.  He  has  not  noticed  that  this  is  a  declension 
of  ideal.  To  get  one's  truth  accepted  by  one's 
Mother  Church,  that  is  the  true  prophet's  mission. 
That  the  Church  of  a  nation  suffers  terribly  by  losing 
out  of  her  ranks  just  the  strongest,  most  independent, 
most  fearless  minds,  is  of  course  always  true.  By 
this  time  the  Nonconformists  must  have  found  this 
out  by  their  own  experience.  These  minds  are 
intended  to  leaven  the  mass,  not  to  leave  it.  No  Non- 
conformist remains  a  Nonconformist.  As  soon  as 
his  Church  is  a  generation  old  the  great  mass  of  the 
members  belong  to  it  because  it  is  the  Church  of 
their  inheritance.  They  belong  as  conformists. 
The  founder  has  not  evolved  a  new  type  of  Christian 
impervious  to  the  temptations  of  formality  and  tradi- 
tionalism. He  has  merely  removed  from  his  own 
Mother  Church  by  his  own  impatience  and  self-will 
the  purifying  and  strengthening  power  of  his  own 
spiritual  insight  and  force.  And  when  a  Church  is 
founded  upon  an  aspect  of  truth  neglected  by  its 
Mother  Church  its  inevitable  tendency  is  to  magnify 
its  own  special  truth  and  to  forget  as  unimportant 
much  of  the  creed  and  practice  of  the  older  Church. 
The  body  of  Christ  is  dismembered.  The  various 
parts  do  not  harmonise  with  each  and  keep  each 
other  in  due  control.  This  arm  is  abnormally  mus- 
cular ;  that  eye  is  bright  because  its  fellow  is  nearly 
blind ;  there  is  no  co-ordinating  principle,  no  cohesion. 

265 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

The  good  which  each  member  ought  to  get  from  the 
other  members  is  lost  by,  the  common  rejection  of 
order  and  obedience. 

In  this  connection  a  word  must  be  said  on  the 
modern  ideal  of  freedom.  A  National  Church  is 
conceived  of  as  bound  and  controlled  and  enslaved. 
Nonconformist  Churches  delight  to  describe  them- 
selves as  "  free  "  Churches.  The  blessedness  of  free- 
dom is  in  giving,  not  in  taking.  The  essence  of  the 
Kingdom  as  Jesus  explains  it  is  service.  It  seems 
a  startlingly  clear  deduction  from  the  Gospel  story 
that  the  best  thing  to  do  when  your  Church  is  back- 
sliding is  to  remain  in  her  and  to  suffer.  It  is  your 
suffering  that  will  help  her.  Service  which  is  so  faith- 
ful and  passionate  that  it  is  in  the  world's  eyes  suffer- 
ing and  sorrow  and  slavery  is  what  Jesus  demands 
from  His  disciples.  Such  faithful  service  goes  always 
to  the  making  of  nations.  An  Englishman  calls  his 
army  "  the  service."  Can  a  Christian  permit  the 
suspicion  of  any  lower  ideal  to  disgrace  his  Church? 
Is  a  Christian's  Church  something  which  makes  him 
comfortable,  or  is  she  something  which  sets  him 
tasks?  It  is  by  suffering  that  we  conquer.  No  law 
of  the  Kingdom  is  more  fundamental. 

We  are  fond  of  speaking  of  the  Elizabethan  age 
as  "  spacious."  It  was  spacious  because  the  nation 
reached  a  conscious  unity  of  feeling  and  thought, 
such  as  nations  touch  only  now  and  then  in  their 
history.  That  "  spaciousness "  is  a  spiritual  thing. 
It  ought  to  be  obvious  in  the  Kingdom  of  Christ 
as  soon  as  that  Kingdom  begins  to  be  concrete  in  a 
nation,  and  rises  above  the  individual  and  provincial 

266 


A  Church  of  England  Approach 

stage.  It  is  not  an  accident  that  Elizabeth's  reign 
produced  the  most  Catholic-minded  divine  of  the 
English  Church.  To  consider  for  a  moment  the 
characteristics  of  Richard  Hooker  will  be  the  best 
way  of  perceiving  the  virtue  inherent  in  a  national 
Church.  Spiritual  spaciousness  is  the  quality  of  na- 
tional as  opposed  to  departmental  religion.  What 
Shakespeare  is  among  dramatists,  Hooker  is  among 
theologians.  It  is  impossible  to  class  him  as  a  high 
Churchman,  a  low  Churchman,  or  a  broad  Church- 
man. He  has  the  fullest  sympathy  with  all  three 
types  of  mind.  He  was  trained  in  the  Evangelical 
school,  and  his  favourite  author  is  Saint  Augustine. 
But  his  aesthetic  sensibilities  are  delicate  and  keen, 
and  it  never  occurs  to  him  to  regard  them  as  the 
enemies  of  his  soul.  Through  them  God's  grace 
comes  to  him  as  abundantly  and  gloriously  as 
through  his  reasoning  and  contemplative  faculties. 
To  call  him  a  high  Churchman  would  be  misleading, 
but  he  is,  nevertheless,  the  spiritual  ancestor  of  the 
modern  high  Church  school,  and  is  in  full  spiritual 
sympathy  with  the  great  mystics  —  with  Philo  Ju- 
dseus,  Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  and  Hugh  of  Saint 
Victor.  He  dares  to  quote  Saint  Thomas  with  respect, 
heedless  of  Protestant  prejudice.  But  he  has  also 
his  broad  Church  side.  He  has  a  noble  faith  in 
reason.  The  wholesome  and  sound  side  of  the  Re- 
naissance is  beautifully  expressed  in  him.  He  loves 
to  quote  from  so-called  profane  authors,  —  from  Ar- 
istotle and  Cicero.  And  these  sides  of  his  genius  do 
not  clash.  They  are  harmonised-  They  are  there  be- 
cause his  nature  is  fuller  and  wider  than  is  common; 

267 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

they  are  there  unconsciously;  just  as  unconsciously 
as  Shakespeare's  breadth  of  sympathy  is  present 
in  his  plays.  Hooker's  mind,  therefore,  gives  no  im- 
pression of  indifference,  of  lazy  tolerance  of  all  creeds 
because  none  is  held  strongly.  On  the  contrary,  he  is 
passionate  on  all  his  sides.  If  we  sum  him  up  under 
three  aspects  we  have  to  admit  that  each  with  him  is 
a  joyful  enthusiasm  and  all  three  are  fused  into  one 
harmonious  and  homogeneous  whole.  It  is  this 
fusing  together  of  different  characteristics  which  in 
a  national  Church  should  come  about  at  all  times  of 
deep  national  feeling.  Such  a  fusion  produces  a  new 
thing  and  a  higher  thing.  When  the  spiritual  tide  of 
national  life  is  low  the  national  Church  will  find  her 
schools  of  thought  and  temperament  inclined  to  fall 
apart,  and  to  split  into  "  free  "  Churches,  each  trying 
to  isolate  itself  and  refusing  to  add  to  its  own  stature 
by  the  hearty  vitality  of  its  union  with  the  whole  body. 
It  is  impossible  for  a  son  of  the  Church  of  England  to 
be  complacent.  What  she  is  is  so  tormentingly  below 
what  she  might  be.  But  she  aspires  to  be  as  full 
and  passionate  and  strong  as  English  human  nature. 
She  aspires  to  make  out  of  English  human  nature 
the  Kingdom  of  God  which  the  Lord  Jesus  "  orders  " 
with  His  governance.  That  is  her  ancient  historic 
mission.  She  desires  the  help  of  every  Englishman 
to  become  what  Englishmen,  by  help  of  God's  grace, 

can  make  her. 

RONALD   BAYNE. 


268 


THE   CHURCH   AS   SEEN    FROM 
OUTSIDE 

The   Rev.    PHILIP   NAPIER   WAGGETT,   M.A. 

Author  of  "Science  and  Religion*' 

WHEN  a  man  is  asked  to  describe  in  any  way 
the  attitude  of  the  English  Church  towards 
"  modern  thought,"  to  suggest  the  prospects  of 
reconciliation  and  of  common  work,  or,  from  a  purely 
external  view,  to  show  something  of  what  may  be 
contributed  by  the  Church's  particular  effort  to- 
ward the  general  advance,  he  is  confronted  by  a 
special  difficulty.  This  difficulty  lies  in  the  immense 
separation  which  seems  to  exist  between  the  two 
terms  of  the  suggested  enquiry.  It  is  almost  as  if 
they  were  what  philosophers,  I  believe,  call  incom- 
mensurate realities.  How,  men  ask,  does  the  Church 
position,  how  does  Church  controversy  or  Church 
development  come  into  contact  at  all  with  the  great 
intellectual  movements  of  the  day?1  What  we  are 
troubled  with  is  not  that  our  controversy  with  what 
is  not  Church  thought  is  too  acute,  but  that  it 
is  too  confused;   or  rather  that  there  is  hardly  the 

1  I  have,  at  some  sacrifice,  refrained  from  all  direct  reference 
to  the  Church's  share  in  the  Social  effort  of  practical  reform, 
an  effort  which  is  only  by  abstraction  separated  from  that  of 
thought. 

269 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

means  for  joining  issue  between  the  two  claimants 
upon  our  attention.  Somewhere  in  her  "  Letters," 
Mrs.  Holland,  writing  to  a  friend  in  the  country,  speaks 
of  the  Creed  going  up  in  the  village  church,  while 
the  men  listen  to  the  wind  which  roars  outside.1  The 
Belief  and  the  wind  are  competitors,  so  to  speak, 
upon  our  attention;  but  they  cannot  be  brought  into 
a  conflict  of  thought.  The  Creed  and  the  modern 
movements,  the  Church  and  science  —  these  indeed 
interrupt  one  another;  they  are  rival  applicants  for 
the  slender  attention  which  we  are  able  to  give.  We 
may  yield  our  minds  to  one  or  the  other,  but  we  can 
hardly  find  within  our  consciousness  a  field  for  their 
debate.  Rivals  in  an  almost  physical  sense  upon  our 
attention,  they  are  hardly  controversialists,  hardly 
opponents.  The  controversy,  if  it  is  a  controversy 
at  all,  is  confused,  dim,  lost  in  a  mist  wherein,  so  far 
from  coming  to  terms,  we  hardly  come  to  blows. 

And  then  further,  there  are  great  personal  mis- 
understandings which  extremely  hamper  personal 
efforts,  not  of  conciliation  only,  but  of  opposition. 
Our  friend  who  comes  to  us  with  an  ache  of  doubt 
goes  away  unsatisfied,  not  so  much  because  what  we 
have  said  appears  to  him  unreasonable,  but  because 
we  have  attributed  to  him  a  position  which  is  not  his 
own  at  all.  Of  Christians,  many  think  this  or  that 
man  to  have  gone  much  further  in  intellectual  doubt 
than  he  actually  has.     It  is  sometimes  the  Christian 

1  "  I  knew  you  must  be  still  in  Church  listening  to  the  sermon 
and  the  roaring  wind,  —  and  I  so  often  think  of  the  chancel 
and  of  the  poor  men  who  look  out  of  the  window  while  the 
Belief  is  said."  —  Letter  of  Mary  Sibylla  Holland  (Arnold),  p.  5. 

270 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

who  has  faced  the  deep  places  of  doubt,  and  imagines 
in  the  other  man  a  degree  of  critical  power  and  of 
experience,  of  which  he  is  perfectly  innocent.  It  is 
so  far  from  being  the  case  that  the  Christians  have 
not  faced  difficulties,  that  they  give  the  adversary 
credit  for  having  been  in  deeper  water  than  he  really 
has.  On  the  other  hand,  others  are  much  further 
removed  than  is  supposed  from  our  position,  and  are 
offered  arguments  and  helps  which  are  not  at  all  in 
place,  which  have  no  appeal,  no  kind  of  point  for 
them  because  they  belong  to  a  region  of  debate 
which  requires,  for  the  entrance  upon  it,  the  answer- 
ing of  many  questions  which  are  precisely  the  open 
questions  of  our  interlocutors. 

I  hint  at,  rather  than  attempt  to  describe,  a  con- 
dition of  things  which  is  surely  familiar  to  a  good 
many  amongst  us.  There  goes  the  Church  argument 
up  aloft,  with  its  questions  of  higher  and  lower,  and 
its  much  more  serious  question  of  critical  study,  chal- 
lenges of  the  authority  of  Christ,  challenges  of  the 
authority  of  the  Gospel  to  represent  Christ,  the  chal- 
lenge of  the  Church  to  show  herself  a  body  which 
really  holds  to  the  Gospel.  These  questions  and 
challenges  pass  over  our  heads,  almost  above  the 
clouds  for  some  of  us.  Meanwhile  down  below  we 
are  beset  with  questions  of  a  totally  different  order, 
on  a  different  plane,  in  a  different  sphere,  questions 
almost  material.  May  I  be  pardoned  for  recalling, 
not  as  an  example  of  this  but  as  a  kind  of  image  of  it, 
what  happens  to  the  parish  priest  who  is  preparing  a 
friend  for  confirmation.  After  many  sessions  of  in- 
struction wherein  the  teacher  has  spent  himself  in  the 

271 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

simplest  explanation,  and  his  pupil  remains  silent, 
mysteriously  attentive,  the  clergyman  pauses,  more 
than  rhetorically,  for  a  reply.  "  I  have  said  by  this  time 
a  great  many  things  to  you,  and  asked  you  a  great  many 
questions.  Have  you  nothing  to  say  to  me  ?  it  is  your 
turn  to  ask.  Is  there  no  question  to  which  you  desire 
an  answer?  "  And  then  the  man  brightens  up  ;  he  has, 
indeed,  a  question.  "  Might  I  ask,  sir,  —  I  have  often 
wondered  —  how  much  you  paid  for  that  clock?" 
That  is  not  an  example,  but  it  is  a  sort  of  image  of 
the  complete  remoteness  of  some  acute  and  question- 
ing minds  from  the  kind  of  reason  which  we  imagine 
them  to  be  seeking.  I  leave  the  suggestion  of  the 
state  as  a  suggestion,  and  endeavour  to  press  on  to 
some  proposals  of  steps  towards  a  cure. 

The  first  need  is  one  which  I  should  describe,  in 
the  most  general  terms,  as  the  need  for  a  complete 
recognition  of  one  another's  honesty.  I  do  not  use 
the  word  "  honesty  "  in  any  narrow  sense.  We  are  all, 
of  course,  indifferent  honest,  but  intellectually  there 
is  the  suspicion  of  parti  pt is.  Do  not  harbour  that 
suspicion,  unless  there  are  positive  grounds  for  it. 
The  Catholic,  the  high  Churchman,  has  really  his 
intellectual  conscience,  after  all.  The  other  man,  who 
may  call  himself  a  materialist,  has  his  immense  desire 
for  good.  I  am  afraid  I  seem  to  repeat  a  merely 
familiar  story,  but  the  reality  which  I  aim  at  is  some- 
thing rather  different  from  what  I  have  seen  described. 
I  am  not  pleading  merely  for  a  conciliatory  temper, 
or  for  giving  another  man  credit  for  good  intentions ; 
but  for  the  remembrance,  under  the  stress  of  the  in- 

272 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

tellectual  confusion  of  which  I  spoke,  that  possibly 
there  is  no  confusion  in  the  other  man's  own  mind. 
One  knows  Dr.  Liddon's  old  good-natured  joke  about 
the  Westminster  window  and  the  fog  on  the  Embank- 
ment. Well,  what  we  now  want  is  the  thought,  the 
guess,  the  hope  that  something  else  than  fog  inhabits 
the  mind  of  the  man  who  remains  mysterious  to  us, 
whose  window  gives  out  only  fumes  our  way. 

This  divination  of  another  man's  clearness  which  is 
obscure  to  us  seems  to  need  two  principal  supports. 
First,  we  must  remember  that  some  men  have  a  more 
acute  critical  power  than  others:  that  questions 
which  seem  settled  for  us  are  open  questions  to  them, 
because  in  their  minds  they  possess  a  finer  instru- 
ment which  finds  crevices  where  we  find  none. 
There  is  a  difference,  then,  in  critical  power ;  some 
have  it  in  a  more  acute  state  than  we.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  critical  do  well  to  remember  that 
some  men  have  larger  data  than  they,  a  richer  supply 
of  substantial  knowledge  arising  from  experience. 
And  although  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  and  its 
criticism  are  not  powers  which  are  alternatives  in  the 
mind,  so  that  one  is  weak  where  the  other  is  strong, 
yet  it  may  often  happen  that  the  person  of  large  and 
rich  experience  is  not  the  most  fully  exercised  in 
critical  activities,  and  still  more  often  that  the  man 
who  is  occupied  in  the  fine  division  of  the  last  rami- 
fications of  new  questions  is  the  man  who  has  no  time 
for  deepening  the  capacity  of  his  soul  and  for  filling 
it  with  larger  measures  of  substantial  gain.  With  all 
reserves,  it  remains  true  that  some  men  have  more 
acute  critical  powers  than  others,  and  some  have 
18  273 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

larger  stores  to  deal  with.  We  could  all  of  us  point, 
in  literature  if  not  in  life,  to  the  men  of  keen  Intelli- 
gence who  have  misjudged,  very  gravely  misjudged, 
their  Christian  neighbours,  taking  them  for  Obscur- 
antists, imagining  them  to  be  the  enemies  of  advanc- 
ing knowledge,  only  because  all  the  time  their 
Christian  neighbours  had  their  minds  fixed  upon  a 
range  of  spiritual  reality  which  might  well  occupy 
all  the  powers  which  they  possessed. 

A  hopeful  divination  of  other  men's  real  thoughts, 
real  clearness,  would  be  a  great  gain;  it  would  tend 
to  reduce  the  confusion  of  our  world  of  thought. 
And  towards  this  there  must  be  boldness  in  our  own 
assertions,  as  well  as  hopefulness  in  hearing  those  of 
others.  Apologetics  must  not  become  the  effort  to 
find  another  man  to  keep  one  in  countenance  in  be- 
lieving. If,  in  believing,  we  are  forced  to  be  content 
with  the  co-existence,  along  with  our  belief,  of  our 
own  ignorance,  how  much  more  may  we  be  patient 
in  face  of  the  existence  of  ignorance  in  others, 
concerning  those  things  which  make  our  life. 

I  allow  myself  to  return  with  a  certain  freedom  of 
digression  to  the  question  of  data.  We  arc  losing 
the  faculty  of  receiving  as  news,  any  piece  of  news. 
Positive  information  we  have  learned  not  to  expect; 
Nil  admirari,  to  be  surprised  at  nothing,  is  the  form 
of  our  mental  experience.  This  effect  is  partly  due 
to  the  fact  that  information  reaches  us  in  a  continuous 
stream,  a  stream  so  rapid  and  so  full  that  there  is  no 
point  at  which  we  catch  the  sense  of  freshness  in  our 
daily  truth.     Of  this   morning's  paper  a  great  deal 

274 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

was  in  yesterday's  second  edition,  still  more  in  yes- 
terday's evening  paper;  while  the  whole  contents  of 
that  were  in  the  telegraphs  on  the  notice-board 
earlier  in  the  day.  There  is  a  continual  addition,  but 
no  pause  and  no  burst.  The  news  is  like  the  spring 
in  Africa,  which  never  comes  because  it  never  quite 
stays  away.  All  this  gives  substance  to  the  habit 
by  virtue  of  which  we  expect  to  have  known  already 
what  we  are  being  told ;  and  this  in  turn  slides  into 
the  converse  expectation  that  what  we  are  told  is  in- 
deed what  we  knew  before.  The  very  notion  of  news, 
the  power  to  receive  substantial  addition  to  knowl- 
edge, is  weakened. 

This  absence  of  the  Athenian  appetite  is  specially 
pronounced  in  the  case  of  a  man  who  is  presented 
with  spiritual  news.  When  the  very  point  to  be  con- 
veyed is  that  there  is  more  to  experience  than  he  has 
yet  experienced,  he  is  sure  to  fit  to  the  words  offered 
him  the  meaning  which  is  measured  by  his  own  life. 
Rhetoric  has  something  to  answer  for  in  this  matter, 
pious  rhetoric,  which  uses  concerning  the  common- 
places of  regular  conduct  or  sincere  intention  the 
august  expressions  first  employed  by  prophets  con- 
cerning those  original  experiences  which  constitute 
revelation.  If  Saint  Paul  tells  of  a  third  heaven,  we  use 
his  word  to  point  to  a  mood  of  happy  confidence  in 
the  letter  of  Scripture.  If  Saint  John  says,  "  What  we 
have  seen,  we  declare,"  his  words  are  used  as  descrip- 
tive of  men  who  try  to  explain  what  they  have  gathered 
from  Saint  John's  Epistle.  And  when  the  great  words 
inspired  by  original  experience  are  thus  fitted  with 
secondary  and  derivative  meaning,  there  remains  no 

275 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

language  to  express  to  a  man  any  evidence  of  the 
nearness  and  beauty  of  God  which  he  does  not  him- 
self share.  There  is  nothing  left  but  the  poor  elo- 
quence of  emphasis,  that  most  forcible-feeble  of 
appeals:  or  silence.  And  silence  is  the  more  practical 
way.  We  are  like  a  painter  who  has  used  his  bright- 
est white  before  treating  the  high  light  of  his  compo- 
sition, and  has  nothing  left  for  that  but  to  scratch  a 
hole  through  his  canvas. 

But  ought  we  not  to  be  anxious  to  recover  the 
common  sense  of  the  saints  of  earlier  ages,  so  as  to 
be  able,  like  our  predecessors,  if  not  to  share  our 
neighbour's  knowledge,  at  least  to  know  that  on  this 
line  or  on  that  he  knows  more  than  we  do?  Failing 
this,  we  are  left  with  so  narrow  a  scheme  of  the  scibile, 
so  poverty-stricken  a  conception  of  being;  with  an 
outlook  upon  experience  which,  for  all  that  may  be 
said  to  us,  remains,  after  all,  only  the  reiterated  report 
of  our  own  inevitably  one-sided  life.  We  perform 
continually  and  on  a  large  scale  what  I  believe  is 
called  the  fallacy  of  simplex  enumeratio.  This  I  know, 
and  this,  and  this,  and  these  are  all ;  or  the  rest  at 
any  rate  is  unknowable. 

And  then  there  is  the  word  "  suggestive."  This  is 
answerable  for  almost  as  much  mischief  as  the  second- 
ary use  of  great  statements.  The  word  had  and  has 
its  own  appropriate  use,  but  it  has  been  used  too 
freely.  It  became  the  fashion  some  years  ago  when 
an  original  man  gave  us  of  his  best,  to  say  that  his 
book  or  sermon  was  "  most  suggestive."  This  ap- 
preciation, once  aimed  at  a  special  quality  in   the 

276 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

speech  and  a  special  experience  in  the  hearer,  came 
in  time  to  carry  with  it  the  flattering  notion  that, 
fine  as  were  the  speaker's  thoughts,  they  were  noth- 
ing compared  to  the  bright  trains  of  reflection  initi- 
ated in  the  hearers'  minds.  It  was  a  rich  soil  into 
which  his  plough  was  put ;  a  rare  energy  was  set 
free  by  his  timely  but  still  humble  stimulus.  His 
function,  the  function  of  the  most  brilliant,  was  to  in- 
terpret us  to  ourselves,  to  give  words  to  the  thoughts 
waiting  in  all  of  us  for  expression.  Hence  his  ready 
appeal,  our  warm  welcome.  He  was  ourselves  made 
audible;  he  "voiced"  —  most  horrible  of  all  our 
newer  words  —  our  silent  thought;  his  speech  was 
"  most  suggestive."  And  indeed  it  would  be  rash  to 
say  that  the  most  popular  speakers  are  not  those  who 
tell  what  everybody  knew  already.  But  we  must  be 
on  our  guard  against  a  certain  simple  conversion  of 
propositions.  It  is  true  that  when  a  man  tells  us 
what  we  knew,  he  speaks  interestingly.  Yet  we 
must  not  draw  from  this  the  statement  that  the  man 
who  speaks  interestingly  never  tells  us  what  we  did 
not  know. 

But  few  will  practically  believe  this,  except  here 
and  there  on  points  of  material  science.  In  a  philo- 
sophical circle  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  out  a 
fresh  thought,  if  the  circle  were  visited  by  one. 
Every  one  would  be  so  eager  to  label  its  expression 
with  some  old  name:  This  is  Berkeley,  that  is  Kant; 
this  is  Dogmatism,  Pragmatism,  even  Platonism. 
New  words,  if  they  could  be  found,  would  at  once  re- 
ceive an  old  connotation.  Tell  a  man  of  a  new  spirit 
in  music,  he  will  interrupt  you  with  "  Ah !  the  after- 

277 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

wave  of  Berlioz."  Tell  an  Englishman,  lost  for  six 
years  on  an  uninhabited  island,  about  the  behaviour 
of  radium  salts,  and  before  the  word  emanation  is 
out  of  your  mouth,  he  will  cap  you  with  the  aerial 
diffusion  of  lead.  I  myself  showed  as  something  a 
little  fresh,  our  new  Capetown  electric  car,  incan- 
descent within  and  without,  and  flashing  violet  above 
and  below,  to  a  raw  native  fresh  from  beyond  the 
Kei,  who  had  probably  hardly  seen  a  train  until  he 
embarked  for  Capetown  at  Indwe.  But  his  philoso- 
phy, his  mood  was  also,  and  quite  sincerely,  nil 
admirari.  It  was  "white  man's  ways,"  and  he  was 
not  at  all  surprised.  For  him,  as  for  the  rest  of  us, 
every  new  thing  seemed  to  have  been  seen  before. 
And  yet  I  doubt  whether,  like  Mr.  Henry  James' 
person  of  "  experience,"  he  was  "  in  the  condition  of 
feeling  life  in  general  so  completely  that  you  are 
well  on  your  way  to  knowing  any  particular  corner 
of  it."1 

I  admit  frankly  that  my  last  instance  is  unfavour- 
able to  the  notion  that  our  disease  of  sameness  is  at 
all  a  new  disease.  Let  it  stand.  We  at  any  rate 
have  the  disease  more  acutely  every  day,  if  acuteness 
can  be  spoken  of  in  such  a  connection. 

It  is  most  oppressive  in  the  field  of  religion,  and 
there  it  oppresses  the  amiable  as  much  as  the  trucu- 
lent. We  are  of  the  best  intentions  and  wish  to  learn. 
But  our  bright  intelligent  way  of  taking  each  other's 
disclosures  to  point  always  to  our  own,  quite  possibly 

1  Partial  Portraits,  p.  389. 
278 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

more  interesting,  past,  must  sometimes,  one  imagines, 
be  almost  exasperating  to  the  man  who  wants  to  tell 
us  what  we  have  already  in  terms  assured  him  that 
we  do  not  know. 

I  plead  rather  earnestly  for  the  recognition,  for  the 
hopeful  suspicion,  that  other  men  may  have  gone 
through  more  than  we  have.  I  plead  for  the  truth  of 
the  Differences  of  Data;  for  a  waiting,  silent,  pain- 
fully attentive  attitude.  Let  us  be  more  receptive, 
if  haply  some  one  has,  after  all,  something  to  add  to 
us  in  counsel. 

One's  own  brilliant  critical  faculty  may  resolve  the 
world  as  it  appears  to  oneself  into  matter  and  energy; 
into  lumps  and  shakes;  the  tiniest  lumps,  and  shakes 
rapid  beyond  imagination.  If  to  another  it  appears 
to  contain  more,  or  to  be  contained  by  something 
which  we  cannot  admit  to  consideration,  let  us  not  be 
over-ready  to  conclude  that  the  difference  of  opinion 
is  due  to  his  blunted  critical  faculty  alone.  A  wider 
experience,  a  mass  of  data  less  easily  managed  than 
our  own,  may  also  have  contributed  to  this  disagree- 
ment. 

II 

I  HAVE  allowed  myself  a  long  digression  on  this 
point  of  the  credit  for  sincerity  which  must  be  ex- 
tended as  far  as  possible  to  all  our  various  witnesses. 

The  second  great  need  I  should  describe  as  the 
endeavour  to  distribute  our  enquiry,  the  enquiry  of 
faith.     The  reason  we  make  so  very  little  progress  in 

279 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

the  actual  work  of  controversy,  the  reason  so  many 
men,  in  despair  of  a  real  debate,  go  on  with  their  own 
measure  of  knowledge  and  leave  other  people  with 
their  own  doubts,  is  that  what  is  in  itself  a  long  and 
intricate  enquiry  is  put  before  us  all  together  and 
confusedly.  We  should  be  much  more  likely  to  take 
an  interest  in  the  whole  field  if  the  field  were  mapped. 
We  do  not  become  all-round  men  by  having  ques- 
tions thrown  in  upon  us  at  once  from  every  side. 
Distinction  is  a  step  towards  co-ordination.  What 
may  well  at  first  sight  appear  an  effort  of  depart- 
mental limitation  will  turn  out  to  be  the  most  profit- 
able effort  towards  a  wider  view  of  the  whole  field ; 
whereas  that  confused  treatment  which  despises  de- 
partmental limits  results  only  in  a  man's  almost  total 
ignorance  of  the  whole,  and  his  far  from  moderate 
estimate  of  the  small  portion  which  he  himself  sur- 
veys. I  wonder  whether  others  feel  with  me  about 
this,  about  the  way  in  which  questions  which  are  real 
questions,  are  made  unreal  by  being  produced  in  the 
mid-course  of  an  enquiry  which,  by  its  very  exist- 
ence, presupposes  that  they  have  been  answered  one 
way  or  the  other. 

One  can  understand  the  matter  best  when  we  take 
the  physical  side.  How  tiresome  and  useless  it  would 
be,  how  tiresome,  in  fact,  it  often  is,  if  in  the  crisis  of  a 
physical  discussion  concerning  the  behaviour  of  a 
newly  discovered  metal,  or  the  more  subtle  but  still 
purely  physical  enquiry  into  the  ultimate  constitution 
of  matter,  one  finds  oneself  confronted  with  questions 
strictly  ontological.     The  discussion  of  atoms  is  often 

280 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

thus  miserably  confused.  We  get  a  mixture  beween 
what  is,  after  all,  only  the  most  minute  measurable 
constituent  of  stuff,  which  cannot  indeed  be  seen  but 
which  may  be  inferred  mathematically  by  a  consider- 
ation, for  example,  of  the  behaviour  of  light  in  certain 
circumstances,  with  what  is  quite  another  thing, 
namely  the  ideal,  metaphysical,  ultimate,  or  original 
constituent  of  matter.  How  tiresome  would  be  the 
metaphysical  critic  who,  in  the  midst  of  our  consider- 
ation of  some  wonderful  measurement  of  minutest 
bodies,  should  intrude  the  etymological  criticism  that 
whatever  can  be  measured  is  ex  hypothesi  not  an  atom. 
Or  to  take  the  cruder  case ;  how  troublesome  if  in 
the  course  of  the  re-examination  of  g  by  means  of  an 
improved  Cavendish  experiment,  somebody  were  to 
raise  the  question  of  the  existence  of  the  external 
world.  The  judicious  must  surely  answer  that,  while 
the  existence  of  the  external  world  may  be  in  itself 
very  doubtful,  for  physical  experiment  it  must  be 
regarded  as  settled.  It  has  no  place  in  an  enquiry 
which  assumes  the  affirmative  answer  to  the  wider 
metaphysical  question.  Well,  is  it  not  exactly  the 
same  thing  when  in  the  course  of  a  discussion  about 
the  behaviour  of  the  soul  or  of  the  reality  of  the 
Church  you  are  confronted  by  the  question  put  to  us 
by  dogmatic  materialism?  Undoubtedly  many  be- 
lievers are  materialists  about  material  things  and 
even  about  what  they  call  spiritual  things,  but  this 
does  not  make  the  question  less  hopelessly  incon- 
venient. It  is  obvious  that  no  enquiry  could  go  for- 
ward with  any  prospect  of  success  where  the  different 
steps  of  doubt  are  not  more  clearly  marked  out.     To 

2S1 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

some  of  the  questions  which  we  meet,  —  Has  Science 
disproved  creation?  or,  Have  new  discoveries  given 
fresh  probability  to  the  statement  that  light  was 
called  into  being  by  God's  will?  —  it  is  impossible  to 
give  any  answer,  because  it  is  impossible  to  give 
any  meaning.  You  may  as  well  tell  what  is  the 
Presbyterian  view  of  radium  salts,  or  whether  Mr. 
Warner's  success  in  Australia  has  strengthened  the 
Church  schools. 

Now  I  would  endeavour  to  say  with  all  emphasis 
that  my  idea  is  not  that  any  of  the  questions  debated 
amongst  us  are  to  be  ruled  out,  either  those  which 
belong  to  concrete  matters  of  occurrence  or  those,  at 
the  opposite  pole,  which  belong  to  the  most  ultimate 
problems  of  being.  We  are  not  to  put  aside  by  a  kind 
of  anathema  those,  for  example,  who  doubt  the  ex- 
istence of  spirit.  But  we  may  properly  invite  them 
to  consider  that  their  presence  cannot  be  practically 
useful  in  a  mental  assembly,  whose  business  it  is  to 
consider  the  prospects  of  the  spiritual  life.  Their 
question  is  a  good  and  valid  one.  If  it  can  be  argued 
out  with  these  who  are  interested  in  it  so  as  to  reach 
a  negative  reply,  all  trouble  about  Christianity  would 
then  be  saved  ;  for  there  would  be  nothing  upon  which 
to  found  a  debate.  We  could  say,  after  the  fashion 
of  ministers  in  the  French  Chamber,  //  riy  a  pas  de 
question  religieuse.  What  is  hopelessly  unreasonable 
and  unpractical  is  the  sudden  intrusion  of  these 
doubts  at  a  later  stage,  when  issue  has  already  been 
joined  upon  questions  which  cannot  arise  until  the 
materialistic  superstition  has  been  crushed.     None  of 

282 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

the  questions  are  to  be  stifled,  but  we  are  to  take 
things  in  order,  and  to  admit  to  higher  —  or  if  so 
please  you  to  lower  —  disputations  those  who  have 
made  up  their  minds  about  the  earlier  questions 
which  are  the  wicket-gates  to  the  several  departments. 
There  is  no  profit  in  discussing  New  Testament  Law 
with  those  who  do  not  acknowledge  the  authority  of 
Jesus  upon  which  all  Christian  Law  rests. 

I  have  made  these  remarks  by  way  of  preparation 
—  I   believe    a  necessary  preparation  —  for  the   en- 
deavour to  answer  the  question  which  I  suppose  to 
be  put  to  me  —  "  What  do  you  mean  by  the  Church?  " 
If  we   are  to  bring  Church  ideas  into  any  kind  of 
scheme  of  general  criticism,  we  must  make  up   our 
minds  about  the  links  of  connection.     Quite  at  the 
first,  perhaps,  the  work  of  thought  will  be  to  segre- 
gate these  Church  questions,  to  show  them  as  lying 
far  within  a  system  which  can  only  be  entered  by  the 
affirmative    answer,    as    I    have    repeatedly   said,   to 
certain     early    questions.        Materialism,     dogmatic 
accounts  of  the  past  of  mankind,  unmoral  views  of 
Society — it   is  absurd   to    bring   any   of  these  into 
direct   collision    with    Church    notions.      The    mere 
question  of  reality  of  the  Church  does  not  arise  for 
those  to  whom  these  questions  are  still  open  ones. 
The  first  work  may  therefore  be  a  work  of  segrega- 
tion ;  but  there  will  next  be  the  work  of  making  steps 
and  links.     We  shall  have  to  show  how,  where  the 
successive  affirmations  of  approach  are  possible,  the 
questions   which   elicit   them    must   be  framed   and 
ranged ;  by  what  steps  does  the  man  win  entrance 

283 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

to  the  region  where  Church  questions  are  real  ones. 
This  task  is  not  one  for  me  to  endeavour  in  such  an 
essay  as  this.  It  is  something  to  have  pointed  out 
its  existence  and  its  nature. 

In  a  simply  logical  world  the  result  of  such  a 
method  of  approaching  Church  questions  would  be 
to  narrow  progressively  the  circle  of  men  to  whom 
we  should  appeal.  To  speak  in  the  crude  language 
of  external  facts,  we  should  have  first  a  band  of  men 
discussing  the  reality  of  the  spirit.  Supposing  half 
of  them  deny  it,  are,  in  fact,  materialists,  or  find  that 
they  cannot  give  with  certainty  an  affirmative 
answer,  that  is  to  say  are  agnostics ;  then  the  next 
step  towards  a  Christian  debate  is  left  with  a  smaller 
public  for  its  appeal.  We  go  on  with  the  other  half. 
Among  these  men,  believers  about  the  soul,  there 
will  arise  genuine  questions  about  God's  relationship 
to  it.  And  eventually  from  point  to  point  we  pass  to 
those  who  are  confronted  with  the  great  and  vital 
question  whether  as  spiritual  men,  as  believers  in  the 
prerogative  of  the  spirit,  they  can  accept  the  leader- 
ship and  the  mastery  of  Jesus  Christ. 

Of  course  such  a  statement  as  this  has  to  be  made 
with  great  reserves.  It  is  merely  put  forward  as  a 
crude  suggestion  of  what  actually  goes  on  in  much 
more  subtle  ways  in  the  world  of  mind.  In  the  con- 
crete, in  the  mixed  man,  in  the  experience  moving  at 
once  in  several  planes  which  is  life,  we  have  no  such 
strict  separations.  People  do  not  first  make  up  their 
minds  that  they  are  spiritualists,  and  then  ask  them- 
selves the  questions  of  Theism.  They  do  not  first 
make  up  their  minds  about  God,  and  then  ask  them- 

284 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

selves  the  question  of  Christianity.  They  find  God 
in  Christ,  and  finding  God  they  find  themselves. 
And  the  questions  of  materialistic  philosophy  are 
dissipated  by  the  very  fact  that  men  find  themselves 
in  the  position,  in  a  spiritual  position  where  they 
become  unintelligible.  Still  when  it  comes  to  debate, 
it  is  after  some  such  outline  as  this  that  the  debate 
must  proceed.  And  it  is  by  link  after  link  like  this 
that  the  bond  can  be  forged  between  the  materialistic 
position  and  the  position  where  Church  questions 
are  important. 

It  is  only  by  the  avenue  of  the  inward  conscious- 
ness, in  the  resolved  submission  of  the  man,  that  we 
find  our  way  to  the  Church. 

The  Church  itself  is  a  reality  of  spirit,  in  spirit, 
evident  to  spirit,  real  in  point  of  fact  only  for  spirits, 
and  those  only  in  the  particular  condition  of  obedi- 
ence, of  conversion.  The  body  of  men  who  are  pos- 
sessed by  this  reality  have  contact  in  affairs  with  other 
men  for  whom  the  Church  reality,  the  reality  of  souls 
submitted  to  Christ,  is  practically  nonexistent. 

The  Church  idea,  therefore,  comes  into  conflict  in 
the  sphere  of  conduct  with  rival  ideas,  and  its  sub- 
jects appear  as  a  band  of  men  among  the  nations  of 
the  world.  But  it  remains  an  ideal  reality,  and  the 
questions  which  concern  it  can  only  be  examined  by 
those  who  by  successive  and  ever  more  exacting 
affirmations  have  come  in  view  of  its  true  features. 


285 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 


III 

HERE,  indeed,  the  notions  falsely,  as  Maurice  showed, 
called  "popular"  can  help  us  very  little.  Few  things 
probably  are  more  simply  defined  than  the  high 
Church  position  as  it  appears  to  those  who  are  not 
high  Churchmen.  To  those  who  accept  the  unpopu- 
lar name,  high  Churchmanship,  so  far  as  it  stands  for 
what  they  accept,  stands  for  an  entire  religious  life, 
with  all  its  complexity,  variety,  and  depth.  In  a  given 
space  and  time,  the  best  that  can  be  attempted  is  to 
select  one  or  two  points  out  of  the  whole  position  for 
fairly  deliberate  discussion.  And  further,  when  the 
occasion  of  the  writing  is  an  attempt  at  general  un- 
derstanding, the  points  chosen  should  be  points  upon 
which  misunderstanding  is  most  general.  These  two 
points  for  us  are  probably,  first,  the  question  of  the 
limits  and  constitution  of  the  Church,  and  secondly 
the  question  of  the  value  of  outward  things  in  religion. 
It  is  the  first  upon  which  I  shall  spend  the  rest  of 
my  space,  the  question  of  the  limits  and  constitution 
of  the  Church.  The  task  of  defining  a  conception  of 
these  may  perhaps  best  be  approached  by  setting  in 
order  four  possible  types  of  conviction. 

(i)  The  first  type  of  conviction  is  one  which  per- 
haps does  not  exist  in  many  actual  minds.  It  is  that 
the  Church,  the  outward  body  of  believing  Christians 
in  which  Revelation  and  Grace  energise  among  men, 
is  one  which  is  not  only  quite  strictly  defined  but  also 
quite   easily   recognised,  so  that  we  can  say  without 

286 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

hesitation  concerning  a  given  man,  if  only  he  is  accu- 
rately described,  that  he  does  or  does  not  belong 
to  the  Church.  In  this  view  the  membership  in  the 
Church  which  is  necessary  to  salvation,  with  what- 
ever difficulties  of  particular  evidence,  may  always 
be  ascertained  in  principle  by  means  of  well-known 
tests. 

(2)  The  second  type  of  conviction  is  that  which 
regards  external  organisation,  corporate  life,  as  a 
positive  hindrance  to  spiritual  reality,  which  sees  the 
very  essence  of  personal  reality  in  self-seclusion  and 
in  separation  from  others.  While  other  things  may 
have  corporate  existence,  salvation  must  always  be 
individual  in  such  sense  as  to  have  no  organisation  in 
common  with  others,  or  at  any  rate  as  little  as  pos- 
sible. In  this  point  of  view  organisation  is  only  a 
concession  to  the  necessities  of  the  human  side  of 
the  Church,  and  in  no  sense  a  part  of  its  divine 
reality. 

(3)  While  the  two  former  notions  are  perhaps  not 
definitely  held  by  many,  there  are  many  who  would 
seek  satisfaction  in  a  third  view;  namely,  that  cor- 
porate activity  is  part,  or  at  any  rate  a  result  of  the 
genuine  life  of  Grace,  and  is  indeed  its  actual  real- 
isation in  the  world  we  know;  but  that  there  is  no 
particular  form  of  organisation  which  is  better  than 
another.  The  various  methods  by  which  Christians 
have  combined  are  to  be  judged  as  methods  toward 
an  end,  namely  the  propagation  of  the  Gospel,  of 
which  the  organisation  itself  is  not  considered  to 
form  a  part.  They  are  the  products  of  human  wit; 
and  therefore  any  particular    form   is  valuable,  like 

287 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

a  society  for  the  promotion  of  a  special  Christian 
purpose,  so  long  as  it  is  found  not  inconvenient;  and 
it  ought  never  to  be  clung  to  as  in  itself  part  of  the 
end  for  which  men  are  Christians.  In  general  terms, 
corporate  life  is  not  an  evil,  but  a  good  thing;  yet 
it  is  a  thing  which  in  its  form  has  not  come  to  us 
by  authority,  is  rather  regulated  with  a  view  to  the 
temporary  fulfilment  in  a  given  place  of  a  purpose 
which  is  in  itself  eternal,  namely  the  salvation  of  all 
men.  This  theory  is  accepted,  no  doubt,  with  more 
or  less  of  consciousness  and  of  satisfaction  by  many 
men  of  good-will. 

(4)  Fourthly,  and  in  contrast  to  the  last  as  well  as 
to  the  other  two,  we  attempt  to  describe  the  Catholic 
position.  This  finds,  indeed,  in  the  corporate  life  of 
the  kingdom,  as  it  is  called  in  the  New  Testament, 
not  a  mere  piece  of  machinery,  but  part  of  the  es- 
sence of  the  Gospel.  Those  who  hold  it  reject  the 
idea  that  the  Church  is  to  be  considered  merely 
as  an  unessential  method  of  getting  out  the  essential 
message.  They  are  so  far  dissatisfied  with  the  state- 
ment that  the  Church  exists  in  order  to  preach  the 
Gospel,  and  find  it  so  one-sided,  that  they  would  be 
almost  willing  in  preference  to  accept  the  statement 
that  the  Gospel  was  and  is  preached  in  order  to  cre- 
ate the  Church.  The  Church  is  the  end,  in  this  view, 
of  our  Lord's  own  ministry.  He  came  that  He  might 
gather  together  men  into  one  and  make  them  into  a 
Body.  The  object  of  all  His  ministry  and  passion 
is  to  get  for  Himself  and  make  for  Himself  and  to 
present  to  God  a  perfect  Church.  To  gather  to- 
gether into  one  those  who  had  been  scattered,  who 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

had  been,  not  a  people,  but  only  so  many  persons. 
In  broadest  contrast,  therefore,  with  the  second  view, 
it  regards  organisation  and  corporate  life,  the  unity 
of  growth,  as  constituting  the  very  object  of  Christ's 
whole  work,  and  of  His  Prayer  "  that  they  may  be 
one."  Further  in  contrast  to  the  last-mentioned 
view  (3),  and  in  consequence  of  what  has  been 
already  said,  it  is  held  by  high  Churchmen  that 
there  are  definite  and  real  principles  of  organisation 
which  have  come  to  us  from  Christ ;  that  if  it  is  un- 
true to  describe  corporate  life  as  in  contrast  with,  or 
hostile  to,  personal  religion,  it  is  also  untrue,  though 
in  a  less  degree,  to  regard  the  dislocation  of  corpo- 
rate life  as  in  its  own  nature  an  indifferent  thing 
which  no  man  need  lament.  Yet  it  refuses  to  com- 
mit itself  to  the  view  which  we  have  put  at  the 
head  (1). 

The  principles  of  organisation  which  are  in  their 
own  nature  certain,  are  nevertheless  known  with 
various  degrees  of  certainty  and  knowledge. 

The  knowledge  which  is  in  its  own  nature  sin- 
cere is  carried  out  in  action  with  various  degrees  of 
success. 

In  such  a  view,  therefore,  however  illogical  it  may 
appear  to  some,  there  is  a  possibility  of  actual  grada- 
tion in  men's  Churchmanship,  and  also  a  possibility 
of  actual  doubt  with  regard  to  the  degree  to  which 
they  have  attained  true  obedience  to  the  divine  plan. 
A  man  who  should  think  in  this  manner  would  be 
slow,  therefore  —  in  many  cases  he  would  finally  re- 
fuse —  to  define  as  out  of  the  Church  those  who 
lack  what  he  believes  to  be  some  of  the  elements  of 
19  289 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

its  true  organisation.  He  does  not  readily  consent  to 
draw  a  line,  however  far  afield,  within  which  men 
who  believe  in  Christ  are,  and  beyond  which  they 
cease  to  be,  Churchmen.  Rather  he  is  bound  by 
the  very  nature  of  his  doctrine  concerning  Church- 
manship,  namely,  that  it  is  of  the  essence  of  the  Gos- 
pel to  believe  profoundly  that  everybody  is  a  true 
Churchman  in  the  very  same  proportion  as  he  is  a 
true  Christian. 

He  will  admit  (and  it  is  a  thought  which  will  bal- 
ance what  has  been  last  uttered),  that  the  Christian 
life  often  grows  in  human  souls  in  a  one-sided  and 
unbalanced  way;  that  its  progress,  so  far  as  that 
progress  is  discernible,  is  of  necessity  made,  not  in 
direct  lines,  but  by  steps  which  sway  from  side  to  side. 
Therefore  he  will  recognise  that  in  some  men  the 
work  of  Grace  may  proceed  very  far,  though  the 
thoughts  of  solidarity  and  corporate  responsibility 
have  not  developed  at  all  equally  with  those  of  the 
individual  joy  in  Christ.  Still,  though  in  this  way  a 
man  may  be  growing  in  intensity  of  Christian  life 
without  for  the  time  growing  in  the  sense  of  the 
Kingdom,  yet  taking  things  on  the  whole,  we  may 
say,  and  the  high  Churchman  is  bound  to  say,  that 
the  more  truly  a  man  is  a  Christian,  the  more  con- 
sciously his  Christianity  is  developed,  and  the  further 
(taking  things  on  the  whole)  it  has  gone,  so  much 
the  more  must  he  be  in  a  true  sense  a  Churchman. 
And  seeing,  as  we  do,  the  work  of  Grace  operating 
in  many  quarters  that  lie  apart  from  the  historical 
organisation  of  the  Church  in  its  main  stream,  we  are 

290 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

unable  and  we  are  unwilling  —  in  fact  we  resolutely 
refuse  —  to  draw  the  line  among  the  followers  of 
Christ  at  which  the  Church  ceases.  I  emphasise  the 
word  "  line."  I  do  not  say  there  are  no  limits.  But 
the  figure  which  seems  most  fit  to  suggest  the 
Church's  unity  is  not  that  of  a  disk  bounded  by  a 
definite  circumference,  a  disk  within  which  all  is  safe 
and  outside  of  which  all  is  nought  or  uncertain.  The 
figure  which  is  felt  to  be  more  profitable  is  that  of  a 
radiating  light,  the  limits  of  whose  area,  though  they 
exist,  cannot  be  discerned,  and  the  form  of  whose 
extension  is  star-like.  As  the  rays  streaming  from 
the  centre  penetrate  into  the  darkness,  so  the  Church 
penetrates  into  the  world,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say 
where  it  leaves  off. 

But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  figure,  nor  does  it 
follow  from  the  thought  which  it  is  offered  to  illus- 
trate, that  a  high  Churchman  is  indifferent  to  the  less 
and  the  more  of  Churchmanship,  or  that  he  has  no 
measure  of  them,  no  guidance  for  their  recognition. 
The  Church  which  cannot  be  defined  like  a  geometri- 
cal figure  by  its  limiting  line,  is  defined,  and  with 
absolute  certainty,  by  its  blazing  centre ;  and  to  be  a 
Churchman  means  to  have  recognised  the  paths  along 
which  the  light  streams  from  the  centre;  to  have 
accepted  as  part  of  the  Gospel,  in  the  first  place  the 
principle  of  organisation  or  rather  of  organic  life,  and 
in  the  second  place  certain  paths  along  which  this 
organic  life  is  constituted.  Accordingly,  though  the 
high  Churchman  is  able  to  be  most  liberal  with 
regard  to  others,  he  is  with  regard  to  himself  strict 
and  unswerving,  and  is  never  satisfied  with  the  degree 

291 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

of  obedience  he  has  attained.  He  seeks  to  realise  to 
the  fullest  possible  extent  of  activity  and  form,  those 
principles  which  he  already  discerns,  and  he  seeks  to 
know  more  and  more  fully  the  root  of  those  principles, 
the  deeper  first  principles  which  underlie  them.  Con- 
sequently, though  his  position  is  in  contrast  with  that 
of  the  man  who  thinks  that  a  crude  answer  can  always 
be  given  with  regard  to  the  limits  of  the  Church,  it  is 
also  greatly  contrasted  with  the  position  of  the  man 
who  thinks  that  the  Church  does  not  exist,  and  that 
there  is  no  particular  man  or  group  of  men  nearer 
than  any  others  are  to  the  form  in  which  God  meant 
them  to  live. 

The  most  thorough-going  view  of  the  necessity  of 
Church  fidelity  is  capable  of  being  also  the  most 
tolerant,  or  rather  the  most  generous  and  hopeful. 
To  believe  that  Churchmanship  is  essential  to  Chris- 
tianity is  to  discover  Churchmanship  in  all  Christians. 
But  the  "  moderate  "  view,  the  opinion  that  Church- 
manship is  a  desirable  adjunct  or  ornament  to  some- 
thing else  which  is  essential  Christianity,  leaves  a  man 
free  to  deny  any  position  in  the  Church  to  many 
whom  he  acknowledges  to  be  Christians;  to  regard 
himself  as  possessing  a  dignity  or  advantage  of 
station,  a  real  gift  from  Christ  which  is  not  only 
denied  to  some  others,  but  which  they  are  not  in 
need  of. 

Certainly  the  thorough-going  view  may  also  be 
ungenerous.  It  is  not  enough  to  perceive  the  logical 
conversion  of  the  proposition  "  only  Churchmen  are 
Christians "    into    "  all    Christians    are   Churchmen," 

292 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

though  even  this  is  more  than  some  have  perceived. 
Everything  turns  on  the  practical  treatment  of  the 
converse  thus  arrived  at.  It  becomes  a  warrant  of 
hope  and  a  command  of  generous  sympathy  and 
honour  only  when  it  is  steadily  held  in  the  light  of 
experience.  We  must  be  faithful  to  the  positive 
method.  That  is,  we  must  look  at  what  men  are,  at 
what  they  believe  and  do ;  we  must  recognise  gladly 
the  Christian  state  when  we  see  it,  and  pray  for  the 
grace  not  to  miss  the  discovery  of  it  where  it  exists. 
Under  this  safeguard  of  watchfulness,  our  proposition 
"  only  Churchmen  are  Christians "  will  not  lead  to 
our  denying  the  Christianity  of  those  whose  Church- 
manship  is  not  evident.  We  shall,  at  all  costs,  recog- 
nise the  discipleship  to  Christ,  and  believe  that, 
however  ill  realised  or  unconscious  it  may  be,  the 
desire  of  Church  life  must  be  in  those  who  desire  to 
belong  to  Him.  I  say  "  desire,"  for  it  may  be  that 
there  are  some,  even  among  believers,  who  are  rather 
in  the  position  of  catechumens  than  of  full  disciples; 
who  are  on  the  way  to  belong  to  Christ,  rather  than 
travelling  a  path  within  His  realm. 

And  further,  the  positive  method,  the  appeal  to 
experience,  to  history,  has  a  double  application,  just 
as  our  bare  proposition  has.  We  are  not  to  reduce 
our  list  of  Christians  in  order  to  preserve  our  defini- 
tion of  Church  essentials ;  we  are  to  keep  in  the  safe 
way  of  experience,  asking  who  actually  is  a  Christian. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  must  not  impoverish  our 
conception  of  Churchmanship  in  order  to  make  it 
match  our  own  Christianity.  We  must  ask  what  act- 
ually is  and  has  been  the  way  of  the  Church.     Is  not 

293 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

the  Eucharist  the  glowing  hearth  of  love  from  which 
all  her  devotion  streams,  unless,  unawares,  she  has 
become  something  other  than  she  was?  And  is  not 
the  Eucharist  all  this  because  it  is  the  Lord's  own 
Presence?  Is  not  the  "  moderate  "  view  of  the  great 
ordinance  the  one  which  really  deserves  the  blame  of 
showing  a  third  thing  between  the  Lord  and  the 
Soul?  Is  not  the  "extreme"  view  here  also  the  safe 
view,  the  unifying  view,  which  sees  in  His  sacrament 
Christ,  and  Christ  alone,  and  regards  that  which  is 
Best  as  also  Necessary? 

But  I  have  gone  too  far.  I  refrain  from  suggesting 
the  questions  which  naturally  precede  and  follow  this 
one ;  questions  of  incorporation,  ministry,  order,  con- 
ference, common  action.  This  seems  to  me  no  place 
to  ask  what  a  synod  is  and  who  can  sit  in  it.  I  desire 
not  to  obscure  the  main  statement  that  Churchman- 
ship  may  be  variable  and  yet  real,  that  the  Church's 
unity  is  vital  and  most  definite,  though  it  is  not  to  be 
described  as  if  by  the  lines  of  a  geometrical  figure, 
but  determined  by  the  continuity  of  life.  So  far  as 
in  this  way  one  can  suggest  anything,  this  seems  to 
me  to  suggest  the  high  Churchman's  thought  about 
the  Church ;  its  ultimate  and  absolute  necessity,  its 
essential  and  Divine  character,  its  real  and  definite 
existence;  and  yet  at  the  same  time  the  difficulty 
which  must  be  ours  with  regard  to  its  limits.  And 
along  with  this  prudent,  modest,  and  liberal  attitude 
concerning  others,  what  I  have  said  suggests,  I  hope, 
the  reality  of  the  high  Churchman's  unflinching 
confidence  in  the  principles  of  organisation  which 
have  come  down  to  us  from  the  great  past,  and  his 

294 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

constant  zeal,  just  so  far  as  he  is  a  real  high  Church- 
man, to  know  more  accurately  and  to  follow  more 
faithfully,  the  lines  of  organic  life  which  he  believes 
to  be  the  lines  of  obedience. 

It  is  indeed  in  this  word  "  obedience "  that  the 
whole  secret  lies.  For  here  is  our  answer  to  those 
who,  putting  aside  all  the  cheap  and  long-discredited 
objections  to  corporate  life  which  were  formerly 
thought  valuable,  would  urge  upon  us,  that  if  the 
Church  is  indeed  a  vital  unity,  if  its  laws  are  laws 
of  life,  they  may  be  trusted  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves; that  the  Church,  if  it  is  indeed  part  of  the 
work  of  Grace  to  make  a  body,  is  bound  to  be  such 
a  body ;  and  that  therefore  there  is  no  call  for  any 
given  man  to  take  sides  upon  the  matter,  to  stand 
for  the  principles  of  organisation  ;  that  it  is  bound 
to  assert  itself  without  him  ;  that  there  is  no  need 
to  take  pains  about  the  discernment  of  the  princi- 
ples of  growth  which  are  quite  certain  to  vindicate 
themselves  by  their  own  power  of  life  ;  that  what 
we  ought  to  desire  is  to  live  the  Christian  life  within 
ourselves ;  its  form  and  relations  will  take  care  of 
themselves.  Indeed  there  is  much  truth  in  this, 
so  much  truth  that  all  our  care  and  thought,  all 
our  study  of  the  past,  all  our  anxiety  about  Sacra- 
ments and  Orders  and  unity  of  action,  are  wholly 
and  finally  worthless,  unless  at  the  ground  and  root 
of  them  there  is  the  care  to  increase  in  the  essential 
life  and  joy  of  God's  presence.  But  if  this  be  there, 
then  it  does  not  follow  that  the  other  care  is  unnec- 
essary; for  the  life  which  we  are  speaking  of  is  an 
intellectual  life.  295 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

It  constitutes  itself,  it  reasserts  itself  against  death, 
it  maintains  itself,  not  by  a  mechanical  necessity,  not 
by  a  quasi-chemical  metabolism  of  nutrition,  but  by 
a  process  of  souls.  The  image  from  life  misleads 
us  if  we  conclude  from  it  that  because  the  plant 
grows  without  thinking,  therefore  the  anti-typal  plant, 
the  Church,  will  grow  without  thinking  also ;  that 
because  the  grub  is  metamorphosed  into  the  fly  with- 
out prayer,  without  zeal,  without  love,  without  inten- 
tion, therefore  the  life  of  which  it  is  the  image,  the 
new  creation  in  mankind,  will  bring  itself  to  pass 
without  thought.  In  order  to  obtain  a  just  parallel 
to  a  Church  growing  without  thought  and  zeal  we 
should  need  a  tree  growing  without  sap  and  fibre, 
a  plant  nourished  without  leaves  or  chlorophyll,  an 
animal  developed  without  food,  without  blood.  For 
indeed  the  blood,  the  food,  the  sap,  the  growth- 
process  of  a  body  which  is  a  body  of  salvation  is 
constituted  in  thought,  in  spiritual  activity,  in  love 
and  penitence.  Its  growth  is  a  growth  by  intention, 
the  maintenance  of  its  life  is  the  maintenance  of  its 
purpose.  It  is  a  new  creation  in  freedom,  growing 
by  the  enlistment  and  redemption  of  the  fallen  will, 
growing  as  the  will  once  fallen  is  lifted  up  into  a 
genuine  and  growingly  conscious  share  in  the  Di- 
vine purpose.  The  Fall  itself  is  the  abandonment 
of  thought  for  impulse.  The  fault  which  had  to 
be  remedied  was  precisely  this  slothful  yielding  to 
laws  of  growth  which  realise  themselves.  The  new 
life  is  a  life  in  the  broadest  sense  intellectual ;  it 
is  a  life  of  light.  And  here  is  our  answer  to  those 
who  ask  us  why,  if  Churchmanship  is  indeed    part 

296 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

of  the  life  of  Grace,  we  do  not  trust  blind  Grace 
to  bring  forth  true  Churchmanship.  Our  answer  is 
that  the  labour  of  knowledge,  the  effort  of  Conser- 
vatism, the  energy  (even  the  strife)  of  adherence, 
to  the  principles  we  discern,  the  long  toil  of  obedi- 
ence, is  the  very  thing,  is  the  very  life  we  trust, 
but  which  finds  itself  in  knowledge  and  struggle,  in 
choice,  that  there  is  no  virtue  which  is  to  remain 
blind,  no  Grace  which  is  not  always  conquering 
darkness,  that  the  Life  is  the  Light  of  men.  And 
if  there  be  any  person  strictly  in  contrast  with  the 
high  Churchman  I  have  sketched,  it  is  precisely  the 
man  who  thinks  that  no  care  of  his  is  called  for  in 
order  that  the  form  may  be  true,  who  thinks  that 
the  energy  bestowed  upon  a  genuine  representation 
on  earth  of  the  law  of  the  Kingdom  is  an  energy 
which  ought  to  have  been  spared  for  the  more  vital 
cause,  the  more  intimate  and  separate  concerns  of 
the  soul  in  its  solitude  before  God.  The  high 
Churchman  recognises  that  the  Kingdom  is  the  first 
word  of  the  Gospel ;  that  the  Lord  in  the  announce- 
ment of  His  purpose,  in  the  announcement  of  His 
presence,  made  mention  first  of  a  Kingdom,  even 
before  he  named  the  King,  and  made  clear  at  the 
same  time  that  it  was  a  Kingdom  of  souls,  a  King- 
dom of  thought  and  Love,  a  Kingdom  whose  laws 
had  their  authority  indeed  from  above,  but  their 
sanction  and  the  means  of  their  fulfilment  in  the 
willing  action  of  obedient  hearts. 


297 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

The  above  may  seem  to  many  with  whom  I  am 
really  in  full  sympathy  but  a  very  poor,  meagre,  and 
vague  account  of  the  great  possession  we  share.  It 
means  something  not  vague  to  me,  and  I  am  sure 
that  the  thing  which  these  words  point  to  is  not 
poor  and  slight,  but  the  one  great  thing  under 
Heaven  which  has  its  roots  in  Heaven  itself. 

The  comprehension  towards  which  I  desire  to  lift 
my  wishes  and  thoughts  is  one  not  only  different  from 
certain  practical  schemes  of  compromise  but  related 
to  them  as  an  opposite.  The  so-called  Church  unity 
whose  basis  is  of  the  earth,  earthy,  has  often  been 
offered  and  in  many  contrasted  forms  to  the  accept- 
ance of  Christians  wearied  and  weakened  by  debate. 
It  almost  always  proves  to  be  a  unity  of  outward 
form  or  at  most  of  merely  intellectual  consistency. 
When  we  meet  the  proposal  that  Church  people 
should  have  the  widest  liberty  in  belief  and  dis- 
belief, so  long  as  they  conform  with  exactness  to 
a  state-regulated  ceremonial,  we  meet  an  old  friend, 
or  rather  an  old  enemy,  in  almost  the  old  form. 
Rigidity  of  legal  uniformity  has  very  often  gone 
along  with  indifference  about  the  heart  of  truth. 
Erastianism  and  Latitudinarianism  are  old  allies. 
And  even  when  the  exaggerated  claim  of  State  or 
National  Control  was  made  in  Catholic  accents,  it 
was  not  always  untouched  by  that  fault  from  which 
Catholics  think  themselves  most  of  all  likely  to  be 
free.  The  extremes  of  doubt  and  dogma  meet,  and 
meet  sometimes  in  one  man.  The  Court  which  sup- 
ported Laud,  supported  Hobbes  as  well,  and  patron- 
ised  Chillingworth.     The  unity  of  externalism  is  not 

298 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

simply  a  poor  substitute,  it  is  the  thing  most  incom- 
patible with  deep  orthodoxy  and  the  vital  inter- 
connection of  reason,  love,  and  will  in  a  single  effort. 
The  day  we  long  for  is  not  a  day  in  which  the 
Church  of  England  will  move  grandly  forward  with 
a  Prayerbook  perfectly  exhibited  through  the  uni- 
form ministry  of  men  holding  opposite  beliefs ;  but 
a  day,  the  day,  when  the  light  shall  shine  so  full  in 
her,  and  the  vital  connection  of  her  heart  and  move- 
ments be  so  sure  and  so  known,  that  there  shall 
be  room  in  her  and  room  claimed  for  every  man  who 
really  confesses  that  JESUS  is  LORD,  God  mani- 
fest in  the  flesh,  —  room  for  all  those,  and  room  for 
no  one  else. 

I  say  "  room  claimed  "  by  those  for  whom  the 
room  is  ready.  And,  in  strictness  remember,  this  will 
mean  that  no  one  will  suppose  himself  to  be  a  Chris- 
tian who  does  not  also  believe  himself  to  be  a  Church- 
man, and  endeavour  to  realise  his  Churchmanship  in 
love  and  obedience. 

Such  a  Church,  true  to  itself  in  inmost  truth,  will 
be  far  from  thinking  the  furthest  offsets  of  external 
action  insignificant.  She  will  insist,  on  the  contrary, 
that  they  shall  become  significant.  Knowing  the 
fountain-head  of  her  own  waters,  she  will  endeavour 
that  the  streams  may  run  clear,  from  unexpressible 
love  to  ordered  statement;  from  statement  to  cere- 
monial, vital  and  yet  various,  because  enlisting  the 
various  temperaments  which  share  the  one  love; 
from  worship  to  social  endeavour,  minute  in  intimacy, 
ever  broader   in    extension ;  to  expression  in  many 

299 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

unforeseen  activities  which  shall  be  church  activities, 
because  they  are  spiritual,  but  not  spiritual  because 
they  despise  the  body.  Such  a  Church,  true  to  her- 
self, intolerant,  as  every  living  thing  must  be  by  the 
terms  of  the  charter  of  life,  of  all  that  is  contrary  to 
her  life,  will  yet  be  the  Church  which  alone  can  serve 
the  men  who,  at  a  given  hour,  still  seek  and  have  not 
found  the  faith  in  which  she  rests  and  moves. 


IV 

Much  must  be  added  to  this  paper  before  it  could 
safely,  however  slightly,  represent  the  Church  idea 
upon  more  than  one  side.  I  may  be  expected  to  tell 
what,  in  my  own  belief,  are  the  main  and  necessary 
elements  of  organisation;  what  is  finally  and  always 
characteristic  of  the  Church;  what  at  the  lowest 
reckoning  a  Christian  is  ;  at  what  point,  for  practical 
purposes,  fellowship  is  effectual.  But  I  should  depart 
from  my  plan  if  I  discussed  these  here.  Silence 
about  them  is  dictated  not  by  a  conciliatory  prudence, 
or  even  alone  by  the  modesty  of  little  knowledge,  but 
by  the  occasion  and  the  method  of  the  present  paper. 
For  this  is  not  a  proposal  for  reform  or  for  co-opera- 
tion, nor  is  it  a  discourse  intended  to  expose  the 
strength  of  their  position  to  high  Churchmen  or  to 
make  those  men  high  Churchmen  who  are  not  that 
now.  It  aims  only  at  removing  some  quite  prelimi- 
nary objections  to  considering  the  Church  system  and 
idea  as  rational  at  all ;  and  it  stops  very  far  short  of 
any  description  of  the  Church's  life  as  it  is. 

300 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

At  present  a  good  deal  has  been  done  to  explain 
and  recommend  the  ideals  and  the  nature  and  work  of 
science  to  those  Churchmen  who  are  not  scientific. 
In  such  work  we  do  not  show  positively  the  features, 
for  example,  of  biological  investigation  or  of  its  sub- 
ject-matter. The  end  is  attained  if  it  is  shown  that 
Biology  is  not  an  artificial  system  remote  from  nature, 
or  in  method  remote  from  other  parts  of  science,  or 
fanciful,  or  given  up  to  inconsequent  speculation. 

The  same  restriction  of  effort  is  proper  when 
we  speak  of  the  Church  and  the  Church  idea  to  any 
who  have  thought  of  the  first  as  a  conventional  as- 
sociation, or  of  the  other  as  an  eccentric  survival  in 
thought  only  possible  for  those  who  exile  them- 
selves from  modern  studies.  It  would  be  an  "  extrav- 
agance," a  departure  from  method  —  and  I  was 
guilty  for  a  moment  of  such  an  extravagance  —  to 
introduce  any  one  or  two  of  the  positive  facts  the  im- 
portance of  which  taken  together  I  have  endeavoured 
to  point  out. 

The  main  thing  needed  in  order  that  the  Church 
may  come  within  the  view  of  many  men  is  to  assert 
afresh  her  spiritual  character.  This  which  seems  to 
segregate  her  really  brings  her  near.  Not  all  men  have 
cathedral  stalls,  but  all  men  have  souls.  It  is  when 
the  Church  seems  to  take  rank  with  the  kingdoms  of 
the  world  or  the  associations  for  secular  study  that 
she  becomes  unintelligible,  impossible,  at  least  quite 
unmanageable  for  thought.  To  be  removed  is  in 
this  case  to  draw  near,  to  be  lifted  up  is  to  be  homely. 

But  she  is  a  mystic,  not  a  sorcerer ;  and  mystics  are, 
301 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

for  ordinary  purposes,  quite  ordinary.  That  is  why, 
like  Gilliatt  in  "  Les  Travailleurs  de  la  Mer"  the 
Church  is  so  disappointing  in  the  matter  of  miracles, 
social  or  otherwise;  miracles,  such  as  the  critics 
expect.  "  Faire  des  miracles  etait  une  chose  a 
laquelle  il  se  refusait  obstin£ment,  ce  qui  est  ridicule 
a  un  sorcier.  Ne  soyez  pas  sorcier,  mais  si  vous 
l'£tes,  faites  votre  metier." 

The  Church  is  neither  a  rival  in  the  market,  nor  a 
sorcerer  in  our  town,  something  strange  but  earthy. 
The  Church  is  mankind  spiritualised,  re-created;  and 
this  very  sublimeness,  I  said,  makes  her  ordinary  and 
near. 

The  Irish  missionaries  planted  themselves  in  isles 
to  be  near  all  Britain.  It  is  the  castle  frowning 
among  us  which  is  isolated.  The  island  is  our  neigh- 
bour by  virtue  of  the  sea,  that  wonderful  sea  which 
unites  because  it  divides,  and  is  an  image  of  the 
unifying  virtue  of  a  true  distinction. 

The  being  of  the  Church,  we  have  to  repeat,  is  in 
the  minds  and  for  the  minds  of  men ;  but  we  must 
give  to  every  term  of  this  expression  its  widest  mean- 
ing. It  is  as  a  development  of  a  certain  condition 
of  the  consciousness  that  the  Church  takes  a  place 
among   cognisable   facts. 

The  authority  of  the  Church  is  an  authority  for 
brethren,  for  believers,  about  belief,  in  belief,  an  au- 
thority to  help  prayer  and  love.  It  is  the  authority 
which  one  exercises  toward  the  other,  which  all  ex- 
ercise for  each,  when  two  or  three  are  gathered  to- 
gether, when  they  agree  touching  anything  they  shall 
ask.     It  is  the  authority  which  the  mother  possesses 

302 


The  Church  as  Seen  from  Outside 

for  the  child,  when  they  worship  together,  the  child 
kneeling  toward  his  mother,  his  face  veiled  in  her 
robe,  and  Christ  between  them.  It  is  an  authority 
of  consent  but  not  of  self-directed  consent,  for  the 
leadership  is  an  appointed  one. 

The  man  who  from  outside  challenges  this  authority 
is  like  one  who  should  intrude  upon  the  mutual  con- 
fidence of  friends.  But  the  very  thing  which  makes 
interference  ludicrous  makes  understanding  possible. 
It  is  when  the  Church  confronts  men  as  a  power  con- 
ventionally or  nationally  or  financially  defined  that  she 
becomes  an  unintelligible  mystery.  When  she  ap- 
pears not  simply  as  the  shrine  of  an  idea  which  might 
have  remained  without  a  shrine,  but  as  life  with  the 
form  which  belongs  to  life,  it  is  possible  for  her  to  be 
contemplated  by  men  who  are  for  the  time  not  of 
her,  and  to  bring  the  truth  nearer  to  them. 

PHILIP   NAPIER   WAGGETT. 


3°3 


A  CHURCH  OF  ROME  APPROACH 

WILFRID    WARD,    B.A. 
Author  of"  Witnesses  to  the  Unseen,"  etc. 

I  REGARD  the  word  "  science  "  in  the  title  of  this 
work  as  comprehending  historical  and  biblical 
criticism,  as  well  as  the  physical  sciences,  and  I 
propose,  in  response  to  the  invitation  of  the  Editor, 
to  answer  three  questions :  — 

(i)  Why,  in  endeavouring  to  formulate  a  Weltan- 
schauung  which  takes  cognisance  at  once  of  the  trend 
and  achievements  of  science,  and  of  the  truths  of 
religion,  do  I  consider  that  the  problem  should  be 
approached,  in  the  first  instance,  from  the  standpoint 
of  religious  faith,  rather  than  from  that  of  science? 

(2)  Why  do  I  consider  that  the  constitution  of 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church  is  suited,  ideally,  for  the 
necessary  mental  adjustments,  apart  from  the  consid- 
eration of  certain  practical  difficulties  which  make 
the  general  assimilation  of  new  truths  slower  among 
Catholics  than  in  other  religious  bodies? 

(3)  How  do  I  regard  the  problem  practically  hie 
et  nunc,  account  being  taken  of  these  difficulties? 

I  propose  to  give  my  answers  briefly,  and  on  those 
broad  lines  which  alone  the  space  placed  at  my  dis- 
posal allows. 

(1)  In  answering  the  first  question,  I  go  upon  the 
general  principles  which  we  inherit,  in  different  forms, 

3°4 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

from  Burke,  from  Butler,  from  Coleridge,  from  Car- 
dinal Newman,  —  that  we  have,  in  dealing  with  such 
questions  as  those  before  us,  to  ascertain  the  order 
of  Nature  in  the  human  mind,  and  to  act  on  it. 

The  true  province  of  science,  in  relation  to  human 
experience  as  a  whole,  is  not  to  give  us  an  entirely 
new  standpoint  which  supersedes  the  old,  any  more 
than  we  wear  spectacles  to  take  the  place  of  eyes. 
It  is,  on  the  contrary,  to  extend  or  correct  the  defec- 
tive or  inaccurate  spontaneous  declarations  of  ex- 
perience, which  science  presupposes  as  having  their 
root  in  truth.  Experience,  though  radically  trust- 
worthy, is  seldom  long  content  with  its  own  narrow 
limits.  It  issues  spontaneously,  in  deductions  from 
the  data  of  experience,  or  speculations  on  their  im- 
plications, which  are  partly  true,  partly  illusive  con- 
jecture. Science  corrects  illusions,  and  gradually 
substitutes  the  true  rational  developments  of  expe- 
rience for  its  inaccurate  and  fanciful  developments. 
But  in  doing  so  it  assumes  the  truth  of  the  primary 
data  of  experience. 

I  assume  all  forms  of  religion  to  present  normally 
a  combination,  in  very  various  proportions,  of  human 
speculation  and  tradition,  with  one  aspect  of  experi- 
ence,—  namely,  the  consciousness  of  responsibility 
contained  in  conscience,  and  the  sense  it  conveys  of 
dependence  on  a  higher  Power.  Speculation  and 
legend  are  interwoven  with  those  parts  of  religious 
experience  which  are  the  true  life  of  religion.  And 
in  this  connection,  as  in  the  case  of  other  aspects  of 
experience  which  have  become  blended  with  fanciful 
conjecture,  the  lawful  function  of  science  is,  I  main- 
20  3°5 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

tain,  not,  in  the  first  instance,  to  make  a  clean  sweep 
of  existing  beliefs,  but  to  sift  critically  their  various 
ingredients.  The  work  of  science  is  not  to  destroy 
the  existing  religion,  or  to  offer  us  an  entirely  new 
mental  synthesis,  but  gradually  to  correct  the  inci- 
dental extravagances  of  prescientific  speculation  on 
the  supernatural,  and  to  prune  its  overgrowths.  One 
cannot  destroy  religion  provisionally.  Religion,  once 
destroyed,  will  not  be  effectually  replaced.  It  is  too 
intimately  connected  with  the  gradual  development 
of  mind  and  soul  to  be  given  effectually  from  out- 
side in  mature  life.  A  new  scientifico-religious  creed 
would  not  easily  take  root,  for  the  religious  element 
in  it  would  be  largely  destitute  of  its  normal  evidence. 
Nay,  more,  the  power  of  inward  growth  in  the  reli- 
gion early  implanted,  its  power  of  holding  and 
moulding  the  mind,  may  be  easily  destroyed  by  the 
rough  handling  even  of  its  mental  setting,  —  of  the 
incidental  legends  and  speculations  which  it  contains. 
It  is  a  case  of  the  wheat  and  the  tares  over  again. 
Some  undisturbed  growth,  some  permission  of  super- 
stitious accretion  is  necessary,  at  all  events  under  our 
present  conditions,  in  order  that  what  is  normal  and 
true  in  religion  may  be  firmly  grasped.  With  some 
minds,  indeed,  just  as  inevitable  limitation  prevents 
any  one  from  being  a  specialist  in  many  branches, 
so  a  certain  congenital  weakness  makes  a  grasp  of 
the  scientific  standpoint  incompatible  with  a  grasp 
of  religious  truth,  and  such  weakness  must  be  recog- 
nised and  allowed  for  in  individual  cases.  For  Silas 
Marner  to  doubt  that  the  lots  decided  aright  was  to 
disbelieve  in  God.     It  is  probable  that  had  any  one 

306 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

succeeded  in  persuading  the  simple  Lama,  in  Mr. 
Kipling's  Kim,  that  his  quest  for  the  river  of  heal- 
ing which  sprang  up  where  the  Saviour  shot  his 
arrow  was  a  fool's  errand,  that  his  conviction  that 
Kim  had  been  providentially  sent  to  him  was  credu- 
lity of  the  deepest  dye,  that  many  other  sustaining 
beliefs  which  guided  his  course  in  life  were  equally 
unreliable,  he  would  eventually  have  gone  mad  with 
sorrow.  We  can  hardly  conceive  his  faith  in  Provi- 
dence surviving  the  destruction  of  a  setting  which 
had  become  so  elaborately  and  closely  twined  around 
it.  His  religious  faith  could  not  have  stood  the 
truths  of  even  a  very  simple  science.  Yet  the  touch- 
ing picture  before  us  is  that  of  a  really  "  holy  one,"  as 
he  was  regarded  by  the  people,  whose  faith  in  guid- 
ance from  on  high,  and  in  the  worth  of  righteousness, 
had  in  it  elements  that  were  trustworthy  as  they  were 
deep,  and  would  make  him  capable  of  enduring  death 
for  the  True  and  the  Just. 

Such  cases  must  be  in  our  minds  if  we  would  see 
all  aspects  of  the  practical  problem  before  us,  because 
what  is  wholly  true  of  a  small  minority  of  simple- 
minded  mystics,  is  partly  true  of  a  large  majority  of 
believers.  The  point  will  come  at  which  the  effect 
on  the  imagination  of  a  new  setting,  if  it  is  offered 
suddenly  and  wholesale,  will  destroy  a  true  faith. 
For  man  does  not  live  by  reason  alone.  But  the 
motive  which  has  prompted  the  present  volume  re- 
minds us  that  such  incompatibility  between  religious 
and  scientific  culture  does  not  represent  the  normal 
attitude  of  the  most  thoughtful  at  present.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is   the   union  of  faith  with   superstition 

3°7 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

—  the  divorce  of  faith  from  science — which  is  apt 
to  give,  in  their  eyes,  a  certain  plausibility  to  the 
agnostic  contention  that  religion  is  incredible  as 
being  naturally  the  enemy  of  a  science  which  is  unde- 
niable, and  that  a  reconciliation  between  the  two  is 
impossible. 

The  question  before  us  is,  then,  how  in  one  indi- 
vidual to  combine  a  grasp  of  the  truths  of  religion 
with  an  acceptance  of  the  general  outlook  revealed 
by  the  secular  sciences;  and  I  maintain,  as  I  have 
already  said,  that  the  normal  course  of  life  and  of 
Nature  is,  in  dealing  with  this  problem,  our  best 
guide.  A  child  learns  the  broad  principles  of  right 
and  wrong;  it  learns  to  trust  its  parents,  to  trust  the 
information  of  its  senses,  which,  as  time  goes  on, 
gradually  correct  and  supplement  each  other;  to 
believe  the  broad  simple  views  of  history,  the  incul- 
cation of  which  experience  shows  to  be  the  only  way 
of  teaching  its  first  lessons.  There  are  certain  prac- 
tical correlatives  to  the  child's  apprehension  of  these 
early  lessons  which  are  not  true.  Confidence  in 
parents,  so  desirable  and  reasonable  a  temper,  trans- 
lates itself  into  a  practical  belief  in  their  infallibility. 
The  vivid  apprehension  of  the  pictures  or  lessons 
through  which  it  learns  its  first  lessons  of  history 
often  translates  itself  into  a  belief  in  the  literal  exact- 
ness of  what  are  really  inexact  symbols,  or  broad 
views  which  need  much  qualification  to  make  them 
accurate.  The  judgments  of  the  home  circle  are 
again  held  as  a  final  standard.  To  correct  in  due 
course  these  inaccurate  overgrowths  of  valuable  be- 
liefs, Nature  does  not  recommend  a  clean  sweep  of 

308 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

early  lessons,  —  the  presentment  of  a  brand-new  creed 
of  science  and  enlightenment,  which  begins  by  say- 
ing, "  what  you  have  learnt  is  false ;  I  will  teach  you 
a  new  and  better  way."  On  the  contrary,  a  wise 
teacher  gradually,  and  in  proportion  as  the  mind  is 
ripe  for  such  distinctions,  points  out  the  difference 
between  the  truths  and  their  exaggerations.  Parents 
are,  he  explains  for  the  practical  purposes  of  a 
child's  daily  guidance,  generally  trustworthy;  but 
they  are  not  infallible.  The  judgments  of  the  home 
circle  give,  in  most  cases,  a  definite  and  more  or  less 
coherent  point  of  departure  for  freer  criticism,  —  and 
one  must  have  some  fairly  coherent  standpoint  to 
begin  with,  at  the  lowest,  as  an  exercise  ground  for 
the  intellect.  The  early  lessons  in  history,  and  the 
pictures  used  to  illustrate  them  do  give  broad  out- 
lines of  true  historical  events  of  which  the  details  are 
unknown  or  known  to  be  far  more  complex  than  can 
be  conveyed  in  the  form  of  their  first  presentment. 
The  division  of  historical  characters  into  good  and 
bad  (to  which  a  child  tends  with  instinctive  delight) 
has  its  meaning  and  represents  the  outlines  of  a  gen- 
eral view.  Further  knowledge  is  introduced  gradu- 
ally as  a  corrective.  It  is  not  presented  as  something 
which  ought  to  displace  bodily  and  supersede  the 
whole  existing  mental  furniture.  The  first  educative 
ideas  are  regarded  as  containing  in  a  not  wholly 
accurate  form  fundamental  principles  to  shake  which 
would  be  to  destroy  the  mind's  power  of  consistent 
apprehension. 

And  so,  too  (I  would  maintain),  the  results  of  his- 
torical criticism  and  of  the  physical  sciences  should 

3°9 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

be  gradually  superimposed  on  the  basis  of  the  exist- 
ing religion,  that  religion  being  prior  to  these  results, 
and  the  necessary  displacements  in  its  superstructure 
being  gradual,  and  effected  with  due  regard  for  the 
constitution  of  the  human  mind.  For  the  faculty  of 
religious  belief  (if  such  a  metaphorical  expression  be 
lawful)  may  be  lost,  if  its  nature  is  disregarded  and 
its  laws  are  violated. 

If  this  is  generally  true,  even  with  those  religions 
in  which  the  fanciful  element  is  large,  and  the  ethical 
element  far  from  perfect,  still  more  true  is  it  with  any 
form  of  Christianity,  in  which  the  ethical  element  is 
so  predominant  and  is  in  itself  noble  and  pure.  If, 
for  example,  Scripture  is  at  one  stage  of  mental 
development  believed  as  literally  true  in  all  details, 
because  it  is  the  word  of  God,  a  wise  upholder  of  the 
reconciliation  of  science  and  faith  should  not,  on  the 
principles  I  am  upholding,  make  a  clean  sweep  of 
such  a  belief,  but,  presupposing  the  belief  and  its 
fundamental  truth,  should  distinguish  that  truth 
from  its  inaccurate  interpretation  or  application. 
He  should  show  that  the  human  instruments  of  a 
divine  message  wrote  with  the  culture  of  their  time, 
which  included  ignorance  or  error  in  matters  now 
explored  by  science  and  critical  history,  and  that 
God's  teaching  is  enshrined  in  documents  in  which 
that  culture  is  inevitably  to  be  found.  That  culture 
may  include  inaccuracy  in  secular  science  without 
prejudice  to  the  fact  of  a  Divine  message. 

(2)  I  claim  for  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  that 
in  its  general  line  of  action  it  has  practically,  in  the 
long  run,  adopted  this  modus  op era,7idi  in  its  own  life, 

310 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

and  in  the  gradual  development  of  its  constitution  as 
an  ecclesiastical  polity. 

This  will  be  more  evident  if  we  first  note  the 
change  which  the  last  fifty  years  have  brought  in 
the  statement  of  the  problem  before  us.  Speaking 
roughly,  it  is  this,  —  that  fifty  years  ago  the  theo- 
logians were  apt,  in  popular  discussion,  to  present  a 
large  intellectual  structure,  dealing  in  point  of  fact 
with  matters  within  the  cognisance  of  physical  science 
and  history,  as  well  as  of  theology  proper.  This 
structure  had  the  prescriptive  right  of  possession, 
as  comprising  the  "  orthodox  "  theological  position. 
The  orthodoxy  of  new  hypotheses,  in  science  or  his- 
tory, was  tested  by  their  consistency  with  it.  Thus 
geologists  were  adjudged  heterodox  if  they  differed 
from  the  traditional  view  (long  inferred  from  the 
Bible)  as  to  the  antiquity  of  man;  evolutionists 
were  condemned  because  they  differed  from  the  gen- 
erally received  account  of  a  series  of  special  crea- 
tions, and  so  forth.  The  modus  agendi  applied  in 
the  Galileo  case  was  still  in  force,  and  theories  were 
condemned  on  the  ground  that  they  contradicted 
the  generally  accepted  view  as  to  what  Scripture 
vouched  for. 

This  method  now  no  longer  prevails  even  in  popu- 
lar discussion.  Scientific  and  critical  research  has, 
at  all  events,  shown  beyond  question  that  much  of 
the  traditional  "theological"  structure  will  not  stand. 
The  antiquity  of  man,  once  deduced  from  Scripture, 
is  no  more  regarded  as  necessary  to  orthodoxy  than 
the  Ptolemaic  interpretation  of  the  book  of  Joshua. 
But  to  the  agnostic  tendency,  to  which  this  demon- 

311 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

stration  at  first  led,  has  succeeded  the  view  that  the 
structure  of  the  current  "  theology  "  (using  the  word 
in  the  large  sense  above  indicated)  is  one  the 
strength  and  importance  of  whose  parts  are  very 
various ;  that  the  dilemma  of  all  or  none  was  false ; 
that  the  agnostic  conclusion  was  as  unproven  as  the 
ultra-conservative  assumption  had  been  unwarranted; 
that  the  "theological"  structure  was  the  outcome  of 
the  development  of  Christian  thought  in  prescientific 
days,  including  many  overgrowths  as  well  as  the 
growing  vital  parts;  that  there  is  no  short  cut  to 
the  essence  of  Christianity;  that  man  cannot  ade- 
quately isolate,  comprehend,  or  define  the  divine 
truth  presented  by  dogmatic  propositions;  but  that 
a  truer  (though  never  an  exact)  representation  of 
the  truths  committed  to  the  guardianship  of  theol- 
ogy, as  embodied  in  an  intellectual  setting  which 
takes  account  of  modern  science,  will  be  obtained 
by  the  process  of  mutual  correction  in  which  the 
body  of  scientific  and  critical  speculation  —  largely 
coloured  as  it  is  by  the  anti-Christian  bias  so  often 
influencing  its  frame rs  —  engages  in  reciprocal  criti- 
cism with  the  "theology"  in  possession,  which  is  at 
present  mingled  with  prescientific  and  inaccurate 
conjecture.  Any  large  or  free  presentment  of  the 
scientific  and  critical  outlook  will  include  much  over 
and  above  ascertained  fact,  just  as  the  prescientific 
statement  of  "theology"  involved  inaccurate  over- 
growths in  matters  which  have  only  in  later  times 
been  sifted  by  scientific  investigation  and  historical 
criticism.  A  certain  antagonism  then  between  the 
representatives  of  science  and  of  theology,  an  atti- 

312 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

tude  of  mutual  criticism,  would  seem  to  be  the 
indispensable  preparation  for  any  satisfactory  assimi- 
lation. Only  thus  shall  we  approach  that  elimina- 
tion of  unproved  excesses  on  either  side  which,  so 
long  as  they  stand,  make  the  two  systems,  of  science 
and  "  theology,"  irreconcilable. 

I  maintain  that  this  process  of  antagonism  and  sub- 
sequent partial  assimilation  between  the  conclusions 
of  the  human  reason,  freely  energising,  and  the  cur- 
rent presentment  of  the  truths  of  faith,  which  we  now 
see  to  be  essential  to  theological  precision  in  view  of 
the  advance  of  human  thought  and  of  secular  knowl- 
edge, has  in  fact  been  unconsciously  taking  place 
from  the  first  in  the  Catholic  Church  in  the  develop- 
ment of  its  "  theology."  Such  a  contention  does  not 
exclude  the  possibility  of  injustice  and  excess  on  the 
part  of  individuals  in  authority  in  their  initial  antag- 
onism to  the  novelties  advanced  in  the  name  of 
"  reason ;  "  nor  does  it  involve  a  subsequent  assimila- 
tion which  is  either  rapid  or  complete.  But  although 
the  results  visibly  attained  may  be  only  approximate, 
we  may  see  in  the  representation  within  the  Church 
of  all  the  interests  concerned,  and  their  mutual  inter- 
action, the  Providential  means  of  at  once  preserving 
the  essence  of  revelation  and  admitting  the  obviously 
just  demands  of  advancing  human  thought. 

And  as  the  story  of  organic  development  is  said  to 
be,  broadly  speaking,  similar  to  the  story  of  the  grow- 
ing foetus,  so  the  history  of  the  Church  would  seem 
to  mark  out  the  philosophy  of  her  action  in  respect 
of  her  individual  members.  The  story  of  the  Church 
to  which  the  faith  was  committed  at  Pentecost,  and  to 

3*3 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

whose  members  science  and  philosophy  have  gradu- 
ally imparted  new  successive  phases  of  secular  culture, 

—  from  the  days  of  the  Alexandrian  School  to  those 
of  the  Aristotelian  renaissance  of  the  thirteenth  cen- 
tury, —  is  broadly  similar  to  the  story  of  the  growing 
youth.  The  Church  has  followed  the  path  of  Nature. 
It  received  a  revelation  at  the  outset,  —  a  moral  ideal, 
together  with  sanctions  and  beliefs  which  gave  men 
the  power  of  translating  it  into  action.  On  that  reve- 
lation its  members,  from  an  early  period,  made  specu- 
lations, and  from  it  they  made  deductions,  both 
speculations  and  deductions  including  a  large  ele- 
ment of  the  fanciful.  They  have  gradually  been 
pruned  within  the  Church  in  accordance  with  the 
lessons  taught  by  the  advance  of  the  human  intellect 
in  accuracy  of  reasoning;  yet  the  operation  of  prun- 
ing has  been  done  with  great  caution  lest  Divine 
Truth  should  be  mutilated  in  the  process  of  cutting 
off  superstitious  accretions.  The  well-known  instance 
of  the  early  Gnostic  controversy  was,  as  it  were,  a 
rehearsal  for  this  mode  of  action  so  often  repeated 
within  the  Christian  Church.  She  rehearsed  in  that 
instance,  in  relation  to  philosophical  speculation,  the 
course  which  she  must  now  inevitably  take  in  rela- 
tion to  the  positive  sciences.  The  Hellenism  of  the 
Gnostics  was,  in  spite  of  its  elements  of  genuine  philo- 
sophical speculation,  largely  an  indulgence  in  fancy. 
And  it  involved  the  rejection  of  the  Old  Testament, 

—  an  essential  element  in  the  groundwork  of  Chris- 
tian development.  It  was  opposed  by  St.  Irenaeus 
on  behalf  of  the  Church,  and  his  ever-memorable 
passage  on  the  vanity  of  human  speculation  on  mat- 

3i4 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

ters  of  which  we  can  know  nothing,  may  be  regarded 
as  a  motto  representing  the  wisdom  of  the  Christian 
philosophy  of  Faith.  But  while  the  "  acute  secularis- 
ing" of  Christianity  and  its  sudden  Hellenising,  to  use 
Harnack's  phrases,  was  opposed  by  the  Church,  the 
assimilative  genius  of  Catholicism  became  gradually 
apparent  in  this  very  matter.  Harnack  has  not  hesi- 
tated to  say  that  in  Catholic  theology,  as  subsequently 
developed,  "  Gnosticism  obtained  half  a  victory,"1 
in  so  far,  he  explains,  as  Gnosticism  was  Hellenism. 
Cardinal  Newman,  as  I  have  elsewhere  pointed  out, 
takes  a  very  similar  view  of  this  episode  in  Christian 
history.  The  condition  was  that  the  assimilation  was 
gradual  and  critical.  The  Gnostic  rejection  of  the 
Old  Testament,  the  very  basis  of  Christian  develop- 
ment, was  set  aside;  the  more  fanciful  theories  were 
rejected.  The  essential  genius  of  Catholicism  and 
the  essence  of  the  revelation  were  preserved.  Given 
this  condition,  the  gradual  adoption  of  the  Hellenic 
superstructure  in  its  explication  was  admissible. 

The  combination  of  exclusiveness,  whereby  the 
essential  principles  and  beliefs  of  the  primitive  reve- 
lation were  preserved,  and  assimilative  power  whereby, 
once  this  was  assured,  the  more  serious  achievements 
of  the  human  reason  and  the  more  important  factors 
of  a  newer  culture  could  be  admitted,  has,  then,  I 
would  maintain,  characterised  the  Church  from  the 
first  days  of  her  intellectual  life.  She  began  as  a 
child.  The  revelation  was  imparted  to  uneducated 
fishermen.  Deep  truths  of  vital  importance  to  all, 
cultured  and  uncultured,  were  given  her  once  for  all, 
1  See  Harnack's  History  of  Dogma,  I.  227. 
3*5 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

at  a  stage  prior  to  that  at  which  the  Christian  philo- 
sophical schools  came  into  existence.  The  infantine 
fancies  or  boyish  speculations  which  arose  had  to  be 
gradually  eliminated,  and  to  give  place  to  the  grave 
philosophy  and  fuller  knowledge  of  fact  contributed 
by  the  great  Christian  thinkers  and  the  serious  ex- 
ponents of  secular  science.  The  division  of  parts  in 
the  polity  which  was  gradually  evolved,  —  a  division 
which  is  now  so  acutely  needed  when  the  world 
known  to  history  and  to  science  is  found  to  be  sus- 
ceptible of  a  knowledge  so  much  more  wide  and 
accurate  than  was  once  imagined  to  be  possible, — 
was  visible  already  in  the  early  centuries;  —  the  divi- 
sion (I  mean)  between  the  representatives  of  the 
devotional  life,  and  the  representatives  of  research, 
reflection,  and  speculation  on  the  intellectual  basis  of 
that  life.  And  the  Ruling  Power  which  the  Church, 
as  a  world-wide  society,  needed,  embodied  also  the 
third  element  in  its  constitution,  namely,  the  official 
and  divinely  appointed  guardians  of  the  deposition 
fidci,  whose  work  it  was  to  protect  and  supervise 
both  interests,  —  to  preserve  the  faith  on  which  de- 
votion rested,  to  resist  the  encroachments  of  the 
speculative  intellect,  and  yet  not  to  bar  out  assured 
intellectual  truth,  which  it  behooved  the  Society  to 
assimilate,  lest  Christianity  should  be  identified  with 
superstition  and  become  inaccessible  to  the  educated. 
(3)  All  this  may  appear  to  be  highly  theoretical. 
The  Church  of  Rome,  it  may  be  urged,  has  been 
historically  the  foe  to  science  and  to  freedom  of  in- 
tellect. In  proportion  as  the  distinctive  features  of 
"  Romanism  "  have  become  clearly  differentiated  in 

316 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

course  of  Church  history,  the  intolerant  and  perse- 
cuting spirit  has  increased.  The  Roman  authorities 
have  ever  been  notorious  for  condemnation  —  when 
have  they  done  anything  in  the  direction  of  assimi- 
lation? Even  admitting  what  has  been  said  as  a 
theory,  how  can  it  be  regarded  as  true  to  fact? 

To  this  I  reply, 

(#)  That  just  as  a  contest  or  rivalry,  physical, 
political,  financial,  between  a  man  of  principle  and  a 
man  without  principle,  is  often  an  unequal  one,  —  for 
the  latter  may  in  a  hundred  ways  hit  below  the  belt, 
—  so  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  Church  must  be, 
not  indeed  a  foe  to,  but  a  drag  on,  scientific  advance. 
The  man  without  a  conscience  has  simply  to  think 
of  the  best  road  to  success.  The  other  must  ask 
at  every  step,  "  Is  this  lawful?"  The  Church  has 
other  duties  apart  from  the  promotion  of  the  secular 
sciences,  —  duties  which  may  in  some  degree  come 
athwart  the  immediate  interests  of  these  sciences.  To 
preserve  truth  as  a  whole  may  mean  to  arrest  for  a 
time  a  one-si  led  development.  Science  may,  there- 
fore, move  faster  outside  the  Church  than  within  it. 

(b)  It  is  quite  true  that  authority  acts  normally, 
not  by  way  of  active  assimilation,  but  mainly  by  way 
of  opposition,  to  new  developments  of  the  reason 
because  Authority  is  the  guardian  of  the  deposit  of 
faith  that  is  handed  down,  and  it  guards  it,  in  the  first 
instance,  in  the  traditional  form,  opposing  novelty 
until  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  modification  of  its 
form  does  not  mean  real  mutilation  of  its  essence. 
Authority  opposes  the  entrance  of  a  new  phase  of 
intellectual   expression   until   such    a   new   phase   is 

3J7 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

shown  to  be  without  danger  to  the  faith.  It  is  the 
representatives  of  the  intellectual  force  in  the  Church, 
and  not  those  of  official  authority,  who  normally 
initiate  the  work  of  assimilation.  Authority  tests  it, 
and  may  in  doing  so  seem  to  oppose  it.  She  plays, 
so  far  as  scientific  proof  is  concerned,  the  part  taken 
by  the  "  Devil's  advocate,"  in  the  process  of  canoni- 
sation. She  is  jealous  of  disturbing  changes  in  the 
human  medium  by  which  faith  in  the  unseen  is  habit- 
ually preserved  hie  et  nunc  ;  science  is  placed  by  her 
on  the  defensive ;  excesses  and  fanciful  theories  are 
gradually  driven  out  of  court ;  a  truer  and  more 
exact  assimilation  of  assured  results  in  science  and 
in  theology  is  thus  obtained  by  the  thinkers ;  then, 
and  not  until  then,  Authority  accepts  such  results 
passively.  She  is  the  guardian,  not  of  the  truths  of 
science,  but  of  the  things  of  the  spirit.  It  is  not  for 
her  to  initiate  inquiries  beyond  her  special  province. 

This  division  of  parts  was  visible  in  the  great 
theological  transformation  of  the  thirteenth  century. 
It  was  not  Ecclesiastical  Authority,  but  the  great 
University  Professors  —  Albertus  Magnus,  Thomas 
Aquinas,  and  their  peers — who  accomplished  the 
work  of  assimilating  Christian  Theology  to  the  philo- 
sophical culture  of  the  Aristotelian  Renaissance. 
Authority  successively  opposed,  tolerated,  and  ap- 
proved their  labours,  as  those  labours  gradually 
Christianised  the  "new  learning"  of  the  thirteenth 
century.  Our  present  need  is  a  body  of  specialists 
and  theologians  of  insight,  who  will  do  a  similar 
work  for  the  critical  and  historical  sciences  of  the 
twentieth  century. 

3i8 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

(V)  It  is,  then,  not  as  being  the  best  road,  having 
regard  solely  to  the  interests  of  present  scientific 
activity,  that  I  advocate  the  "  approach "  to  the 
desired  synthesis  (to  use  the  phrase  in  the  Editor's 
Preface)  through  the  Church  of  Rome,  but  as  being 
the  road  whereby  the  security  of  both  interests  can 
be  best  defended.  Assuming  that  Christianity  was  a 
revelation  of  spiritual  truth,  the  interests  of  truth  as 
a  whole  are  best  guarded  by  an  institution  which 
does  act  to  some  extent  as  a  drag  on  the  freest 
adoption  of  speculations  advanced  in  the  name  of 
science  and  criticism.  An  absolutely  free  admission, 
broadcast,  among  all  minds,  of  the  most  various 
calibre,  of  the  highly  speculative  theories  of  (more 
especially)  modern  biblical  critics,  —  theories  inspired 
often  by  anti-Christian  prejudice,  —  need  not  be 
prejudicial  to  secular  science  itself.  It  may  even 
contribute  to  scientific  truth  from  the  gems  mixed 
with  the  rubbish.  But  it  may  be  opposed  to  the 
interests  of  truth,  as  a  whole,  hie  et  nunc.  It  may 
destroy  religious  faith  in  the  many.  The  imagina- 
tion becomes  overpowered  by  the  kaleidoscope  of 
irresponsible  speculation.  The  faculty  whereby  re- 
ligious truth  is  grasped  is  confused  by  the  over- 
crowding of  the  mind.  Its  grasp  is  relaxed.  Faith 
may  be  killed  never  to  return,  and  lost  like  some 
traditional  secret  in  art  or  in  painting,  —  as  the 
tradition  of  the  old  Gregorian  singing  is  said  to 
have  been  lost. 

Hence  the  suspiciousness  on  the  part  of  the  guar- 
dians of  dogma  of  any  novelty  which  affects  the 
statement  or  exposition  of  dogma.     It  is  no  question 

3J9 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

of  hostility  to  science  as  such,  but  of  the  jealous 
guardianship  of  the  "  deposit."  This  is  no  fancy  or 
theory.  The  jealousy  of  which  I  speak  may  bring 
out  exhibitions  of  the  persecuting  temper  in  indi- 
viduals ;  it  may  be  mixed  up  with  party  feelings  or 
personal  antipathies ;  it  may  take  the  form  of  ob- 
scurantism :  but  no  one  acquainted  with  Rome  can 
deny  that  there  is  in  the  appointed  rulers  this  deep 
traditional  sense  that  it  is  their  business  to  guard  the 
"  deposit,"  and  that  to  fail  in  this  is  the  one  great 
crime  compared  to  which  injustice  to  secular  science 
is  a  small  matter,  —  for  it  is  to  fail  in  the  principal 
duty  of  their  office.  This  may  sound  not  an  entirely 
promising  defence  of  Rome  as  the  "  approach  "  to  a 
synthesis  between  religion  and  science.  But  I  regard 
the  method  I  have  sketched  as  essential  if  both  ele- 
ments are  to  be  preserved.  The  trend  of  the  modern 
movement  is  at  present  inevitably,  at  least  indirectly, 
anti-religious.  The  wonders  of  Christianity,  the  new 
birth  of  the  moral  world  which  we  owe  to  it,  have 
become  an  old  story.  They  cease  to  inspire  and 
hold  men  as  they  once  did.  It  is  science  which  now 
brings  the  charm  of  new  worlds  of  discovery.  A 
scientific  synthesis  of  the  Universe  which  forgets 
religion  is  the  real  danger. 

The  greater  the  intellectual  displacements  which 
are  seen  to  be  inevitable,  the  more  essential  is  it  that 
a  living  organism  should  preserve  that  supernatural 
truth  which  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  intellectual,  and 
of  which  a  merely  intellectual  recasting  of  knowledge 
may  take  no  more  account  than  a  complete  record 
of  the  anatomical  analysis  of  the  human  body  takes 

320 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

account  of  the  soul.  A  representative  body  which 
professes,  through  good  and  evil  repute,  to  hold  fast 
to  the  Christian  message,  to  assert  it,  to  defend  it 
to  the  death,  is  essential  if  Christianity  is  to  last  in 
any  true  sense  in  the  modern  world  of  ever-changing 
intellectual  theories,  amid  the  irregular  and  uncer- 
tain advances  towards  scientific  conclusions,  through 
fanciful  and  delusive  speculation.  Such  a  body  does 
not  directly  aid  science  in  its  own  domain.  That  is 
not  its  object  or  its  business.  But  it  does  preserve 
one  of  the  elements  in  the  desired  synthesis,  which 
without  such  a  body  to  fight  its  battles  would  gradu- 
ally dwindle  to  nothing  and  lose  its  influence.  The 
new  points  of  view  suggested  by  men  of  science  are 
doubtless  accepted  outside  the  Roman  Communion 
more  readily  than  within.  But  is  that  to  say  that 
they  are  assimilated  in  them  by  Christianity?  I 
doubt  it.  The  scientific  synthesis  may  assimilate 
elements  of  Christianity  elsewhere.  But  if  Christi- 
anity is  to  assimilate  what  is  true  in  science,  without 
itself  becoming  utterly  diluted  and  losing  its  distinc- 
tive genius  amid  the  inevitable  intellectual  changes, 
I  see  no  other  machinery  which  will,  in  the  long 
run,  accomplish  this  work,  except  the  organic  co- 
operation of  defenders  of  the  various  truths  and 
interests  concerned,  the  machinery  for  which  is  to  be 
found  in  the  constitution  of  the  Catholic  Church. 

The  specially  rigid  attitude,  then,  of  modern  Rome 
may  be  regarded,  roughly,  as  the  response  and  retort, 
of  a  living  vigorous  power  representing  Christianity, 
which  assumes  a  definite  policy  to  counteract  a  policy 
on  the  part  of  what  may  be  called  the  modern  move- 
21  321 


Ideals  of  Science  and  Faith 

ment,  which  is  irreligious  as  well  as  scientific.  The 
desideratum  at  present  is  not  to  dethrone  that  power 
represented  by  the  Church,  but,  as  I  have  already- 
suggested,  to  cultivate  vigorous  thought  and  wide 
learning  within  the  Church  and  among  all  Christian 
thinkers,  lest  a  necessary  practical  policy  on  the  part 
of  the  Church  should  tend  to  become  identified  with 
intellectual  intransigeance  and  sheer  opposition  to  the 
interests  of  truth  in  certain  departments.  The  results 
of  the  scientific  movement,  as  they  come  to  us  from 
the  hands  of  opponents  of  Christianity,  the  Church 
cannot  accept.  They  are  not  pure  science.  What  is 
advanced  as  science  is  in  reality  often  subtly  coloured 
by  the  prepossessions  of  its  advocates.  Only  learn- 
ing and  thought  among  Christians  themselves,  fairly 
equal  in  extent  and  quality  to  those  of  their  oppo- 
nents, can  afford  the  means  for  the  desired  synthesis. 
Until  these  are  found,  faith  may  be  inevitably  allied 
within  the  Church  with  a  secular  science  which  is 
not  fully  alive  to  the  problems  of  the  moment.  The 
Church  which  has  the  patience  to  wait  for  these  in- 
dispensable allies  does  not  afford,  necessarily,  the 
quickest  "  approach  "  to  an  acceptance  of  the  modern 
scientific  outlook ;  but  she  may  prove  to  afford  the 
only  machinery  whereby  the  desired  synthesis  may 
be  attained,  —  whereby  Christianity  can  be  preserved 
undiluted,  until  Christian  thought  has  accomplished 
the  task  of  finding  the  necessary  modus  vivendi  and 
rescuing  science  proper  from  the  hands  of  those 
assailants  of  Christianity  whose  jugglery  presents 
the  results  of  their  own  anti-Christian  prepossessions 
as  an  integral  part  of  scientific  achievement. 

322 


A  Church  of  Rome  Approach 

And  here  I  terminate  my  suggestions ;  for  the  actual 
problems,  placed  by  modern  science  and  scientific 
criticism  before  the  thinking  world  of  Christians,  do 
not  differ  very  considerably  for  the  Roman  Catholic 
and  for  adherents  of  the  various  shades  of  Protestant- 
ism. My  purpose  here  has  been  to  show  that  the 
religious  approach  being  the  natural  preliminary  to 
the  consideration  of  scientific  criticism,  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  Catholic  Church,  and  even  its  modus  agendi 
in  the  past,  are  well  adapted  to  the  situation.  The 
constituent  forces  concerned  in  the  development  of 
its  theology  exhibit  its  claim  as  the  guardian  of  belief 
in  the  divine  revelation,  —  a  belief  so  constantly  as- 
sailed, so  easily  destroyed  for  individual  minds  in  the 
confusing  Babel  of  modern  speculation,  —  while  pro- 
viding for  such  assimilation  of  serious  thought  and 
science  as  is  consistent  with  the  security  of  Christian 
faith  in  the  weak  and  impressionable  mind  of  man. 
Whether  this  assimilation  has  always  been  within  the 
Church  as  rapid  as  it  might  be  consistently  with  the 
sacred  interests  to  which  I  refer,  is  another  question. 
But  on  the  assumption  that  Christianity  is  all  it  pro- 
fesses to  be,  such  a  deflection  from  the  perfect  via 
media,  as  excessive  jealousy  for  Christian  tradition 
implies,  would  seem  to  be  a  less  serious  charge  than 
that  of  over-great  hastiness  in  reconstruction. 

WILFRID   WARD. 


323 


INDEX 


Abiogenesis,  the  breakdown  of  the 
case  for,  89 

Africa,  a  spring  in  South,  275;  Cape- 
town electric  car,  278 

Agnosticism,  decay  of,  85  ;  religions, 
84;  and  the  Presbyterian  Church, 
243;  the  agnostic  tendency,  311 

Alexandrian  school,  314 

Alfred,  King,  setting  up  schools,  128 

Altruism,  70,  71,  72 

Angelo,  Michael,  "  Art  for  Art's  sake," 
126 

Anthropomorphism,  there  are  many 
errors,  but  one  truth  in,  32 

Antoninus,  freedom  lays  in  the  mind 
itself,  193 

Ants,  what  know  they  of  fate  and  of 
the  future,  46 

Apologetics  and  believing,  274 

Aquinas,  Thomas,  320 

Aristotle,  172,  184,  224,  267;  Aristo- 
telian renaissance,  314,  318 

Arnold,  Matthew,  in  conflict  with  the 
Dogmatists  of  religion,  126 

Artistic  group,  126 

Atheism,  what  has  been  called,  27 

Athenian  appetite,  275 

Atomic  theory  of  the  universe,  82, 83, 97 

Atoms  and  an  inner  principle  of  adap- 
tation, 89 ;  the  discussion  of,  often 
confused,  280 

Augustine,  Saint,  and  Richard  Hooker, 
267 

Australia,  severance  of  religious  bodies 
from  any  vital  connection  with  politi- 
cal life,  263 

Authority,  the  guardian  of  the  "de- 
posit" of  faith,  317;  authority  and 
science,  318 


Bacillic  forms   sensitive  to  stimuli 
from  their  environment,  88 


Bacon,  before  his  time  in  England, 
227;  his  work  telling  at  last,  228 

Balfour,  A.  J.,  a  theological  stumbling 
block  may  be  a  religious  aid,  242 

Bayne,  Rev.  Ronald,  A  Church  of 
England  Approach,  246-268 

Beethoven,  what  struggle  for  existence 
will  explain  the  advent  of  a,  36 

Berkeley,  277 

Bible,  the,  14,  238,  239,  240,  241,  242, 
243;  not  a  scientific  text-book,  241; 
history  of  the  power  of  ideals,  249  ; 
historical  character,  essential  to  its 
value,  251;  the  kingdom  of  God  in, 
252;  and  the  secular  sciences,  310 

Biological  Approach,  Professor  J.  A. 
Thomson  and  Professor  Patrick 
Geddes,  49-80 

Biology,  20,  35,  52;  and  education, 
186,  203;  evolution,  62,  63,  yS\ 
human  progress,  78 ;  idea  of  God, 
7S ;  theology,  49,  50 ;  ideals  of,  y^t 
75,  7j,  80;  ideals  of  religion,  204 

Boscowich,  the  atomic  theory,  83 

Box-making  in  modern  education,  208 

Brahmin  purification,  198 

Brain,  the,  no  real  continuity  between 
brain  processes  and  mental  experi- 
ences, 90 

Branford,  Mr.  Victor  V.,  A  Sociologi- 
cal Approach,  103-156 

British  and  French  educational  meth- 
ods, 171 

Brown-Sequard  and  biological  science, 
196 

Browning's  "  Christmas  Eve,"  249 

Buclmer's  "  Force  and  Matter,"  83 

Buddha  and  the  great  spiritual  discov- 
ery of  the  race,  147 

Buffon  and  evolutionary  processes,  135 

Bull,  John,  educational  reawakening, 
188 


325 


Ind 


ex 


Bulletin  four  P  Action  Morale,  i 76 
Bunge  and  biological  problems,  55 

Calvin,  John,  223,  225,  22S,  239, 
263 ;    Calvinistic  system,  227 

Campbell,  John  MacLeod  and  the 
Church  of  Scotland,  234 

Candlish,  Professor  J.  S.,  on  seven- 
teenth-century theologians,  232;  on 
principles  of  the  Reformation,  239 

Causation,  100  ;  its  genesis,  109;  scien- 
tific principle  of,  109 

Cause  and  effect,  86,  91 

Cell,  the,  19 ;  inorganic  material  and, 
20  ;  the  living,  89 

Celibacy  for  the  school  mistress,  174 

Ceremonial,  religious  and  artistic,  140, 
145 ;  ceremonialism,  206 

Ceremonials,  functions  of,  149 

Chalmers,  Thomas,  130,  235 

Chance  one  of  the  most  orderly  phe- 
nomena in  the  universe !  64 

Charlemagne  creating  local  administra- 
tion, 128 

Chemistry  and  life,  88 

Chiene,  Dr.,  no  antagonism  between 
science  and  religion,  222 

Chillingworth,  the  extremes  of  doubt 
and  dogma  meet,  298 

China  and  education,  186 

Christian  doctrines,  14;  doctrine  of 
creation,  224;  "evidences,"  234; 
Church  vitalised  the  European 
nationalities,  260;  thought  and 
modern  science,  312 

Christianity  and  Biology,  51;  and  the 
Grseco- Roman  civilisation,  255;  and 
renunciation,  163;  the  scientific  syn- 
thesis of,  320;  no  short  cut  to  es- 
sence of,  312. 

Church  atmosphere  and  a  scientific  man, 
12;  and  education,  172,  203;  human 
reason,  313;  modern  thought,  323; 
Nonconformists,  261 ;  Roman  Em- 
pire, 255  ;  science,  270,  317  ;  schools, 
173;  and  sociology,  221;  mankind 
spiritualised,  302 

Church  of  England  Approach,  Rev. 
Ronald  Bayne,  246-26S ;  the  Bible, 
249  ;  Puritanism,  258  ;  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  260 ;  Noncon- 
formist Free  Churches,  262;  change 
in  the  Nonconformist  ideal,  263; 
ideal   of  freedom,   265;    its   catho- 

32 


licity  asserted  as  a  national  King- 
dom of  Christ,  267;   aspires  to  be. 
as  strong  as  English  human  nature, 
268 

Church  of  England  Approach,  Rev. 
Philip  Napier  Waggett,  269-303; 
parties  in  the  English  Church  — 
need  for  recognition  of  each  other's 
honesty,  272;  suppositions  upon 
which  faith  in  the  Church  rests, 
283;  methods  of  enquiry,  284;  be- 
lief in  an  inward  submission  of  the 
spirit,  2S5;  two  points  of  high 
Churchmanship,  2S6;  limits  and 
constitution  of,  2S6;  four  types  of 
conviction,  286;  the  Catholic  type, 
28S ;  this  Catholic  type  not  narrow, 
289;  the  Church  may  be  figured  as 
a  star  in  the  darkness,  291 ;  the 
star  has  its  blazing  centre,  although 
its  light  has  not  circumference  line, 
291;  tolerance  of  high  Churchmen, 
292;  the  principle  "only  Church- 
men are  Christians,"  293;  the  ap- 
peal to  history,  293;  the  high 
Churchman's  position,  294;  the  law 
of  obedience,  295  ;  the  law  of  growth, 
295  ;  the  true  method  of  unity,  298 ; 
scope  of  dominion,  299;  limitation 
of  the  high  Church  approach,  300; 
spiritual  character  of,  301 ;  author- 
ity, 302 

Church,  Presbyterian  Approach,  Rev. 
John  Kelman,  219-245;  relation  be- 
tween science  and  religion,  222,  225  ; 
divines  hostile  to  scientific  advance, 
228 ;  divines  and  liberty  of  thought, 
231  ;  unflinching  champion  of  po- 
litical liberty,  231 ;  School  of  Rec- 
onciliation, 236;  inspiration,  240; 
reconciliation  of  science  and  faith, 
244;  the  newer  conception  of  the 
Bible,  244 ;  science  and  religion 
need  no  reconciliation,  244;  "The 
facts  are  God's  facts,"  244;  the  past 
a  controversy  of  misunderstanding, 
245 

Church  of  Rome  Approach,  Mr.  Wil- 
frid Ward,  304-323 ;  the  province 
of  science,  304;  religion  a  combi- 
nation of  speculation  and  tradition, 
305;  scientific  development,  310; 
conclusions  of  human  reason,  t>*3) 
achievements  of  human  reason,  316; 

6 


Ind 


ex 


translates  moral  ideas  into  action, 
314;  freedom  of  human  intellect, 
316;  scientific  advance,  317:  guar- 
dian of  the  things  of  the  spirit,  318; 
danger  to  faith,  31 S;  as  the  "ap- 
proach "  to  a  synthesis  between 
religion  and  science.  319;  preserves 
"deposit "  of  faith,  320 ;  its  attitude 
defended,  321;  materialistic  oppon- 
ents, 322;  hasty  acceptance  of  sci- 
entific speculation,  323 

Cicero,  267 

Clerical  schoolmasters  in  social  science 
ahead  of  their  Fositivist  antagonists, 
176 

Coe  and  the  altruistic  aspect  of  life, 

7i 

Coleridge,  305 

Comte,  120,  129,  135,  136 

Condorcet  on  the  human  mind,  136 

Confucius,  147 

Conservation  of  energy,  8,  9,  97,  100. 

Continuity,  variation  as  well  as  con- 
tinuity in  living  creatures,  59 

Copernicus,  172;  Copernican  theory 
of  mind  and  matter,  97 

Corot,  126 

Cosmos,  self-explanatory,  iS 

Covenanters,  widened  breach  between 
science  and  religion,  229 

Creation,  the  legend  of  six  days,  13; 
and  God,  29,  30;  and  science,  17; 
Mephistophelean  story  of,  157 

Credulity  and  science  and  religion,  220 

Creed,  the,  270 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  selecting  his  Parlia- 
ment, 128 

Culture  of  Existence,  79;  ideals  of 
pecuniary,  120;  deficiency  of  cul- 
ture resources,  100  ;  cultural  differ- 
entiation, 103  ;  groups,  149 

Cuvier,  the  type  system  of,  1S6 


Darwin,  51,  71,  10S, 


172,  186, 


237,  242 
Data,  a  plea  for  differences  of,  274, 

279;  data  of  experience,  305 
Davids,  Professor  Rhys,  147 
Death  and  the  soul,  13;  the  spectacle 

of,  166,  168 
Degeneration,  spiritual,  151 
Deity,  the  existence  of,  16 
Demolins,    M.,  the  expositor   of   the 

larger  influence  of  Le  Play,  1 76 


Denny,   Professor  James,  and   man's 
responsibility  for  the  nature  which 
he  has  inherited,  60 
Descartes,  the  atomic  theory,  82 
Development,  the  human  stage  of,  40 
Dewey,  Professor,  and  race  experience, 

188 
Diderot,  conceptions  of  idealism,  139, 

140 
Difficulties  in  religion,  271 
Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  267 
Diplomacy  and  sociology,  142 
Disease,  diseases,  43;  we  suffer  from 

disease  of  sameness,  278 
Divine  Will,  limitation  of  the,  9 
Dogma,    114;    suspiciousness    of    the 
church  to  novelty  in  exposition  of, 
298,  319 
Doubt,  intellectual,  271 
Doyle,  see  Conan,  quoted,  33 
Drummond,   Professor  H.  and  altru- 
ism, 71 ;  and  evolution,  242 

East,  the  reconstruction  of  the  ruined, 
216 

Economics  and  religion,  123 

Educational  Approach,  Professor  P. 
Geddes,  170-207 

Educational  Approach,  Technical, 
Professor  P.  Geddes,  207-216 

Education,  common  ideals,  170;  polit- 
ical ideals,  129;  French  schools, 
171;  Church  schools,  173;  English 
Educational  Office,  181  ;  United 
States,  Commissioner  of,  1S0  ;  the 
teacher,  192;  real  essential  of,  182; 
and  Nature,  184  ;  biology,  186;  re- 
awakening in,  18S,  206  ;  the  synthetic 
view  of,  1 89  ;  co-ordination  of,  196  ; 
science,  194,  205,  309;  Oriental  and 
Western,  198;  gardening,  208;  box 
making,  209 ;  payment  for  school 
and  home  work,  210  ;  Sunday,  213  ; 
parents,  309 

Elizabeth,  reign  of  Queen,  the  King- 
dom of  Christ  in  England,  261  ;  the 
"  spacious  "  age  of  Elizabeth,  266  ; 
produced  the  most  Catholic-minded 
divine  of  the  English  Church,  267 

Emerson,  126 

England,  Church  of,  see  Church  of 
England  Approaches 

Encyclopedists,  223 

Energy,  83,  89  ;  the  dissipation  of,  29 


327 


Ind 


ex 


Epictetus,  freedom  lays  in  the  mind 

itself,  193 
Equality,  175 
Erasmus,  126 
Erastianism  and  Latitudinarianism  are 

old  allies,  298 
"Essays  and  Reviews,"  15 
Ethical  Approach,  An,  Hon.  Bertrand 

Russell,  157-169 
Eucharist,  the,  294 
Euclidean  system,  98 
Evil,  and  Christianity,  163 
Evolution,  18,  26,  27,  61,  62,  63,  64, 

205,   242,   243;    ethical   aspects   of 

organic,   6S;  a   materialised   ethical 

process,  73;  of  social  groups,  124; 

and  Genesis,  237,  311 

Facts  of  science,  God's  facts,  242 

Failures,  necessary  for  the  race,  39 

Faith,  the  field  of  enquiry  must  be 
mapped,  279 ;  faith  healing,  197  ; 
presuppositions  upon  which  faith 
in  the  Church  rests,  283  :  the  divorce 
of  faith  from  science,  308 ;  danger 
to  faith  from  irresponsible  specula- 
tion, 314;  deposit  of,  317,  318,  320; 
the  enquiry  of,  279 

Fall,  the,  of  man,  17  ;  a  perennial 
event,  151;  the  abandonment  of 
thought  for  impulse,  296 

Fate,  163,  165,  168 

Fechner  and  quantitative  equivalence, 
92 

Finance  and  the  Vatican,  131 

Financiering,  119,  120 

Fiske,  and  altruism,  71 

Flint,  Dr.,  on  the  war  between  super- 
stition and  reason,  222;  "so  long 
as  men's  beliefs  as  to  things  were 
regulated  not  by  evidence  but  by 
authority,  there  could  be  no  science,' ' 
241 ;  the  book  of  Nature,  a  book  of 
revelation,  242,  243 

Force,  shall  we  worship,  161 

Formalism,  mathematical,  11 1;  for- 
malists,  115 

Frederick  the  Great,  working  like  a 
galley  slave,  129 

Freedom,  Stoic,  162 ;  modern  ideal 
of,  in  a  National  Church,  266 

French  Revolution,  233,  234 

French  schools,  175,  176,  177 

Froebelians,  18S 


Galileo,  82,  172,  311 

Galton,  Francis,  203 

Gardening  and  Education,  208 

Geddes,  Professor  P.,  A  Biological 
Approach,  49-80;  An  Educational 
Approach,  170-207;  A  Technical 
Approach,  207-216;  on  altruism, 
171;  and  social  groups,  105 

Genesis,  the  book  of,  15  ;  and  evolution, 
237 

Genius  and  science,  36 

German  educational  professors,  174 

Gilliatt  in  "  Lcs  Travaillcurs  de  la 
Mer,"  302 

Glennie,  J.  Stuart,  147 

Gnosticism  and  Catholic  theology,  315 

God  —  and  man,  101;  does  He  work 
without  agents,  42;  a  scientific,  39; 
how  His  will  done  on  earth,  255 

Goethe,  126,  157 

Goodness,  shall  we  worship,  161 

Gospels  give  man  new  reality  of  re- 
sponsibility, 253 

Gravitation,  the  law  of,  17 

Guidance,  theology  vaguely  assumes, 
science  sees  it  not  at  all,  36,  37 

Haeckel,  the  protogenes  of,  84 

Haldane,  Dr.  J.  S.,  the  vitalistic  posi- 
tion, 55 

Hand,  Rev.  J.  E.,  Preface  and  Intro- 
duction 

Harnack  on  Catholic  Theology  and 
Gnosticism,  315 

Harvey  and  the  circulation  of  the  blood, 

53 

Heathen  types,  152 

Hegel,  definition  of  philosophy,  97;  an 
idealist  of  the  historical  group,  135 

Hellenism  of  the  Gnostics,  315 

Herder  and  evolutionary  processes, 
135 

Heredity,  the  doctrine  of,  58 

High  Churchmanship,  what  it  stands 
for,  286 

History,  ideals  of,  135;  statisticians, 
132;  historical  formalists,  132;  ideal- 
ists, 135;  historians,  types  of,  132 

Hobbes,  86,  298 

Hokusai  and  artistic  education,  209 

Holiness  as  ideal  synthesis,  154 

Holland,  Mrs.  Mary  Sibylla  and  the 
Belief,  270 

Home  work,  payment  for,  210 


328 


Ind 


ex 


Hooker,  108;  the  most  Catholic-minded 
divine  of  the  English  Church,  267 

Hugh  of  Saint  Victor,  267 

Hutchinsonians,  240 

Huxley,  13,  69,  186,  and  Hugh  Miller, 
236,  237 

Ideal  school  of  educational  art,  192, 
of  organised  culture,   190 

Ideals,  biology,  74,  jy  ;  of  pecuniary 
culture,  120;  education,  170;  of  the 
East,  199;  history,  135;  industry, 
107,  121;  perfection,  161;  the  power 
of,  249;  necessary  to  the  race,  251  ; 
religion,  154,  204,  246;  science,  •/y; 
107,  no,  150,  246,  301  ;  social,  148; 
men  of  science,  247;  modern  ideal 
of  freedom  in  a  national  Church, 
266 ;  moral,  and  Church  of  Rome,  314 

Idealism,  Spinoza's,  140;  religious  gen- 
esis of,  147;  in  the  universities,  152; 
common  interests  of,  152;  practical 
policy  of,  154;  the  insight  of  crea- 
tive, 165 

Idealistic  social  alliances,  152 

Idealists  and  formalists,  115  ;  literary, 
126;  political,  128;  philosophical, 
138 

Idolatry,  in  politics,  12S;  of  scientists, 

Incommensurate  realities,  269 

India,  realisation  of  the  good,  197 

Industrial  types,  121;  industry  and 
science,  107 

Inheritance,  variation  as  well  as  con- 
tinuity in,  59 

Inorganic  material  and  life,  20;  pro- 
cesses, 56 

Inquisition,  tales  of  the  wickedness  of 
the,  264 

Intelligence  not  wholly  inaccessible, 
and  yet  not  familiarly  accessible,  38 

Introduction,  editor's,  general  purpose 
of  volume 

Iren?eus,  Saint,  314 

Israelites,  the  creed  of  the  old,  and  Mr. 
Huxley,  13 

James,  Henry,  his  person  of  experi- 
ence, 278 

James,  Professor  W.,  and  measure- 
ment, 92;  bankruptcy  of  Natural 
Theology,  68 ;  Christian  Science, 
197;  "Talks  to  Teachers,"  188 


Japan,  her  world  pre-eminent  recogni- 
tion of  the  Good,  199 

Jefferson  striving  to  unite  political  phil- 
osophy with  practical  administra- 
tion, 129 

Jesuit  schools,  178 

Jesus  Christ  and  suffering,  32  ;  to  the 
Lord  that  we  pray,  42 ;  rustic  la- 
bour, 216;  the  perfect  King,  and 
also  the  perfect  people,  253;  the 
mastery  of,  284;  God  manifest  in 
the  flesh,  299;  the  Church  the  end 
of  our  Lord's  ministry,  288 

Jew,  the,  and  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
264 

Job,  God's  answer  to,  160 

John,  Saint,  quoted,  275 

Jurisprudence,  a  methodological  con- 
vention of,   127 

Kant,  135,  251,  277 

Kelvin,  an  example  of  cultural  differ- 
entiation, 10S 

Kingdom  of  Christ,  and  the  Roman 
Empire,  255-259;  the  Gospel  of 
the,  253 ;  tendencies  to  limit  the 
scope  of,  258  ;  in  England,  261  ;  not 
desired  as  a  concrete  reality,  264 

Kipling,  Rudyard,  "  McAndrew's 
Hymn,"  226;  Kim,  307 

Known  and  Unknown,  197 

Knox,  John,  on  Church  government, 
227,  22S 

Kropotkin  on  altruism,  71 

Labour,  division  of,  191 

Laotse,  147 

Latitudinarians,  22S,  298 

Lavoisier,  an  example  of  cultural  dif- 
ferentiation, 108 

Law,  the  law  of  human  life,  98 ;  natu- 
ral law,  S6;  the  reign  of,  25,  35 

Lawyers,  political  formalists,  127 

Lecky  on  Presbyterian  persecutions, 
231 

Leibnitz,  139 

Leisure  vicarious,  119 

Leonardo,  126,  209 

Liberty,  166,  175 

Life,  19,  21,  54,  60,  84,  SS;  and  biol- 
ogy? 52  i  an(i  science,  19;  physico- 
chemical  theories  of,  57 

Lindsay,  Professor  T.  M.,  on  pagan 
science,  224 


329 


Ind 


ex 


Linnaeus,  108,  172 

Lister  and  developments  of  healing, 
198 

Literary  idealists  and  formalists,  126 

Lodge,  Sir  Oliver,  A  Physicist's  Ap- 
proach, 1-48 

Logical  formalism,  in 

Love  and  hate,  70;  golden  light  of 
love,  168 

Lowe,  Robert,  and  payment  by  results, 
177 

Luther,  226,  239,  263 

Magic,  in  relation  to  religion  and  na- 
ture, 197,200;  survivals  of,  149 

Magnus  Albertzts,  314 

Mallock  on  science  and  religion,  221 

Man  and  the  universe,  46,67,  82;  and 
God,  101;  his  origin,  17;  product 
of  the  evolutionary  process,  66;  The 
Free  Man's  Worship,  157;  his  as- 
pirations and  ideals,  159,  162,  1S9; 
his  impotence  before  the  powers  of 
nature,  159;  and  the  forces  of  na- 
ture, 167;  does  not  live  by  reason 
alone,  307;  his  antiquity,  311 

Man,  antiquity  of,  311 

Marner,  Silas,  casting  lots,  306 

Martineau,  Dr.,  on  science  and  religion, 
221 

Materialism,  244,  250 ;  theory  of  the 
universe,  Sy ;  dogmatic,  2S1;  and 
the  reality  of  the  spirit,  284 

Mathematical  conceptions,  98;  formal- 
ism, in 

Matter,  26,  84,  97 

Maynard,  Miss,  ideals  of  civilisation, 
culture  and  philanthropy,  220 

Measurement  and  physical  explana- 
tion, 91 

Mechanical  theory,  53;  philosophers, 
92 

Medical  science,  Western,  198 

Melancthon,  126 

Mental  states  have  a  quantitative  as- 
pect, 92 

Metaphysical  and  physical  enquiries 
must  be  kept  distinct,  280;  but 
neither  are  to  be  suppressed,  282 

Metchnikoff,  196 

Method  of  divine  government,  21 

Methodological  convention,  1 10  ;  meth- 
odology of  non-scientific  groups,  114 

Metternich,  177 


Miller,  Hugh,  and  the  school  of  Recon- 
ciliation, 244 

Mill,  J.  S.,  86,  130 

Militarism,  the  creed  of,  162 

Mind,  the,  93,  95,  97 ;  as  an  adjunct 
of  the  brain,  90 

Miracles,  16,  244 

Missionary,  work  and  broadening  of 
the  theological  outlook,  234 ;  the 
Irish  Missionaries,  302 

Modern  specialism,  191 

Moral  ideals  and  the  Church  of  Rome, 

3X4 

Morley,  John,  on  the  great  Puritan 
chiefs,  231 

Moses,  184,  236;  purifications  of,  198 

Muirhead,  Professor  John  H.,  A  Psy- 
chological Approach,  81-102 

Miinsterberg,  Professor,  and  mechan- 
ics of  mind,  93 

Myth,  survivals  of,  149 

National  Church,  261,  263,  266, 
268 

Nature,  Uniformity  of,  25;  adapta- 
tion of  the  forces  of,  45;  the  book 
of,  242 ;  the  continuity  of,  84  ;  unity 
of,  84;  laws  of,  99;  man's  impotence 
before  the  power  of,  159;  the  forces 
of,  167;  and  education,  184;  the 
mastery  of,  216;  the  strategy  of, 
70;  natural  laws,  86;  "  Naturphilos- 
ophie,"  1S8;  naturalistic  explana- 
tion of  the  universe,  88  ;  the  normal 
course  of,  30S ;  church  follows  the 
path  of,  314;  the  book  of  Nature 
the  text-book  of  divine  revelation, 
242 

Newman,  Cardinal,  305,  315 

New  Testament,  see  Bible 

Newton,  33,  228,  240 

Nietzsche  and  worship  of  force,  161 

Nonconformity,  262;  non-conformist 
ideal  changes  in  the  conception  of 
Christ's  kingdom,  263;  the  sin  of 
leaving  the  national  Church,  264; 
Non-conformity  and  the  national 
Church,  265,  266 

Obscurantists,  274 

Occupations,  honorific  and   humilific, 

118 
Okakura,  "  Ideals  of  the  East,"  198 
Oken,  the  teachings  of,  1S8 


Index 


Opposition  of  fact  and  ideal,  162 
Organic  development,  313 
Origin,  the  subtleties  of,  239 
Owen,  Robert,  and  idealism,  130 

Pain,  the  endurance  of,  166 

Pantheism,  different  kinds  of,  31 

Parents  and  education,  309 

Parker,  Colonel,  the  training  of 
teachers,  188 

Past,  the  magical  past  does  not  change, 
167 

Pasteur,  10S,  196,  198 

Paul,  Saint,  quoted,  275 

Pearson,  Karl,  whether  life  is  mechan- 
ism, 56;  a  naturalist  of  all  special- 
isms, 203 

Pestalozzi  and  education,  188 

Philo  Judaeus,  267 

Philosophy,  6,  85,  100,  137,  13S,  139, 
247,  314;  and  the  Christian  Church, 
315;  no  fresh  thought  received  as 
such,  277 

Physical  interference,  41 ;  causa- 
tion and  conceptions,  86,  91 ;  meta- 
physical enquiries  must  be  kept 
distinct,  2S0;  but  not  suppressed, 
282 

Physicist's  Approach,  A,  Sir  Oliver 
Lodge,  1-48 

Planets,  bodily  existence  on  other 
planets  is  probable,  38 

Plato,  his  philosophic  revelation,  the 
triad  of  good  and  beautiful  and  true, 
199 

Pliny  the  younger,  the  political  ideal 
on  its  negative  side,  130 

Poetry,  a  reconciling  element  to  reli- 
gion, 6 

Policeman,  a  political  formalist,  127 

Political  types   and  ideals,   126,    129; 


politics   and   relij 


politics 


and  natural  selection,  127 
Power,  submission  to  power,  the  gate 

of  wisdom,  164 
Prayer,  8,   13,  21,  35,  40,  43,  44,  47, 

244;  Prayerbook,  299 
Preface,  Rev.  J.  E.  Hand 
Presbyterian  Approach,  A.,  Rev.  John 

Kelman,  219-245 
Presbyterian      Church,    see     Church 

Presbyterian 
Priest,   priestcraft,  and  religion,   104; 

and   women,    131;    priestly  types, 


143;    primary  religious  revolution, 

149 
Protoplasm,  19,  20,  53 
Psychic  Lift  of  the  Race,  the  Great, 

x47 
Psychological  Approach,  A,  Professor 

John  H.  Muirhead,  81-102 
Psychology,  85,  89,  101,  and  religion, 

93,  *01  ,  ... 

Ptolomy  obscurantism  in  science,  172 
Puritanism,  Sir  Walter  Scott  on,  230; 

tendencies  to  limit  the  Kingdom  of 

God,  258;  Ruskinon,  259 

Quality  of  Race  to-morrow,  201 
Quantity  of  Empire  to-day,  201 

Race,  the  Great  Psychic  Lift  of  the 
Race   achieved  by  the   Priesthood, 

Ram  and  prayer,  8 

Rainy,  Principal,  on  Presbyterian  lib- 
erty of  thought,  230 

Reason,  human,  and  the  Church  of 
Rome,  316 

Receptive,  let  us  be  more,  279 

Reconciliation  of  Science  and  Reli- 
gion, Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  24-48 

Redemption  and  Science,  151 

Reformation,  period  of  the,  226,  232, 

244>  259 

Religion  and  Science,  the  Outstand- 
ing Controversy,  Sir  Oliver  Lodge, 
2-23 

Religion  and  the  Census  Reports,  104 ; 
economics,  123  ;  philosophy,  1,  39  ; 
politics,  131  ;  priestcraft,  104;  psy- 
chology, 93,  1 01  ;  stronger  to-day 
than  any  period  since  Reformation, 
85  ;  the  conflict  with  science,  81, 
123,  244;  and  secular  sciences,  308; 
sociology,  143;  Spinoza,  140;  of 
snobbery,  148;  a  combination  of 
speculation  and  tradition,  305 ;  a 
scientific  religious  creed  impossible, 
306;  difficulties  in,  271 

Religions,  a  civil  war  of,  264 

Religious  ceremonial,  144,  145,  146, 
149;  belief,  the  faculty  may  be  lost, 
309 ;  idealism,  147 ;  opposition  to 
riches,  122  ;  and  scientific  aims  con- 
trasted, 12  ;  revolution,  the  primary, 
14S 

Renaissance,  the  sound  side  of,  267 


33l 


Index 


Responsibility,  Is  a  man  responsible 
for  the  nature  which  he  has  in- 
herited? 60 

Restoration,  period  of  the,  230 

Romance,  201 

Roman  Empire,  the  Kingdom  of 
Christ  and  the,  255,  259 

Romanes,  and  nature,  63 

Rome,  Church  of,  see  Church 

Rome,  Church  of  Approach,  Mr. 
Wilfrid  Ward,  304-323 

Roux  and  biological  science,  196 

Royce,  on  natural  selection,  101 

Ruskin,  57,  73,  259 

Russell,  Hon.  Bertrand  Russell,  An 
Ethical  Approach,  157-169 

Sahara,  the  reclamation  of  the,  215 

Saints  and  seers,  distrust  of  the  quest 
for  cold  hard  truth,  5  ;  there  is  more 
nearly  an  orthodox  science  than 
there  is  an  orthodox  theology,  4; 
the  outline  of  modern  science 
known,   5 

Schleiermacher's  renovation  of  the- 
ology,  141 

Schools,  173;  French  school,  171; 
English  Church,  2S2 

Science,  and  creation,  17;  Christian 
thought,  312;  and  faith,  1-22;  an- 
tagonism between  science  and  faith, 
24,  308,  312;  and  the  Bible,  310; 
redemption,  151;  religion,  81,  207, 
219,  220,  241,  244,  306;  theology, 
4,  312;  religion  in  the  Presbyterian 
Church,  222 ;  the  true  province  of, 
305 ;  corrects  illusions,  305 ;  the 
Church,  270,  317;  education,  194, 
205,  309;  industry,  107;  sociology, 
114  ;  defects  of  modern  science,  112; 
dogma  of  modern  science,  114; 
Christian  science  and  Professor 
James,  197;  ideals  of,  yy,  154,  301; 
dissects  more  than  it  constructs, 
76 

Scientific  atmosphere  and  a  religious 
man,  12;  scientific  development  and 
the  Church  of  Rome,  310,  320 ;  the 
Presbyterian  Church,  244;  scien- 
tific man  and  the  Bible,  251  ;  meth- 
ods, 112;  a  scientific  synthesis,  319, 
321;  scientists,  types  of,  114 

Scott,  Sir  Walter,  on  the  Covenanters, 
229 


Sectarianism  less  marked  in  science 
than  theology,  5 

Selection,  36 

Sense  of  things,  elemental,  Editor's 
Intioduction 

Servetus,  225 

Shakespeare's  breadth  of  sympathy  in 
his  plays,  268 

Shaw,  Bernard,  202 

Sins,  failures,  mistakes,  —  yes,  they  ex- 
ist; evolution  would  be  meaningless 
if  perfection  were  already  attained,  39 

Smith,  Adam,  108,  235 

Smith,  Robertson,  185 

Social  alliances,  ideal,  152 

Social  groups,  evolution  of,  124 

Social  groups,  105 

Social  ideals,  genesis  of,  125,  148 

Social  studies,  the  renewal  of,  187 

Sociological  Approach,  A,  Mr.  V.  V. 
Branford,  103-156;  group  and  com- 
munitary  interests,  105;  society,  156 

Sociology  and  diplomacy,  142;  and 
religion,  143,  204,235;  science,  114; 
the  Church,  221;  the  birth  of,  in 
1776,  235 

Socrates,  his  communion  with  the  all- 
pervading  mystery  of  the  universe, 

138 

Soul,  the  idea  of  soul  as  substance, 
90;  not  intruded  into  the  unity  of 
the  heritage,  59 ;  and  the  outer 
world,  167;  God's  relationship  to 
it,  284 

Spencer,  Herbert,  70,  120,  135,  13S, 
172,  1S6 

Spinoza,  his  declaration  that  religious 
ideals  must  expand  with  the  growth 
of  knowledge,  139,  141 ;  service  to 
religion,  140 

Spiritual  degeneration,  151;  matters, 
our  faculty  for  receiving  new  truth 
is  blunted,  274,  279 

State  schools,  172 

Statistics  and  history,  132 

Stoic  freedom  in  which  wisdom  con- 
sists, 162 

Stokes,  Sir  G.  G.,  the  mathematical 
power  and  knowledge  of,  33 

Stout,  Professor,  and  the  external 
world,  96 

Struggle  for  existence,  72 

Stylists,  the,  manifest  as  Formalists, 
126 


332 


Ind 


ex 


Suffering  of  Jesus  Christ,  32;  by  suf- 
fering Christ's  Kingdom  is  spread, 
263;  by  suffering  that  we  conquer, 
266 

"Suggestive,"  the  abuse  of  the  word, 
276 

Sunday  and  freedom  from  week-day 
lessons,  214 

Superstition,  197,  316 

Symbolism,  an  ever  renascent,  206 

Sympathy,  to  lighten  sorrow  by,  168 

Technical  Approach,  A,  Professor 
Patrick  Geddes,  207-216 

Temporal  and  spiritual  power,  132; 
differences  of  opinion  on  important 
issues,  4;  not  yet  had  its  Newton, 

34 
Theological  renascence,  the  nineteenth 

century,  141 
Theology  and  biology,  49,  50,  52,  74; 

and  evolution,  62,  63;  science,  312; 

Schleiermacher's  renovation  of,  141  ; 

scholastic,  223 
Thomas,  Saint,' and  Richard  Hooper, 

267 
Thomson,  Professor  J.  Arthur,  A  Bio- 
logical Approach,  49-80 
Time,  the  purifying  fire  of,  168 
Titian  and  technical  education,  209 
Toleration,  its  moral  value,  263 
Trajan,    his   political   ideal   stated   to 

Pliny,  130 
Truth,   our    faculty   for    receiving    is 

blunted,  274 
Turgot  and  political  idealism,  130 
Tyndall  on  disturbance  of  natural  law, 

8 ;  address  to  British  Association  in 

1874  quoted,  84;  a  believer  in   the 

ultimate   reducibility   of   mental    to 

atomic  changes,  91 

Unification  of  religious  scientific 
ideals,  154 

United  States  Commissioners  of  Edu- 
cation, 180 

Universe,  11,  17,  21,  23,  26,  29,  46, 
82,  S7  ;  a  scientific  synthesis  which 
forgets  religion,  the  real  danger,  320 


Universities  and  idealism,  152 

Variation  as  well  as  continuity  in  in- 
heritance, 59 

Vatican,  the,  its  finances  in  sound  or- 
der, 131 

Veblin,  Thorstein,  the  psychological 
types  classified  by,  120 

Vicarious  leisure,  119 

Vico,  an  idealist  of  the  historical  group, 

*35 
Vitalism,  53,  55 
Volition,  the  doctrine  of,  94 
Voltaire  and  the   "Illumination"  in 

France,  232 
Von  Baer,  the  embryology  of,  186 


Waggett,  Rev.  P.  N.,  The  Church 

as  Seen  from  Outside,  269-303 
Wagner,  126 
Wallace,   A.   R.,   and  man's   highest 

qualities,  67 
Ward,  Mr.  Wilfrid,  A  Church  of  Rome 

Approach,  304-323 
Waste,  conspicuous,  119 
Waves,  18;  experiments  on,  34 
Welby,  V.  Lady,  Editor's  Introduction 
Wells,  Mr.  H.  G.,  137,  202,  247 
Weltanschauung,  304 
White,   Gilbert,  found  Nature  in  his 

garden,  184 
Wind,  the  Italian,  and  natural  law,  8 ; 

and  blaze  of  sun,  18 
Witchcraft  in  Scotland,  228 
Women  and  priests,  131 
Wordsworth  and  physical  phenomena, 

101 
World,  an  alien  and  inhuman,  159;  the 

external,    96;    may   be    more    than 

lumps  and  shakes,  279 
Worship  only  the  God  created  by  our 

own  love  of  the  good,  162 

Zola  sees  nearer  facts  of  life  than  poli- 
tician, 202 

Zoroaster,  his  constructive  intensity, 
215 


333 


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